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Abstract 
 This thesis explores how the metaphysical concept of participation shapes and 
informs Richard Hooker’s apology for the Elizabethan Settlement in Of the Lawes of 
Ecclesiastical Polity. While scholars have long noted the presence of participatory language 
in selected passages of Hooker’s Lawes, the implicit ways in which participation structures 
the metaphysical, epistemological, and political arguments across the work have never been 
uncovered or explored. Accordingly, this work shows how Hooker uses the architectural 
framework of ‘participation in God’ in order systematically to build his cohesive vision of the 
Elizabethan Church. This study shows how Hooker’s account of participation thereby 
deflates the range of modern accusations that the Lawe is an incoherent work. It also 
illuminates, critiques, and opens up ecumenical and theological possibilities as part of a 
modern theological ressourcement of participatory metaphysics. 
 This thesis therefore explores the gestures between Hooker’s metaphysics, 
epistemology, and political vision in turn. The thesis first outlines as a heuristic device the 
‘architecture of participation’ (the constituent ideas and themes which make up the polyvalent 
possibilities of the term) through which Hooker’s thought can be best understood. In the 
second chapter, this thesis explores two ‘mini-treatises’ in the Lawes that together reflect 
Hooker’s basic architecture of participation: the suspension of creation from God through the 
system of laws sharing in eternal law; and the redemption of creation through sacramental 
participation in Christ. The third chapter unveils how Hooker’s architecture of participation 
establishes a certain homology between his ontology and subsequent epistemology. As 
Hooker responds to his opponents in the Lawes, reason and desire emerge from the 
architecture of participation to become the constellating categories for a mixed cognitive 
ecology which circumscribes both natural and supernatural forms of cognitive participation in 
God. The fourth chapter investigates how the last three so-called ‘books of power’ in the 
Lawes represent a closing movement from the ‘general meditations’ of earlier books to the 
disputed ‘particular decisions’ of the Tudor polity, namely episcopacy and lay ecclesiastical 
supremacy. The chapter explains how the architecture of participation yields the substructure 
upon which Hooker constructs his political ecclesiology. The closing chapter addresses 
directly the opening provocations, arguing that Hooker’s architecture of participation 
provides a series of related gestures showing the logical and coherent connections in his 
thought that make him a systematic theologian of a particular type.
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A Note on References to the Works of Richard Hooker 
 All quotations are taken from the modern, seven-volume Folger edition of Hooker’s 
works: W. Speed Hill, ed., The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker 
(volumes 1-5, Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977-90; 6, Binghamton: Belknap Press, 1993; 7, 
Tempe: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1998).  
 This thesis uses a dual reference system for the Lawes designed to aid those readers 
who only have access to Keble’s widely available nineteenth-century edition, and takes the 
following format: volume number in the Folger edition followed by page and line numbers, 
plus Hooker’s note number, where relevant; followed by Keble’s section number. For 
example: Lawes, 1:73.8-10; I.5.2. This thesis also uses the following abbreviations for works 
of (or works directly related to) Hooker: 
A Christian Letter A Christian Letter of Certaine English Protestantes…unto 
that Reverend and Learned Man Maister R. Hoo[ker] 
Autograph Notes Autograph Notes to the Christian Letter 
Answer Answer to the Supplication 
Certaintie A Learned and Comfortable Sermon of the Certaintie and 
Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect 
Dublin Fragments The Dublin Fragments. Grace and Free Will, the 
Sacraments, and Predestination 
FLE Folger Library Edition 
Jude The Sermons Upon Part of S. Judes Epistle 
Justification A Learned Discourse of Justification, Workes, and How the 
Foundation of Faith is Overthrowne 
Lawes Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie 
Predestination Notes toward a Fragment on Predestination 
Pride A Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride 
Reference to other theological works follows the standard convention used throughout this 
thesis, whereby the full reference is given in the first use, followed by a shortened version 
thereafter.
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A Note on Theological Labels 
 This study uses five terms that require some brief explanation and apology: ‘puritan’, 
‘Anglican’, ‘Reformed’, ‘Reformed orthodoxy’, and ‘Reformed scholasticism’. In relation to 
the first two of these terms, the once traditional binary of ‘puritan’ and ‘Anglican’, as Nigel 
Voak points out, is in many ways no longer satisfying, helpful, or edifying.1  
 On the one hand, the label ‘puritan’ creates an illusory sense that there was ever a 
monolithic group to whom the label could be applied in any crisp or definitive way. Yet the 
term is at least contemporaneous, remains in almost ubiquitous scholarly use, and so cannot 
be lightly displaced, as William Haugaard recognizes.2 As Peter Lake has eloquently 
developed, however, greater nuance and precision is therefore required without simply 
abandoning a familiar label. As a good starting point, this study affirms Lake’s careful 
definition of ‘puritan’, and the corresponding idea that ‘conformist’ might be a more useful 
pairing than ‘Anglican’. Lake offers the following definition: 
In what follows ‘presbyterian’ will be used to refer to those men who can be shown to 
have espoused or defended the presbyterian platform of government. The term 
‘puritan’ is used to refer to a broader span of opinion, encompassing those advanced 
protestants who regarded themselves as ‘the godly’, a minority of true believers in an 
otherwise lukewarm or corrupt mass. It is therefore used as a term of degree, or 
relative religious zeal rather than as a clear-cut party label. Thus, while all 
presbyterians were puritans, not all puritans were presbyterians and the use adopted 
here is designed to reflect that. The term ‘conformist’ is used to refer not to all those 
who can in some sense be said to have conformed to the rites and ceremonies of the 
English church, but only to those men who chose to make a polemical fuss about the 
issues of church government and ceremonial conformity and who sought to stigmatize 
as puritans those less enthusiastic about such issues than themselves.3 
                                                          
1 Nigel Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology: A Study of Reason, Will, and 
Grace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. xvi-xviii. 
2 William Haugaard, ‘Preface’, in FLE, 6.1:10 n.13. 
3 Peter Lake, Anglicans & Puritans? Presbyterian and English Conformist Thought 
from Whitgift to Hooker (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p.7. 
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As Lake observes, labels such as ‘puritan’ often hide a variety of opinions.4 ‘Puritans’ were 
often at the centre of the establishment and so were not all advocates of radical institutional 
reform. Lake therefore prefers the term ‘presbyterian’ to describe advanced protestants, and 
yet others opt for another contemporaneous term (namely ‘precisian’) to name the advanced 
protestant tendency towards seeking a precise biblical mandate for all human actions.5 This 
study takes on board Lake’s central idea that ‘puritan’ covers a broad spectrum, but also 
acknowledges that the broad label ‘puritan’ remains such a feature of academic scholarship 
that it is not easily displaced. As such, while noting the historical and interpretative limits of 
the label, this thesis will use the phrase ‘radical puritan’ to describe people such as Thomas 
Cartwright and Walter Travers, to whom Hooker was responding. This label suggests the 
radical degree of religious zeal within a looser puritan sensibility, emphasizing not only 
biblicism but also presbyteral governance in ways that implicitly threatened the legal basis 
and established practices of the Elizabethan ecclesiastical polity. 
 On the other hand, ‘Anglican’ is clearly an anachronistic label to try to stick on 
Hooker, and cannot defensibly be used to describe the period before 1660; it certainly never 
could be used to describe the reality of the Church of England before 1642.6 Yet, once again, 
it is still commonly used as a ubiquitous (if regrettably anachronistic) term in the modern 
academic study of Hooker. Unlike the label ‘puritan’, however, this study will only use the 
label in relation to these modern studies as they deploy the term. Even if Hooker is, as some 
claim, the founding father of ‘Anglicanism’, he would not know what this meant, and it is a 
difficult phenomenon to define adequately or meaningfully.7 
                                                          
4 Lake, Anglicans & Puritans?, pp. 4-8, 25-26. 
5 For example, see W. Bradford Littlejohn, Richard Hooker: A Companion to His Life 
and Work (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2015), pp. 35-40. See also Theodore Dwight Bozeman, The 
Precisianist Strain: Disciplinary Religion and Antinomian Backlash in Puritanism to 1638 
(The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), pp. 3-10. 
6 See Michael A Brydon, The Evolving Reputation of Richard Hooker. An 
Examination of Responses 1600-1714 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 1-20, 81-
122. 
7 See Mark D. Chapman, Sathianathan Clarke, & Martyn Percy, eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of Anglican Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 1-20, 77-91. 
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 This study therefore uses three labels that more accurately reflect the unique character 
of Hooker, as well as the context in which he found himself writing. These are ‘Reformed’, 
‘Reformed orthodoxy’, and ‘Reformed scholasticism’. The label ‘Reformed’ is now typically 
preferred to ‘Calvinist’, taking into account, as it does, that the Reformed stream of theology 
found its origin not merely in Calvin but in other reforming contemporaries.8 ‘Reformed 
orthodoxy’ refers, then, to the natural attempts from the mid-sixteenth century onwards to 
codify and systematize the theology of the early reformers such as Zwingli, Bucer, Calvin, 
Luther, Melancthon, Vermigli, and Cranmer. Willem van Asselt and Pieter Rouwendal 
therefore write that: 
This period continued into the 17th and 18th centuries. With regard to the 
original meaning, various nuances can be discerned in the term. In the sense 
of “the right doctrine” or “opinion,” the word refers to a certain content, 
which was to be defended in confrontation with deviating views. Here, the 
term orthodoxy formulates a strong linkage between systematic theology and 
ecclesiastical confessions.9 
‘Reformed scholasticism’ describes one tendency within Reformed orthodoxy to codify and 
systematize reformed thought. Van Asselt and Rouwendal suggest four distinctive 
characteristics of ‘Reformed scholasticism’, a term which: ‘(1) refers to the academic 
theology of the schools (2) as practiced in the period of orthodoxy, (3) using scholastic 
method in the exposition of doctrine and (4) in content, is bound to the Reformed 
confessions.’10  As this thesis will show, these three terms (Reformed, orthodox, scholastic) 
together best describe Hooker’s theological identity.
                                                          
8 Willem J. van Asselt, ed., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2011), p.8. See also Herman J. Selderhuis, ed., A 
Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 1-7, 11-27. 
9 Van Asselt, Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, pp. 5-6. 
10 Van Asselt, Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, p. 9. 
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1. ‘The participation of God himselfe’: Hooker and the Recovery of Participation 
1.1 Introduction 
Every political vision assumes an epistemology, a way of looking at and 
understanding the world, which in turn is buttressed by some kind of ontology, a claim about 
what, how, and why the world is. In Richard Hooker’s Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, 
the metaphysical language of participation forms the architectural framework through which 
he builds his rebuttal of ‘them that seeke (as they tearme it) the reformation of Laws, and 
orders Ecclesiastical, in the Church of England’.1 Hooker purposes to move from ‘general 
meditations’ to the ‘particular decisions’ that govern the Elizabethan Religious Settlement but 
which have proved contentious.2 In his initial general meditations, ‘law’ acts as Hooker’s 
controlling image, an architectural blueprint through which Hooker will parse subsequent 
particular points of controversy over the role and interpretation of Scripture, the Book of 
Common Prayer, and ultimately the nature of the Elizabethan Church with its bishops and lay 
ecclesiastical supremacy. For Hooker, all things ‘do work, after a sort, according to law’, and 
such laws direct creatures to their perfective formal end.3 Through this legal entelechy, 
Hooker perceives that the root issue behind the religious controversy of his age is whether or 
not the Elizabethan Religious Settlement has the character of such law. In the move from the 
general to the particular, then, a legal ontology undergirds a particular epistemology, out of 
which arises Hooker’s apology for the political structures of the Elizabethan Church itself. 
Early on within his general account of law, Hooker crucially claims that, through formal 
laws, ‘all things in the worlde are saide in some sort to seeke the highest, and to covet more 
or lesse the participation of God himselfe.’4 For Hooker, the metaphysics of participation 
describe how creation relates to the divine Creator: creation consists of participatory and 
teleological bodies, both physical and social, that are legally ordered within a cosmic 
hierarchy and which desire to share analogically in the divine nature. If ‘law’ lays out a 
formal metaphysical blueprint, ‘participation in God’ emerges as its living, dynamic 
architecture that generates and illuminates the edifice of Hooker’s subsequent 
                                                          
1 Hooker, Lawes, 1:1.2-4; Pref.1.1. 
2 Hooker, Lawes, 1:57.29-32; I.1.2. 
3 Hooker, Lawes, 1:58.32-33; I.2.1. 
4 Hooker, Lawes, 1:73.8-10; I.5.2.  
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epistemological and political claims. For Hooker, participation in God represents the final 
end sought throughout the becoming cosmos. 
Accordingly, this work will show how Hooker uses an architectural framework based 
on the notion of ‘participation in God’ in order to build a systematic and coherent 
metaphysical, epistemological, and political vision of the Elizabethan Church as a contingent 
and yet fitting instrument through which English believers can share in the life of God. As 
prolegomena to the study of the role of participation in Hooker’s Lawes, this initial chapter 
first outlines as a heuristic device the ‘architecture of participation’ (the constituent ideas and 
themes which make up the polyvalent possibilities of the term), as well as the general 
ecumenical retrieval of ‘participation’ and ‘deification’ in contemporary theological 
discourse (1.2). This will help set the context for how Hooker understands the concept of 
participation, as well as the ecumenical and political debates to which his work may still be 
able to speak. Next, this opening chapter turns to the idea of participation as it occurs within 
Hooker’s Lawes (1.3). This final section illustrates the kind of exegetical challenges to the 
system and coherence of Hooker’s thought on participation, defines what these key terms 
mean, and suggests how participation promises to act as the dynamic architecture around 
which Hooker builds his various ontological, epistemological, and political claims in a 
coherent and systematic manner. 
1.2 The Ecumenical Retrieval of ‘Participation in God’ 
When the modern reader hears Hooker claim that through the Incarnation ‘God hath 
deified our nature’, and that legal and sacramental participation in Christ variously draws 
people into ‘the participation of divine nature’, it evokes the problems and possibilities 
around the recent ecumenical retrievals of participation and deification.5 Before turning, 
however, to the broad nexus of ideas and sources that together circumscribe an ‘architecture 
of participation’ (and then to the modern ecumenical rediscoveries of such concepts) it is first 
worth exploring what participation and deification mean in general in order to see how they 
are related. 
 
                                                          
5 Hooker, Lawes, 1:73.8-10; 2:224.14-15; 2:238.18; I.5.2; V.54.5; V.56.7. 
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1.2.1 Defining ‘Participation’ and ‘Deification’ 
At first glance, participation seems to have a straightforward Latin etymology: as 
Aquinas puts it, ‘to participate [participare] is, as it were, to take a part [partem capere].’6 
For Aquinas, however, such Latin also renders an older Greek philosophical notion of 
participation as methexis. As will be shown, unlike the philosophical idea of methexis, the 
Latin etymology of participare threatens to suggest the idea that participation divides some 
simple quality into discrete parts (partem capere). Accordingly, Aquinas quickly extends his 
definition also to state that, ‘when something receives in particular fashion that which 
belongs to another in universal fashion, the former is said to participate in the latter.’ 
Accordingly, Aquinas shifts the still familiar, quotidian notion of participation (as taking a 
part in or of something) towards a more philosophical sense of methexis, which involves an 
asymmetrical relationship between something restricted and contingent with some donating, 
universal source. 
Aquinas therefore accommodates a Platonic account of participation into his notion. 
Plato was the first philosopher to use participation (methexis) in a precise philosophical sense 
in relation to the problem of the many and the one, namely how a contingent 
phenomenological multiplicity relates to some metaphysically simple, unitive, formal 
source.7 For Plato, participation (methexis) expresses the way in which many things can 
warrant the same name without dividing some simple quality into separate parts. The 
etymology of methexis (μέθεξις from μετέχω) indicates that things in the world have an 
ontological dependency on higher spiritual, intellectual realities, and implies plurality, 
similarity, relation and asymmetry all at once.8 Indeed, participation becomes an attempt to 
                                                          
6 Thomas Aquinas, Expositio libri Boetii de Hebdomadibus, 2.24; hereafter 
abbreviated as In De Heb. English translation in An Exposition of the ‘On the Hebdomads’ of 
Boethius, trans. J. Schultz and E. Synan (Washington: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2001), pp. 14-29. 
7 See M. Annice, ‘Historical Sketch of the Theory of Participation’, New 
Scholaticism, 26 (1952), 49-79. 
8 See Fritz-Gregor Hermann, ‘μετέχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν and the Problem of 
Participation in Plato’s Ontology’, Philosophical Inquiry, 25:3-4 (2003), 19-56. See also 
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see the world as, in some sense, drenched with the divine. The root of the term, ἔχω (‘to 
have’) when used with a genitive object indicates the ‘having of,’ in the sense of ‘sharing in’ 
a whole rather than ‘taking’ a part. Thus, many things can be said to share limited possession 
of a whole without dividing it into many discrete, separated parts. Meanwhile, the prefix, 
μετά, means ‘amidst’ and, in compositional words, ‘after’ or ‘in pursuit of’ something else. 
Participation (methexis) is therefore a compound construction suggesting that one thing has 
its own reality only by virtue of sharing in something other than itself and by dynamically 
tending towards that other. Accordingly, Charles Bigger defines Plato’s use of methexis in 
this manner: ‘“Participation” is the name of the “relation” which accounts for the 
togetherness of elements of diverse ontological type in the essential unity of a single instance. 
In this sense it is a real relation, one constitutive of the nexus qua nexus which arises from 
it.’9 For example, one calls something ‘beautiful’ insofar as it participates in the exemplary 
Form of beauty. A beautiful person, then, remains distinct from the ideal Form of beauty but 
participates in that ideality insofar as he or she shares in it. In participatory metaphysics there 
exists a real, constitutive (if asymmetrical) relation between an exemplary, heavenly, 
participable Form and the temporal, embodied participant of that same Form. Plato uses a 
host of other terms in addition to methexis in order to describe this asymmetrical relationship: 
mixis (mixture), symplokē (interweaving), koinōnia (coupling), and mimesis (copying). Yet, 
participation (methexis) has had the most enduring and wide-ranging impact. 
The attendant Platonic idea of imitating God connects the metaphysics of 
participation with ideas about deification, or becoming god-like through assimilation 
(homoiōsis theōi) in some regard.10 Plato understands the ‘divine’ in diverse ways throughout 
his writings, including the gods of mythology, the soul of the world, the intellect that orders 
all things, and the formal philosophical notion of ‘the Good’ as the fullness of being. In the 
dialogue Timaeus, for example, Plato describes how an intelligent Maker produces the 
                                                          
David C. Schindler, ‘What’s the Difference? On the Metaphysics of Participation in a 
Christian Context’, The Saint Anselm Journal, 3.1 (2005), 1-27. 
9 Charles P. Bigger, Participation: A Platonic Inquiry (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1968), p. 7. 
10 See Paul M. Collins, Partaking in Divine Nature: Deification and Communion 
(London: T&T Clark, 2012), pp. 18-27. 
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sensible world, describing this intelligent Maker as God, Father, Craftsman, One, or Mind.11 
As commentators often point out, the English word ‘god’ therefore remains an inadequate 
translation of the Greek word.12 Regardless of such inadequacy, at various points across his 
philosophical dialogues, Plato crafts an anthropology in which both human beings and the 
cosmos exhibit a likeness to the divine, a similarity which grounds the possibility of 
participation (methexis) in and imitation (mimesis) of God, the dynamic ensoulment of the 
exemplary Good, Beautiful, and True.13 The end goal of such imitation of and participation in 
God is assimilation, which Plato sees as the development and growth of divine 
characteristics, and which some later Neo-Platonists more strongly (and evocatively) parse as 
ontological union (henosis), the erotic and sensuous mingling of the many with the one.14 
While it remains a matter of debate to what extent Christian thinkers were influenced 
by such Greek philosophical sources, they were certainly cognisant of them, often baptising 
them with the exigencies of Christian soteriology. As such, both participation in God and 
deification soon assumed great importance in patristic scriptural exegesis and theology. In the 
New Testament, the word often translated into English as participation renders a host of 
terms other than (but not contrary to) the metaphysical tradition of methexis. These terms 
echo the philosophical problem of the many and the one, but cast it in terms of how the 
multitude of diverse believers relate to God and Christ. The scriptural terms for participation 
include: metechō (sharing in something), metalambanō (receiving a share), koinōnia (inward 
fellowship or communion), and menō (abiding, indwelling). The final two terms are 
particularly significant: koinōnia expresses the unitive and constitutive relationship of the 
believer to Christ (1 Corinthians 1.9, 1 John 1.3), especially in the Eucharist (1 Corinthians 
10.16) and so through the Church as Christ’s Body (1 Corinthians 12.27); and menō again 
                                                          
11 Plato, Timaeus, 28-29. English translation in Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M. 
Cooper (Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), pp. 1234-1236. 
12 See G.M. Grube, Plato’s Thought, 2nd ed. (London: Athlone Press, 1980); and J.P. 
Kenney, Mystical Monotheism: A Study in Ancient Platonic Theology (Hanover & London: 
Brown University Press, 1991). 
13 See Plato, Phaedo, 100b-d; Theaetetus, 176a; Republic 476a; Timaeus, 29e; Laws, 
716b-c. English translation in Plato, Complete Works, pp. 86; 195; 1102; 1236; 1402-1403. 
14 For example see Plato, Theaetetus, 176b. English translation in Plato, Complete 
Works, p. 195. 
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alludes to eucharistic participation and union with Christ (John 6.56). The idea of becoming 
‘participants [koinōnoì] of the divine nature [theias…physeōs]’ becomes explicitly mooted in 
2 Peter 1.3-4. There, Paul links knowledge (epignōsis) of Christ as the doorway to sharing in 
God’s ‘divine power’ and ‘divine nature’.15 
The idea of ‘becoming participants of the divine nature’ found in 2 Peter 1.4 stands 
alongside a number of other scriptural and philosophical themes and texts that became 
important for early Christian ideas about deification. Gregory of Nazianzus in the fourth 
century coined theōsis to describe the deiform transformation of believers through their 
participation in God, although a number of other terms were also used in earlier periods, the 
most significant of which is theopoiēsis, and earlier patristic writers similarly place 
deification as a central theme.16 In terms of etymology, theōsis (formed from the verb theoō, 
‘to make god’) means ‘becoming god’, while theopoiēsis (from the verb theopoieō, ‘to 
deify’) means ‘making divine’ or ‘making into a god’, but the terms remained imprecise and 
broad in early usage. Despite such imprecision, early Christian writers drew careful lines 
around the terms. Typically, theōsis was taken to refer to the transformation of believers into 
the likeness of God, rather than the pagan notion of apotheōsis, the literal making of a god, an 
idea which would have violated Christian monotheism. Gregory of Nazianzus used this 
nuanced version of theōsis, then, to circumscribe the whole economy of salvation: the self-
emptying of God in the Incarnation, the assumption of Christ’s resurrected body into the 
divine life, the sharing in deified humanity through baptism, the ascent of the believer to God 
through contemplation, and the eschatological fulfilment of human nature in heaven. 
Although ideas about deification formed a central theme for patristic writers of the second to 
fourth centuries, Pseudo-Dionysius in the sixth century was the first to attempt a definition of 
                                                          
15 See Stephen Finlan, ‘Second Peter’s Notion of Divine Participation’, in Theōsis: 
Deification in Christian Theology, eds. Stephen Finlan & Vladimir Kharlamov (Eugene: 
Princeton Theological Monograph Series, 2006), pp. 32-50. 
16 Stephen Finlan & Vladimir Kharlamov, eds., Theōsis: Deification in Christian 
Theology (Eugene: Princeton Theological Monograph Series, 2006), pp. 5-8. For a 
comprehensive overview, see Norman Russell, ‘Appendix 2: The Greek Vocabulary of 
Deification’, in The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), pp. 333–344. 
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theōsis as ‘being as much as possible like and in union with God’,17 an intellectual union with 
the essential divine attributes such as truth, goodness, and oneness through participation in 
the Eucharist. Pseudo-Dionysius’ definition still remained general and inexact, covering a 
wide range of ideas. All told, however, deification worked on two broad registers in the early 
Christian period, one theological and another pedagogical.18 As a theological register, 
deification referred to the Incarnation, the ‘exchange formula’ of Athanasius (recapitulated by 
many others) that Christ ‘became human that we might become divine’.19 As a pedagogical 
register, it referred to the teaching that the purpose of human life was to become like God as 
far as is possible, especially through the participation of Christ. 
The constitutive ideas of such theōsis were immensely varied, then, but went back, of 
course, to scriptural motifs consonant with the idea of participation in God. These motifs 
included: being made in God’s image and likeness (Genesis 1.26, 27); divine filiation or 
adoption (Psalm 82.6, Galatians 4.5, Romans 8.15, Ephesians 1.5); taking on God’s nature (2 
Peter 1.4, John 10.34); imitation of holiness or divine perfection (Matthew 5.48, John 14.12, 
Ephesians 5.1); being reformed by God (John 3.6, Romans 12.2, 2 Corinthians 5.17); being 
conformed or united to Christ (John 17.21-23, Phillipians 2.5-11 & 3.21, Romans 8.29, 1 
John 3.2); and the transformation of the universe through God’s action (Habbakuk 2.14, 1 
Corinthians 15.28).20 Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov helpfully suggest that the 
influence of scriptural images, Greek philosophical terms, and popular ideas about deification 
mean that the ocean of conceptual equivalents for theōsis therefore included the following: 
                                                          
17 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, 1.3. English translation in 
Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheid, (New York: Paulist Press, 
1987), p. 198. 
18 See Norman Russell, Fellow Workers with God: Orthodox Thinking on Theosis 
(New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2009), pp. 23-27. 
19 Athanasius, De Incarnatione Verbi Dei, 54. English translation in Nicene and Post-
Nicene Fathers, eds. Philip Schaff & Henry Wace, second series, 14 vols. (Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 1994), vol. 4, p. 65. 
20 See Basil Studer, ‘Divinization’, in Encyclopedia of the Early Church, ed. Angelo 
Di Beradina, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), vol. 1, p. 242. See also M. 
David Litwa, We Are Being Transformed: Deification in Paul’s Soteriology (Walter de 
Gruyter & Co., 2012). 
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‘union, participation, partaking, communion/partnership, divine filiation, adoption, 
recreation, intertwined with the divine, similitude with God, transformation, elevation, 
transmutation, commingling, assimilation, intermingling, rebirth, regeneration, 
transfiguration.’21 The most important virtual synonyms for theōsis in the patristic period are, 
however, ‘participation’, ‘union’, and ‘adoption’. As Anna Williams puts it, ‘without one of 
these three concepts…we are speaking of some form of sanctification that is not specifically 
deification.’22 
Accordingly, Norman Russell provides a useful typology of nominal, analogical, 
ethical, and realistic uses of theōsis, all of which indicate just how polyvalent the term was in 
early Christian thought.23 In this typology, ‘deification’ could refer to a title of honour 
(nominal), the gift of grace that gives to human beings what belongs properly to Christ’s 
nature (analogical), imitation of divine moral attributes (ethical), or the complete 
transformation of human nature through participation in God (realistic). The possible 
meanings of ‘deification’ remained broad and overlapped considerably, then, with the 
metaphysical and biblical languages of participation, even if they remained conceptually 
distinct. 
Theōsis developed over later centuries in eastern theology, however, from such broad 
and allusive themes to a more tightly controlled doctrine. In the fourteenth century, Palamas 
developed the distinction coined by Maximus the Confessor in the sixth century between 
God’s essence and energies: theōsis involves participation in the latter rather than the former, 
protecting the utter transcendence of God while allowing for the ontological transformation 
of the believer. Gösta Hallonsten’s proposal that studies must therefore distinguish between a 
doctrine and a theme of theōsis proves useful here. Deification as a doctrine tightly means ‘a 
                                                          
21 Finlan & Kharlamov, Theōsis, p. 6. 
22 Anna Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 32. See also Anna Williams, ‘Deification in the 
Summa Theologiae: A Structural Interpretation of the Prima Pars’, Thomist, 61 (1997), 219-
255. 
23 Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 1-3. 
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rather well-defined complex of thought that centers [sic] on one or more technical terms’.24 
Such a complex of thought encompasses a particular Orthodox synergistic anthropology, 
soteriology, and understanding of the divine nature (with the distinction between essence and 
energies) uncommon in the western tradition. Andrew Louth labels this the ‘cosmic 
dimension of theōsis’, an ‘arch stretching from creation to deification’ since ‘the doctrine of 
deification preserves this sense that God created the world to unite it to himself’.25 Here, the 
end of participation in God is most commonly ‘christification’, becoming the image of Christ. 
In contrast, deification as a theme loosely contains ideas of participation in the divine nature, 
adoption, and union with God or Christ, often derived from biblical sources and therefore 
commonly found across traditions. Indeed, deificatory language can be seen in Augustine of 
Hippo,26 Aquinas,27 Luther,28 and Calvin,29 but arguably reflects biblical images of adoption, 
participation, and union rather than Palamite doctrine. 
                                                          
24 Gösta Hallonsten, ‘Theōsis in Recent Research: A Renewal of Interest and a Need 
for Clarity’, in Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification 
in the Christian Traditions, eds. M. J. Christensen & Jeffrey A. Wittung (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2007), pp. 281-293 (pp. 283-287). 
25 Andrew Louth, ‘The Place of Theōsis in Orthodox Theology’, in Partakers of the 
Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, eds. 
M. J. Christensen & Jeffrey A. Wittung (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007), pp. 32-46 
(pp. 34-36). 
26 See Gerald Bonner, ‘Deification, Divinization’, in Augustine Through the Ages: An 
Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), pp. 265–66. 
27 See Williams, The Ground of Union. Williams argues, of course, for an ecumenical 
accord between the theologies of Palamas and Aquinas. Others remain sceptical of such an 
accord: see Hallonsten, ‘Theōsis in Recent Research’, pp. 282-83. 
28 See Carl E. Braaten, and Robert W. Jenson, eds., Union With Christ: The New 
Finnish Interpretation of Luther (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998). The New Finnish School 
is not without its critics: see, for example, Robert Kolb, Martin Luther: Confessor of the 
Faith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
29 For example see J. Todd Billings, Calvin, Participation, and the Gift: The Activity 
of Believers in Union with Christ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); and Carl Mosser, 
‘The Greatest Possible Blessing: Calvin and Deification’, Scottish Journal of Theology, 55 
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These brief etymologies and attempted definitions of ‘participation’, ‘participation in 
God’, and ‘deification’ have shown just how protean these terms are, how broadly allusive 
Hooker’s use of such language could be, and how ecumenically complex the situation 
remains over the language of methexis and theōsis. Yet, before finally turning to the 
ecumenical retrievals of these terms, it is now possible to draw out what the ‘architecture of 
participation’ looks like, meaning the intellectual material, joists, and structures which inform 
the background to Hooker’s idea of ‘participation in God’. 
1.2.2 The Architecture of Participation 
As the previous section showed, the concept of participation encompasses a staggering 
range of themes and ideas. It remains possible nevertheless to produce as a heuristic device an 
‘architecture of participation’ which informs to some degree Hooker’s language of 
participation and deification. This architecture emerges out of a cumulative genealogy of 
participation, what Jacob Sherman labels as the three historical iterations of the concept: the 
formal (regularly associated with Plato); the existential (exemplified in the thought of Thomas 
Aquinas); and the creative (emerging out of Christian Neoplatonism and finding full 
expression in certain Baroque and Romantic modes of thought).30 To these three turns we 
might add a fourth between the formal and existential: the unitive or henological, especially as 
seen in Neoplatonism. Each of these iterations add elements to what the ‘architecture of 
participation’ looks like, as well as what theological claims it informs, buttresses, or 
enlightens. 
For Sherman, the first participatory turn comes out of Platonic accounts of methexis as 
a response to the philosophical problem of the many and the one. As noted in the previous 
section, Plato’s account of participation revolves around formality: methexis describes how 
the divine realm of Forms constitutes embodied and temporal things; the manifest realm of 
becoming dynamically receives its variety of forms through participation in divine Forms. 
                                                          
(2002), 36–57. Other scholars disagree that deification is present in Calvin’s thought: see 
Frederick W. Norris, ‘Deification: Consensual and Cogent’, Scottish Journal of Theology, 49 
(1996), 411-428. 
30 Jacob H. Sherman, ‘A Genealogy of Participation’, in The Participatory Turn: 
Spirituality, Mysticism, Religious Studies, eds. Jorge N. Ferrer and Jacob H. Sherman (State 
University of New York Press, 2008), pp. 81-112. 
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Such participation is real but analogical. On the one hand, the participated Forms are 
ontologically different from their particular, contingent participants. Forms are immutable, 
eternal, incorporeal, sensually imperceptible but intellectually apprehensible.31 On the other 
hand, Forms are the constitutive cause of being and, as such, are truly related to the particular 
beings that participate in them, even if not in a univocal sense: particular beings share in the 
whole of the eternal, transcendent Form, but they do not exhaust it, such that particular beings 
exhibit the divine Form in an embodied, temporal, and contingent fashion.32 Such a formal 
turn in participatory metaphysics addresses the ‘what-ness’ of temporal things and establishes 
a relationship of causality or existential constitution from the divine realm as an architectural 
mark of participation. The hallmarks of such formal participation are analogy, real relation, 
asymmetry, and the immanent saturation of the world with the divine, all of which preserves 
the priority of transcendence. 
The second participatory turn for Sherman is existential, the ‘why’ anything exists at 
all. Aquinas fulfils this participatory turn to the existential for Sherman by adding to formal 
participation an account of how participation establishes existence. Participation becomes a 
claim, then, about divine agency in creation: just as a Platonic Form causes everything named 
after that Form, so too, for Aquinas, God as self-subsistent being (esse subsistens) must cause 
by emanation everything that participates in the first perfection of being (esse). Indeed, 
Thomas describes creation as ‘the issuing of the whole of being from the universal cause 
[emanatio totius entis universalis a primo principio]’.33 Aquinas explicates creaturely being 
(esse) in both Aristotelian terms of act-as-perfection, and in Platonic terms of participation. In 
Aristotelian fashion, Aquinas argues that being is ‘first thing conceived by the intellect’ and 
thus has priority over the other transcendentals.34 ‘Being’ precedes all other notions and acts 
                                                          
31 Plato, Phaedo, 78c; 79a; 79d; 80a-b. English translation in Plato, Works, pp. 68-70. 
32 Plato, Phaedo, 100c; Timaeus, 28a. English translation in Plato, Works, pp. 86; 
1234. See R.E. Allen, ‘Participation and Predication in Plato’s Middle Dialogues’, 
Philosophical Review, 69 (1960), 147-183. 
33 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I.45.1 resp., Latin and English dual text 
(New York: Blackfriars, 1964-81); hereafter ST. 
34 Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate. 1.1 resp., English translation in Truth, trans. N.T. 
Bourke (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1952-54); hereafter De Ver. Compare ST, I.5.2 
resp. and I.11.1 resp. 
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as the ground for all other perfections: ‘being’ involves act (actus essendi) and act is 
perfection. Aquinas then adds to this Aristotelian framework the Platonic notion of 
participation as a partial sharing in something that belongs to another more fully. Aquinas 
argues that all beings (enta) are substantial unities of ‘essence’ (essentia) and ‘existence’ 
(esse).35 Yet, no contingent being (ens) is identical with being (esse): whatever does not exist 
by eternal necessity only exists by participating in being (esse), which means participating in 
God as esse subsistens.36 Each created being (ens) receives existence to the extent in which it 
participates in God’s self-subsistent being. The particular capacity of an essence determines 
the degree to which a creature participates in being, as potency to act.37 Aquinas argues that 
God’s ideas act as the exemplary cause of created things.38 The diversity of creatures stems 
from the diverse ways that creation relates to God’s exemplarity. The first exemplary cause of 
things remains the principle of distinct multiplicity: the divine essence contains all the various 
perfections of things in its simple unity. The multitude of things reflects God’s goodness more 
perfectly: one creature alone cannot represent adequately God’s perfection or exemplify all of 
the ways in which a creature can participate in God’s exemplarity.39 God therefore freely wills 
a hierarchy of being, proceeding from less to more perfect forms: ‘the universe would not be 
perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things,’ as Aquinas puts it.40 Multiplicity 
in creation reveals what Rudi Te Velde calls ‘a multiplicity of an intelligible order’ in which 
created diversity represents its cause ‘not in the manner of the cause itself, but in its own 
distinct manner as intended and preconceived by the cause’.41 
                                                          
35 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles I, c.32 & 34, trans. A. Pegis & V. Bourke 
(Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975); hereafter ScG. 
36 Thomas Aquinas, In octo libros Physicorum expositio, 21, 1153; hereafter In Phys. 
English translation in Thomas de Aquino: Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, trans. R.J. 
Blackwell et al. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963). Compare ST, I.II.26.4. 
37 See C. Fabro, ‘The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of 
Participation’, Review of Metaphysics, 27 (1947), 465-69. 
38 Aquinas, ST, I.44.3 resp. 
39 Aquinas, ST, I.47.1 resp. 
40 Aquinas, ST I.47.2 resp. 
41 Rudi Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (New York: 
Brill Press, 1995), pp. 97-106. 
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John Rziha describes four implications of Aquinas’ existential account of 
participation.42 First, creation depends totally on God for all perfections, which God alone 
possesses as self-subsistent being, and which creatures possess only by participation in God. 
In participation, creation is a gift (donum). Second, ontological participation defines 
creatureliness, simultaneously setting creation apart from the self-subsistent Creator but also 
yoking creation to God as a creatio continua. Third, existential claims in participatory 
metaphysics are therefore analogical: creatures exist per participationem, and God simply per 
essentiam. Finally, participation explains both the primary perfection of being and also all 
further, secondary perfections, including cognitive participation in divine knowledge. 
The third participatory turn for Sherman is creative, a more numinous turn involving 
diverse thinkers and still underway in some modern philosophy and theology. Here, 
participation expresses the contingent, historical sharing in divine creativity through human 
imagination and skill, the discovery of creative abilities such that the human being becomes 
homo creator. Sherman sees John Scotus Eriugena in the ninth century as the first theologian 
to place the ‘theme of homo creator central, defining the human being as essentially both 
created and creating (natura creata and natura creans) and making the human central to the 
eschatological re-creation of all things’.43 Sherman traces in the later Meister Eckhart, 
Nicholas of Cusa, and Tommaso Campanella similar ideas that human creativity shares in 
divine craftsmanship and expresses divine knowledge, eliding the distinction between heaven 
and earth as human inventiveness echoes and unfolds the eternal Word in creation. Although 
Sherman does not draw the consequence, the creative turn perhaps also flows out of Aquinas’ 
existential understanding of participation, where all secondary acts and perfections (and so all 
activities properly human, whether cultural, linguistic, artistic, or work) can be said to 
participate in God just as much as our existence. Formal participation remains dynamic, the 
move from becoming to being. The hallmark of creative participation is indeed to see the 
                                                          
42 John Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions: St. Thomas Aquinas on Human 
Participation in Eternal Law (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009), 
pp. 12-15. 
43 Sherman, ‘A Genealogy of Participation’, p. 94. See especially John Scotus 
Eriugena, Periphyseon: the Division of Nature, trans. John O’Meara (Montreal: Bellarmin, 
1987). 
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human participant as both divine gift (donum) and as an ongoing, dynamic, unfolding, co-
operative work (opus) and worker with the divine, rendering human beings as homo faber. 
The final, additional participatory moment (a fruitful addition to Sherman’s 
genealogy) revolves around a unitive or henological turn somewhere between the formal and 
existential: the Platonic and Neoplatonic emphasis on union and assimilation with the divine 
through participation. The Platonic notion of ‘likeness to God’ as the telos of human life 
became elevated into religious mysticism in later Platonists such as Plotinus, for whom the 
final stage of the soul’s ascent to God was to become one with the divine without losing 
individuation.44 Such union was the consummation of purification and was often imaged as 
vision, touch, blending, ecstasy, and erotic mingling with the divine unity.45 The deiform 
nature of the soul indicated a complementary aspect of participatory henology, namely the 
idea, developed by Neoplatonic thinkers, of the cyclical emanation of the universe from and 
return back to its divine Creator, which modern scholars often label as the exitus-reditus.46 
Proclus describes, for example, how ‘every effect remains in its cause, proceeds from it, and 
reverts upon it,’ relating the multiplicity of an intelligible order to its unitary causal source.47 
As such, ‘participation in God’ is the hallmark of creation and the engine which drives both its 
existence from and its formal end in (re)union with the divine. The exit from the divine is 
deiform, and so the return to the divine is deificatory. Yet, far from emptying agency from the 
created ‘middle’ between exit and reversion, Neoplatonists such as Proclus imagine a triadic 
structure of monē-prodoos-epistrophē that honours the suspended middle between exit and 
return.48 The monē (rest, remaining) describes how God remains supereminenty identical with 
himself as the unitive source of emanation (monos). The prodoos (proceeding, emanating) 
                                                          
44 Plotinus, Enneads, V.5.4.8, trans. Stephen MacKenna (London: Penguin, 1991). 
45 Plotinus, Enneads, III.9.10.11-13 ; VI.9.9.33-46; VI.9.11.4-7. 
46 See Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 38. 
47 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, trans. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2004), Proposition 35, p. 39. 
48 Proclus, Elements, Propositions 25-39, pp. 29-43. My thanks to Dr Andrew 
Davison and Professor Brendan Sammon for pointing out this triadic structure. See Brendan 
Sammon, The God Who Is Beauty: Beauty as a Divine Name in Thomas Aquinas and 
Dionysius the Areopagite (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2013). 
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identifies the rise of every being into its own determinate being. The epistrophē (return) 
describes the reversion of the proodos (the created being) to the monos. As such, the proodos 
circumscribes the creative agency engendered in determinate beings by their emanation, a 
dynamic sharing in the productive capacity of the monos through participation that yields 
what Proclus calls ‘a likeness of the secondary to the primary’.49 
These four participatory moments cumulatively produce an ‘architecture of 
participation’, then, which exhibits something like what Kathryn Tanner calls a ‘weak’ and 
‘strong’ sense of participation, but which might be better phrased as an ‘extensive’ and an 
‘intensive’ sense, or even better as an ‘exit’ and ‘return’ (exitus-reditus).50 In a weak, 
extensive, or exiting sense, the architecture of participation revolves around the dynamic 
sphere of ontological becoming: it images the becoming of creation as it shares in the self-
diffusive plenitude of God’s perfect being. This weak sense encompasses both the formal and 
the existential modes of participation. Here, insofar as things exist, they exist by participation 
in God as self-subsistent being itself; and, according to the degree in which they share in 
participated being, things move from potentiality to actuality. In this weak sense, the focus 
remains on ek-static participation, that is, how things receive their formal and efficient reality 
dynamically from God. The weak form of participation constitutes identity as created by, 
through, and for God; it is, in effect, about creation as a diminished likeness of the divine, the 
diffusion of divinity throughout the universe, and occurs almost as a commonplace image in a 
variety of Christian thinkers. 
In a strong, intensive, or returning sense, however, the architecture of participation 
describes the telos of created being: a creature experiences the final perfection of being 
through an intense (re)union with the divine nature, and so finally becomes what it is not, 
namely god-like. This strong sense of ‘participation in God’ encompasses the other two 
participatory turns: the creative and henological. Accordingly, this strong sense of 
participation often corresponds with what Norman Russell calls the analogy and metaphor of 
deification discussed in the preceding section. 51 Deification as analogy entails that people are 
                                                          
49 Proclus, Elements, Proposition 29, p. 35. 
50 Kathryn Tanner, Christ the Key (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
pp. 1-57.  
51 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, pp.1-2. 
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‘god-like’ through grace such that they enjoy the status that properly belongs to Christ 
through sharing in his nature. In turn, the metaphor of deification has two distinct approaches, 
the ethical and the realistic. The extrinsic, ethical approach ‘takes deification to be the 
attainment of likeness to God through ascetic and philosophical endeavour, believers 
reproducing some of the divine attributes in their own lives by imitation’. The more intrinsic, 
realistic approach ‘assumes that human beings are in some sense ontologically transformed 
by deification’, either directly by virtue of the Incarnation or through participation in the 
sacraments. In either approach, deification images the teleological aspect of participation: it 
often includes the weak version of participation in God but stresses the end of participation as 
a (re)union with the self-diffusive plenitude of God’s subsistent, perfect being, elevating the 
creature so that it becomes (whether analogically, ethically or realistically) ‘god-like’, that is, 
a fulfilled (even if diminished) similitude of divinity as it shares in the divine nature.  
Both the weak and strong versions of participation in God do not evacuate creation, 
however, of its own agency. Much like Proclus’ notion of the ē, both versions appeal to the 
Neoplatonic concept of influence (influentia) in which the highest cause resides within its 
effects, freighting even the secondary acts of creatures with divinity. The weak version of 
participation in God typically revolves around the metaphysical becoming of creation through 
created forms that participate in their original cause. In the strong version of participation in 
God, deification images the perfection of created things according to their form, most 
typically human beings. Such perfection therefore encompasses human making as well as 
divine creativity, the co-creative aspect of participation. Human work shares in the self-
diffusive generosity of God’s nature: it is a theonomous participation which emanates from 
our formal nature as a diminished similitude of divinity bound up in, and made for, 
communion with God. 
As such, rather than being two divergent versions of participation in God, these 
‘weak/extensive/exiting’ and ‘strong/intensive/returning’ senses often penetrate and 
complement each other. Indeed, Tanner argues that Christ often acts as the key to unlock both 
senses of ‘participation in God’. On one hand, ‘the paradigms for created things exist in the 
second person [of the trinity], God’s own Word or Wisdom,’52 making created things images 
of the eternal Logos. On the other hand, Christ’s incarnation means that ‘perfect human 
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imaging of God is achieved by perfect unity with what is perfectly and properly the image of 
God, the second person of the trinity’.53 As such, participation in Christ (as both eternal and 
incarnate Word) often forms the basis of participation in God for both weak and strong 
senses. In the weak aspects of the architecture of participation, Christ acts as the divine giver 
of the gift of form and existence. In the strong aspect of the architecture of participation, 
Christ re-orients the participant as an image of the divine, capable of similitude to divine 
creativity, that is to say, a participant of God’s own self-diffusive nature. 
As the above general architectural account reveals, the idea of participation exhibits a 
complex and multivalent character that nonetheless structures theological claims stretching 
from creation to eschatology, sometimes (but not always) involving a claim about deification. 
The heuristic ‘architecture of participation’ embraces a set of motifs capable of different 
emphases and configurations but joined by family resemblance. This architecture of 
participation will be an important foil for the idea of participation as found in Hooker’s 
Lawes. A further prolegomenon, however, is why and how participation had to be recovered 
in modern studies and ecumenism, a question to which the next section turns. 
1.2.3 The Recovery of ‘Participation in God’ 
In his allusion to ‘the participation of divine nature’, Hooker cites 2 Peter 1.4, a key 
biblical text for those who have historically claimed that human beings are ‘participants’ 
(koinōnoi) in divinity, even to the point of becoming like God (theōsis). Yet, such claims for 
a long period suffered from neglect and opprobrium in western theology, making such an 
ecumenical retrieval of ‘participation’ and ‘deification’ seem unlikely. Rowan Williams 
considers that the root of the antipathy comes as a ‘result of the claims of medieval and 
sixteenth-century sectarian and apocalyptic groups to be united in essence with God (and so 
incapable of sin)’.54 Others trace the problem concerning deification back further. One of the 
most severe and influential attacks on such language came from Adolf von Harnack, a 
nineteenth-century Protestant scholar. Harnack claimed that the early Church had subverted 
the original Gospel with pagan and ‘Hellenistic’ ideas such that: 
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…when the Christian religion was represented as the belief in the incarnation of God 
as the sure hope of the deification of man, a speculation that had originally never got 
beyond the fringe of religious knowledge was made the central point of the system 
and the simple content of the Gospel was obscured.55 
While Jules Gross’ seminal study of Patristic thought on deification in 1938 subsequently 
showed that Harnack underestimated the Greek Fathers, the suspicion that deiform 
participation obscures the Christian kergyma remained common in scholarship.56 Protestant 
writers in particular expressed theological concern that any exegesis of 2 Peter 1.4 that 
entertained notions of deification ended up eliding the distinction between creatures and their 
Creator, and so violated monotheism. For example, Karl Barth instead interpreted the Petrine 
passage only to mean ‘the practical fellowship of Christians with God and on this basis the 
conformity of their acts with the divine nature’.57 The idea that participation in God might 
mean deification was commonly seen in western thought, therefore, as an aberrant, exotic, 
and suspicious feature of eastern theology, a fall into pantheism. Even within Orthodox 
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Christianity, until recently theōsis ‘was a technical term familiar only to monks and patristic 
scholars’.58 
The past few decades witnessed, however, a slow but steady retrieval of deification 
alongside participation that has revealed both the protean complexity and profound 
ecumenical possibility of these related concepts. The impetus came from the confluence of 
several streams, each of which proved to be tributaries to an ever-increasing sea of retrieval. 
Gross’ seminal study noted above was the first comprehensively to analyse deification, taking 
into account its varied Christian and non-Christian sources. Gross showed that early Christian 
theology transcended the pagan notion of apotheōsis and rooted the idea of theōsis within a 
biblical matrix. Partly as a result of Gross’ work, the study of participation in God, along with 
an attendant idea of theōsis, eventually regained currency across theological traditions. 
Norman Russell argues that, from within Orthodox Christianity, there were four crucial 
factors to the popular re-reception of deification. 59 First, there was an apologetic rediscovery 
of Gregory Palamas in response to claims that his teachings on theōsis were ‘near to heresy’. 
Second, Russian religious philosophers such as Myrrha Lot-Borodine, Vladimir Lossky, and 
John Meyendorff influenced both eastern and western thought by placing theōsis as the goal 
of Christian life and the crowning theological achievement of Orthodoxy. Third, spirituality 
of the Philokalia (an anthology of Byzantine texts) was recovered when it was translated into 
various languages. Finally, Orthodox scholars re-engaged with the early Greek Fathers and 
their emergent thought on theōsis.  
In turn, these rediscoveries of deification became a springboard for modern 
ecumenical dialogue and study. Hallonsten’s distinction between the doctrinal and thematic 
aspects of deification confirms that deification per se cannot be seen as the sole preserve of 
eastern theology. The biblical images of participation, union, and adoption (which together 
act as virtual synonyms for deification in patristic thought) form a theme in western thought 
as much as eastern, even if the narrower doctrinal formulations of deification are absent. 
Accordingly, the number of scholarly works and collections about the idea of participation 
and deification have proliferated in recent years, tracing both the historical development of 
the idea as well as contemporary reconstructions, placing it firmly on the theological agenda. 
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In addition to official ecumenical dialogues that have considered, in part at least, participation 
and deification, there have been many academic attempts to trace the idea within particular 
thinkers or use them within different traditions, both western and eastern, Protestant and 
Catholic.60 
The most relevant modern ecumenical conversation for this study remains, of course, 
Anglican and Eastern Orthodox dialogue. Over the past four decades there have been four 
phases of Anglican-Orthodox ecumenical dialogues, producing four reports.61 In each phase, 
references to participation and deification are few in number and scattered throughout 
numerous theological topics. While participation in the life of God constitutes the ground of 
Christian life and the Church in all four Anglican-Orthodox dialogues, there also remains 
some deep-seated ambivalence over the language of theōsis. For example, the Moscow 
Agreed Statement of 1976 briefly casts faith in terms of participation in and union with God, 
but also marks out theōsis as a difficult ecumenical idiom: 
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To describe the fullness of man’s sanctification and the way in which he shares in the 
life of God, the Orthodox Church uses the patristic term theosis kata charin 
(divinisation by grace). Once again such language is not normally used by Anglicans, 
some of whom regard it as misleading and dangerous.62 
Here, the Moscow Agreed Statement affirms participatory language as amenable to both 
Anglican and Orthodox theology, but sees the Orthodox doctrine of theōsis as exotic, even 
aberrant, to some (unidentified) Anglican thinkers. Even though the doctrinal language of 
theōsis remains problematic, the report admits, however, that ‘Anglicans do not reject the 
underlying doctrine [i.e. the fullness of sanctification as a sharing in the life of God] which 
this language seeks to express; indeed, such teaching is to be found in their own liturgies and 
hymnody’.63 
At the same time as the rediscovery of participation as deification, western interest in 
participatory metaphysics has also witnessed an unlikely renaissance in recent decades. 
Participatory thought in western philosophical and religious study suffered a steady decline 
from the seventeenth century onwards, largely as a result of what Walter Capps calls the 
advent of a ‘Cartesian-Kantian temper’.64 If participation suspends creatures from the creative 
divine nature in which they share, then the ‘Cartesian-Kantian temper’ or ‘paradigm’ brackets 
off or denies the existence of any religious or metaphysical source: such sources are either 
cognitively inaccessible as ‘noumenal’ realities, or are produced by ‘subjective’ imagination 
and cultural-linguistic invention. The ‘Cartesian-Kantian temper’ metaphysically flattens and 
disenchants the world, and overtook participatory metaphysics as the cultural assumption 
about how the world was constituted. 
Some scholars argue that this modern disenchantment has genealogical roots in late 
medieval ideas of univocity and nominalism, which Hans Boersma claims ‘serve as the two 
blades of a pair of scissors that cut the tapestry [of heavenly participation] by severing the 
                                                          
62 Anglican-Orthodox Joint Doctrinal Commission, Moscow Agreed Statement, 1.1-3. 
63 Anglican-Orthodox Joint Doctrinal Commission, Moscow Agreed Statement, 1.3. 
64 Walter Capps, Religious Studies: The Making of a Discipline (Fortress Press, 1995), 
pp. 2-12. 
22 
 
participatory link between earthly sacrament (sacramentum) and heavenly reality (res)’.65 On 
the one hand, Duns Scotus introduced the idea that ‘being’ (esse) is univocal: both creatures 
and God exist in the same way or in the same sense. For Boersma, univocity snipped the 
participatory cord: in participatory metaphysics, creatures exist only insofar as they 
participate in ‘being-itself’, namely God’s self-subsistent nature; the univocity of being 
instead unhooks creatures from God and places them together onto a flattened ontological 
spectrum. On the other hand, late medieval nominalism ‘was the seedbed for modern 
individualism’, being ‘predicated on the notion that each person was, as it were, a self-
subsistent entity, whose being was, in principle, unrelated to the being of other persons’.66 
Whereas ‘participation in God’ implied real relations (transcendentally with God and 
vertically with all other creatures who participate in God), nominalism bred atomism and 
voluntarism, the separation of creatures from one another and God, who becomes inscrutably 
‘other’ and relates to creation through the arbitrary fiat of the divine will. The separation of 
the natural and supernatural sphere seemed to make the latter, in a sense, intellectually 
dispensable. As Boersma puts it, ‘heavenly participation gave way to a celebration of the 
natural ends of earthly realities’,67 a paradigmatic shift which shaped modernity and seemed 
to relegate participatory metaphysics. 
Yet, several tributaries emerged and converged to revivify the metaphysical potential 
of participation in modern western theology. Diverse thinkers such as Owen Barfield, Henri 
Bergson, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Sergei Bulgakov, Gilles Deleuze, and Alfred North 
Whitehead (among others) appropriated, in widely different ways, the language of 
participation. From another direction, the central role of participation in Thomistic thought 
was rediscovered (or uncovered) by the work of C. Fabro, L. B. Geiger, R. Te Velde, and J. 
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Wippel.68 Despite internal differences, these scholars illustrate how participation allows 
Aquinas to show how creation depends upon God for the perfection of ‘being’ (esse). Partly 
out of this Thomistic recovery, other scholars have called for an ethical and political return to 
participatory thought since participation images both the first perfection of creatures (the act 
of being, actus essendi) and also the secondary acts of creatures (such as directed by natural 
law) as participations in the providential ordering of the universe.69 Studies of the links 
between participatory metaphysics, the language of deification, and biblical ideas of union 
with Christ have also helped place participation back on the scholarly agenda.70 
Elsewhere, a number of contemporary religious studies scholars identify themselves 
with a ‘participatory turn’ away from the ‘Cartesian-Kantian paradigm’. This turn argues for 
an ‘enactive understanding of the sacred, seeking to approach religious phenomena, 
experiences, and insights as cocreated events’ which emerge from ‘the interaction of all 
human attributes and a nondetermined spiritual power or creative dynamism of life’.71 
Kathryn Tanner and Hans Boersma also turn to participation, but as an ecumenical and 
ecclesial offering. Kathryn Tanner uses participation as part of her continued development of 
a ‘Christ-centered theological vision’ that can ‘be productively used to talk about almost 
anything of Christian interest in an integrated way’, thereby giving Christians ‘sufficient 
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confidence about its fruitfulness to employ [the vision] themselves’.72 Hans Boersma even 
more strongly hopes that a ‘ressourcement’ of participatory metaphysics ‘will, as a matter of 
course, lead to genuine rapprochement between evangelicals and Catholics’ against ‘the 
onslaught of a desacralized modernity’.73 
Finally, Radical Orthodoxy constitutes the most significant contemporary English 
retrieval of participation. In brief, Radical Orthodoxy politically retrieves participation in 
order to challenge the privileging of ‘autonomy’ as a fundamental value within secular 
liberalism:  
The central theological framework of radical orthodoxy is ‘participation’ as developed 
by Plato and reworked in Christianity, because any alternative configuration perforce 
reserves a territory independent of God. The latter can only lead to nihilism (though in 
different guises). Participation, however, refuses any reserve of created territory, 
while allowing things their finite integrity.74 
Radical Orthodox histories describe a ‘theological fall’ from participation to nominalism 
beginning with the univocal ontology Duns Scotus and the voluntarism of late scholasticism, 
a story with which, as we have seen, Hans Boersma concurs. Such a fall creates both a 
secular space evacuated of the divine and also a vision of the ‘absolutely autonomous free 
individual’ who forms the basis for the ‘subtle growth of a totalitarian politics’ (of which, it is 
claimed, political liberalism is one variant) through ‘the promotion of a cold will-to-power’.75 
As James K. A. Smith suggests, the histories of Radical Orthodoxy attempt to unpick how 
‘behind the politics of modernity (liberal, secular) is an epistemology (autonomous reason), 
which is in turn undergirded by an ontology (univocity and the denial of participation)’.76 
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Radical Orthodox histories construct a pejorative view, then, of the political consequences 
developed out of a Scotist univocal ontology. Unhooked from participation in God, social 
order became seen as merely a collection of autonomous individuals, especially in such 
philosophers as Hobbes and Adam Smith. The origin of society becomes essentially violent: 
competition and self-interest mark social relations, mediated by social contract in a 
supposedly neutral public space. Radical Orthodoxy calls for an ecclesial return to a 
participatory worldview which begins with ‘the ontological priority of peace over conflict’.77 
Indeed, Christianity contains ‘the precise opposite of nihilism – a creed which vigorously 
excludes all violence from its picture of the original, intended, and final state of the 
cosmos’.78 Participation in God therefore constitutes the political essence of Radical 
Orthodoxy: the doctrine of the Trinity expresses ‘a multiple which is not set dialectically over 
against the one, but itself manifests a unity’, an analogate in which the analogue of creation 
shares.79 Radical Orthodoxy opens up an antagonistic dualism, then, between participatory 
Christianity as ‘the true politics, the true polity’, and western modernity.80 The recovery of 
participation has turned into a call to arms. 
1.3 Participation in Hooker’s Thought: Problems and Prospects 
The previous section gave a general overview of the recovery and architecture of 
participation. This section can now turn to the problems and prospects for a study of 
participation in Hooker’s thought. At first sight, however, the presence of participatory 
language in Hooker’s thought seems incontestable but perhaps unpromising. Indeed, within 
the Lawes, the idea of participation only explicitly occurs in Books One and Five.  
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In Book One, Hooker refers to participation directly only twice, and both times in 
relation to the pursuit of the Good within a legal ontology. First, when he considers ‘the law 
wherby man is in his actions directed to the imitation of God’, Hooker appeals to two 
scholastic ideas with roots in Aristotle and Neoplatonism: that God is perfect actuality 
(‘conteyned under the name of Goodnesse’) while creatures are a mixture of potentiality and 
actuality; and that effects contain something of (and desire to become like) their causes. 
Hooker concludes that: 
…every effect doth after a sort conteine, at least wise resemble the cause from which 
it proceedeth: all things in the world are saide in some sort to seeke the highest, and to 
covet more or lesse the participation of God himselfe.81 
Second, Hooker casts goodness in more Platonic terms later on in Book One as he discusses 
the human pursuit of perfection: 
No good is infinite but only God: therefore he our felicitie and blisse. Moreover desire 
tendeth unto union with that it desireth. If then in him we be blessed, it is by force of 
participation and conjunction with him.82 
Both of these references to participation in Book One stand clearly within a Thomistic 
tradition of participation (participare, methexis) which combines Aristotelian causality with 
Neoplatonic metaphysics. 
The remaining direct uses of participation happen in Book Five from the fiftieth 
chapter onwards. Here, Hooker discusses sacramental participation and union with God, 
considering ‘how God is in Christ, then how Christ is in us, and how the sacramentes doe 
serve to make us pertakers of Christ’.83 Within these chapters, Hooker parses participation 
through biblical idioms, especially of abiding (menō) and inward fellowship (koinōnia): 
sacramental and ecclesial participation in Christ’s hypostatic union constitutes the restoration 
and fulfilment of human nature in (re)union with God. Accordingly, these later references to 
participation root the notion in the Trinity and our share in divine life through Christ. As 
such, Hooker offers in Book Five his only real definition of participation as ‘that mutuall 
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inward hold which Christ hath of us and wee of him, in such sort that ech possesseth other by 
waie of speciall interest propertie and inherent copulation’.84 As he elaborates this definition, 
Hooker paraphrases 2 Peter 1.4 (‘the participation of divine nature’) as a participatory chain 
from Christ to the Trinity where ‘wee are therefore adopted sonnes of God to eternall life by 
participation of the onlie begotten Son of God, whose life is the wellspringe and cause of 
oures’.85  
In these passages, although Hooker variously uses Thomistic and biblical idioms to 
explore participation, he consistently employs the verb in a singularly transitive and 
reciprocal manner.86 Thus, Hooker will always use ‘participation of’ (the objective genitive) 
rather than ‘participation in’ in order to show what would have been the grammatical object 
of ‘participate’. As such, Christ and the believer mutually participate one another through an 
asymmetric pattern of salvific transformation in the sacraments, just as all things participate 
God through God’s creation of all things and God’s act resides in his effects as the First 
Cause. Hooker’s transitive and reciprocal use of participation, whatever the biblical idioms 
which also shroud it, ultimately recalls Proclus’ Neoplatonic use of metechein. Indeed, after 
Hooker defines participation in Book Five, he immediately outlines two principles to unpack 
the nature of reciprocity within participation: ‘that every original cause imparteth itself unto 
those things which come of it’; and ‘whatsoever taketh being from any other, the same is 
after a sort in that which giveth it being’.87 These principles of participatory reciprocity 
recapitulate the account of causality set out by Proclus in his Elements of Theology, discussed 
in a previous section of this chapter (1.2.2). These Proclean principles were mediated to 
Hooker via Pseudo-Dionysius and Aquinas, and they help Hooker describe participation as 
the pattern of causality through which God’s utter transcendence causes, sustains, and 
redeems creation as its effect. 
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While these direct references to participation may seem relatively brief given the 
length and scope of the Lawes, they form the metaphysical foundations of the whole work. 
The previous section of this study showed just how polyvalent the concept of participation 
can be. The broad semantic field around participation means that, if the architectural 
connections of Hooker’s Lawes are laid bare (as this study hopes to do), then the subject of 
every part may be said to be participation, even if direct references are only made in Books 
One and Five. Indeed, though apparently unpromising, participation acts as an architectural 
principle which generates, informs, coheres, and illuminates the entirety of the Lawes: it is 
the principle behind and implied in every argument; all of Hooker’s claims must be read in 
light of his commitment to participation. As final prolegomena, then, this section overviews 
the following: the promise of, and problems in, contemporary study of participation in 
Hooker’s Lawes; the claims made for and against Hooker’s coherency and systematicity; and 
finally some methodological guidelines for, as well as the structure of, this study. 
1.3.1 Studies of participation in Hooker’s Thought 
Despite the relatively low number of direct references to participation in Hooker’s 
Lawes, modern scholars have increasingly recognised its key generative role within Hooker’s 
thought as part of a broader ressourcement of participatory metaphysics in Anglican thought. 
Yet, these accounts have not fully developed the generative and systematic architecture of 
participation in God strictly in relation to the polemical particulars of the Lawes itself, 
namely the move from ontology to epistemology and finally to politics hinted at earlier. 
Neither do studies agree on what participation means for Hooker, nor how it relates to 
deification, not to mention the meta-questions of what constitutes coherency and 
systematicity in the first place. This section overviews the most significant studies of 
participation in Hooker’s thought, highlights the disagreements and problems that this study 
seeks to overcome. 
F.L. Cross and E.A. Livingstone locate the modern recovery of participation 
(especially parsed as deification) in English thought to the patristic revival of the Oxford 
Movement.88 A.M. Allchin’s work on the idea of participation in Anglican thought from the 
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late sixteenth through to the nineteenth centuries attempted to demonstrate an even earlier 
persistence of such thought, a persistence in which the Oxford Movement also stood.89 
Allchin saw the ecumenical possibilities behind such ressourcement of participation and 
deification, especially as found in the Oxford Movement, writing: 
It was as if there was a veritable epiphany of patristic spirituality and theology in the 
midst of our divided western Christendom, an epiphany which would draw together 
into new possibilities of reconciliation elements of the Reformation heritage and 
elements of the continuing tradition of the churches in communion with Rome. Here 
again there is much unfinished business, much in the original vision of the Oxford 
Movement which has not yet been realised and appropriated.90 
If the Oxford Movement for Allchin looked to Rome, then the contemporaneous study of 
E.C. Miller on deification in the Anglican tradition claims that Anglicanism might stand as a 
kind of ‘Western Orthodoxy’.91 With studies such as those of Allchin and Miller, 
participation and deification seemed academically ripe for ecumenism, even as official 
Anglican-Orthodox dialogue counselled (as mentioned in the previous section) that theōsis 
was largely alien and problematic for Anglicans, at least in its Orthodox formulation. 
Yet, the broad claims about participation as deification are controversial when applied 
to Hooker. For Allchin, Hooker was the earliest key representative who makes participation 
in God central, the ‘forgotten strand in Anglican tradition’. Allchin coins the phrase 
‘theocentric humanism’ to describe how Hooker’s use of participation provides ‘a vision of 
man which finds its fulfilment in God’, a cosmic arc from creation through to salvation.92 
Taking into account Books One and Five of the Lawes, Allchin provocatively argued that 
Hooker’s language of participation in God implies a doctrine of deification. For Allchin, the 
Lawes describes how ‘not only that God has come down to be where we are, in our human 
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mess, but that he has lifted us up to where he is in his divine splendour’.93 Allchin 
accordingly aligns Hooker’s thought with ‘the doctrine of man’s theosis’ which ‘can only 
make sense when seen in relation to a world filled, or rather drenched, with God’.94 
Participation in the life of God therefore entails ‘a constant growth into the three theological 
virtues or powers of faith, hope, and love, a growth which leads us slowly from this world of 
time into the great world which lasts for ever’.95 For Allchin, Hooker (along with selected 
others) accordingly represents an Anglican reception of the Orthodox doctrine of 
‘deification’. David Neelands follows Allchin in seeing that Hooker was ‘informed by the 
Patristic notion of theosis or divinization’.96  
Other scholars challenge, however, the link that Allchin draws between participation 
and theōsis. For example, while John Booty affirms that participation is the key to Hooker’s 
theology, he suggests that Hooker does not intend the term to signify theōsis. Booty translates 
theōsis as ‘fusion, absorption, or deification’ and claims that Hooker clearly rejects such an 
idea.97 Instead, Booty claims, Hooker only uses biblical idioms to describe participation 
rather than the Orthodox idea of deification. For Booty, rather than ontological union with 
God, ‘the spirituality of participation is fundamentally social…restoring us to relationship 
with God and with one another’.98 Of course, Allchin, Neelands, and Booty all have problems 
in their readings. Allchin talks loosely of a ‘doctrine’ of participation and deification in 
Hooker’s thought which bears no immediate relation to the doctrinal particulars of deification 
within Orthodox thought. Similarly, Neelands spends too little attention on what constitutes 
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the Patristic idea of deification, while Booty’s definition of theōsis seems weak, if not 
misleading or even incorrect. 
Beyond such exegetical problems, however, the metaphysical role of participation in 
Hooker’s thought has gained steady currency. The most significant study, which Allchin 
uses, comes from Olivier Loyer, who places participation as the key that unlocks ‘non pas à 
l’économie de la creation seulement, mais à l’économie trinitaire et à l’économie du salut’.99 
Loyer continues that in Books One and Five of the Lawes: 
La participation, en effet, souligne à la fois la transcendence et l’immanence divine. 
Au plan de la creation, Dieu est en nous, cache au creux de notre être, précisément 
parce qu’il crée cet être de rien et, donc, lui est infiniment extérieur. Au plan de la 
redemption, Dieu est encore en nous, précisément parce qu’il nous donne sa grâce et, 
par là, manifeste son entière souveraineté. 
For Loyer, participation forms an ontological chain in Hooker’s thought, as it were, from the 
first gift of creation (in Book One) through to the final gift of adoption and union with the 
divine (developed in Book Five). Participation in Christ is the turning point from ontological 
becoming in Book One towards ontological being as believers share in the life of the Trinity. 
As Olivier Loyer writes of Hooker’s participatory account in Book Five, ‘[chez Hooker] le 
mystère de la vie trinitaire et de notre participation au Christ est l’origine et le terme de toute 
reflexion, de toute pratique religieuse.’100 
Following on from Loyer’s seminal study, a number of studies have paid attention to 
one or more aspects of how participation relates to other aspects of Hooker’s thought in the 
Lawes. Bryan D. Spinks and Charles Irish trace how Hooker uses participation in relation to 
the sacraments.101 Spinks notes how Hooker’s discussion of law in Book One paves the way 
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for the later discussion of the ordo salutis in Book Five. Spinks draws the arc in this way: for 
Hooker, ‘the created universe itself, with its laws, allows participation in the divine…election 
through Christ, justification, and the society of the church allows this participation to be 
achieved.’102 Irish similarly traces how Hooker’s account of participation in Book One 
combines Neoplatonic and Aristotelian ideas to create a legal entelechy; after sin frustrates 
such legal desire for perfection, the divine law (co-identical with Christ) restores and fulfils 
human nature, leading to Hooker’s discussion in Book Five of sacramental participation in 
Christ. Other writers, such as Egil Grislis, Robert Schwarz, Robert Slocum, and Edmund 
Newey, variously see participation as a cornerstone in Hooker’s theological system in 
relation to topics as diverse as christology, creation, anthropology, and soteriology.103 
Generally, however, such works do not move beyond Books One and Five. Accordingly, the 
illuminating potential of participation for the entirety of the Lawes goes largely unexplored, 
especially related to Hooker’s polemical purpose to defend the ‘particular decisions’ that 
govern the Elizabethan Religious Settlement. 
The cumulative works of the Canadian scholar W.J. Torrance Kirby form the most 
helpful exception to this lacuna. Kirby’s studies of participation in Hooker’s thought range 
from close, analytical readings of the idea, particularly in Book One, through to exploring the 
governing role that participation plays both to extol and limit the royal ecclesiastical 
dominion. Kirby’s work consistently shows how Hooker combines participatory metaphysics 
with the concrete political and constitutional issues of the Elizabethan period. As such, Kirby 
insists that the Lawes acts as ‘political theology’ where particular theological commitments 
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determine the shape of political claims. Participation remains the most significant theological 
commitment in the Lawes, according to Kirby, that in turn significantly shapes Hooker’s 
political vision. In particular, Kirby argues that Hooker’s participatory exposition of 
Chalcedonian Christology (especially in the fifty-third chapter of Book Five) shapes his 
polemical defence of lay ecclesiastical supremacy in Book Eight: 
The Christological categories of person and nature, of subject and accident, are 
deployed throughout Hooker’s examination….By his studied use of these categories, 
Hooker invoked a powerful and traditional theological model for his defence of the 
Tudor constitution and, by implication, impugned the Disciplinarian opposition to the 
union of Church and Commonwealth as itself doctrinally unsound.104 
Accordingly, this work intends to build upon that of Kirby and take it one step further. 
Kirby’s insight that a particular ontology generates the shape of politics remains true, but 
misses out the intervening epistemology that connects the two as a kind of flying buttress. 
Indeed, the participatory structures of Books One and Five generate Hooker’s 
epistemological claims in Books Two through Five just as much as his later political 
apologetics. 
1.3.2 Coherency and Systematicity in Hooker’s Thought 
The central claim of this work is that participation systematically forms the 
architectural ratio that makes the parts of the Lawes cohere together as a whole. This claim 
begs, of course, two questions: namely, whether or not the Lawes actually is both systematic 
and also coherent. Of especial importance for this work, then, are the challenges to Hooker’s 
systematicity and coherency in terms of how his epistemological and political claims relate to 
his ontological commitment to participation. In order to clarify the challenges ahead, the 
following section briefly outlines the various attitudes to Hooker as a theologian and to the 
Lawes as a whole. 
The idea of Hooker as a coherent systematic thinker at all causes difficulty in certain 
circles. On one side, William Haugaard claims that ‘no theologian before Richard Hooker 
                                                          
104 W.J.T. Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy (Leiden: Brill, 
1990), p. 8. Kirby’s other works will be discussed throughout this study and so are not listed 
here. 
34 
 
had given [emerging Anglicanism] systematic or coherent theological expression’,105 and 
Egil Grislis proclaims that ‘Hooker saw his work as a logically consistent whole’.106 Indeed, 
according to Aidan Nichols, it is in Hooker’s Lawes that ‘Anglicanism first achieved a 
relatively coherent form’, while Paul Avis thinks that Hooker ‘laid the foundations of 
Anglican ecclesiology’ since he was ‘great with the greatness of Shakespeare’.107 Similarly, 
Dionisio De Lara, J.S. Marshall, George Morrel, Olivier Loyer, A.S. McGrade, Lee W. 
Gibbs, and A.J. Joyce all argue that Hooker’s works reveal a coherent, systematic unity, 
although only Marshall, Morrel, and Loyer see participation as a constituent part of such 
harmony.108 Indeed, Marshall guardedly writes that the Lawes ‘is not a systematic theology’, 
by which he means a systematic arrangement of doctrinal topics, but rather represents ‘a 
system of unique comprehensiveness of design and fullness of interpretation’ and ‘an organic 
scheme’.109 
Yet, on the other side, some writers cast doubt on Hooker’s status as a systematic 
theologian or as a coherent thinker at all. James Cargill Thompson describes the Lawes 
merely as a piece of polemical writing: ‘Hooker was continually arguing to a brief, and he 
cannot easily be acquitted of the charge of subordinating his political ideas to the immediate 
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needs of the controversy.’110 The logical unity of Hooker’s thought was, according to Cargill 
Thompson, a product of political necessity rather than theological commitment. In a similar 
vein, Diarmaid MacCulloch witheringly writes of Book Five, ‘one feels that if the 
parliamentary legislation of 1559 had prescribed that English clergy were to preach standing 
on their heads, then Hooker would have found a theological reason for justifying it.’111 Other 
scholars, such as William Bouwsma and Charles Miller, argue that to classify the Lawes as a 
theological system would be misleading, even inappropriate.112 For Bouwsma and Miller, the 
Lawes does not fit the genre of systematic theology where philosophical systems or 
theological categories determine the shape, content, or order of a work. Bouwsma argues that 
the category of system would be an unlikely feature for Hooker’s work anyway. He writes: 
I am aware that some of Hooker’s disciples have admired him as a consistent or even 
a systematic thinker….And of course, as the famous first book of the Lawes shows, 
Hooker could manage, in limited passages, a degree of systematic coherence. But the 
sixteenth-century was, on the whole, uncongenial to systematic thought; and when we 
encounter it, it seems chiefly to serve not so much cognitive needs as the need for 
order and control.113 
Despite his own reservations about the systematic status of the Lawes, Miller affirms, 
however, that ‘we can, nevertheless, see across Hooker’s writings a coherence’ that comes 
out of ‘a core of concepts’ such as rationality, hierarchy, and participation. Similarly, Bryan 
Spinks argues that the Lawes is not a ‘systematic theology’ in the modern sense, but rather 
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has a coherent structure that allows him to move from general philosophical principles to a 
defence of the Elizabethan Settlement.114  
Second, other scholars attack the idea that Hooker’s Lawes exhibits coherency at all, 
whether in its political, epistemological, or ontological claims, or in the relation between 
them. First, a series of scholars argue that Hooker’s political vision in the later parts of the 
Lawes fails to cohere with his ontological commitments in Book One. For example, H. F. 
Kearney argues that Hooker remains unable to reconcile rationalist and voluntaristic 
conceptions of law across the Lawes.115 Likewise, Peter Munz suggests that Hooker fails to 
reconcile Thomistic principles of the reasonableness of law with the realities of the Tudor 
political situation, the latter of which called for appeals to Marsilius of Padua and the 
implication that the state was purely voluntaristic and secular.116 Other scholars challenge 
Hooker’s coherency in terms of how his epistemological claims relate to his ontology. 
Gunnar Hillerdal writes that ‘Hooker’s philosophical failure is evident’ since he fails to join 
an Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy of reason, which evaluates nature in a positive light, with 
a Protestant theology of grace and predestination.117 Joseph Devine similarly challenges the 
integrity of Hooker’s thought when he concludes that Hooker ‘scholastic theology broke 
down’ when it fails to explain in satisfactory terms the Reformation soteriological principle 
of sola fide (faith alone) alongside the Thomistic idea that grace perfects nature.118 As A.S. 
McGrade looks over scholarly studies of Hooker’s epistemology, then, he observes that 
Hooker ‘has the unusual distinction of being severely criticised for both hypo- and hyper-
rationalism’, of either subsuming reason under the activity of irrational grace or extolling 
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reason at the expense of revelation, and in either case falling foul of incoherency.119 In turn, 
Rory Fox claims that ‘Hooker’s ecclesiastical polity is muddled, incomplete, and quite simply 
incoherent’.120 For Fox, tradition is the only warrant Hooker can employ against the 
arguments of his radical puritan opponents for further reform; and yet this is the same 
theological warrant he rejects in the arguments put forward against the English Reformation 
by his Roman Catholic opponents. Elsewhere, W.J. Torrance Kirby points to how ‘two 
Christian Platonisms’ found in Hooker’s legal ontology causes broad and perhaps 
irreconcilable tensions. Kirby describes the two Christian Platonisms as Augustinian 
immediacy (immediate participation through Christ) and Dionysian hierarchy (the mediation 
of participation through created orders). The two traditions of participation here appear 
contradistinctive: if one has immediate participation in Christ, then a mediatory system of 
created orders would seem gratuitous. For Kirby, ‘the continuing debate over the logical 
cohesiveness of Hooker’s thought might be illuminated by further reflection on these two 
Christian Platonisms.’121  
In light of these kinds of criticisms, that Hooker’s thought is both coherent and 
systematic remains an open question, especially since studies have ill-defined what exactly 
constitutes coherence and system in the first place. The following section turns, then, to these 
questions. As a final prolegomenon, the following section outlines some hermeneutical 
principles for this study in relation to the terms participation and deification, as well as to the 
key question of what constitutes coherence and system. 
1.3.3 Hermenutical Principles 
Four hermeneutical principles will guide this study as it explores in what sense the 
idea of participation shapes Hooker’s Lawes into a coherent and systematic whole. The 
opening two principles regard the meaning of participation and deification. The final two 
principles address what this study will understand ‘coherence’ and ‘system’ to mean. 
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The first principle comes from the heuristic ‘architecture of participation’ developed 
earlier (1.2.2). This heuristic device will inform what Hooker means when he refers both 
directly to participation in Books One and Five, as well as the wider semantic field around 
participation as it occurs throughout the Lawes. As the architecture of participation shows, 
participation works as a polyvalent term, covering a range of philosophical, biblical, and 
popular idioms and images. The participatory architecture has two non-competitive and 
overlapping cadences: the ‘weak/extensive/exiting’ and the ‘strong/intensive/returning’. The 
language of creation describes the former, while the language of deification (itself capable of 
multiple meanings) exists as a possibility in the latter cadence. 
The second principle relates to the first and upholds Hallonsten’s distinction 
(developed in 1.2.1) between a theme and a doctrine of deification. The doctrine of 
deification remains unique to Eastern Orthodoxy, while the theme of deification holds 
possibilities for modern ecumenical discourse since it describes the broad and commonly held 
exegetical set of biblical images, especially participation, union, and adoption. A theme of 
deification does not necessarily entail, of course, a doctrine, especially not in its Orthodox 
formulation. Accordingly, this study will explore Hooker’s thematic account of participation 
and deification without assuming its direct equivalence to doctrinal uses in eastern 
theology.122 In this regard, this study employs Russell’s salutary fourfold typology of 
nominal, analogical, ethical, and realistic aspects of deification in order to understand 
Hooker’s account of theōsis. 
The third and fourth principles concern in turn what constitutes coherence and system, 
but require some more explanation. The two terms share, of course, some common ground. 
‘Coherency’ suggests something about the logical arrangement and connection of parts. 
Similarly, ‘system’ suggests the causal relation of parts in a whole.123 Indeed, W.V. Quine 
and J.S. Ullian suggest that system, coherence, truth, and logic remain intimately nestled 
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together, implying one another through a web of connected gestures.124 Yet, both terms come 
with intellectual baggage and claims that they obfuscate either the indeterminacy or the 
clarity of Christian kerygma. Quentin Skinner, for example, writes about the ‘myth of 
coherence’ in which later exegetes impose a unified reading of particular thinkers, giving 
them a false ‘coherence, and an air generally of a closed system, which they may never have 
attained or ever been meant to attain’.125 As mentioned earlier, William Bouwsma wonders 
whether coherency acts as a useful lens at all through which to view thinkers like Hooker. In 
a different vein, Paul Holmer attacks the ‘scandal’ of some academic theologians and their 
‘senseless system-mongering’ that looks like idle speculation.126 Hooker faces his own 
critics, of course, in this regard too. The anonymous conforming puritan authors of A 
Christian Letter in 1599 accuse Hooker of writing in a style in which he would show himself 
‘another Aristotle by a certain metaphisicall and crupticall method [in order] to bring men 
into a maze’.127 The anonymous authors of A Christian Letter here allege that Hooker 
obscures his heterodoxy with abstract speculation far removed from apostolic and kerygmatic 
simplicity. If either coherence or system are going to be useful terms, then, it needs to be 
clear what these terms will mean in this study of Hooker’s participatory thought. 
As Robert Audi notes, there are many varying philosophical accounts of coherency, 
and the term also raises the wider issues of justification and truth.128 Justification involves a 
vertical relation between basic propositions to those they justify. A claim is justified if it 
corresponds with contiguous claims in a broader network of belief. In contrast, claims of 
truthfulness either involve horizontal relations between propositions within a web that 
demonstrate their truthful coherency, or a comparison between the beliefs (or judgements) 
being assessed and the world as it is commonly experienced, a comparison that demands 
correspondence in order to claim veracity. Unlike correspondence theories of truth, then, 
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philosophical coherentism in its most stringent forms therefore holds that, ‘the epistemic 
justification of an empirical belief derives entirely from its coherence with the believer’s 
overall system of empirical beliefs and not at all from any sort of factor outside that 
system.’129 Likewise, philosophical coherentism stresses that the harmonious horizontal 
relation of propositions marks the truthfulness of a system of beliefs: a statement coheres 
(and so is true) if it follows logically from, or implies, some other statement.  
While questions of justification and truth (as well as the philosophical shortcomings 
of coherentism) are beyond the concerns of this work on Hooker, three useful aspects about 
coherency come to the fore. First, at a basic level, coherency suggests the relation of ideas 
within a web, where ideally each belief in the web entails or gestures towards all the others. 
Second, coherency assumes that the logical principle of non-contradiction must hold for these 
relations to have structural integrity: one proposition cannot contradict another within the 
web. As such, coherence also involves the stronger notion of logical implication already 
indicated in the first aspect: a statement coheres either if it follows on from, or if it implies, 
another statement.130 Third, as Laurence BonJour admits, ‘since actual human systems of 
belief seem inevitably to fall short of perfect coherence, however that is understood, their 
truth is usually held to be approximate at best.’131 
Anna Williams points out that theological and secular epistemology diverge on a 
number of points, but converge nevertheless in a number of significant ways regarding what 
constitutes coherency, as well as the provisionality and epistemic limits of truth claims.132 
Unlike propositions in some coherentist accounts, theological claims do not exist in a self-
contained propositional system, but rather act as a way to describe how creation relates to 
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God and so how creatures relate to one another. As Anna Williams writes, theology ‘never 
claimed its plausibility rested solely on the compatibility of propositions within a system, but 
only that coherence is the goal and by-product of correct interpretation of its recognized 
warrants’, especially Scripture.133 While the divine subject and origin of theology remains 
certain, theological claims are not indubitable but rather reflect the provisional understanding 
of their human participants in the divine act of self-disclosure. Williams notes that ‘the 
provisionality of Christian belief does not, however, distinguish it from non-theological 
claims’134 since current philosophical epistemologies rarely argue that certitude remains 
attainable, as seen in the third aspect of philosophical coherency above. 
Texts from Hooker seem to lend support to a nuanced account of coherency. On the 
one hand, for Hooker in the Lawes sacred doctrine is a scientia, a way of knowledge, rather 
than simply a propositional set: ‘Theologie, what is it but the science of thinges divine? What 
science can be attained unto without the help of natural discourse and reason?’135 As Peter 
Candler shows in relation to Aquinas, the medieval notion of theology as a scientia involves 
the manuduction (manuductio) of believers as it ‘leads them by the hand’ to participate in the 
life of God.136 Similarly for Hooker, since human beings grow ‘by steppes and degrees’, 
theology aims to help them grow and participate in God. In the Lawes, such participation 
occurs especially through embodied worship, the edifying liturgical acts that serve as a ‘hand 
to lead and a way to direct’.137 The Lawes might indeed be said itself to be an exercise in 
manuduction given its emphasis on participation, an attempt to lead his theological opponents 
‘by the hand’ to conformity and ‘the participation of God himselfe’.138  
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42 
 
On the other hand, Hooker elsewhere describes the provisionality and epistemological 
limits of faith as an intellectual habit. Hooker remains aware of the apophatic limits of 
theological enquiry, writing how: 
…dangerous it were for the feeble brain of man to wade farre into the doings of the 
Most High…[Y]et our soundest knowledge is to know that we know him not as in 
deed he is, neither can know him.139 
Indeed, Hooker declares that human attempts to understand perfectly the relationship between 
God and creation are limited by the incommensurability of human limitation and divine 
transcendence, writing that: 
…the manner of this divine efficiencie being farre above us, we are no more able to 
conceive by our reason, then creatures unreasonable by their sense are able to 
apprehend after what manner we dispose and order the course of our affaires.140 
For Hooker, theology retains the capacity for self-critique because it understands the limits of 
human understanding and the debilitating effects of sin. 
In light of Hooker’s stress on theology as provisional and in via, the third 
hermeneutical principle of this study will be the following: ‘coherency’ refers to the web of 
claims that, although less than indubitable, exhibits as few internal inconsistencies as possible 
while seeking to imitate the divine self-disclosure and draw people into divine participation. 
The degree to which the web coheres lends it internal strength and credibility. Yet, because 
the web remains provisional, such coherence does not thereby involve a zero-sum game in 
which any inconsistency or tension necessarily makes the whole structure collapse. Hooker’s 
thought will be coherent to the degree that the ontological, epistemological, and political 
claims of the Lawes exhibit mutuality and avoid blatant contradiction but not necessarily 
tension. Indeed, for Hooker such tensions are endemic to the human search for knowledge 
and arise because ‘every cause admit not such infallible evidence of profe, as leaveth no 
possibilitie of doubt or scruple behind it’.141 This work will show how participation implies 
the web of claims made in the Lawes, its own architectural gestures making the broader web 
                                                          
139 Hooker, Lawes, 1:59.12-16; I.2.1. 
140 Hooker, Lawes, 1:68.2-6; I.3.4. 
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of claims cohere together, and to which other claims themselves gesture back. As such, this 
study privileges not a hermeneutic of suspicion (as many studies of Hooker implicitly seem to 
adopt, seeking out apparently insoluble dilemmas), but rather gives priority to a generous 
hermeneutic seeking to re-trace Hooker’s architecture of order that bears and distributes the 
load of metaphysical, epistemological, and political tensions evident in his context into a 
stable edifice. 
This third principle about coherency leads to the fourth principle about what counts as 
systematic. The relational nature of propositions indicates a system in which they operate. 
W.V. Quine and J.S. Ullian write: 
Nearly any body of knowledge that is sufficiently organized to exhibit appropriate 
evidential relationships among its constituent claims has at least some claim to be 
seen as scientific. What makes for science is a system, whatever its subject.142 
As shown earlier in this section, Hooker sees theology as a science, a body of knowledge 
about ‘thinges divine’. As such, as an exercise in theology, the Lawes must involve system in 
some regard. Anna Williams provides a helpful distinction here between two senses of what 
‘systematic theology’ might mean.143 The term can refer to ‘a body of prose intended to give 
a reasonably comprehensive account of Christian doctrine, ordered locus by locus’, a 
tendency which Williams labels as ‘Type1’. Yet, the term can also refer to ‘theological 
writing in which the treatment of any one locus indicates, at least in some measure, how it is 
informed by other loci or how it will itself determine the shape of others’, a tendency which 
Williams labels as ‘Type 2’. The fourth hermeneutical principle turns on whether Hooker’s 
Lawes exhibits a Type 1 or Type 2 form of system. 
Some scholars claim, as noted in the previous section, that Hooker’s Lawes work is in 
some regard a Type 1 systematic theology. Marshall argues, for example, that Hooker’s 
Lawes largely parallels the structure of Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, while De Lara exclaims 
that ‘Richard Hooker is the St Thomas Aquinas of Anglicanism…with his powers for 
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systematic thinking’.144 Yet, these claims are fraught with almost intractable difficulties over 
the theological identity of Hooker, not to mention the structural implausibility that the Lawes 
in any meaningful sense maps onto the Summa Theologiae. Recent Hookerian scholarship 
traces the influence of Reformed thought on Hooker, as well as Reformed uses of Aquinas, 
making it difficult for modern scholars to reach a consensus about how to identify Hooker’s 
theology.145 Furthermore, the contingent polemical concerns determine the structure of the 
Lawes, rather than any Type 1 systematic genre. Yet, while it excludes the Lawes as a Type 1 
systematics, Hooker’s polemicism actually frames the Lawes within Type 2. Hooker scholars 
have noted the rhetorical side of Hooker’s work, in terms of style, strategy, and polemic.146 
Brain Vickers convincingly argues that ‘Hooker’s use of rhetoric is ultimately subordinate to, 
and dependent upon, logical argument’.147 For Vickers, Hooker appeals to a particular genus 
of Aristotelian rhetoric – the judicial oratory – through which he hopes to establish the justice 
or injustice of certain actions and beliefs in relation to the Elizabethan Settlement and lay 
ecclesiastical supremacy. The genre of the judicial oratory implies settling a dispute through 
logical demonstration and thus depends more upon cumulative reason and judgement rather 
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than persuasive guile. Vickers focuses here on Hooker’s logical and orderly attempt to 
provide a coherent account of the disputed ontological, epistemological, and political aspects 
of the Elizabethan Settlement. As such, ‘it is abundantly clear that Hooker has structured his 
work using the terms and techniques of formal logic’ which ‘soon develops strands or 
filaments that reach out to make other connection’.148 The notes here of logic and the 
generative relation between ideas that mutually gesture towards each other sound out 
something like Williams’ Type 2 systematicity in Hooker’s Lawes. 
Even though Hooker does not consider an exhaustive set of doctrinal loci in the 
Lawes, this work will show how Hooker’s participatory metaphysics gesture towards, shape, 
and knit together his epistemological and political claims into a coherent whole. As such, 
Hooker’s participatory metaphysics act like a jigsaw piece: though a complete doctrinal 
puzzle may be absent, ‘a solitary piece displays by its very shape its trajectory towards 
linkage,’ as Anna Williams phrases it.149 Hooker indeed sees the Lawes as constituting a 
whole whereby each element adds strength to what follows, and each former part gestures 
back and illuminates what has gone before. Of this purpose, Hooker writes: 
For as much helpe whereof as may be in this case, I have endeavoured throughout the 
bodie of this whole discourse, that every former part might give strength unto all that 
followe, and every later bring some light unto all before. So that if the judgements of 
men doe but holde themselves in suspence as touching these first more general 
meditations, till in order they have perused the rest that ensue: what may seeme darke 
at the first will afterwards be founde more plaine, even as the later particular decisions 
will appeare, I doubt not more strong, when the other have beene read before.150 
Thus, Hooker works through the most significant metaphysical claim – participation – to 
specific epistemological and political consequences since: 
…in all parts if knowledge rightly so termed things most general are most strong: 
Thus it must be, in as much as the certaintie of our perswasion touching particulars 
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dependeth altogether upon the credite of those generalities out of which they 
growe.151 
The final hermeneutical principle, then, accords with Williams’ Type 2 account of systematic 
theology. This final principle acts as the litmus test for the presence of system in Hooker’s 
thought, understood not as a genre but as an orderly relation of gestures that portray or 
suggest comprehensiveness, either explicitly or tacitly. 
1.3.4 Structure 
Having now laid out the relevant prolegomena, this final section can now lay out the 
structure of this work. Hooker’s ontological, epistemological, and political claims all face 
exegetical problems over their coherency and systematicity. The next three successive 
chapters broadly consider in turn, then, Hooker’s ontology (2), epistemology (3), and politics 
(4), tracing out the architectural role of participation in each area, as well as suggesting how it 
overcomes or diffuses alleged problems over the coherency of the Lawes. As such, this order 
follows Hooker’s aim to move from the ‘general’ to the ‘particular’ in the Lawes. In light of 
these close readings, the final chapter (5) gathers together an account of in what sense 
Hooker’s thought can accordingly be said to be coherent and systematic. 
More precisely, the second chapter considers the architecture of participation as it 
occurs in two metaphysical mini-treatises in Books One and Five of the Lawes. It argues that 
Hooker explores an extensive and an intensive mode of participation to explore the 
metaphysical distinction and relationship between nature and grace in creation and 
redemption. For Hooker, participation involves a double donation: God’s influence 
undergirds the integrity of creation, and it also gratuitously effects redemption through Christ 
who imprints a new supernatural finality in the human natures of believers who participate 
him through baptism and the eucharist. The third chapter then explores how Hooker 
constructs in Books Two through Five of the Lawes two modes of cognitive participation in 
God derived from and corresponding with these two modes of metaphysical participation, 
namely the natural and the supernatural. In epistemological terms, God illuminates the natural 
rational capacities of humankind which participate in the ratio of eternal law, but also 
supervenes with the saving knowledge of Scripture in order to remedy the effects of sin. This 
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third chapter unpacks how human beings receive such supernatural knowledge not only 
through reason but also through the emotions in worship, which acts as a training school to 
mediate and re-form right reason and right desire as they share in divine truth and goodness. 
The fourth chapter explains how the preceding metaphysical and epistemological claims of 
the Lawes, structured by an architecture of participation, offer a ‘grammar of participation’ 
by which Hooker can account in the closing ‘books of power’ in the Lawes for how the 
visible episcopal orders and lay ecclesiastical supremacy are contingent and yet fitting 
participations in divine providence, suspended from and mediating divine causality and 
power. The closing chapter returns to the provocations of this opening chapter, addressing 
how Hooker’s architecture of participation accordingly can be seen to have generated both a 
sense of system and coherence across the Lawes as a whole. 
A serious and in-depth study of the architectural framework of participation in 
Hooker’s Lawes promises two benefits, then, one particular and the other general. On the one 
hand, this study addresses particular debates within contemporary Hookerian study over the 
coherency of his various ontological, epistemological, and political claims, laying out how 
the architecture of ‘participation in God’ informs, illuminates, connects, and coheres these 
claims together. On the other hand, it offers Hooker’s model of participation and deification 
as a salutary resource for both Anglican-Orthodox dialogue and for those who are interested 
in or involved with the modern theological and political retrievals of participatory 
metaphysics. Indeed, this study prepares the ground to show how Hooker’s account of 
participation illuminates, critiques, and opens up ecumenical and theological possibilities as 
part of a modern theological ressourcement of participatory metaphysics.
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2. ‘Most abundant vertue’: Hooker’s metaphysical architecture of participation 
2.1 Introduction 
As this work will explicate how Hooker’s epistemology and politics exhibit a certain 
systematic homology with his metaphysical thought, this chapter first explores the 
metaphysical claims of the Lawes. Here, participation forms the central concept which both 
shapes Hooker’s metaphysical discourse about how creatures share in God and also informs 
all of his subsequent claims, as later chapters will show. The previous chapter offered the 
heuristic ‘architecture of participation’ (1.2.2). Generally speaking, the architecture of 
participation describes the ordering of individuals and communities towards the perfection 
found most properly in God. Architecturally, participation has two non-competitive and 
complementary motifs. On the one hand, participation (methexis) images a 
‘weak/extensive/exiting’ paradigm, namely the divine influence within creation. An intrinsic 
pattern of divine causality renders all that exists as a divine gift and similitude, a sharing in 
God’s ‘most glorious and most abundant vertue’, as Hooker puts it.1 On the other hand, 
participation can also image a ‘strong/intensive/returning’ paradigm, namely the final 
perfection of creatures through an intense (re)union with the divine nature such that they 
become (as far as their forms allows) what they are not, namely god-like (theōsis). Hooker 
appeals to both architectural motifs in two metaphysical mini-treatises within the Lawes.2  
First, in chapters two through fifteen of Book One he uses participation to describe how 
creatures generally participate in (and desire union with) God through a legal ontology that 
circumscribes creation and redemption. Later, in chapters fifty through sixty-eight of Book 
Five he intensifies the participatory return of rational creatures to God with his account of the 
dominical sacraments, ultimately rendering participation in Christ as a form of deification. 
This chapter examines in turn, then, these two participatory moments in Hooker’s Lawes as a 
prelude to later chapters on epistemology and politics. 
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The presence in Books One and Five of the two aspects found in the heuristic 
architecture of participation occasions, however, the first challenge to the coherency of the 
Lawes. These two aspects loosely correlate with what Wayne Hankey respectively labels as 
‘Dionysian mediation’ and ‘Augustinian immediacy’, both Platonic in origin.3 First, Hooker 
appeals to ‘Dionysian mediation’ with his use of the Neoplatonic, hierarchical lex divinitatis 
[law of divine power], the system of laws that participate in eternal law and mediate between 
creation and the utterly transcendent, creative, and unitary principle of God’s own being.4 
Such a participatory system of mediating hierarchies flows through the work of Pseudo-
Dionysius and Aquinas into Hooker’s Lawes. Second, Hooker also appeals to the idea that, 
since human beings are made in the image of God, they are also capable of God and can 
immediately participate in grace of Christ’s union of human and divine natures through faith, 
especially within the dominical sacraments. Hankey labels this participatory dynamic as 
‘Augustinian immediacy’ since it derives from Augustine of Hippo, whose work heavily 
influences the sixteenth-century Reformers and leads to the corresponding Reformed 
emphasis on salvation by grace, faith, and Christ alone (the triumvirate of sola gratia, sola 
fide, solus christus).5 These claims about immediacy flow out of the confluence between 
early Christianity with Middle and Late Neoplatonism as they are commonly concerned with 
the soul’s mystical ascent to immediate union with God. Whatever the parallel presence of 
Dionysian mediation, such arguments remain influential within the medieval period with, for 
example, Aquinas defending the possibility of immediate union with God. For Aquinas, God 
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creates the rational soul immediately, and the rational soul cannot attain its ultimate 
perfection until it returns to God in the same manner, that is without creaturely mediation.6 
Torrance Kirby questions the logical cohesiveness of these two ‘Christian Platonisms’ 
when Hooker tries to hold them together in the Lawes.7 These two manners of mediation 
seem to stand in strong contrast to one another: the first mediates through a complex legal 
hierarchy of being; and, the second mediates immediately through Christ. The tension 
between the two modes of mediation represents a tension inherent in Hooker’s thought. For 
Kirby, the distinction unveils two contrasting concepts of God’s government (gubernatio dei) 
in Hooker’s thought: namely, hierarchy and grace. The question of cohesion is whether or not 
Dionysian mediation and Augustinian immediacy can sit together since either the latter seems 
to supersede the former, or the former suggests the latter is insufficient in some regard. 
Indeed, for the anonymous authors of A Christian Letter in 1599, Hooker’s account appears 
to overthrow the doctrine of the reformed Church of England. For these authors, Hooker’s 
appeal to the natural law tradition, the light of reason, and the authority of pagan philosophy 
(especially Aristotle) are all in breach with the emphasis of the Articles of Religion on 
Reformation principles of the sufficiency of Christ, faith, and Scripture.8 The authors allege 
that Hooker seems to qualify the perfect sufficiency of divine law in matters of salvation such 
that ‘almost all the principall pointes of our English creed [are] greatlie shaked and 
contradicted’. While Torrance Kirby argues that Hooker successfully combines a Neo-
Platonic ontology with Protestant assumptions about nature and grace, he also states that ‘the 
continuing debate over the logical cohesiveness of Hooker’s thought might be illuminated by 
further reflection on these two Christian Platonisms’.9 
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The burden of this chapter, then, is to unpack the complexity of Hooker’s 
metaphysical accounts of participation in Books One and Five of the Lawes, alluding to other 
texts from Hooker’s extant works that expand upon or clarify his argument. Hooker’s two 
accounts of participation will be taken in turn: first, an explicatio textus of the legal ontology 
in Book One (2.2), and then a similar exploration of Hooker’s account of the sacraments in 
Book Five (2.3). Through these readings of Books One and Five, this chapter unveils the 
presence of both the extensive and the intensive modes of participation in these two accounts. 
Finally, this chapter then details how Christ acts as the key who unlocks both participatory 
orders (mediatory hierarchy and immediate grace), distinguishing between nature and grace, 
but also uniting them as complementary acts of the same divine influence rather than dividing 
them as competitors (2.4). Here, this chapter recasts the apparent tension between Hooker’s 
two Platonisms as a productive one in which nature and grace cohere together as aspects of 
one divine knowing and gift, that is to say, as differing but related intensities of participation 
in God through Christ, each implying the other within the becoming quality of existence. 
Here, Christ forms the influential principle behind the mediating hierarchies, while their work 
remains his such that he personally perfects and elevates them in the immediacy of the 
hypostatic union shared in as a gift by believers. 
2.2 ‘The father of lights’: law and extensive participation in God 
 Hooker determines from the beginning of the Lawes to demonstrate that the radical 
puritan understanding of the nature and authority of the law, with all of its ramifications for 
church order and practice, remains theologically deficient. Accordingly, the nature and 
character of law becomes the controlling image in Book One. Hooker proposes that: 
Because the point about which we strive is the qualitie of our Lawes, our first entrance 
hereinto cannot better be made, then with consideration of the nature of lawe in 
general, and of that lawe which giveth life unto all the rest, which are commendable 
just and good, namely the lawe whereby the Eternall himselfe doth worke. Proceeding 
from hence to the lawe first of nature, then of scripture, we shall have easier accesse 
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encore dans ses sermons’. 
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unto those things which come after to be debated, concerning the particular cause and 
question which wee have in hand.10 
While Hooker only explicitly mentions participation twice in this general account of law (see 
1.3), the very structure of Book One puts law in analogical terms. Analogy indicates the 
omnipresence of participatory metaphysics: the various laws derive from God as the ‘father 
of lights’ and so intrinsically frame creation as a participatory analogue of eternal law.11 As 
these laws dispose creation to perfective ends, they thereby reveal how all things ‘covet more 
or lesse the participation of God himselfe’ as the source and site of perfection. Such 
participation therefore begins with the first ‘weak/extensive/exiting’ paradigm (namely, 
creation) but sets the final end of creation as the second ‘strong/intensive/returning’ pattern of 
(re)union with God (or redemption). 
Since law acts as an analogical term, Hooker here distinguishes three summa genera: 
eternal law, natural law (covering both non-rational, non-voluntary agents, and voluntary, 
rational agents), and divine law. Book One of the Lawes thereby falls into three parts: what a 
law is in general, as well as the law by which God himself works (I.2); the law of nature (I.3-
10); and the law of scripture (I.11-15). This section offers an explicatio textus of these three 
parts. Accordingly, this explicatio textus details how Hooker establishes law as an analogical 
image (2.2.1) and then parses in turn Hooker’s threefold legal genera (2.2.2-4). Within this 
legal ontology, this chapter will show how Hooker weaves together a complex set of ideas 
springing from his participatory metaphysics: analogy, Aristotelian causality, eudaimonic 
desire, the medieval transcendentals of being (especially ‘one’, ‘good’, ‘beauty’, and ‘truth’), 
dispositive hierarchy, and the social aspect of Thomistic mereology (i.e. the theory of 
parthood relations).12 The latter aspect in particular plays an important polemical role against 
his puritan opponents who, Hooker alleges, set up their own private judgement above the 
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authority of the Church.13 For Hooker, participation implies that there are no atomised 
individuals but rather that individuality remains constituted by a vertical suspension from the 
divine and by hierarchical location within a created community of participated being. Here, 
the actions of an individual are only properly ordered when they refer to the common good at 
which the essence of law (as it is commonly held) aims as a final end. As such, Hooker 
establishes how laws mediate the immediate rule of eternal law as effects from an original 
cause, governing the creative exit and redemptive reversion of creation from and to God. 
2.2.1 ‘After a sort’: the analogy of law 
 In the second chapter of Book One, law acts as a conceptual lynchpin in Hooker’s 
teleological account of reality as inherently ordered within a universal entelechy that 
participates in diminished fashion in God’s own perfection. At the beginning of Book One of 
the Lawes, Hooker gives a general definition of law (very similar to that of Aquinas) as ‘that 
which doth assigne unto each thing the kinde, that which doth moderate the force and power, 
that which doth appoint the forme and measure of working, the same we terme a Lawe’.14 In 
other words, as it is for Aquinas, law is a rule of action appropriate to the thing it directs. For 
Hooker, ‘all things therefore do worke after a sort according to lawe’.15 On the one hand, 
then, law binds God and creation into a non-contrastive community. Both God and all of 
creation respectively are or have such an intrinsic ratio or nomos shaping the kinds of actions 
appropriate to their specific natures. Yet, on the other hand ‘law’ also separates God and 
creation since it acts as an analogical (rather than univocal) term that describes the actions of 
created things and ‘even of God himselfe’ but only ‘after a sort’.16 In relation to law, Hooker 
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Hooker more commonly prefers the term ‘proportion’ to ‘analogy’, recalling Aquinas’ 
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notes an asymmetry in the analogy between God and creation. Creation experiences the 
differentiated kinds of law as either the author of law or (more commonly) as the subject of 
law’s direction. Yet, in contrast ‘the workes and operations of God have him both for their 
worker, and for the lawe whereby they are wrought’.17 Hooker locates the ontological nature 
of law perfectly and simply in God’s self-mediated identity since the ‘being of God is a kinde 
of lawe to his working’. God simply is co-identical to law (per essentiam), whereas creation 
has laws which participate in eternal law (per participationem). 
Hooker’s order of laws (eternal, natural, divine), along with his use of analogy, 
indicates an implicit participatory structure of laws which strongly echoes the accounts of 
analogy, participation, and law found in Aquinas’ thought.18 Aquinas understands that 
participation has three elements: first, a source that possesses some perfection in total and 
unrestricted fashion (the analogate); second, a subject that possesses the same perfection, but 
in a limited and restricted way (the analogue); and, third, that the subject depends on the 
donating source of the perfection to receive that perfection, as an effect from a cause (the 
suspension of the analogue from the analogate).19 Within these three elements, any perfection 
remains analogical rather than univocal. In terms of the primary perfection of being (esse), 
for example, being can only be predicated analogically: as the primary analogate, God self-
subsists and simply is (per essentiam) whereas creation exists as an analogue by participating 
                                                          
analogy of proportionality where two or more terms are linked by a proportional relationship. 
Yet, Hooker’s use of participation suggests a relationship different to proportionality. Since 
there is a causal connection between the two terms of a participatory relationship, Hooker 
implicitly suggests an analogy of intrinsic attribution where a perfection found in creatures 
exists pre-eminently in God as its source. Compare Aquinas, ST, I.5-6 for his account and 
defence of analogy as the proper way to predicate perfections of God and creatures. 
17 Hooker, Lawes, 1:58.22-59.4; I.2.1. 
18 See Aquinas, ST, I.II.90-108 for the treatise on law; In De Heb, lect. 2, n.24 for a 
discussion of the types and structure of participation; In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum 
expositio, IV, lect.1, n. 535-543 (hereafter In IV Met.), English translation in Commentary on 
Aristotle's Metaphysics, trans. John P. Rowan (Dumb Ox Books, 1995). See also ST, I.13.5 
resp., and ScG, I. c. 34, for discussions of analogical predication. 
19 W. N. Clarke, ‘The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas’, Proceedings of the 
American Catholic Philosophical Association, 26 (1952), 150-52. 
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in God (per participationem), the freely donating source of participated being. Aquinas 
appeals to such participation in his account of humankind’s natural law: ‘natural law is 
nothing other than the sharing (participatio) in the eternal law by intelligent creatures.’20 
Here, Aquinas suspends the intrinsic character of natural law (formally disposed to perfective 
ends) from the perfect eternal law. Natural law accordingly acts as a diminished similtitude of 
divine government (providence, the ratio of eternal law).21 The eternal law expresses, for 
Aquinas, the rational order (ordo rationis) of creation in the divine mind which human reason 
then participates in and mediates through acts of the will and through particular actions.22 
Aquinas sees divine law both as a remedial aid for sin but also as a new form of participation 
in eternal law. Indeed, divine law acts as the supernatural revelation of God’s providence, 
equated with the eternal law, in moral matters. It also charitably gifts the grace of the Holy 
Spirit, and the light of grace illuminates the created intellect such that the creature is made 
deiform (deiformis).23 Divine law, especially the new law of Christ, has the greatest 
participation in eternal law because ‘nothing can approach nearer to the last end than that 
which is the immediate cause of our being brought to the last end’.24 
Two other features in Hooker’s definition of law also echo Aquinas and compound 
their similarity. Like Aquinas, Hooker couches the definition of law within Aristotelian ideas 
of causality that emphasise the non-coercive and teleological nature of law.25 Hooker leads up 
to his general definition of law with the Aristotelian ideas that ‘all things that are have some 
operation not violent or causall’, and that ‘neither doth any thing ever begin to exercise the 
                                                          
20 Aquinas, ST, I.II. 91.2 resp.  
21 Aquinas, ST, I.II. 90.1 ad. 1; I-II.91.2 resp. 
22 M. Rhonheimer, Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomist View of Moral 
Autonomy, trans. by Gerald Malsbary (New York, Fordham University Press, 2000), pp. 64-
70. 
23 Aquinas, ST, I.12.5 resp. 
24 Aquinas, ST, I.II.106.4 resp. 
25 For Aristotle, ‘violent’ is opposed to ‘natural’ operation. Hooker casts law as an 
intrinsic, natural principle rather than as the external, coercive mandate of an imposing force. 
See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1135a-1136b. English translation in The Complete Works 
of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 
vol. 2, pp. 1791-1793. 
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same without some foreconceaved ende for which it worketh’. Since Hooker appeals to the 
Aristotelian-Thomist dictum that all things work towards some perfective telos, law acts as an 
internal principle of action which ensures that agents are ‘made suteable fit and 
correspondent unto their end’.26 As a concept, law accordingly has a non-coercive character 
because it operates as a natural or voluntary (for rational beings) principle that directs all 
things towards the perfective ends proper to their natures. Second, Hooker’s definition itself 
emphasises the essential rationality of law, akin to Aquinas’ insistence that law is grounded 
in reason (aliquid rationis) and acts as a rule and measure for action (regula et mensura).27  
Hooker here betrays his suspicion of a crude and unmitigated voluntarism that portrays the 
inscrutable will of God as the root of all action and obligation, an attitude he thinks common 
in those advocating further ecclesiastical reform.  For Hooker, ‘they erre therefore who thinke 
that of the will of God to do this or that, there is no reason besides his will.’28 Similarly, in A 
Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride, Hooker insists that ‘a law simplie commanding or 
forbidding is but dead in comparison of that which expresseth the reason why it doth the one 
or the other.’29 Against such crude voluntarism, Hooker construes law as an inherent and 
rational pattern that directs all things to ‘the means whereby they tende to their owne 
perfection’.30 
                                                          
26 See Aquinas, ST, I.44.4 resp: ‘every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing 
would not follow more than another from the action of an agent, unless it were by chance.’ 
27 Aquinas, ST, I.II.90.1 resp. 
28 Hooker, Lawes, 1:61.18-19; I.2.5. 
29 Hooker, Pride, I, in FLE, 5:309.11-13. 
30 Hooker, Lawes, 1:69.10; I.3.5. Hooker does not ignore, however, the importance of 
the divine will in moving God to action. Since rational law directs creative action, it also 
involves the Scotist and Thomist idea of willing most rationally (rationabilissime), even 
where the divine reason may be unavailable to the human intellect. Indeed, Hooker writes 
that God wills rationally, that is to say according to the ‘counsel of his owne will’ even when 
‘many times no reason [be] knowne to us.’ See Lawes, 1:61.19-20, 23; I.2.5. Compare 
Aquinas, ST, I-II.93.4 resp. with Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, lib. III, dist. 7, q. 3, § 61 (ediz. 
Vaticana, 2006, vol. IX, p. 287, § 61), Lectura, lib. III, dist. 7, q. 3, § 77 (ediz. Vaticana, 
2003, vol. XX, p. 214, § 77); and Lectura, lib. III, dist. 32, q. unica, § 37 (ediz. Vaticana, 
2004, vol. XXI, p. 262, § 37). Pace the commentary in FLE, 6.1:482 (which argues that 
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For Hooker, then, the analogical concept of law forms a first principle that both unites 
and distinguishes the divine nature and the participatory created order. Law is a non-coercive, 
mediatory principle: the rational essence of law instils an intrinsic ordo from which things are 
directed to their own perfection. Such a notion can be asymmetrically applied to God as well 
as creatures: in God, law is found simpliciter; and in creatures law works through 
participation. Indeed, the variety of laws in creation analogously expresses the participation 
of the cosmos in its perfect Creator since ‘for that perfection which God is, geveth perfection 
to that he doth.31 The analogical link between God and creation militates against seeing 
creation as an autonomous space evacuated of God. Indeed, the source and root of all law is 
the being of God, entailing that all creation by its very nature theonomously participates in 
and is suspended from the divine nature.32 
2.2.2 ‘Her voice the harmony of the world’: participating eternal law  
 Hooker moves in chapters two and three of Book One from his general, teleological 
definition of law into a more detailed and specific consideration of the different legal genera, 
beginning with the eternal law co-identical with God’s nature. As noted in the previous 
section, participation implies that some quality exists in unrestricted fashion in a primary 
analogate, exists in some diminished manner in an analogue, and that the analogue is causally 
suspended from the analogate. In legal terms, then, eternal law represents the primary 
analogate, ‘her voice the harmony of the world,’ as Hooker phrases it.33 Accordingly, Hooker 
determines in the First Book of the Lawes to show ‘in what maner as every good and perfect 
gift, so this very gift of good and perfect lawes is derived from the father of lights’.34 This 
                                                          
Hooker rejects a genealogy of voluntarism from Scotus through to Luther and Calvin) 
Hooker therefore has Ockham more than Scotus in mind with his critique of unmitigated 
voluntarism. 
31 Hooker, Lawes, 1:59.5-6; I.2.2. 
32 I take the phrases ‘participated theonomy’, ‘theonomous’, and other similar 
cognates from M. Rhonheimer, Natural Law and Practical Reason, pp. 234-51. Theonomy 
contrasts with autonomy and heteronomy since it sees creation and God as distinct but also as 
related: laws are intrinsic to creatures but causally undergirded by eternal law. 
33 Hooker, Lawes, I.16.8; 1:142.9. 
34 Hooker, Lawes, I.16.1; 1:135.11-13. 
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section details how Hooker’s account of eternal law as the primary analogate balances on the 
one hand a radically Augustinian hypostatic distinction between God and creation with, on 
the other hand, Dionysian and Thomist ideas of dispositive hierarchy.35 The hypostatic 
distinction secures God’s transcendence, increases the distance between eternal law and 
created laws, and obviates mediation. The dispositive hierarchy in turn lessens the distance 
by emphasising God’s immanent causality within creation, what Kirby calls ‘the common 
participation of the manifold derivative species of law in their one source’.36 Herein lies the 
tension of whether such a balance between transcendence and immanence (and ultimately 
between Augustinian immediacy and Dionysian mediation) remains coherent or not. 
Hooker uses the tension, of course, to be productive. As such, Hooker’s account of 
eternal law establishes God as the ‘highest wellspring and fountaine’ of the first 
‘weak/extensive/exiting’ paradigm of participation. The legal expression of the divine nature 
constitutes the existential and formal manner through which creation exits from and returns to 
God (the Neoplatonic structure of exitus-reditus). As such, eternal law also points towards the 
henological, unitive tendency of the second participatory paradigm too, namely the 
‘strong/intensive/returning’ aspect in which the natural vocation of humankind remains union 
with God. Here, instantiated desire ‘teacheth unto union with that it desireth…by force of 
participation and conjunction’ and ‘united we live as it were the life of God’.37 Eternal law 
acts as the monistic ground from which springs variety, the derivation of the many from the 
one, or created hierarchy from ‘the first originall cause’ (archē). It also frames the dispositive 
goal of creation (telos) for transcendent (re)union. 
Since ‘law’ acts as an analogical term, Hooker views eternal law from two very 
different standpoints: it can be viewed either as a consubstantial quality of God’s nature in se, 
or from the perspective of creation as it participates in God ad extra. Hooker’s account of 
                                                          
35 On Augustinian hypostatic distinction and Dionysian dispositive hierarchy in 
Hooker’s account of eternal law, see W.J.T. Kirby, ‘Law Makes the King: Richard Hooker on 
Law and Princely Rule’, in A New Companion to English Renaissance Literature and 
Culture, ed. Michael Hattaway (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010), pp. 274-288. 
36 W.J.T. Kirby, ‘Reason and Law’, in A Companion to Richard Hooker, ed. W.J.T. 
Kirby (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 251-272 (p. 254). 
37 Hooker, Lawes, 1:111.21-25; I.11.1. 
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eternal law is therefore markedly Dionysian as he remarks upon the apophatic and kataphatic 
aspects of knowing God. On the one hand, ‘dangerous it were for the feeble braine of man to 
wade farre into the doings of the most High’ since ‘our soundest knowledge is to know that 
we know him not as in deed he is, neither can know him: and our safest eloquence concerning 
him is our silence’.38 For Hooker, in this passage the ‘naturall, necessary, and internall 
operations of God,’ such as the mystery of Trinitarian relations, are accordingly ‘without the 
compasse of my present intent’. The transcendent simplicity of the divine nature exceeds 
intellectual apprehension. On the other hand, however, we can apprehend something through 
rational reflection, experience, and divine revelation about God’s creation and governance of 
the world since ‘such operations…have their beginning and being by a voluntarie purpose, 
wherewith God hath eternally decreed when and how they should be’. As such, Hooker 
distinguishes between the ultimately apophatic operation of God’s nature in se and the 
kataphatic workings of God ad extra within creation. Indeed, ‘that little thereof which we 
darkly apprehend, we admire, the rest with religious ignorance we humbly and meekly 
adore.’39 
The twofold perspective of in se and ad extra, leads Hooker uniquely to posit a ‘first 
eternall lawe’ and a ‘second law eternall’.40 The first eternal law describes eternal law from 
God’s perspective and secures the radical otherness of God, the hypostatic distinction 
between God and creation. The internal operations of God contain both the natural and 
necessary operations of the Trinity and also the voluntary operations that have to do with ‘the 
law eternall which God himselfe hath made to himselfe, and therby worketh all things wherof 
he is the cause and author’.41 While God’s necessary and internal actions must be marked by 
ratio since ‘God’s being is a kinde of law to his working’, the divine nature exceeds human 
comprehension, even in relation to God’s voluntary actions in eternal law. God remains 
causa sui and his metaphysical simplicity causes the multiplicity of creation but sharply 
distinguishes him from it. Thus, Hooker defines the first eternal law in terms of the creative 
order of God’s voluntary decision to share participated being: ‘this law therfore we may name 
eternall, being that order which God before all ages hath set down with himselfe, for himselfe 
                                                          
38 Hooker, Lawes, 1:59.6-19; I.2.2. 
39 Hooker, Lawes, 1:62.10-11; I.2.5. 
40 Hooker, Lawes, 1:63.27-29; I.3.1. 
41 Hooker, Lawes, 1:62.1-2; I.2.5. 
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to do all things by.’42 Yet, since God creates the cosmos, the latter participates in variegated, 
diminished ways in the first eternal law. Such participation leads Hooker to claim that there is 
a second eternal law, namely ‘that which [God]…hath set downe as expedient to be kept by 
all his creatures’.43 The second eternal law describes eternal law from the perspective of 
creation, the pattern of legal actions internal to the created beings subject to participated 
eternal law. This second eternal law entails a necessary hierarchical subordination between 
the creature and the Creator. Yet, the second eternal law suspends creation from God and so 
lessens the distance: the hierarchy of being commonly participates in eternal law, co-identical 
with God’s perfection. It is this second notion that more readily concurs with the Thomistic 
legal and teleological tradition (something Hooker himself intimates) in which the rational 
providence of eternal law of God moves ‘all things to their due end’ and in which ‘all laws 
insofar as they share in right reason to that extent derive from the eternal law’.44 While the 
first eternal law is concerned with ‘being’ (esse, co-identical with and found perfectly in 
God), the second eternal law revolves around ‘becoming’ (as creation dynamically receives 
and seeks its variegated and diminished perfection of esse). 
Indeed, the legal work of God in se and ad extra remain linked through the analogical 
notion of participated law. The fundamentally unknowable mystery of God’s monistic nature 
generates a Neoplatonic procession of manifold laws that frame and order creation so that it 
returns to God as the source and site of perfection.45 Hooker explicates the causal link 
between the in se and ad extra, between the primary analogate (God) and participatory 
analogue (creation), through the medieval transcendentals. The transcendentals have their 
genesis in Plato (following Parmenides) who considers the co-extensive properties of being-
as-such. In turn, Aristotle coins the term ‘transcendental’ to describe those properties of being 
that transcend the ten categories, that is to say all the possible things that can be the subject or 
                                                          
42 Hooker, Lawes, 1:63.1-3; I.2.6. 
43 Hooker, Lawes, 1:63.8-9; I.3.1. 
44 Aquinas, ST, I-II. 93.1 resp. where the ‘Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to 
their due end, bears the character of law’; and ST, I.II.93.3 resp. where ‘the eternal law is the 
plan of government in the Chief Governor.’ See Hooker, Lawes, 1:64 s for Hooker’s 
quotation of Aquinas’ following articles 4-6. 
45 See W.J.T. Kirby, ‘The Neoplatonic Logic of Richard Hooker’s Generic Division 
of Law’, Renaissance et Réforme, 22.4 (1998), 49-67. 
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predicate of a proposition. Of all the medieval thinkers who comment upon the 
transcendentals, it is Thomas Aquinas who gives them greatest coverage and constitutes the 
medieval tradition of the transcendentals par excellence.46 Properly speaking, the 
transcendentals are convertible terms for ‘being’ (esse), which is the ground of possibility for 
all subsequent perfections. Of particular importance for Hooker are the ‘one’ (unum), the 
‘good’ (bonum), the ‘beautiful’ (pulchrum), and the ‘true’ (verum). ‘One’ adds to ‘being’ the 
notion of intelligible unity; ‘good’ adds to ‘being’ the notion of plenitude; ‘beauty’ adds to 
‘being’ the idea of attraction; and ‘truth’ adds to ‘being’ the idea of correspondence between 
a thing and its form. Hooker follows Aquinas and treats the transcendentals as they relate to 
God’s nature, as well as to how they relate to human desires to share in them. As human 
beings desire perfection, so too do they desire the transcendental qualities found most 
completely in God. 
In order to understand how creation participates in the transcendental properties of 
eternal law through the mediation of the legal pattern of immanent causality, Hooker looks in 
the two directions of eternal law. First, he looks at the perfections found in the divine nature. 
Second, he considers how God’s perfection acts as the efficient, exemplary, and final cause 
of all created perfections. This second viewpoint describes the participatory ontology of 
creation, the kataphatic suspension of all that exists from God as a participatory analogue. 
Accordingly, Hooker begins his account of eternal law by explicating in what manner God in 
se is the source and site of all perfections, the primary analogate of participation. Two of the 
convertible transcendentals in particular – esse and unum – form God’s co-identical, essential 
perfections As Hooker considers God’s nature, he emphasises that ‘Our God is one [unum], 
or rather verie Onenesse, and mere unitie’. 47 Hooker’s account here densely fuses together 
Christian creedal monotheism with a Neo-platonic, henological emphasis on the principle of 
unity as the goal of creative and intelligible activity.48 Hooker then emphasises God’s 
                                                          
46 See J. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas 
Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1996).  
47 Hooker, Lawes, 1:59.20-24; I.2.2. 
48See Proclus, Elements of Theology, Proposition 21: ‘Every order has its beginning in 
a monad and proceeds to a manifold co-ordinate therewith; and the manifold in any order 
may be carried back to a single monad.’ See Kirby, ‘The Neoplatonic Logic’, pp. 51 and 61 
n.7, which lists as further examples the following: Plotinus, Enneads, III.8.7 (‘It is certain, 
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simplicity in ontological terms. Recalling Aristotelian-Thomistic arguments, Hooker states 
that God is essentially self-subsisting being (esse) who, of necessity, is completely in act 
(purus actus) and no way in potentiality. 49 Such essentially self-subsisting being constitutes 
and self-mediates its very own ratio, a kind of law to its own working and the unitary source 
of all created laws. 
Hooker therefore identifies the essential ontological plenitude and henological unity 
of God as the source and summit of cosmic order. Turning from the nature of God in se 
towards God’s creative acts ad extra, Hooker joins together the transcendentals with a 
Neoplatonic structure of exitus-reditus and Aristotelian physics. Here, God’s eternal law acts 
as an efficient, formal, and final cause in creation, that is to say the existential and formal 
ground of participation in God.50 Thus, since the being of God is co-identical with law, God 
                                                          
also, that as the Firsts exist in vision all other things must be straining towards the same 
condition; the starting point is, universally, the goal’); Plotinus, Enneads, V.4.1 on the One as 
origin, and VI.9.3 on the One as end; Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, p. 145 
(‘Inspired by the father, each procession of the Light spreads itself generously toward us, and 
in its power to unify, it stirs us by lifting us up. It returns us back to the oneness and deifying 
simplicity of the Father who gathers us in. For, as the sacred Word says, “from him and to 
him are all things” [Rom. 11:36]’); and Augustine, Confessions, 13.4-5, English translation in 
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, eds. Philip Schaff & Henry Wace, first series, 14 vols. 
(Peabody: Hendrickson, 1994), vol. 1, p. 191. 
49 Hooker, Lawes, 1:72.26-30; I.5.1. ‘Act’ and ‘potency’ are technical terms derived 
from Aristotle’s distinction, transmitted by Aquinas, between έν δυνάμει and έν ένεργεία. See 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IX.1-8, 1045b-1050a. English translation in Aristotle, Complete 
Works, vol. 2, pp. 1651-60. Compare Aquinas, ST, I.3.7 resp. 
50 Aristotle identifies four causes: formal, final efficient, and material. See Aristotle, 
Physics, Book II.1-9, 192a-200b. English translation in Aristotle, Complete Works, vol. 1, pp. 
329-42. Hooker omits mention of the material cause, but stands within typical scholastic use 
of Aristotelian causality in the medieval and early modern periods, including that of 
scholastic theologians within Reformed Orthodoxy. See T. Theo J. Pliezier and Maarten 
Wisse, ‘“As the Philosopher Says”: Aristotle’, in Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, ed. 
Willem J. Van Asselt (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2011), pp. 26-45, 
esp. pp. 39-40. 
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acts both as the first cause for the genesis of the world through a downward, creative 
procession of being contained under specific created forms (the efficient and formal cause), 
and also as the final cause to which all things tend through a legal entelechy of desire for the 
original divine unity and plenitude of being. God’s transcendent action operates, then, 
through mediate, intrinsic causes. Hooker enumerates two principles behind such 
participation, both of which follow Aquinas’ idea that the cause remains in the thing caused 
(causa est in causato).51 First, Hooker argues that there is a diminished similitude between 
effect and cause: ‘everie originall cause imparteth it selfe unto those things which come of it.’ 
Second, participation primarily is ontological: ‘whatsoever taketh beinge from anie other the 
same is after a sorte in that which giveth it beinge.’ For Hooker, participation therefore 
describes the causal ordering of the cosmos towards God as creative source and perfective 
end since ‘every effect doth after a sort conteine, at least wise resemble the cause from which 
it proceedeth’.52 
Hooker recognises a consonance between non-Christian and Christian sources that 
affirm God as efficient and formal cause of participation. In one direction, Hooker points 
towards ‘the wise and learned among the verie Heathens themselves’, such as Homer, 
Mercurius Trismegistus, Anaxagoras, Plato, and the Stoics, all of whom recognise ‘some 
First Cause, whereupon originallie the being of all things dependeth’.53 In all cases, these 
pagan authors see the first cause as a self-mediating, legal, and rational principle.54 Like 
Aquinas, Hooker then blends together in Book Five the Neoplatonic language of self-
diffusion and influentia with Aristotelian ideas of God as the efficient cause of being: ‘God 
hath his influence into the very essence of all things, without which influence of Deity 
                                                          
51 Hooker, Lawes, 2:234.33-235.3; V.56.1. Compare Aquinas, ST, I.44.3. Aquinas 
argues that God’s ideas act as the exemplary, effective, and final cause of created things and 
that creaturely essences participate in the divine mind as an effect participates in its cause. 
52 Hooker, Lawes, 1:73.7-8; I.5.1. See also Pride, III, in FLE, 5:341.3-9. 
53 Hooker, Lawes, 1:59.33-60.14; I.2.3. 
54 Hooker, Lawes, 1:60.11-14; I.2.3: ‘They all confesse therfore in the working of that 
first cause, that counsell is used, reason followed, a way observed, that is to say, constant 
order and law is kept, whereof it selfe must needs be author unto itself.’ 
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supporting them their utter annihilation could not choose but follow.’55 In a Christian vein, 
Hooker similarly sees in Book One that ‘from the Father, by the Sonne, through the Spirit all 
things are’.56 In other words, all created forms are said to be from the Father, by the Son, and 
through the Holy Spirit, and thereby analogically participate in the divine being and unity of 
the Trinity as a diminished similitude. 
In terms of final causality, ‘the generall end of Gods external working, is the exercise 
of his most glorious and most abundant vertue: Which abundance doth shew it selfe in 
varietie’.57 Hooker again blends non-Christian thought with Christian claims in order to detail 
how the many share a unitary source. Following Aristotle, a thing’s formal cause determines 
its end or final cause.58 As something seeks its formal cause, determined by its nature and 
mediated through intrinsic laws, it also vicariously participates in the perfect final cause, 
namely God. As the final cause, God directs creation to its share in the perfection of being 
through participation in eternal law, co-identical with God’s being and unity. It is the sense of 
God as the final cause which leads Hooker to give a thoroughly Thomistic account of the 
‘good’ (bonum), a teleological transcendental at which all forms aim and desire.59 The ‘good’ 
                                                          
55 Hooker, Lawes, 2:236.7-13; V.56.5. The Neoplatonic language of ‘influence’ and 
‘causality’ can be found in Proclus, Elements of Theology, Proposition 35, pp. 37-38, who 
summarises the process of emanation and return as follows: ‘every effect remains in its cause, 
proceeds from it, and returns to it.’ Compare Aquinas, ST, 1.65.3 resp., who follows Proclus 
in arguing that the causality of higher forms operate through lower forms, even if covertly, 
such that ‘the thing that underlies primarily all things [i.e. Being] belongs properly to the 
causality of the supreme cause [i.e. God]’. 
56 Hooker, Lawes, 1:59.28-29; I.2.2. 
57 Hooker, Lawes, 1:61.6-8; I.2.4. 
58 Hooker, Lawes, 1:67.y; I.3.4: ‘Form in other creatures is a thing proportionable to 
the soul in living creatures. Sensible it is not, nor otherwise discernable than only by effects. 
According to the diversity of inward forms, things of the world are distinguished into their 
kinds.’ Forms, or formal causes, are that which give things their being. Accordingly, ‘form’ 
corresponds with ‘law’ in that they both relate to proper ends, the first as formally 
establishing and the second as directing a creature towards its perfecting telos. 
59 On goodness, see Aquinas, ST, I.II.94.2 resp: ‘the good has the intelligibility of an 
end’; De Ver, 21.1 ‘all things found to have the criterion of an end at the same time have the 
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adds to esse the notion of perfective fullness such that all perfections ‘are conteyned under 
the generall name of Goodnesse’.60 Since God is purus actus and self-subsisting being, then 
God’s nature is also co-identical with the ‘good’ and ‘there can bee no goodnesse desired 
which proceedeth not from God himselfe, as from the supreme cause of all things’.61 Hooker 
here affirms the integral goodness of all creation: Hooker parses ‘good’ in terms of 
participatory ‘being’, which all things enjoy to some kind or degree since God is ‘the 
supreme cause of all things’. Transcendental goodness lends to ‘being’ an ecstatic quality 
characteristic of participatory metaphysics: as the last chapter showed (1.2.1), participation 
(methexis) means to strive for or be in pursuit of something else, in this case ‘being’. For 
Hooker, a thing’s form ecstatically directs it to perfective ends, rendered as ‘good’ because 
they qualitatively add to participated being. All things therefore ‘covet more or lesse the 
participation of God himselfe’ as the source and site of all goodness.62 With the outward 
motion of being emanating from God, beings participate in their efficient cause; in the return 
to God, things seek their final cause through their formal constitution. Form or law suspends 
creation from, and ecstatically directs creation back towards, participation in God’s goodness. 
 Hooker establishes, then, the first eternal law as the apophatic fount of the manifold 
forms of law understood by rational creatures under the aspect of the kataphatic second 
eternal law. The orders of created laws that participate in eternal law fall under two genera 
for Hooker: natural (which contains species of physical, celestial, and rational law) and 
revealed. Human laws straddle these two genera, reflecting that they exist under both types. 
Indeed, Peter Munz perceptively describes how, for Hooker as for Aquinas, human laws 
                                                          
criterion of a good’; and ST, I.5.1 resp. everything is perfect insofar as it is actual. For 
Aquinas, essences are dispositional properties that tend from potency to act insofar as they 
are realised in or by the substantial subject. Since actuality is perfection, the ‘end’ is the point 
at which the dispositional properties of natural substances reach their fulfilment as a likeness 
to their divine cause. Thus, Aquinas variously describes the end as perfect and as ‘good’, 
meaning a diminished similitude of divine ontological plenitude. 
60 Hooker, Lawes, 1:73.2-3; I.5.1. 
61 Hooker, Lawes, 1:73.5-7; I.5.2. Hooker stands within a Thomistic tradition again. 
Aquinas, ST, I.6.1 resp. writes: ‘All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God 
Himself, inasmuch as all things are similitudes of the divine being.’ 
62 Hooker, Lawes, 1:73.10-14; I.5.2. 
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represent ‘nothing but the rational application to concrete and sometimes varying conditions 
of the general principles of natural law’,63 and (in Christian societies) such particular 
determinations also must accord with Scripture.64 Hooker accordingly writes of the 
architectonic suspension of various laws from eternal law: 
Now that lawe which as it is laid up in the bosome of God, they call eternall, recyveth 
according unto the different kinds of things which are subject unto it different and 
sundry kinds of names. That part of it which ordereth natural agents, we call usually 
natures law; that which Angels doe clearely behold, and without any swarving 
observe is a law coelestiall and heavenly; the law of reason that which bindeth 
creatures reasonable in this world, and with which by reason they most plainly 
perceive themselves bound; that which bindeth them, and is not knowen but by 
speciall revelation from God, Divine law; humane lawe that which out of the law 
either of reason or of God, men probablie gathering to be expedient, they make it a 
law. All things therfore, which are as they ought to be, are conformed unto this second 
law eternall, and even those things which to this eternall law are not conformable, are 
notwithstanding in some sort ordered by the first eternall lawe.65 
Hooker recognises the paradox that the eternal law, properly speaking, remains inexplicably 
‘laid up in the bosome of God’, and yet such eternal law ‘readeth it selfe to the world’through 
a pattern of legal causality.66 The two participatory genera of ‘natural law’ and ‘divine law’ 
are the patterns of such divine action within creation. Although we are ‘neither able nor 
worthy to open and looke into’ the book of eternal law, God gratuitously self-discloses and 
shares his nature when he suspends creation from eternal law as a diminished similitude.67 In 
both natural and revealed law, then, God accommodates himself to the finite capacity of 
created forms. As such, the apophatic, transcendent divine nature remains paradoxically 
‘alwayes before our eyes’ since we are capable of discerning immanent divine causality in 
                                                          
63 Munz, The Place of Hooker, p. 54. See Hooker, Lawes, I.10.1-15; 1:95.27-110.20.  
64 Hooker, Lawes, 1:237.21-29; III.9.2. For this principle, Hooker cites Aquinas, ST, 
I.II.95.3. 
65 Hooker, Lawes, 1:63.14-29; I.3.1. 
66 Hooker, Lawes, 1:136.14; I.16.2. 
67 Hooker, Lawes, 1:62.11; I.2.5. 
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our own intrinsic forms and in the historical divine self-disclosure.68 The following sections 
detail, therefore, Hooker’s account of these two legal genera, beginning with natural law and 
following with divine law. The first section on natural law images the extensive participation 
of God in creation. The latter section on divine law portrays the intensive participation of 
God in redemption. 
2.2.3 ‘From the footstoole to the throne’: natural law and the logic of desire 
Hooker turns in chapters three through ten of the Lawes from the primary analogate of 
participatory metaphysics (eternal law) to the analogue of creation (the natural law tradition). 
Indeed, Hooker’s take on the natural law tradition represents the first way in which eternal 
law ‘reads’ or mediates itself into the world, the way in which God adapts his influence to our 
capacities. As such, the participatory analogue of natural law exhibits a diminished likeness 
to the order of eternal law as it is causally suspended from (and tends towards a unitive return 
to) the same eternal law. This Dionysian lex divinitatis forges all of creation together in a 
chain of being which participates in God as the highest cause.69 The ecstatic quality of 
participation as a striving towards something sets desire as a watermark stamped through 
Hooker’s account of the two hierarchical extremes of the participated second eternal law, 
namely both ‘natures law’ and the ‘law cœlestiall and heavenly’.70 The former covers laws 
that govern non-rational and non-voluntary agents as they intuitively desire natural ends, a 
kind of precursor to the modern idea of physical science. The latter considers the laws which 
govern the ‘immaterial and intellectual’ angelic orders geared to the supernatural vision of 
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69 See Hooker, Lawes, 3:331.19-332.1; VIII.2.1 where Hooker paraphrases the lex 
divinitatis in the following manner: ‘Order is a gradual disposition…..[God] requireth for 
ever this to be kept as a law, that wheresoever there is a coagmentation of many, the lowest 
be knit to the highest by that which being interjacent may cause each to cleave unto other, 
and so all to continue one.’ In Hooker’s Autograph Notes, in FLE, 3:494.2-12, he refers to the 
Christian Neoplatonism of Pseudo-Dionysius as his source: ‘Lex itaque divinitatis est infima 
per media ad suprema reduci, inquit B. Dionysius’ [And so it is a divine law, says St. 
Dionysius, for the lowest things to be led back to the highest by those that are intermediate]. 
70 Hooker, Lawes, 1:63.18, 20; I.1.3. 
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God (visio dei) that satiates their cognitive desire.71 Thus, Hooker moves from the ‘footstoole 
to the throne of God’ in order to emphasise both the universality of law and also the 
saturation of the material and immaterial worlds with a logic of desire which aims at 
perfection within the bounds of particular forms.72 Hooker structurally places the human law 
of reason between these two extremes in order to show that humankind shares non-voluntary 
and voluntary, material and immaterial, physical and intellectual types of participation in 
eternal law. As all these species of natural law share a common logic of desire to share in the 
convertible transcendentals of being (particularly unum, bonum, and pulchrum), both the 
material and immaterial creation are ‘sociable partes united into one bodie’.73 Participation 
thereby displays a mereological aspect: the varied forms of creation naturally tend towards 
order, harmony, proportion, and the common good. This section considers in turn, then, each 
of these three legal species (the natural, celestial, and rational) contained under the summa 
genera of natural law. It develops how Hooker balances the twin Platonisms of Dionysian 
mediation and Augustinian immediacy. Indeed, Hooker suspends the mediating legal orders 
of creation from the immediate influence of God as subordinate instrumental causes that 
participate in their divine efficient cause. 
Beginning at the ‘footstoole’, Hooker (like Aquinas) broadly intends ‘natures lawe’ to 
‘meane that manner of working which God hath set for each created thing to keep’.74 More 
specifically, Hooker means the term to refer to ‘naturall agents, which keepe the law of their 
kind unwittingly, as the heavens and elements of the world, which can do no otherwise then 
they do’.75 Such physical, non-cognitive laws of nature participate as a diminished similitude 
of ‘what the eternall lawe of God is concerning things natural’.76 Participation in eternal law 
                                                          
71 Hooker, Lawes, 1:69.25; I.4.1. 
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E. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion (Washington: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2011). 
73 Hooker, Lawes, 1:69.11-12; I.3.5. 
74 Hooker, Lawes, 1:64.3-5; I.3.2. Compare Aquinas, ST, I.II.91.2 ad 3 where non-
rational creatures share in the eternal law by ‘inward moving principles’, the innate 
tendencies to certain acts and ends. 
75 Hooker, Lawes, 1:64.4-8; I.3.2. 
76 Hooker, Lawes, 1:65.12-13; I.3.2. 
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constitutes natural order and stability in the universe. Hooker paraphrases Arnobius of Sicca 
to suggest that the whole cosmos would accordingly collapse if it were to stray from the order 
and rule of the law of nature: 
Now if nature should intermit her course, and leave altogether, though it were but for 
a while, the observation of her own laws…what would become of man himselfe, 
whom these things now do all serve?77   
Indeed, the laws of nature asymmetrically depend upon the perpetual stability and ratio of 
eternal law for both their created content and their perfecting government.78 
 Hooker expresses the government of eternal law over nature within a Neoplatonic 
structure of procession and reversion (exitus-reditus) through which created things naturally 
desire and pursue the transcendentals of being, unity, and goodness. In terms of the 
production (exitus) of the cosmos, Hooker draws an analogy between the participation of the 
law of nature in eternal law and the production of art. Hooker appeals to the image of God as 
an ‘artist’ or ‘workman’, common in other Neo-platonic and Christian writers, to describe 
how nature proceeds from the perfect, divine creative source.79 Hooker writes: 
                                                          
77 Hooker, Lawes, 1:65.20-66.4; I.3.2. See Lee Gibbs, ‘The Source of the Most 
Famous Quotation from Richard Hooker’s Law of Ecclesiatical Polity’, Sixteenth Century 
Journal, 21.1 (1990), 77-86. 
78 Hooker, Lawes, 1:66.27-67.20; I.3.4. 
79 Hooker, Lawes, 1:68.25; I.3.4. Hooker refers to God as a ‘workman’, akin to the 
Platonic and Stoic name for the Maker of the world (the demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus). The 
‘artist’ metaphor also recalls Aquinas, ST, I.II.93.1 resp. where Aquinas groups art (ars), 
exemplar (exemplar), idea (idea), and law (ratio) together. Here, Aquinas compares the 
eternal law of God with the exemplar an artist has when he produces a work of art. Pauline 
Westerman conceptually situates ‘exemplar’ within medieval theories of art: an exemplar acts 
as no mere conventional pattern that one copies, but as a criterion to distinguish whether or 
not a work of art, as a whole, is suitable and proportionate for its purpose, that is to say 
whether or not it corresponds harmoniously with what the artist intended. See Pauline 
Westerman, The Disintegration of Natural Law Theory: Aquinas to Finnis (New York: Brill 
1997), pp. 26-30. 
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Notwithstanding with nature it commeth sometimes to passes as with arte….Those 
things which nature is said to do, are by divine arte performed, using nature as an 
instrument….Nature therefore is nothing else but Gods instrument….[U]nto us there 
is one only guide of all agents naturall, and he both the creator and the worker of all in 
all. 80 
In this passage, Hooker follows Aquinas and distinguishes between the first cause (God as 
‘creator-worker’) and secondary or ‘instrumental’ causes (the ‘divine arte’ of created forms) 
in order to subsume all activity in creation under the legislative power of the eternal law.81 
Hooker here follows medieval and early modern discussions of Aristotelian causality, 
including those typically found in Reformed scholasticism. The instrumental cause is a 
subordinate efficient cause. In this case, describing nature as an instrumental cause guards its 
integrity: natural forms are not merely passive recipients of God as their efficient first cause, 
but enjoy the participatory influence of God’s action in their very being. Both the first 
perfection of esse (from God as efficient cause) and also the subsequent, secondary 
perfections (from the instrumental, formal acts of nature) have their source and reference in 
God. Order, regularity, proportion, and the consonance of instrumental causes with the first 
cause reveal, for Hooker, that ‘nature hath some director of infinite knowledge to guide her in 
all her ways’.82 They also show that the space between the creative exit from and redemptive 
return to God is not evacuated of natural agency. Just as Neoplatonism has a tripartite 
cosmological account of monē-prodoos-epistrophē that honours the suspended middle 
between exit and return (1.2.2), Hooker’s account of natural law argues that, as human beings 
share an intellectual character with God, the law of reason unveils how human communities 
are both made in the image of God and also work as co-creators with God, instruments 
undergirded by divine influence. 
                                                          
80 Hooker, Lawes, 1:66.6-7; 1:68.18-69.5; I.3.3-3.4. 
81 The distinction of causes is Thomist in tone. See Aquinas, Compendium Theologiae 
ad Fratrem Reginaldum, 17.10. English translation in Compendium of Theology, trans. Cyril 
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Hooker then turns to the perfective return (reditus) of nature to its unitive source. The 
law of nature stems from ‘the setled stabilitie of divine understanding….tearmed by the name 
of Providence’.83 Hooker rejects the notion that participation consists of creation imitating 
‘exemplary draughts or patterns….subsisting in the bosome of the highest’.84 Hooker 
accordingly embraces Aristotelian entelechy rather than Platonic form. Intrinsic laws act as 
entelechies and are the means, an ‘original draught’,85 through which creatures act 
purposively but theonomously participate in God, ‘some director of infinite knowledge to 
guide her in all her ways’.86 Thus, creation is neither autonomous (that is to say, evacuated of 
divine activity), nor is it heteronomous (that is to say, arbitrarily subject to the divine will). 
Rather, creation remains theonomous, meaning that created forms instrumentally participate 
in, and are suspended from, a providentially ordered eternal law. 
The internal principles of law direct all things, both non-rational and rational, to 
particular perfective ends that are participatory similitudes of divine, transcendental 
perfections. In an account reminiscent of Aquinas, they do so through a natural pattern of 
desires, a logic which motivates action towards perfection. Here, ‘desire’ describes what 
Sarah Coakley defines as ‘the physical, emotional, or intellectual longing that is directed 
towards something or someone wanted’.87 For Aquinas, natural law participates in eternal law 
through appetites, that is to say natural inclinations which work as the ‘inner principle of 
motion’ directed towards naturally perfective ends.88 These perfective ends are parsed as 
‘good’ and natural dispositive desires work as a physical (and in the case of rational 
creatures, psychic) motor to move a creature from inclination to action. Thus, both rational 
                                                          
83 Hooker, Lawes, 1:68.6-11; I.3.4. Compare Hooker, Autograph Notes, in FLE, 
3:527.12-18: ‘Operatio Dei ad extra est duplex: Creatio. Gubernatio’ [God’s external 
operation is double: creation, government].  
84 Hooker, Lawes, 1:66.31-67.3; I.3.4. 
85 Hooker, Lawes, 1:66.31-68.15; I.3.4. 
86 Hooker, Lawes, 1:67.20-25; I.3.4. 
87 Sarah Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay ‘On The Trinity’ 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2013), p. 346. 
88 Aquinas, ST, I.II. 93.6 resp; I.II. 94.2 resp. The idea of appetite recurs throughout 
the Summa Theologiae. See ST, I.II.8.1: ‘Appetite is nothing other than an inclination toward 
something, something that is both similar and suited to that which desires it.’ 
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and non-rational creatures orient themselves through natural desire to goodness and 
‘participate in the divine reason by way of obedience’.89 Similarly, for Hooker, desire stems 
from all created things being ‘somewhat in possibilitie’, which is to say as not yet fully 
actualised or fulfilled in their potential quality of existence.90 Desire works as an existential 
motor driving the ecstatic, formal move from becoming to being through the pursuit of 
perfective ends.  
Like Aquinas, Hooker especially understands this ‘becoming’ through the medieval 
transcendental ‘goodness’, the perfective actuality of ‘being’.91 For Aquinas, goodness 
evokes appetitive desire: ‘the reason that something is good is that it is desirable…Goodness 
and being are the same in actuality, but goodness as such involves the idea of desirability.’92 
Similarly, Hooker notes two ‘degrees’ of possible ‘goodnesse’, the ‘good’ (bonum) 
describing that transcendental which all things desire, namely the plenitude of being (esse) 
which is co-identical with God’s nature. First, all things desire ‘the continuance of their 
being’, that is to say, to ‘be like unto God in being ever’, mainly through survival and 
propagation. This first desire constitutes participation in being (esse), the ground for all other 
possible perfections, and which is only found absolutely in God as ipsum esse. ‘The next 
degree of goodnesse,’ Hooker writes, revolves around ‘resemblaunce with God’ through ‘the 
constancie and excellencie of those operations which belong unto their kinde’, namely 
consistency for non-rational agents (to imitate immutability) and excellence in the knowledge 
of truth and exercise of virtue (for rational agents to imitate God’s ‘absolute exactness’). 
Such ontological participation in God remains essentially Trinitarian in character. Just 
as all things participate in God as effects in their highest cause, so too do all things in some 
way share in the Father as ‘goodness’, in the Son as ‘wisdom’ ordering all things, and in the 
power of the Spirit as an end.93 Participation therefore has a mereological aspect: it describes 
both the derivation of the many from the One, and also the parthood relations between 
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92 Aquinas, ST, I.5.1. See Jan A. Aertsen, ‘The Convertibility of Being and Good in 
St. Thomas Aquinas’, New Scholasticism, 59 (1985), 449-470. 
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created forms that share in, and are united under, the common good. Indeed, Hooker yokes 
together the telos of the laws of nature with perfectibility and the common good. He writes 
that: 
…lawe directeth them [i.e. natural agents] in the meanes whereby they tende to their 
owne perfection: So likewise another law there is, which toucheth them as they are 
sociable partes united into one bodie, a lawe which bindeth them each to serve unto 
others good, and to preferre the good of the whole before whatsoever their owne 
particular.94 
Perfection is the end of the law of nature, and perfection is thereby bound up with social life. 
Hooker turns from this ‘footstoole’ to the ‘throne of God’ in order to discuss the 
cognitive and rational participation in God as it is found in the immaterial angels. As in his 
account of nature’s law, Hooker’s analysis of angelic law combines an entelechy of desire 
with the wider social character of his legal teleology. The angelic orders are directed by the 
inherent principles of celestial law to certain desirable ends, namely the transcendentals of 
being (esse), goodness (bonum), and, for the first time, beauty (pulchrum). Hooker begins his 
account of celestial law by noting how God acts as the source and end of desire for 
transcendental perfections: 
God which mooveth meere naturall agents as an efficient onely, doth otherwise move 
intellectuall creatures and especially his holy Angels. For beholding the face of God, 
in admiration of so great excellencie they all adore him; and being rapt with the love 
of his beautie [pulchrum], they cleave inseparably for ever unto him. Desire to 
resemble him in goodness [bonum] maketh them unweariable, and even unsatiable in 
their longing to doe by all meanes all maner good unto all the creatures of God, but 
especially unto the children of men….Angelicall actions may therefore be reduced 
unto these three generall kindes; first, most delectable love arising from the visible 
apprehension of the puritie, glory, and beautie of God….; second, adoration grounded 
upon the evidence of the greatnes of God, on whom they see how all things depende; 
thirdly, imitation bred by the presence of his exemplary goodnes, who ceaseth not 
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before them daily to fill heaven and earth with the rich treasures of most free and 
undeserved grace.95 
Rational agents like angels enjoy a cognitive participation in God: the spiritual sight of God 
(visio dei) properly signals intellectual apprehension of divine perfection, an apprehension 
which awakens the inherent desire of celestial law to ‘adore, love, and imitate’ God as the 
final cause.96 Angels are moved by God as final cause because they are intellectual agents 
whose rational capacities and wills are attracted to the perfect and perfecting ratio of God’s 
being. Such perfections are, of course, the act of being (esse) expressed under the convertible 
transcendentals of goodness (the fullness of being) and beauty (the attractive, desirable 
quality of being). Hooker thus suggests that participatory celestial law moves angelic agents 
to the perfection of their own kind, a limited reflection of divine plenitude, through vision 
and imitation of God. Indeed, Hooker notes that the Book of Job twice calls angels the 
‘Sonnes of God’, a familial term that suggests both generative dependency and mimetic 
similarity.97 
As is true for the laws of nature, celestial law has a markedly sociable quality. While 
non-rational agents are ‘sociable partes united into one bodie’ by non-cognitive, natural 
participation in eternal law, angels intellectually apprehend God’s perfection. As such, angels 
are deliberately linked ‘into a kinde of corporation amongst themselves, and of societie or 
fellowship with men’ through a mutually recognisable, cognitive participation in eternal law. 
Cognitive participation generates a rational, hierarchical, and helpful society between angels 
and humanity. Hooker accordingly suggests that there are three functions of celestial law.98 
First, celestial law has an intrinsic aspect that calls angels to ‘praise’ God as the source of all 
perfection. Second, celestial law has a corporative aspect, establishing a celestial hierarchy of 
orders, ‘an Army, one in order and degree above the other.’ Finally, celestial law emphasises 
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angelic service, the ‘ministeriall imployment’ with and to humankind who also reflect the 
rational participation in eternal law.99 The obedient angels execute this threefold celestial law 
with ‘joy’, an ecstatic expression of a freely embraced law which directs the angels to 
individual, corporate, and cosmic perfection.100 God is both the source and summit of this 
celestial law. It is precisely the failure to apprehend God as the perfect good, caused by a 
faulty estimation of autonomy, which led to the angelic fall from grace. Hooker takes the 
classical Christian position that ‘the fall of Angels therefore was pride’, the rejection of God 
in favour of an ‘admiration of their own sublimitie and honor’.101 The consequence of angelic 
sin remains profoundly anti-social: the fallen angels ‘have by all meanes laboured to effect an 
universall rebellion against the lawes, and, as far as in them lyeth, utter destruction of the 
workes of God’.102 
Finally, within natural law Hooker places the law of reason dialectically between the 
laws of nature and celestial law, namely as between the footstool and throne of God. On the 
one hand, then, human beings exhibit a likeness to the angels: as intellectual analogues of 
God, both possess reason and will.103 As such, the final perfection of human nature (just as 
with the angels) comes from cognitive participation in God: 
If then we be blessed, it is by force of participation and conjunction with him [i.e. 
God]….Then we are happie therfore when fully we injoy God, as an object wherein 
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the powers of our soules are satisfied with everlasting delight: so that although we be 
men, yet by being unto God united we live as it were the life of God.104 
On the other hand, unlike the angels, human beings ‘are at the first without understanding or 
knowledge at all’ (an Aristotelian tabula rasa), as well as being embodied and mortal.105 
Indeed, human beings are also bound to the physical, non-cognitive world and ‘as when we 
breath, sleepe, move, we set forth the glory of God as naturall agents do’.106 Hooker remains 
clear, however, that humanity’s vocation remains to ‘growe by degrees, till they come at 
length to be even as the Angels themselves are’, that is, to have ‘full and complete knowledge 
in the highest degree that can be imparted [by God] unto them’.107 
Within creation, this rational capacity reflects a special way, then, of participating in 
eternal law under the aspect of God’s government (gubernatio). In his Notes toward a 
Fragment on Predestination, Hooker distinguishes between God’s governance over non-
cognitive and cognitive types of participation: ‘the government of God is: general over all; 
special over rational creatures’.108 In the fifth chapter of Book One of the Lawes, Hooker 
implicitly expands upon these two kinds of participation in eternal law. He lists the kinds of 
perfections that humankind seeks by setting-out an Aristotelian-Thomistic anthropology that 
places human beings dialectically between both non-cognitive and cognitive parts of 
creation.109 A human being is a substantial form constituted by its soul. According to the 
powers of the soul, Hooker arranges humankind’s natural appetites and gears their desires 
towards proportionate or connatural ends: vegetative (with a desire for nutrition, growth, and 
reproduction); sensitive (with a desire for sensory input); and rational (with a desire for 
theoretical and practical speculation). Later, when he turns to divine law (as the next section 
will detail) Hooker adds a natural desire for an ultimate ‘spirituall and divine’ perfection, 
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106 Hooker, Lawes, 1:138.23-30; I.16.3. 
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namely to live in the beatitude of God’s presence.110 On the one hand, therefore, human 
beings share with all creation in the two types of desirable goodness noted earlier: the natural 
desire for ‘continuance of their being’ (esse) through all that is required to stay alive and 
through propagation; and ‘resemblaunce with God’ through ‘the constancie and excellencie 
of those operations which belong unto their kinde’. On the other hand, however, human 
beings share with the angels a particular kind of cognitive excellency, namely the capacity to 
know truth and exercise virtue, the aspiration to the ‘greatest conformity with God’.111 The 
order and rectitude of the sentence of reason directs human beings to know ‘truth from 
falshood’ and so to direct actions to fulfil the natural and necessary desire for ‘the utmost 
good [bonum] and greatest perfection’.112 Ultimately, since ‘no good is infinite but only 
God’, human beings desire God as the final end.113 The natural vocation of humankind is 
thereby ‘union with that it desireth’, namely God. As such, God acts directly as the first cause 
of the rational human form, but also (through the intrinsic, instrumental acts of those forms) 
as the final cause which contains all possible perfection. 
 Hooker accordingly suspends the law of reason from a transcendent source as a kind 
of theonomous participation. Hooker secures the law of reason as an intrinsic property of 
human nature since it circumscribes what human beings know by the light of natural 
understanding and is ‘investigable by reason without the helpe of revelation supernaturall and 
divine’.114 Yet, reason (like any capacity) cannot ‘rightly performe the functions allotted to it, 
without perpetuall aid and concurrence of that supreme cause of all things’.115 While the law 
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of reason remains intrinsic to human nature, it is causally undergirded by divine influence 
and order that tends towards harmony and the common good. As such, human beings are a 
microcosm of the cosmic macrocosm that depends upon eternal law for order and 
harmony.116 Hooker writes that as long as ‘each thing performeth only that worke which is 
naturall unto it’, then all remains preserved. Yet, failure ‘would be ruine both to itselfe, and 
whatsoever dependeth on it’. Similarly, ‘man being…a very worlde in himselfe’ would draw 
harm to all in ‘his transgressing of the law of his nature’. The law of reason, then, constitutes 
the rational, cognitive participation of human beings in the providential order of the universe. 
Such cognitive participation remains theonomous: just as ‘Nature…is nothing else but God’s 
instrument’, so too is the voice of reason ‘but his instrument’.117 Human beings are ‘a law 
unto themselves’118 through their rational capacity. Yet, the intrinsic entelechy of law means 
that they are also causally suspended from God: 
Laws apparently good are (as it were) things copied out of the very tables of that high 
and everlasting law even as the book of that law hath said concerning it selfe, By me 
Kinges raigne, and by me Princes decree justice. Not as if men did behold that booke, 
and accordingly frame their lawes, but because it worketh in them…119 
The law of reason represents the particular ‘determination of the wisedome of God’, the 
cognitive participation of the human being in the providential ‘rule of divine operations 
outwards’, namely eternal law. 
Hooker adds admonitory notes, however, to his account of the law of reason. In the 
Notes towards a Fragment on Predestination, Hooker adds a crucial distinction about divine 
government: ‘There are two forms of government: that which would have been, had free 
creation not lost its way; that which is now when it has lost its way’.120 Sin entails that the 
law of reason proves a curiously difficult thing to realise once humankind ‘has lost its way’: 
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satanic delusion, the haste of the will to accept apparent goods presented to it, poor habits, 
laziness, and the fact that ‘the search of knowledg is a thing painful’ all contribute to error 
and confusion.121 The counsel of reason is not so certain that there is no room for the will to 
dissent or turn to another apparent (but perhaps false) good.122 Furthermore, while unaided 
human reason can discover of itself certain essential speculative and practical truths, sin 
frustrates the natural, legal desire for union with goodness, found in its simplicity in God. In 
relation to union with God, Hooker warns that: 
Of such perfection capable we are not in this life. For while we are in the world, 
subject we are unto sundry imperfections, griefs of body, defectes of mind, yea the 
best thinges we do are painefull, and the exercise of them greevous being continued, 
without intermission, so as in those very actions, whereby we are especially perfected 
in this life, wee are not able to persist: forced we are with very wearines and that often 
to interrupt them: which tediousnes cannot fall into those operations that are in the 
state of blisse, when our union with God is complete.123 
Hooker thereby exhibits what Rowan Williams calls ‘both a positive and a modest valuation 
of the human’: the participatory law of reason describes the excellency of human nature and 
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yet also ‘the unbridgeable gap between our finite capacity and the object that satisfies us’.124 
Hooker accordingly distinguishes between the aptness and ability of the will and reason.125 
On the one hand, reason and the will are originally apt (originaliter apta) for their purpose. 
On the other hand, although ‘reason can find every necessary good when it is supported by 
divine aid’, human reason remains unable, on account of the sloth of sin, so to do. 
 Taken as a whole, then, natural law as the first ‘reading’ of the eternal law into the 
world describes an overall pattern of inherent behaviours and capacities that flow from divine 
creativity, unfold within history, and theonomously reflect the perfection of God through 
participation. Natural law participates in the providential ordering of the cosmos and receives 
its inner principles as well as its proper ends as a gift from the superabundant, self-diffusive, 
and generous character of God, whose very being constitutes the eternal law. As Hooker puts 
its, quoting Acts 17.28, ‘in him wee live, move, and are’.126 As such, natural law possesses 
the character of grace, insofar as it represents a participation in God freely and gratuitously 
gifted by God.127 Natural law primarily participates in eternal law, then, as the 
‘weak/extensive/exiting’ paradigm of participation, but (in the law of reason) also tends 
towards the second ‘strong/intensive/returning’ paradigm where the vocation of humankind 
rests in the union with God. The corrosive nature of sin, however, entails that the natural 
desire for union will remain frustrated, unless God provides a sure and certain remedy. 
Hooker readily recognises this legal lacuna, and hence turns towards the second way in which 
eternal law ‘reads’ itself into the world, namely divine law, considered next. This turning 
represents Hooker’s shift from one Platonism to another, namely from Dionysian mediation 
to Augustinian immediacy, from the mediation of created forms to the extrinsic act of 
redemption in Christ. Once again, however, Hooker holds the two Platonisms together 
through his account of participation. 
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2.2.4 ‘A way mysticall and supernaturall’: divine law and the logic of desire 
In chapters eleven through fifteen of Book One, Hooker turns towards God’s 
redemptive activity in order to resolve the lacuna between what human beings desire through 
the entelechy of law and their inability to realise the end of the same law, namely 
participatory union with God as the source and site of perfection. Since human beings, 
whatever the nobility of their rational capacities, suffer from ‘imbecillitie’ due to sin, God 
provides the divine law recorded through the Holy Scriptures as a remedial aid both to help 
practical reason and also to provide salvific truths not self-evident to reason, such as the 
Resurrection.128 God has indeed ‘revealed a way mystical and supernatural, a way directing 
unto the same end of life by a course which groundeth itself upon the guiltiness of sin, and 
through sin desert of condemnation and death’.129 This supernatural law aims to restore 
human nature to the same end for which the law of reason was originally adequate. Yet, in its 
gratuity, it also elevates the believer to a new supernatural finality, namely from simply 
knowing God (and so participating in eternal law through right action) into the eternal 
contemplation of and union with God’s nature through Christ. Scripture delivers how God 
establishes the supernatural law which is co-identical with Christ, namely redemption ‘by the 
precious death and merit of a mighty Saviour, which hath witnessed of himself, saying, I am 
the way, the way that leadeth us from misery into blisse’.130 ‘The principall intent of 
scripture,’ Hooker writes, ‘is to deliver the lawes of duties supernaturall,’ and faith in Christ 
remains the central duty it details.131 Indeed, Christ imputes righteousness to sinful people 
through faith: quoting John 6.29, Hooker affirms ‘this is the worke of God that ye believe in 
him whome he hath sent’. 
At the beginning of his account of divine law, Hooker recalls the foundation of law in 
the Aristotelian principle that the end of all human action is ultimately the highest good 
(bonum).132 As already noted, Hooker then claims that God is both the first and final cause 
for human beings, ‘desired for it selfe simplie’ since ‘no good is infinite, but only God’. All 
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natural goods, therefore, are penultimate and should only be pursued instrumentally to aid the 
return to the original and terminal good. Hooker expresses the attractive force of this terminal 
good as ‘desire’ for ‘union’ by ‘force of participation and conjunction’ with God.133 Since 
‘complete union with him [i.e. God] must be according unto every power and facultie of our 
mindes’, Hooker accordingly argues that union with God must include both understanding 
and will united in desire for the ‘goodness of beautie in it selfe’, namely God.134  Once desire 
arrives at union, it gives way to satiated ‘love’ or what Augustine calls the ‘sweete affection 
of them that tast and are replenished’.135 Thus, goodness (bonum) and beauty (pulchrum) are 
convertible names for the divine nature, the perfection of being which evokes desire for 
(re)union in that human nature which God has created. The gratuitous and superabundant 
finality for human beings, then, remains supernatural and contemplative: ‘the 
soule…perfected by love…with these supernaturall passions of joye, peace and delight,’ akin 
to the angels.136 
Faced with the incapacity of the law of reason, desire remains the constellating 
category for this second, supernatural way in which eternal law reads itself into the world. 
The intrusion and obstacle of sin – the rejection of God as the proper end with the 
concomitant damage to nature – means that union with God remains impossible without 
divine aid. Appealing to an Aristotelian premise, Hooker argues that God would not create a 
‘naturall desire’ that could be ‘frustrate’, and so the hierarchy of perfections (the ‘sensuall’, 
‘intellectual’, and ‘spiritual and divine’) that humankind desires remains capable of fulfilment 
by supernatural means.137 God acts as the guarantor, then, of desire. While ‘the light of nature 
is never able to finde out any way of obtayning the reward of blisse’, God nonetheless 
recreates the possibility of participatory union through ‘a way mysticall and 
supernaturall….[which] God in himselfe prepared before all worldes’.138 Such a mystical way 
is, of course, found in the divine law of Scripture, especially as it points towards Jesus Christ.  
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Far from being disjunctive, Hooker’s account of divine law therefore presupposes, 
restores, and exceeds natural law, especially the law of reason.139 Hooker stands within the 
Augustinian and Thomist tradition that grace does not efface nature but rather perfects it.140 
Indeed, in Book Three of the Lawes, Hooker parses St. Paul’s idea that ‘nature hath need of 
grace’ as also implying ‘that grace hath use of nature’.141 Accordingly, in chapter fourteen of 
Book One, Hooker writes ‘when we extoll the complete sufficiencie…of scripture, [it] 
must…be understood with this caution, that the benefite of natures lighte be not thought 
excluded as unnecessary, because the necessitie of a diviner light is magnificent.’142 Thus, 
‘when supernaturall duties are necessarily exacted, naturall are not rejected as needlesse.’143 
Indeed, since God instantiates a natural desire for Himself within the legal entelechy of 
created forms, God also eternally provides supernatural aid for when such forms suffer 
corruption: 
We see therefore that our soveraigne good is desired naturally; that God the author of 
that naturall desire had appointed naturall meanes to fulfill it; that man having utterly 
disabled his nature unto those meanes hath had other revealed from God, and hath 
receaved from heaven a lawe to teach him how that which is desired naturally must 
now supernaturally be attained; finallie we see that because those later exclude not the 
former quite cleane as unnecessary, therefore together with such supernaturall duties 
as could not possiblie have beene otherwise knowne to the worlde, the same lawe that 
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teacheth them, teacheth also with them such naturall duties as coulde not by light of 
nature easilie have bene knowne.144 
While the ‘principal intent of scripture is to deliver the lawes of duties supernaturall’ that are 
‘by the light of nature impossible to be attained’, scripture is also ‘fraught even with the 
lawes of nature’.145 As such, divine law supplies the defect of natural law, but also materially 
presupposes it since there is an inherently rational character to both. Even where divine law 
remains ‘somwhat above capacitie of [human] reason, somewhat divine and heavenly’, as law 
it expresses participation in the providential order of God’s ontological ratio and so shares an 
analogical, rational character with natural law.146 When human beings participate in divine 
law, it both strengthens what is left of rationality after the Fall and enables union with God 
through Christ. Such union remains ultimately disproportionate, however, to the ordinary 
capacities of the human believer: participation in God elevates human beings into Christ’s 
deiform glory. 
The unfolding, historical telos of divine law is indeed ‘endlesse union’ with God for 
participating believers.147 In order to describe this union, Hooker translates the three 
theological virtues of faith, hope, and love (taken from 1 Corinthians 13:13) into the 
transcendentals of truth (verum), goodness (bonum), and beauty (pulchrum). Thus, the 
principal object of faith is truth, the highest object of hope is goodness, and love aims at 
beauty. These three transcendentals are identified in turn with the person of Christ:  
Concerning faith the principall object whereof is that eternall veritie which hath 
discovered the treasures of hidden wisedome in Christ; concerning hope the highest 
object whereof is that everlasting goodnes which in Christ doth quicken the dead; 
concerning charitie the finall object whereof is that incomprehensible bewtie which 
shineth in the countenance of Christ the sonne of the living God.148 
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While such theological virtues respectively begin with ‘weake apprehension of things not 
sene’, the ‘trembling expectation of thinges far removed’, and a ‘weake inclination of heart’, 
they end (in a manner akin to the angels) with the ‘intuitive vision of God’ and union with the 
eternal Word, namely Christ himself. The divine law has a christological shape and purpose. 
Unlike natural law, divine law begins as an extrinsic principle but, like natural law, it at the 
last formally shapes those who participate in it and (through it) Christ.  
Hooker’s turn to the divine law begins to translate the language of participation into 
the second heuristic paradigm, namely the ‘strong/intensive/returning’ model of deification. 
Indeed, when Hooker turns to his second metaphysical mini-treatise in Book Five, it is to 
unpack the meaning of ‘that mysticall union whereby the Church is become as neere unto 
Christ, as any one part of his flesh is unto other’, namely how ‘God hath deified our 
nature’.149 This chapter now turns to that second mini-treatise on participation in Hooker’s 
Lawes. 
2.3 ‘Partakers of him in Christ’: intensive participation in God and deification 
 Chapters fifty through sixty-eight of Book Five represent Hooker’s second explicit 
account of participation as he unpacks an account of the dominical sacraments. In these 
chapters, Hooker details how ‘God is in Christ, then how Christ is in us, and how the 
sacramentes doe serve to make us pertakers of Christ’. With their consistent appeal to 
participation these chapters display a metaphysical depth which apparently exceeds the 
immediate polemical purpose of Book Five, namely the shift from the ‘general meditations’ 
of the first four books to the ‘particular decisions’ of controversy, here the established 
provisions for public worship and ministry. Yet, these chapters properly form, as did Book 
One, another treatise within a treatise. As such, Hooker’s discussion of participation in Book 
Five remains fit for both the wider concerns of Book Five and also the political thoughts 
about lay ecclesiastical supremacy in the later ‘books of power’. Indeed, Book Five aims to 
show that the Elizabethan Prayer Book engenders ‘true religion’ and cultivates the Philonic 
virtue of ‘godliness’, with benefits for the here and now in political terms of order, but also 
preparing believers for their final union with God.150 As such, godliness remains ‘the root of 
all true virtues and the stay of all well ordered commonwealths’ since it inspires proper 
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behaviour in those who administer justice and ‘inflameth everie way men of action with zeale 
to doe good…unto all’.151 Yet, the first forty-nine chapters of Book Five also discuss 
instruction and prayer, however, as the ‘elements, parts or principles’ that habitually prepare 
believers to become ‘partakers of him [God] in Christ’ through the sacraments. John Booty 
adroitly recognises, then, that Book Five ‘is a circle whose circumference is the 
commonwealth and whose centre is the concept of participation’.152  
Hooker’s treatise about sacramental participation in Book Five expands upon the 
divine law outlined in Book One. Indeed, as Bryan Spinks observes, Hooker’s ideas about 
sacramental participation must be seen in light of his legal ontology: ‘the created universe 
itself, with its laws, allows participation in the divine…election through Christ, justification, 
and the society of the church allow this participation to be achieved.’153 Much as in the legal 
pattern of causality found in Book One, divine law in Book Five is mediated through a series 
of efficient and instrumental causes: God, Christ, faith, and the sacraments. God’s self-
disclosure in divine law re-establishes the formal and final causes proper to humankind 
through a special chain of efficient causes which renew participation in God. Christ’s 
hypostatic union and life efficiently fulfils the law of human nature such that Christ acts as 
the formal and final cause for participation in God.154 In Christ, ‘God hath deified our nature’. 
God’s immediate, deificatory action in Christ does not preclude the mediation of subordinate 
causes: faith in Christ (expressed through repentance in Book Six), or that the sacraments act 
as ‘instruments’ through which the grace enjoyed by Christ adheres to believers.155 Just as 
law has a teleological character, so too do sacraments imply that ‘grace is indeed the verie 
ende for which these heavenlie mysteries [of divine law] were instituted’.156 Hooker uses a 
number of reproductive, worldly images to describe how believers are drawn into the life of 
God through the Church: the Church is the ‘verie mother of our new birth’, providing the 
‘seede of regeneration’ through the ‘generative force’ of the sacraments.157 Hooker thus sees 
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the sacraments as perfecting instruments to the ontological end to which God directs human 
beings, namely the perfection of ‘being’ or ‘eternall life’, ‘the union of the soule with 
God.’158 Participation in Christ in Book Five renews, perfects, and elevates the exitus-reditus 
of the lex divinitatis in Book One: in the hypostatic union Christ recreates human nature and, 
through faithfully sharing in Christ, believers return ‘Godward’ through him.159 Christ is thus 
a mediated immediacy, the means and end of a participated deification for believers. 
In Hooker’s account of participation in Book Five he ultimately shifts away, however, 
from the implicit Platonic language of methexis found in Book One towards more biblical 
idioms. John Booty particularly notes the prevalence of ‘communion’ or ‘inward fellowship’ 
(from κοινωνία, such as found in 1 Cor. 10.16), and ‘abiding’ (from μένω, such as found in 
John 6.56), each of which can also be translated as ‘participation’.160 Both images retain a 
sense of analogy which respects close association but also maintains difference. Hooker uses 
them to explain how Christ’s human nature enjoys the grace of union with the divine in a 
perfect, full sense. Union does not obliterate the difference between Christ’s two natures but 
asymmetrically perfects his human nature. Believers enjoy an analogous (but not univocal) 
union with God as diminished analogues of Christ through sacramental participation. 
Believers dwell in Christ as their cause, and Christ abides in them as a cause resides in its 
effects. Participation yields a mutual communion which maintains difference but intimately 
links cause and effect together as a transformative dynamic. More importantly, in this 
account of participation in Christ, Hooker also appeals to what Anna Williams identifies (see 
1.2.1) as two other biblical idioms symptomatic of deification: union and adoption. Hooker’s 
second use of participation in the Lawes represents, then, the firm turn from the first 
participatory paradigm towards the second, intensive, deificatory use. In order to show this 
shift, this section will follow in turn Hooker’s threefold moments of participation: God in 
Christ (2.3.1), Christ in us (2.3.2), and sacramental participation in Christ (2.3.3). This 
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explicatio textus will show how, just as it does it Book One, Augustinian immediacy works 
through Dionysian mediation, namely the participatory union with, and supernatural 
fulfilment of the natural desire for, God through a pattern of transformative causality. 
2.3.1 ‘God hath deified our nature’: God in Christ 
 Hooker’s account of the first and second eternal laws in Book One balances 
hypostatic distinction with dispositive hierarchy (and so Augustinian immediacy with 
Dionysian mediation). Similarly, his account of how ‘God is in Christ’ in Book Five balances 
the claims of transcendence and immanence when he discusses Christ’s hypostatic union of 
divine and human natures. In chapters fifty-one through fifty-four, Hooker condenses the 
history of doctrinal development over the doctrine of God and Christ’s Incarnation into eight 
thousand words. As he did with eternal law, Hooker first considers the nature of God in 
chapter fifty-one, emphasising again the inexpressible, henological unity of the divine nature: 
‘The Lord our God is but one God.’161 The persons of the Trinity are distinguished by a 
double procession in a manner which recalls Aquinas and which quotes John of Damascus.162 
Thus, ‘wee adore the father as beinge altogether of him selfe, wee glorifie that consubstantiall 
worde which is the Sonne, wee blesse and magnifie that coessentiall Spirit eternallie 
proceeding from both which is the holie Ghost.’163 From this brief doctrine of the Trinity in 
se, Hooker turns to God’s economy ad extra in the Incarnation, the participable order of 
salvation. In a Thomistic manner, for Hooker the Incarnation is fitting or ‘convenient’ 
(convenientia) for the purpose of salvation.164 For Aquinas, the Incarnation is the 
‘convenient’ way to restore participation in God after the Fall since it alone forms the ground 
of possibility for renewed communion and has an aesthetic fittingness to strengthen and 
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transform the believer.165 Similarly for Hooker, in the postlapsarian sphere ‘the worldes 
salvation was without the Incarnation of the Sonne of God a thinge impossible’ and so ‘there 
is cause sufficient why divine nature should assume humane, that so God might be in Christ 
reconciling to him selfe the world’.166 Hooker quotes Augustine’s variation of the exchange 
formula to explain the aesthetic convenience of the Incarnation in terms of participation: ‘In 
illo Divinitas est unigeniti facta particpeps mortalitatis nostrae, ut es nos participes ejus 
immortalitatis essemus.’167 Hooker appeals to the Pauline language of adoption and filiation 
to image such participation: ‘could wee which are born the children of wrath be adopted the 
sonnes of God through grace, any other then the naturall sonne of God beinge mediator 
betwene God and us?’168 
Hooker acknowledges the metaphysical tension between God’s transcendence in se 
and the kataphatic workings ad extra through Christ’s union of human and divine natures. 
Indeed, the outward working of God’s transcendence in Christ’s hypostatic union is a ‘divine 
mysterie…more true then plaine’.169 In the next five chapters, then, Hooker adumbrates the 
various christological controversies of the past fifteen hundred years in order to show how 
Christ’s human nature asymmetrically participates his divine nature, as well as how the 
hypostatic union forms the efficient cause of salvific participation in God without violating 
either nature. In chapter fifty-two, Hooker gives what Rowan Williams calls ‘a beautifully 
lucid summary of patristic Christological teaching’.170 Hooker notes how the Church had to 
contend with controversies over what the two natures united in Christ’s person meant. For 
Hooker, Nestorius in particular violated the unity of Christ’s natures with his description of a 
moral union (‘two persons linked in amity’) rather than ‘two natures human and divine 
conjoined in one and the same person’. Against Nestorius, Hooker instead commends the 
Alexandrian account of the hypostatic union, derived from Cyril of Alexandria, adopted at 
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the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon, and enhanced by Aquinas with the language of 
subsistence (subsistens).171 Hooker writes: 
If the Sonne of God had taken to him selfe a man now made and already perfected, it 
would of necessitie follow that there are in Christ two persons, the one assuming and 
the other assumed, whereas the Sonne of God did not assume a mans person unto his 
own, but a mans nature to his owne person, and therefore tooke semen the seed of 
Abraham, the verie first original element of our nature before it was come to have 
anie personall humaine subsistence. The flesh and conjunction of the flesh with God 
began at one instant, his takinge to him selfe our flesh was but one act. So that in 
Christ there is no personal subsistence but one, and that from everlastinge. By taking 
only the nature of man he still continueth one person, and changeth but the maner of 
his subsisting, which was before in the mere glorie of the Sonne of God, as is now in 
the habit also of our flesh….Christ is a person both divine and humaine, howbeit not 
therefore two persons in one, neither both these in one sense, but a person divine 
because he is personallie the Sonne of God, humane because he hath reallie the 
nature of the children of men.172 
While Christ is divine, Christ has a fully human nature united to his subsistent person.  
The question remains, however, about how these apparently incommensurable natures 
can coinhere within one person. In chapter fifty-three, then, Hooker turns to the asymmetrical 
participation of Christ’s human and divine natures such that ‘there growth neither gaine nor 
losse of essential properties to either’. Here, Hooker denies what he takes to be an implicit 
suggestion by Gregory of Nyssa that the hypostatic union entails a tertium quid such that ‘the 
nature which Christ tooke weake and feeble from us by beinge mingled with deitie became 
the same which deitie is’.173 Hooker quotes Cyril of Alexandria in order to describe how 
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Christ’s two natures ‘have knit themselves’ without obliterating difference.174 Thus, ‘lett us 
therefore sett it downe for a rule or principle…that of both natures there is a cooperation 
often, an association always, but never any mutuall participation whereby the properties of 
the one are infused into the other.’ Instead, again like Aquinas, Hooker accordingly employs 
a reduplicative strategy, listing what can properly be said of Christ’s divinity and 
humanity.175 Here, Christ’s two natures ‘are as causes and originall groundes of all thinges 
which Christ hath done’. Hooker lists the ‘operations of [Christ’s] deitie’: Christ is the 
highest cause, the wellspring of immortality, has no beginning or end, is omnipresent, and 
remains impassible.176 Hooker then quotes Irenaeus to show the ‘operations of [Christ’s] 
manhood’: Jesus shows hunger, thirst, fear, and grief.177 Yet, through a communicatio 
idiomatum (‘crosse and circulatory speeches’), one can loosely predicate across the two 
natures since they are united in a Thomistic suppositum, or what Hooker calls the ‘whole 
person’ of Christ.178 While they remain distinct, Christ’s two natures ‘concurre unto one 
effect’.179 Christ’s human nature acts as an instrument of divine, efficient action which aims 
at salvation, just as nature is a subordinate instrument of eternal law or the sacraments are 
subordinate instruments of efficient grace. 
It would be ‘too cold an interpretation’, however, to see Christ’s Incarnation merely 
as a formal sharing in human nature.180 Indeed, the Incarnation absolutely associates God’s 
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transcendence with the frailty of humanity such that the latter becomes enfolded into the 
effect of the former. While the Incarnation involves kenotic ‘loss and detriment’ for Christ, it 
also remains the salvific ground upon which believers may too stand and experience the 
effect of divine action without losing their humanity.181 Thus, in chapter fifty-five, Hooker 
has to deny the Lutheran idea that the glorified humanity of Christ is ubiquitous: having taken 
an actual human nature, Christ remains forever united to a specific, limited, material body 
bound by a particular history, the ‘skarres and markes of former mortalitie’ as Hooker 
phrases it.182 Yet, by virtue of union with divinity, Christ’s humanity remains present (and so 
effective) ‘by waie of conjunction’ such that the ‘soule of Christ is present with all thinges 
which the deitie of Christ worketh’ and so has an infinite ‘presence of force and efficacie 
throughout all generations of men’.183 The union of natures in Christ remains the mysterious 
ground through which the whole person of Christ remains present to believers, even in 
apparent absence, and through which ‘wee are made partakers of Christ both otherwise and in 
the sacramentes them selves’.184 The Incarnation acts as the cause through which believers 
share in a transfigured humanity and through which the divine cause itself dwells in them as 
an effect and act through the quotidian realities of temporal existence. 
This model of participatory union in effect and act shapes the gifts which Christ’s 
human nature receives in the hypostatic union and, by extension, how and what believers 
receive in the sacraments. In chapter fifty-four Hooker considers ‘what Christ hath obtained 
accordinge to the flesh, by the union of his flesh with deitie’. Hooker considers the three 
‘gifts’ Christ receives: by the gift of eternal generation, Christ receives deity; by the gift of 
union, his flesh is made one with God, a union which bestows supernatural gifts on his 
human nature; and by the gift of unction, his human nature receives power and perfection 
beyond its nature, namely universal (but not infinite) knowledge and material 
incorruptibility.185 The gift of union represents the deification of Christ’s human nature ‘for 
by vertue of this grace man is reallie made God’ and (echoing Johannine language) ‘God hath 
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deified our nature…by makinge it his owne inseparable habitation’.186 Hooker distinguishes, 
however, between such deified human nature and the divine nature: ‘which union doth ad 
perfection to the weaker, to the nobler no alteration at all’.187 Such asymmetry maintains that 
the hypostatic union transforms human nature in erotic terms while maintaining its 
creatureliness: 
The verie cause of his [i.e. Christ] taking upon him our nature was to change it, to 
better the qualities and to advance the condition thereof, although in no sorte to 
abolish the substance which he tooke, nor to infuse into it the naturall forces and 
properties of his deitie. As therefore wee have showed how the Sonne of God by his 
incarnation hath changed the maner of that personal subsistence which before was 
solitarie and is now in the association of flesh, so alteration thereby accruing to the 
nature of God; so neither are the properties of mans nature in the person of Christ by 
force and vertue of the same conjunction so such altered, as not to staie within those 
limites which our substance is bordered withal; nor the state and qualitie of our 
substance so unaltered, but that there are in it many glorious effectes proceeding from 
so neere copulation with deitie.188 
The effect and act of God also works the grace of unction. Christ’s humanity receives ‘by the 
influence of Deitie’ all perfections that human nature is apt to obtain as well as supernatural 
perfection. Having established the grammar in which Christ’s human nature participates his 
divine nature, Hooker next turns towards the second moment, namely ‘Christ in us’, again 
holding in productive tension the twin Platonisms of Dionysian mediation and Augustinian 
immediacy. 
2.3.2 ‘The participation of divine nature’: Christ in us 
 The manner in which God is in Christ forms the efficient cause of renewed, salvific 
participation. Thus, ‘God in Christ is generally the medicine which doth cure the world, and 
Christ in us is that receipt of the same medicine whereby wee are everie one particularlie 
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cured’.189 If God in Christ acts as the efficient cause of salvation, then Christ is in us as an 
effect, a participable presence which transfuses grace. Just as God’s effect transforms and 
deifies Christ’s human nature, Christ’s effect in us (his ‘person and presence’) likewise 
renews our capacity to fulfil our theonomous nature and return to God as a deified analogue. 
Hooker’s erotic definition of participation in Christ strongly recalls the earlier use of 
Aristotelian causality, Neoplatonic influentia, and analogy in the legal ontology of Book One. 
Of particular note is Hooker’s repetition from his account of natural law that the cause resides 
in the thing caused (causa est causato) and that an effect analogically resembles its cause. 
Hooker writes: 
Participation is that mutuall inward hold which Christ hath of us and wee of him, in 
such sort that ech possessth other by waie of special interest propertie and inherent 
copulation. For plainer explication whereof we may from that which hath bene before 
sufficientlie proved assume to our purpose two principles, that everie original cause 
imparteth it selfe unto those thinges which come of it, and Whatsoever taketh beinge 
from anie other the same is after a sorte in that which giveth it beinge….God hath his 
influence into the verie essence of all thinges….So that all thinges which God hath 
made are in that respect the ofspringe of God, they are in him as effectes in their 
highest cause, he likewise actuallie is in them, thassistance and influence of his deitie 
is theire life. Let hereunto saving efficacie be added and it bringeth forth a special 
ofspringe amongst men conteininge them to whome God hath him selfe given the 
gratious and amiable name of sonnes.190 
Christ fulfils the legal ontology of Book One, the natural desire for perfective goodness. 
Participation in Christ renews the manner in which creatures participate in God as efficient, 
formal, and final cause. Just as law suspends all of creation from God as an analogue of the 
eternal law, so too does participation in Christ suspend the believer from Christ as the 
primary analogate, the source and site of perfection. On the one hand, as with law Hooker 
emphasises transcendence and that believers are in Christ eternally. The Trinity concur in 
goodness, wisdom, and power within both creation and redemption, Christ’s saving work 
‘inwrapped within the bowells of divine mercie, written in the booke of eternall wisdom, and 
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held in the handes of omnipotent power, the first foundations of the world beinge as yet 
unlaide’.191 On the other hand, as with law again Hooker turns to the immanent unfurling of 
transcendent causality. As Christ is in them, believers become like Christ analogically or 
‘after a sort’. Hooker describes how believers participate in Christ’s saving work through an 
erotic metaphor, as an ‘inherent copulation’. The Latin root of ‘copulation’ (copulare) means 
to bind, tie, unite, or couple, typically in a sexual sense. R.C. Schwarz illustrates how Hooker 
uses similar language to describe participation and marriage: copulation, affection, 
fellowship, bodily unity, faithfulness, knowledge and love, and joining are characteristics of 
both in Book Five of the Lawes. 192 Hooker indeed continues the sexual image as he describes 
how all things ‘which God hath made are in that respect ofspringe of God’ and the saved are 
a ‘special ofspringe’ or ‘sonnes’. Participation conceptually images erotic creation, unity, and 
transformation while maintaining difference between creator and creature. 
In Book One, Hooker images God as the Platonic and Stoic artificer of the law of 
nature, the formal cause of the intrinsic principles which make up creation. In Book Five, 
Hooker casts the participation of believers in God’s eternal purpose within the same image. 
Through adoption into God’s predestining purpose, ‘the artificer is in the worke which his 
hand doth presentlie frame’.193 Just as a cause resides in its effects, Christ resides immanently 
in believers making them analogously like him ‘after a sort’. Thus, natural and supernatural 
forms of participation alike draw creatures into the life of the Trinity. Hooker calls this draw 
‘the participation of divine nature’, a paraphrase of 2 Peter 1.4 (‘participants [κοινωνοὶ] of 
divine nature’), a favourite text for theologies of deification. Such deification does not mean 
believers are subsumed into divinity. Rather, as Hooker develops it, deification means the 
‘realisation of human potential in relationship with the creator’ (as Edmund Newey phrases 
it) through participation in Christ.194 
 The manner in which believers participate Christ revolves around the Pauline 
language of adoption and union, a semantic field typically found in patristic accounts of 
deification (see 1.2.1). Hooker offers an Adamic Christology in which Christ recapitulates 
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Adam.195 The first Adam works as ‘an original cause of our nature and of that corruption of 
nature which causeth death’. Christ, as the second Adam, works as ‘the cause original of 
restauration to life’. Thus, ‘as therefore wee are reallie partakers of the bodie of synne and 
death received from Adam,’ the hypostatic union instead make us ‘trulie partakers of Christ’. 
Indeed, ‘wee are therefore adopted sonnes of God to eternall life by participation of the onlie 
begotten Sonne of God, whose life is the wellspringe and cause of ours.’ Participation in 
Christ implies the mediating role of secondary causes which concur with and figure Christ’s 
presence. Hooker writes that ‘but in God wee actuallie are no longer then onlie from the time 
of our actuall adoption into the bodie of his [Christ’s] true Church’. Hooker appeals to a list 
of biblical images about union to describe the Pauline metaphor that the Church is the body 
of Christ: we are in Christ ‘even as partes of him selfe’ (John 15.9); just as ‘God made Eve of 
the ribbe of Adam…his Church he frameth out of the verie flesh…of the Sonne of man’ 
(Genesis 2.22-23); the crucifixion makes the Church ‘such as him selfe is of whome wee 
com’ (1 Corinthians 15.48); and through ‘the union of his deitie with our nature’ we 
participate as ‘branches in that roote out of which they growe’ (John 15.5). The way believers 
participate Christ’s deifying hypostatic union is therefore ‘only seen in image, analogy, and 
metaphor’ and not ‘one-to-one correspondence’.196 
 Hooker develops how Christ acts as an efficient cause in several ways.197  First, ‘it 
must be confest that of Christ, workinge as a creator, and a governor of the world by 
providence, all are partakers.’ Christ is the ratio of God’s creative and providential activity. 
Second, ‘as he dwelleth not by grace in all, so neither doth he equallie worke in all them in 
whom he dwelleth.’ Participation in Christ admits of degrees, that is to say, it takes into 
account the ordinary need for growth even in the extraordinary vocation of union with God. 
Thus: 
…the participation of Christ importeth, besides the presence of Christes person, and 
besides the mysticall copulation thereof with the partes and members of his whole 
Church, a true actuall influence of grace whereby the life which wee live accordinge 
to godlines is his, and from him we receave those perfections wherein our eternall 
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happines consisteth. Thus wee participate Christ partelie by imputation, as when those 
thinges which he did and suffered for us are imputed unto us for righteousness; partlie 
by habituall and reall infusion, as when grace is inwardlie bestowed while wee are on 
earth and afterwards more fullie both our soules and bodies made like unto his in 
glorie.198 
Hooker holds together immediacy and mediation: believers participate in Christ through 
extrinsic imputation and also by the intrinsic infusion of grace within the Church. The 
paradigm of how Christ’s two natures relate becomes also the paradigm for how the Church 
participates in Christ. On the one hand, Hooker again rejects Gregory of Nyssa’s language of 
mixture (μίξις, κρασις) which would seem to abolish the distinction between Christ and the 
believer: ‘as for anie mixture of the substance of his fleshe with oures, the participation which 
wee have of Christ includeth no such kinde of grosse surmise’.199 Yet, on the other hand, 
participation yields a transformative link between the two. The imputation of Christ’s 
righteousness restores communion (κοινωνία, participation) with God. Such extrinsic, 
immediate divine action does not preclude humanity: believers are made anew and spiritually 
grow through the intrinsic ‘participation of Christes infused grace’.200 Thus, over time and 
through the Church, ‘by steppes and degrees they receave the complete measure of all such 
divine grace’ such that they become in their ‘finall exaltation’ participatory, deified 
analogues of Christ in glory.201 Once again, Hooker images such participation in erotic terms 
as a ‘mysticall copulation’. Although believers retain the essential characteristics of 
humanity, they also receive the transformative benefits of divine life as they are drawn into 
the Trinity through Christ’s hypostatic union. These benefits include immediate ‘newnes of 
life’ and the ‘future restauration of our bodies’ in the resurrection.202 Using Russell’s fourfold 
typology of deification (see 1.2.1), Hooker’s account of deification is therefore analogical but 
also realistic, imaging the ontological and ethical transformation of the believer. Indeed, the 
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temporal, embodied growth of grace sets the stage for the final moment of Hooker’s account: 
‘how the sacramentes doe serve to make us pertakers of Christ’, to which the next section 
turns. 
2.3.3 ‘Participation of Christ’: sacramental participation 
 Given that God through Christ works as the efficient cause of salvation and renews 
human nature such that it can formally participate in God as the final cause, Hooker turns in 
chapter fifty-seven of Book Five to how the dominical sacraments instrumentally draw 
believers into participation of Christ’s person and effects. Here, Christ acts as a new exitus-
reditus: his hypostatic union immediately recreates human nature (justification or imputed 
grace) and also acts as the dispositive ground through which believers returns ‘Godwards’ 
(sanctification or infused grace). Hooker’s account of ‘participation of Christ’ therefore 
remains closely linked to his account of law in Book One. While the first eternal law has an 
apophatic, unknowable, and transcendent quality, the second eternal law reads God’s nature 
into the world through an immanent pattern of causality. Similarly, while Christ in glory 
remains transcendent, the sacraments read him into believers through a pattern of intrinsic 
causality. Sacraments take part as God’s ordering of the Church, rooted in the legal structure 
of the universe which aims at God’s goodness; mediate causes are suspended from and tend 
towards God as first cause. Sacraments are the ordinary means or instruments by which 
imputed and infused graces are announced and delivered. Just as Christ’s human and divine 
natures ‘concurre unto one effect’, the mediatory, material signs of the dominical sacraments 
concur with and manifest the effect of God’s transcendent grace in the lives of believers.203 
As such, sacraments are ‘causes instrumentall’, the ‘instruments of God’, or ‘morall 
instrumentes’, just as nature is an instrument of eternal law in Book One. Natural laws tend 
towards God’s goodness as entelechies but also depend upon God for their existence. In a 
consonant vein, the sacraments have as their end grace, the plenitude of God. God guarantees 
that this end accompanies the physical signs of the sacraments, making them necessary for 
                                                          
203 See Hooker, Lawes, 3:85.6-27; VI.6.1. In response to the charge that sacraments 
are only ‘naked, empty and uneffectual signs’, Hooker responds that just as certain things can 
be predicated of Christ’s human nature by itself and more exalted things in virtue of its union 
with the divine nature, so too are sacraments only ‘outward signs’ in themselves and yet are 
‘assisted always with the power of the Holy Ghost’. 
99 
 
eternal life. Primarily, the sacraments mark the moment when God imparts the grace of 
participation. Christ and his effects ‘give notice of the times when they use to make their 
access’.204 Yet, while Christ’s atoning power remains immediately sufficient as a cure for sin, 
God causally mediates it through the sacraments, ‘the use whereof is in our handes the effect 
in his’.205  
 The two dominical sacraments ‘both signifye and cause grace’, instrumentally 
unfurling the two kinds of participation in Christ: namely, imputation (justification) and 
infusion (sanctification). In baptism ‘wee receive Christ Jesus and from him that saving grace 
which is proper unto baptisme’.206 Yet, the end of baptism also involves an intrinsic 
transformation as well as an extrinsic righteousness imputed to the believer. Hooker writes 
that:  
…baptism is a sacrament which God hath instituted in his Church to the ende that 
they which receave the same might be incorporated into Christ and so through his 
most pretious merit obteine as well that savinge grace of imputation which taketh 
away all former guiltines, as also that infused divine vertue of the holie Gohost which 
giveth to the powers of the soule theire first disposition towards newnes of life.207  
Baptism therefore is a ‘seale perhapes to the grace of election before received, but to our 
sanctification here a step that hath not anie before it’. Baptism represents the outward sign of 
the recreation and return of believers to God through Christ, a renewed exitus-reditus. In 
other words, baptism imprints the supernatural finality of human beings to participate 
immediately in the divine nature. It also incorporates believers, however, into the visible 
church, the body of Christ on earth.208 As such, union with Christ is experienced in an 
ecclesial, mediated, corporate, but mystical context: ‘Christ is whole with the whole Church, 
and whole with everie parte of the Church’, and the church is a ‘body mysticall, because the 
mysterie of their conjunction is removed altogether from sense’.209 
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If baptism is the ‘inchoation of those graces’, then the eucharist works their 
‘consummation….often as beinge by continewall degrees the finisher of our life’.210 The 
eucharist involves the move from becoming to being, from potentiality to final, 
eschatological actuality. In chapter sixty-seven, Hooker turns in detail to eucharistic 
participation. While baptism instrumentally imputes grace and begins sanctification, Hooker 
recognises that the quotidian travails of sin mean ‘wee are both subject to diminution and 
capable of augmentation in grace’.211 The eucharist helps believers grow by steps and degrees 
into grace and union with God: ‘such as will live the life of god must eate the fleshe and 
drinke the blood of the Sonne of man.’212 Hooker therefore surveys the eucharistic 
controversies of his day in order to find out a ‘generall agreement, concerning that which 
alone is material, Namelye the reall participation of Christe and of his life in his bodie and 
bloode by meanes of this sacrament’.213 Hooker finds no sentence of scripture that 
definitively necessitates either Lutheran consubstantiation or Catholic transubstantiation as 
the only way to understand what ‘real participation’ means.214 Instead, Hooker parses 
eucharistic reception in terms of a double participation: the believer participates in Christ (as 
a thing participates in its cause) and Christ participates in the believer (as a cause imparts 
itself into its effects). Thus, ‘noe side deniethe but that the soule of man is the receptacle of 
Christes presence’.215 
In an extended passage, Hooker therefore reprises the definition of participation as 
‘that mutuall inward hold which Christ hath of us and wee of him’ in order to describe the 
twofold participation in Christ. The biblical idiom of participation as ‘communion’ here 
becomes crucial. The Geneva Bible translates κοινωνία, such as found in 1 Corinthians 10.16, 
as ‘communion’, but Hooker rightly sees it could also be translated as ‘participation’.  Like 
methexis, for Hooker ‘communion’ denotes a cause-and-effect relationship between Christ 
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and believers typical of participatory metaphysics.216 When he turns to an exegesis of Christ’s 
words of institution found in Mark 14.22-24, he therefore conflates communion and 
participation to describe this pattern of causality: 
My body, ‘the communion [κοινωνία] of my bodie’, My blood, ‘the communion’ of my 
blood….The bread and cup are his bodie and blood because they are causes 
instrumentall upon the receipt whereof the participation of his boodie and bloode 
ensueth. For that which produceth any certaine effect is not vainlie nor improperlie 
said to be that verie effect whereunto it tendeth. Everie cause is in the effect which 
groweth from it. Our soules and boodies quickned to eternall life are effectes the 
cause whereof is the person of Christ, his bodie and bloode are the true wellspringe 
out of which this life floweth. So that his boodie and blood are in that verie subject 
whereunto they minister life not onlie by effect or operation even as the influence of 
the heavens is in plantes, beastes, men, and in everie thinge which they quicken, but 
also by a farre more divine and mytsicall kind of union which maketh us one with him 
even as he and the father are one….[T]hese holie mysteries received in due manner 
doe instrumentallie both make us pertakers of the grace of that bodie and blood which 
were given for the life of the world, and besides also imparte unto us even in true and 
reall though mysticall maner the verie person of our Lord him selfe whole perfect and 
intire….[T]hey are thereby made such instrumentes as mysticallie yeat trulie, 
invisiblie yeat reallie worke our communion or fellowship [κοινωνία] with the person 
of Jesus Christ as well in that he is man as God, our participation also in the fruit 
grace and efficacie of his bodie and blood, whereupon there ensueth a kind of 
                                                          
216 The biblical notion of κοινωνία does not necessarily entail any metaphysical claim 
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[πολλοί] are one body, for we all partake [μετέχομεν] of one bread’. Hooker grafts κοινωνία 
onto the metaphysical tradition of methexis with some justification. 
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transubstantiation in us, a true change of soule and bodie, an alteration from death to 
life.217 
Through the instrumental causality of the eucharistic species, believers participate the 
transcendent Christ through a pattern of mutual communion: they are in Christ as the first 
cause who recreates them (imputed grace), and Christ is in them as a cause in its effects 
(infused grace). The latter aspect transforms or ‘transubstantiates’ believers such that they 
become diminished but real analogues of Christ and receive eternal life, that is to say they are 
mystically united with Christ and thereby with God. Hooker’s use of ‘transubstantiation’ is a 
provocative reworking of Catholic accounts of the eucharist. Hooker turns Christ’s presence 
away from the eucharistic species and towards the recipients: while believers maintain the 
same outward appearance, Christ (and so God) constitutes their formal reality through the 
eucharistic act and consumption. This double participation intimates the christification of 
believers, a form of analogous and implicit deification. Indeed, grace orders believers to share 
an end proper to the divine nature, that is to say the divine life itself. As Robert Slocum 
phrases it, ‘our participation involves us in a co-operative mutuality of unequals as we accept 
God’s saving offer of a divine life.’218 
The sacraments and faith therefore work together as subordinate instrumental causes 
of participation in Christ which forms us for divine union: ‘it is a branch of beliefe that 
sacramentes are in theire place no less required then beliefe it selfe.’219 Hooker commends 
                                                          
217 Hooker, Lawes, 2:334.13-30; 2:336.24-29; 2:339.3-340.1; V.67.5-11. See 
Neelands, ‘Christology and the Sacraments’, p. 383 n.69, placing Hooker as a ‘receptionist’. 
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of the faithful and obedient recipient, with God causing the effect of grace to be imparted. 
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faith as an intellectual gift and habit.220 Yet, faith remains a supernatural grace and virtue 
since ‘the mysteries of our religion are above the reach of our understanding….thaffection of 
faith is above hir reache, hir love to Godward above the comprehension which she hath of 
God’.221 As such, ‘the true reason wherefore Christ doth love believers is because theire 
beliefe is the gift of God.’222 Hooker develops how God is the efficient cause of faith in Book 
Six when he turns to repentance. God’s grace works repentance in believers as ‘the highest 
cause from which man's penitency doth proceede’.223 Grace links the theological virtues of 
faith, hope and love in a chain such that they orient the sinner towards righteousness. 
Through faith, the Holy Spirit illuminates the mind and inclines the will to its proper good, 
namely God.224 Faith gives rise to hope when it conceives ‘both the possibilitie, and the 
meanes to avert evill’.225 Hope then yields to love, the end of union with God: ‘What is love 
toward God, but a desire for union with God? And shall we imagine a sinner converting 
himself to God, in whom there is no desire for union with God presupposed?’226 While God 
(through Christ) is the efficient cause of justification and sanctification, faith constitutes the 
subordinate efficient cause of imputed grace and the formal cause of infused grace.227 In turn, 
the sacraments are instrumental causes which announce and deliver these graces.  
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Hooker balances, then, the immediacy of Christ’s saving relationship to the soul with 
the mediation of such immediacy through a series of secondary causes, namely faith and the 
sacraments. Just as it did in his legal ontology, participation images both the transcendence of 
the primary cause (God) as well as the dispositive, mediatory immanence of divine causality 
within material creation. Immediacy and mediation form the enlivening tension of 
participatory metaphysics. Together they describe the natural vocation for union with God 
through creation and the elevation of believers into deification through redemptive 
participation in Christ. A.M. Allchin defines deification as teaching ‘not only that God has 
come down to be where we are, in our human mess, but that he has lifted us up to where he is 
in his divine splendour’.228 Hooker typically uses the language of participation rather than 
explicitly talk about deification, but even John Booty (who remains sceptical that Hooker 
advocates deification) writes Hooker would ‘accept Allchin’s definition’.229 
2.4 ‘Bugs wordes’: the twin Platonisms and and participation in Christ 
As the previous two sections have shown, participation informs Hooker’s 
metaphysical claims about creation and salvation, forming a Neoplatonic grammar of 
procession and reversion (exitus-reditus). Participation accordingly holds together God’s utter 
transcendence with his immanent causality in creation. As a result, Augustinian immediacy 
and Dionysian mediation stand in productive tension. In Book One, God’s utter 
transcendence immediately generates creation. The Dionysian idea of a lex divinitatis 
structures creation, however, as a hierarchy which mediates divinity and drives creation to 
return to God through its connatural operations. Legal participation therefore describes the 
ontological move from becoming to being. As such, Book One describes the first heuristic 
paradigm of participation: all that exists as a divine gift and similitude, a proportionate 
sharing in God’s ‘most glorious and most abundant vertue.’ Yet, sin frustrates such reversion 
and creates the problem of mediation: it re-opens an infinite gulf between creation and the 
perfect Creator. Divine law accordingly opens up a new mode of participation, namely a 
return to Augustinian immediacy. As it points to Christ, divine law acts as a remedy for the 
imbecility of human faculties occasioned by sin. Yet, divine law also images a 
disproportionate, direct, and supernatural union with Christ and God through grace. In Book 
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Five Christ’s hypostatic union forms the immediate ground for this new mode of 
participatory union. Participation in Book Five images the second heuristic paradigm: an 
intensive (re)union with God which analogously deifies the believer through participation in 
Christ. Here, Christ alone fulfils human nature and restores the return to God. Christ’s 
hypostatic union alone also elevates human nature from the connatural participation in God to 
an intensive, supernatural union with God. Just as the transcendent eternal law ‘reads itself’ 
into the world through a pattern of immanent divine influence and legal causality in Book 
One, so too in Book Five does the transcendent Christ read himself into the world through a 
causal pattern of participation in the dominical sacraments administered by the Church. 
Participation in Christ has the character of law in that it again describes the move from 
becoming to being. Immediacy again grounds mediation, just as in law. While Hooker details 
on the one hand a divinely mediated cosmos (‘order is a graduall disposition’), participation 
also allows him to assert the soul’s immediate relationship to God, a supernatural elevation to 
participated theōsis. In deification, nature and grace coincide in an analogous fashion to the 
union of Christ’s human and divine natures. Indeed, as Newey points out, ‘revealingly, it is 
by use of the prime biblical reference to theōsis at 2 Peter 1.4 [‘the participation of divine 
nature’] that Hooker finds the resolution of all these threads, of God and humanity, of 
transcendent and immanent, of ecclesial and personal, of grace and nature.’230 
For Hooker, the tension between Dionysian mediation and Augustinian immediacy 
reflects the core feature of participation. Participation separates the transcendent analogate 
(God or Christ) and the created analogue (creation or believers) as cause and effect. Yet, 
participation also makes every separation a link: God’s gratuitous action in creation and 
salvation yokes together natural, finite, created forms to a unitive and transcendent source 
and goal who utterly transcends them. As already noted in the introduction to this chapter, 
these two Christian Platonisms seem difficult to reconcile, however, as a coherent whole. The 
immediacy of salvation in Christ (grace) seems to preclude mediation (hierarchical nature) as 
the (corrupted) latter threatens to undermine the integrity of the former and its gratuity. 
Indeed, the anonymous authors of A Christian Letter accuse Hooker of heterodoxy in how he 
treats nature and grace. In relation to Book One, A Christian Letter complains that, while 
Article Six of the Thirty Nine Articles states ‘Holy Scripture contayneth all things which are 
necesarie to salvation’, Hooker writes ‘it sufficeth that nature and scripture doe serve in such 
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full sorte, that they both jointlie and not severallie eyther of them be so compleate, that unto 
everlasting felicitie we need not the knowledge of anie thing more than these two’.231 For the 
authors of A Christian Letter, the total depravity of human nature makes nature redundant 
and grace absolutely necessary: only Christ’s immediacy (solus Christus), and not natural 
mediation, can effect salvation, a Reformed tenet they believe Hooker violates. In relation to 
Book Five, A Christian Letter further complains that, in Hooker’s treatment of the 
sacraments, he threatens to ‘overturne the fayth of our church’ as he seems to insist that ‘the 
grace of God is tyed to anie time, as namelie the time of the Sacraments’ and makes for the 
‘additatment of workes unto fayth’ when he insists the sacraments are conditional means to 
salvation.232 In his Autograph Notes on A Christian Letter, Hooker responds at one point to 
such allegations: 
There are certaine woordes such as Nature, Reason, Will and such like which 
wheresoever you find them named <…> you suspect them presently as bugs wordes, 
because what they mean you doe not in deed as you ought apprehend. You have heard 
that mans Nature is corrupt his reason blind his will perverse. Wherupon under coulor 
of condemning corrupt nature you condemn nature and so in the rest.233 
In order, then, to defend the coherency of Hooker’s participatory metaphysics, this final 
section will first examine the ‘bugs wordes’ which set up an apparent incoherency, namely, 
nature and grace (2.4.1). It will show how Hooker ultimately elides too strict a distinction 
between nature and grace as both analogically represent God’s gratuitous action. Indeed, 
creation is an act of gratuitous donation, while salvation is an act of gratuitous return and 
elevation. Both creation and salvation exist on a participatory continuum: the first is an 
extensive, connatural participation in God as Creator, and the second an intensive, 
supernatural (re)union with God through Christ, a deifying elevation into the life of God 
which assumes union with God as the natural human vocation. ‘Grace’ mediates, then, 
between nature and glory. This section will conclude by showing how Christ acts as the key 
to unlock and defuse the tension between Dionysian mediation and Augustinian immediacy 
(2.4.2). For Hooker, Christ represents the personal, sapiential principle behind both the lex 
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divinitatis and also the salvific reversion and elevation of believers through the hypostatic 
union. 
2.4.1 ‘This the waie of nature, this the waie of grace’: Hooker on nature and grace 
 Hooker seems at first glance to be very clear about the distinction between the way of 
nature (Dionysian mediation) and the way of grace (Augustinian immediacy). As we have 
seen, in the Lawes Hooker makes clear the necessity of grace for salvation and that nature has 
no other recourse to cure sin.234 Indeed, a distinction that Hooker makes between (corrupted) 
‘nature’ and ‘grace’ in A Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride seems to shape the structure 
of the First Book of the Lawes: 
Wee are not dust and ashes but wourse….By which reason all being wrapped up in 
sinne and made thereby the children of death…shall wee think that god hath endued 
them with so many excellencies moe not only then any but then all the creatures in the 
world besides to leave them all in such estate that they had bene happier if they had 
never been? Heere cometh necessarily in a nue waie unto salvation so that they which 
were in the other perverse maie in this be found straight and righteous. This the waie 
of nature, this the waie of grace.235 
The first ten chapters of Book One in the Lawes chart ‘the waie of nature’ and the eleventh 
chapter onwards the ‘waie of grace’ occasioned by sin. The way of grace does not supplant 
nature but it has its origins only in the Incarnation since ‘the guift whereby God hath made 
Christ a fountaine of life is that conjunction of the nature of God with the nature of man in the 
person of Christ’.236 Yet, Christian believers are guided into this way of grace, this way of 
Christ, through the Scriptures, the divine law. As such, Hooker seems to stand clearly within 
the Reformed emphases on sola scriptura, solus christus, and sola gratia. As Hooker phrases 
it in Notes Toward a Fragment on Predestination, ‘Christ alone <could earn> was able to 
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remove and has removed the hindrance to our salvation;…he alone has procured all the means 
to salvation, and this for all men. Salvation never comes to any man without Christ.’237 
Yet, both ‘nature’ and ‘grace’ are highly ambivalent terms for Hooker on account of 
his participatory metaphysics. He notes that ‘the want of exact distinguishing between these 
two waies…hath bene the cause of the greatest part of that confusion whereof christianity at 
this daie laboureth’.238 On one hand, ‘nature’ and the ‘law of nature’ are multivalent terms. At 
the beginning of the Lawes, Hooker plans to move from law in general to the ‘lawe first of 
nature’. In the following chapters, Hooker develops three different senses of what ‘the 
lawe…of nature’ means. First, it can refer to a manner of working under the eternal law, 
which sets the laws for each created thing to keep. Second, it can refer specifically to the laws 
that govern non-rational, non-voluntary agents. Third, it can refer to the law of reason 
guiding rational, voluntary agents. When he later uses the term ‘nature’, Hooker means the 
first sense here, encompassing physical nature, celestial law, and the law of reason as they 
participate in eternal law.  
Since all these possible meanings of ‘nature’ refer to participation in eternal law, the 
term hardly lends itself to modern notions of nature’s atomistic autonomy and mere 
materiality. As such, ‘nature’ remains a theonomous term for Hooker, describing (as it does) 
the multiplicity of created forms (material, non-material, rational, non-rational) participating 
in the unitary ratio of God’s own generous, self-diffusive being. Nature therefore remains 
gratuitous: it is God’s act of self-donation in creation, the diffusion of being. Participation 
freights nature with divinity; it describes how God’s immanent causality saturates creation. 
Nature therefore denotes both the kind of thing something formally is, as well as the 
hierarchical whole of creation. In both cases, it represents the free gift of the Creator. Indeed, 
natural desires originate from and return to God as first and final cause. Instantiated desires 
frame natural participation in God for proportionate, connatural goods, but also the 
intellectual drive for disproportionate, contemplative union with God, which supernatural 
grace ultimately effects. Nature thereby has a supernatural beginning and end and represents 
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an analogous grace. In Book Five, divinity continues to saturate the natural through a pattern 
of gratuitous causality. Christ’s union of human and divine natures, and the natural elements 
of the sacraments, efficiently and instrumentally cause grace. The immediate benefit of 
participation in Christ (imputed righteousness) may be extrinsic and a gratuitous act of grace, 
but participation in Christ also yields the intrinsic and formal growth of infused grace 
(sanctification) in the actual lives of believers as a simultaneous gratuity. 
On the other hand, then, ‘grace’ similarly remains fraught with interpretive difficulty. 
For Aquinas, the definition of grace (from the Latin gratis, freely given) excludes ‘the notion 
of something being due’, either on the basis of nature or as a reward for personal merit.239 As 
such, creation itself represents an analogous act of grace because it is God’s free and 
gratuitous donation. In the First Book of the Lawes, Hooker similarly uses ‘grace’ to cover a 
number of different ideas about God’s causality within creation. First, ‘grace’ can refer to the 
end of God’s external works, namely the variety of creation participating in God. Hooker 
quotes from Wisdom literature to underscore the grace-filled nature of creation: “The Lord 
hath made all things for his owne sake [Proverbs 16.4]. Not that any thing is made to be 
beneficiall unto him, but all things for him to shew beneficence and grace in them.’240 Later, 
‘grace’ expresses again the goodness of God’s operation within creation which the angels 
strive to imitate since God ‘ceaseth not before them daily to fill heaven and earth with the 
rich treasures of most free and undeserved grace’.241 Similarly, human reason cannot ‘rightly 
performe the functions allotted to it, without perpetuall aid and concurrence of that supreme 
cause of all things’.242 In a comparable vein, Hooker again notes in the Dublin Fragments 
that ‘in grace there is nothing of soe great difficultie as to define after what manner and 
measure it worketh’.243 Hooker offers there a triple distinction: 
Thus of the three kinds of Grace: the Grace whereby God doth incline towards man, 
the grace of outward instruction, and the grace of inward sanctification, which twoe 
worke mans inclination towards God, as the first is the well spring of all good, and the 
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second the instrument thereof to our good, soe that which giveth effect to both in 
us…is the gratious and blessed guift of his Holy Spirit.244 
While Hooker here gives causal priority to God’s action of grace, he also links such action to 
the (super) natural ‘effect…in us’. Indeed, Hooker appeals to Pseudo-Dionysius in order to 
stress that ‘grace’ describes the care of God to preserve ‘the nature of each individual’ since it 
is ‘not worthy of Providence to violate nature’.245 Hooker then nods in the two directions of 
grace, first towards creation and then towards the telos of participated perfection: ‘Wee are 
by it [i.e. grace] that wee are, and att length by it wee shall bee that wee would.’246 While 
Hooker seems to distinguish between the ways of nature and grace, in practice such 
distinctions become blurred since all of creation expresses, in its createdness, an aspect of 
divine grace or gratuity. Indeed, ‘grace’ circumscribes a double donation, both the 
undeserved gift of being and the economy of salvation directed towards sharing God’s 
goodness, God’s fullness of being. 
Since the line between ‘grace’ and ‘nature’ is blurred, their relationship becomes a 
matter of degrees within a continuum of divine self-giving in divine law. As Kirby points out, 
‘Hooker’s position is dialectically complex’ and his account of grace and nature exhibits 
‘simultaneously disjunction and conjunction’.247 Within Hooker’s concept of creation-as-
gifted, the supernatural gifts of grace in divine law work within as well as beyond the first 
grace of creation. As a superadded quality, supernatural grace both aids human nature and 
also exceeds it ‘so that in morall actions, divine lawe helpeth exceedingly the law of reason to 
guide mans life, but in supernaturall it alone guideth’.248 In the Dublin Fragments, Hooker 
explores the relationship between nature and grace through an unspecified commentator’s 
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note on one of Aquinas’ articles in the Summa Theologiae about ‘whether man can wish or do 
any good without grace’.249 In the article itself, Aquinas argues that: 
…in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural 
strength for one reason, viz., in order to do and wish supernatural good; but for two 
reasons, in the state of corrupt nature, viz., in order to be healed , and furthermore in 
order to carry out the works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Beyond 
this, in both states, man needs the Divine Help, that he may be moved to act well. 
Nature here carries the freight of grace in different senses for Aquinas, both prelapasarian and 
postlapsarian. Hooker uses the commentator’s gloss that Aquinas means to indicate how ‘a 
special supernatural aid is necessary to elicit an act meritorious and worthy of bliss’. Such 
actions are effective through Christ alone, but nonetheless ‘since there are in us two sources 
of action, God’s grace and our nature, even our best acts savour of both sources’. Like 
Christ’s two natures, nature and grace co-operate and unite even though they remain distinct. 
In all of these instances, Hooker shows little concern rigidly to contrast nature and grace. 
Since desire for participation in God is ‘natural’ in some sense, ‘grace’ analogously describes 
both the created status of the cosmos and the supernatural act of redemption. While the grace 
of creation inclines created forms towards proportional perfections through participation in 
God, supernatural grace restores and elevates rational creatures into an intense, contemplative 
union with God through Christ. 
There are good reasons to argue, then, that while Hooker shows great care in places to 
distinguish between ‘nature’ and ‘grace, ultimately he elides strict distinctions. As such, the 
dialectic proves useful only so far as one takes note of such elisions. Indeed, for Hooker (as 
for Aquinas) ‘grace’ is best taken as a mediating term, somewhere between nature and glory. 
Like Aquinas, Hooker seems to talk of three kinds of participation: through nature, through 
grace, and through glory, where glory is the fulfilment of nature drenched in and elevated by 
God’s grace.250 Grace draws a participatory dynamic, then, between the transcendence of 
God’s causality and the immanent reception of such causality such that believers are elevated 
                                                          
249 Hooker, Dublin Fragments, 10, in FLE, 4:109.g. Hooker refers to Aquinas, ST, 
I.II.109.2. 
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to glory. Indeed, in A Learned Discourse of Justification, Hooker distinguishes three types of 
righteousness: 
There is a glorifyinge righteousness of men in the Worlde to comme, and there is a 
justefying and a sanctefyinge righteousness here. The righteousnes wherewith we 
shalbe clothed in the world to comme, is both perfect and inherente: that whereby 
here we are justified is perfecte but not inherente, that wereby we are sanctified, 
inherent but not perfecte.251 
Justification thus comes from Christ and is imputed as actual righteousness by grace to the 
believer.252 Sanctification is the habitual righteousness grafted by the Holy Spirit within 
believers. For Hooker, while justification remains logically prior, both it and sanctification 
are united in tempore through the instrumental causality of the sacraments. Participation in 
Christ through the sacraments therefore yields a simultaneity. On the one hand, sacraments 
declare the believer to be totally righteous extrinsically through participation in Christ, the 
‘inward hold’ they have ‘of Christ’. On the other hand the sacraments augment the 
progressive, incremental, intrinsic increase in virtue as Christ mutually takes inward hold of 
believers, ‘the effectes thereof are suche accions, as the apostle doth calls the fruites the 
workes the operacions of the spirit.’253 The growth of the believer through sanctifying grace 
reconciles this simultaneity in glory: ‘by the one we are interessed in the righte of inheriting, 
by the other we are brought to the actuall possessinge of eternall blisse, and so thend of both 
is everlasting life.’254 The perfect, inherent righteousness of Christ becomes formally (not 
extrinsically) that of the believer in the beatitude of glory. Until such glory, believers exist 
simultaneously in eternity and in time through participation in Christ. The natural and 
supernatural ultimately become one in bliss as the order of laws that mediate divinity returns 
to the immediacy of (re)union with God. 
 
                                                          
251 Hooker, Justification, 3, in FLE, 5:109.6-11. 
252 Hooker here denies Aquinas’ idea in ST, I.II.110 2 resp. that ‘gratia justificans’ is a 
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2.4.2 ‘The woord or Wisdom of God’: Christ the key 
 Hooker’s participatory metaphysics therefore hold that every separation remains a 
link: the utterly transcendent freely and lovingly suspends the immanent through a pattern of 
causality in which created forms share as diminished analogues in the perfection of the 
analogate. As such, the twin Platonisms of mediation and immediacy can be found in both 
Hooker’s account of creation as well as redemption. For Hooker, Christ is the key who 
unlocks both transcendence and immanence. Christ represents the personal, divine dynamic 
who suspends creation and the believer in the unfolding moments of creation and redemption. 
In Christ, then, Dionysian mediation and Augustinian immediacy meet. Hooker accordingly 
calls Christ the ‘woord or Wisdom of God’.255 As a logocentric and sapiential figure, Christ 
forms both the immediate first principle of all created, hierarchical order, and also the only 
via of return to God in redemption through his hypostatic union of natures.256 
In describing Jesus as the ‘woord or Wisdom of God’, Hooker aligns himself with the 
scriptural, patristic, and medieval exegesis that equates the Johannine language of Christ as 
the eternal Word (λογος) with the personified figure of Wisdom (σοφία) from wisdom 
literature. Both λογος and σοφία express the rational, creative, and loving aspect under which 
creation relates to the divine. In the Hebrew Scriptures, divine Wisdom appears as a female 
personification, especially in Job Proverbs, Sirach, and the Wisdom of Solomon. Roland 
Murphy lists the following as examples: Job 28; Proverbs 1, 8, 9; Sirach 1.9-10, 4.11-19, 
6.18-31, 14.20-15.8, 51.13-21; Baruch 3.9-4.4; and Wisdom 6.12-11.1.257 In these texts, her 
primary role is relational: she radiates from God as an image, remains an intimate friend, and 
lovingly connects and communicates between human beings and God. Sophia represents 
God’s presence to the universe of God’s continuing creativity. In turn, New Testament texts 
                                                          
255 Hooker, Lawes, 2:213.13-23; V.52.3. 
256 Hooker again follows Aquinas. See W.J. Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas’ 
Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1987) who argues that Christ alone is the via of return in Aquinas’ thought. 
257 Roland Murphy, The Tree of Life: an Exploration of Biblical Wisdom Literature 
(William B Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002), p. 146. 
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regularly identify Jesus as divine Wisdom.258 For example, Wisdom themes regularly appears 
within the liturgical hymns found in Philippians 2.6-11, Colossians 1.15-20, Ephesians 2.14-
16, 1 Timothy 3.16, 1 Peter 3.18-22, and Hebrews 1.3. Paul further writes of Christ as 
Wisdom in 1 Corinthians 1.22-24, 30-31. Christ as Wisdom also becomes identified as Christ 
the Word largely on account of the striking similarity between the images in terms of the 
loving suspension of creation from them as divine principles. As a prime example, John’s 
Prologue (John 1.18) casts Jesus as the Word (λογος). The λογος has a complex Greek and 
Jewish history.259 It became a crucial plank in evolving Christian thought about the Trinity 
through the conflation of selective pieces of scripture with philosophical and religious ideas 
of the ancient Hellenistic milieu. In Stoic philosophy, for example, the λογος was the active 
reason penetrating the whole universe. Alternatively, in Jewish thought, for Philo the λογος is 
the immaterial Word of God, a subordinate and intermediary being who provides the 
exemplar for creation. Yet, in the Prologue to his Gospel, John describes the λογος in 
language reminiscent of Wisdom: the Word is united to the divine, active in creation, reflects 
God’s glory, delights to be with human beings, and immanently dwells among them as an act 
of redemption.260 Like John, patristic and medieval exegetes regularly unite σοφία and λογος 
in order to explore how Christ acts as the eternal, divine reason (ratio) or paradigm 
(παράδειγμα) lovingly active in creation and redemption. λογος and σοφία theology can be 
found in the christological thought of Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, 
Ambrose, Jerome, Eusebius of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, and 
Augustine, as well as in the medieval thought of Richard of St Victor and Bonaventure. The 
mutuality of λογος and σοφία continues into the later medieval period, especially through the 
influence of Aquinas. 
                                                          
258 See James D.G. Dunn, Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry Into 
the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1996), 
pp. 163-212. 
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Indeed, Hooker’s favourite Wisdom text (Wisdom 8.1) also regularly features in 
Aquinas’ thought, as W. David Neelands has shown.261 Wisdom 8.1 describes how ‘Wisdom 
reacheth from one end to another mightily, and sweetly [χρηστῶς] doth she order all things’. 
Hooker appeals to this text (as well as Wisdom 11.17) in Book One when he discusses how 
the various orders of creation are a diminished and participatory similitude of an original, 
unlimited divine perfection. Diminishment in creation, however, does not imply imperfection. 
Hooker writes: 
If therfore it be demanded, why God having power and habilitie infinite, th’effects of 
that power are all so limited as we see they are: the reason hereof is the end which he 
hath proposed, and the lawe whereby his wisedome hath stinted th’effects of his 
power in such sort, that it doth not worke infinitely but correspondently unto that end 
for which it worketh, even al things χρηστῶς, in most decent and comely sort, all 
things in measure, number, and waight.262 
As caused, creation variously participates in God’s perfection through analogical laws that 
direct created things to appropriate perfective ends. Finitude does not constitute imperfection, 
but rather frames the creaturely conditions for variegated perfection.263 Participation in God 
reflects a wise and amiable [χρηστῶς] ordering of the various ways that creation shares in 
God’s ‘most glorious and abundant vertue’. 
Hooker implicitly identifies Christ as this amiable Sophia and λογος within the act of 
creation in Book One of the Lawes. The coda of Book One casts law in terms very close to 
the Wisdom of the sapiential books of Hebrew Scripture: ‘her seate is the bosome of God, her 
voice the harmony of the world.’264 That Christ is the Wisdom who orders creation remains 
                                                          
261 W. David Neelands, ‘Predestination’, in A Companion to Richard Hooker, ed. 
W.J.T. Kirby (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 185-220 (pp. 209-210). 
262 Hooker, Lawes, 1:60.28-61.6; I.2.3. See also Lawes, 2:227.34-228.8; V.55.2. 
Hooker draws a strict distinction between the finitude of created beings and the infinity of 
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perfection and preservation’ of the variety of creation, as well as suggesting a measure by 
which things are directed to some particular end. 
263 Hooker, Lawes, 1:61.12-17; I.2.4. 
264 Hooker, Lawes, 1:142.8-9; I.16.8. 
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the background to this coda and explains Hooker’s high estimation of nature. Indeed, in Book 
Five, Hooker describes how all of creation participates in Christ as an efficient cause: ‘it must 
be confest that of Christ, working as a creator, and a governor of the world by providence, all 
are partakers.’265 Christ forms the wise, rational, free, and loving divine donation of being, 
the paradigm for the first heuristic paradigm of participation. When Hooker appeals to 
wisdom theology (especially Proverbs 8.23) in his discussion of how eternal law generates 
creation, Hooker tacitly implies, then, that this involves natural participation in Christ as 
Wisdom: 
That law eternall which God himself hath made to himselfe, and thereby worketh all 
things whereof he is the cause and author, that law in the admirable frame whereof 
shineth with most perfect bewtie the countenance of that wisedome which hath 
testified concerning her self, The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, even 
before his works of old, I was set up etc.266 
The Folger Library Edition commentary denies that Hooker equates here the creative Sophia 
with the divine λογος since God voluntarily chooses to self-impose eternal law.267 Yet, pace 
this commentary, Hooker’s discussion of law as it relates to God makes it clear that λογος 
and Sophia are co-identical in this text as one might expect from the exegetical tradition. 
Indeed, the gloss in the Geneva Bible of 1560 on Proverbs comments that, ‘he [Solomon] 
declareth hereby the divinitie and eternitie of this wisedome…meaning thereby the eternall 
Sonne of God Jesus Christ our Saviour, whome St. John calleth the worde that was in the 
beginning, John 1, 1.’ In Book One, Hooker works through how λογος and Sophia relate. 
While the λογος or ratio of law remains necessary in se (God simply is law), God voluntarily 
chooses to act ad extra upon the creative archetype of the divine Sophia in order to create the 
cosmos. Indeed, for Hooker, eternal law represents ‘that order [λογος] which God before all 
ages hath set down with himselfe, for himselfe to all things by’, while Wisdom (Sophia) is 
                                                          
265 Hooker, Lawes, 2:242.11-13; V.56.10. 
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267 Hooker, Lawes, 1:62.29-63.1; I.2.6: ‘Nor is the freedom of the wil of God any whit 
abated, let or hindered by meanes of this, because the imposition of this law upon himself is 
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the ‘patterne [παράδειγμα] to make, and is the card to guide the worlde by’.268 Thus, in one 
direction, law (circumscribed by λογος or ratio) is eternal, immutable, unchangeable, and 
perfect, co-identical with the being of God and constituting a book ‘we are neither able nor 
worthie to open and looke into’.269 In the direction of creation, however, eternal law 
expresses the free, loving, and generous diffusion of being from God into all created things 
through Sophia, the rational παράδειγμα. Hooker’s statement in Book Five that all creation 
participates in Christ as creator shows that Hooker therefore implicitly sees Christ as both 
λογος and Sophia in Book One. There, Christ is a ‘necessary’ and ‘internall’ member of the 
Trinity and also acts as the creative archetype voluntarily embraced in the divine donation of 
being.270 Indeed, when he turns to the creation of the world in Genesis 1, Hooker makes it 
clear that the divine fiat reflects not an arbitrary will but rather rational ‘speech’ [λογος] 
which institutes the ‘law naturall to be observed by creatures’.271 In the Word or Wisdom, 
God knows all the different ways in which creation can participate in the essential goodness 
of divine nature. Creation becomes a diminished image, then, of the second Person of the 
Trinity through the descending imitation of law. 
In Book One, then, Christ implicitly acts as the transcendent sapiential principle (the 
‘woord or Wisdom’) co-identical with the work of eternal law in which the whole system of 
created laws participates. Hooker returns again to the sweet and amiable [χρηστῶς] character 
of Wisdom in Wisdom 8.1 when he discusses how creation participates in divine Wisdom. 
Hooker’s definition of law as ‘a directive rule unto the goodness of operation’ revolves 
around analogical participation in God’s Wisdom and the co-identical transcendental 
perfections of goodness and beauty. Hooker therefore expands the definition in the following 
manner: 
The rule of divine operations outward, is the definitive appointment of Gods owne 
wisedome set down within himself. The rule of naturall agents that work by simple 
necessity, is the determination of the wisedome of God….The rule of ghostly or 
immateriall natures, as spirits and Angels, is their intuitive intellectual judgement 
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concerning the amiable [χρηστῶς] beautie and high goodnes of that object, which 
with unspeakable joy and delight, doth set them on worke…The rule of voluntary 
agents on earth is the sentence that reason giveth concerning the goodness of those 
things which they are to do.272 
In this passage, Hooker develops briefly how law operates analogously: God’s wisdom 
simply is law; animals keep the law of nature unwittingly through their natural actions; and 
both angels and human beings operate rationally, respectively ‘concerning the amiable 
[χρηστῶς] beautie and high goodness of that object [i.e. God]’ as well as ‘concerning those 
things which they are to do’. While such laws operate as interior principles, they 
theonomously participate in the providential wisdom of God, namely Christ himself, an 
amiable order of λογος and Sophia. At the end of Book One, Hooker appeals to the figure of 
Wisdom in Proverbs 8.15 again to portray a descending imitation of eternal law throughout 
creation: ‘lawes apparently good, are (as it were) thinges copied out of the very tables of that 
high everlasting law, even as the booke of that law hath sayd concerning itself, By me Kinges 
raigne, and by me Princes decree justice.’273 Yet, here such imitation is not simply that of an 
external principle, for there is a strict difference between the infinity of God and finitude of 
creation. Imitation is rather an intrinsic principle (‘it worketh in them’), a theonomous 
participation, an analogical similarity between the ratio of Wisdom (Christ) and the ratio of 
created forms. Christ as Wisdom ‘reads’ himself into the world through such immanent 
causality. Indeed, when Hooker later describes how God influences human beings, he casts 
God’s causality as a ‘sweet [χρηστῶς] compulsion’, an orderly and fitting correspondence or 
convenientia.274 
In the Dublin Fragments, Hooker therefore indexes both nature and grace to the sweet 
amiability [χρηστῶς] of Wisdom in which transcendent causality unfolds immanently. 
Hooker writes: 
The axiome of the providence of God in general, whereby he is said to governe all 
thinges amiablie according to the severall condition and qualitie of their natures, must 
needs especiallie take place, in ordering the principall actions whereunto the hand of 
                                                          
272 Hooker, Lawes, 1:84.16- 85.4; I.8.4. 
273 Hooker, Lawes, 1:136.8-15; I.16.2. 
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his grace directeth the soules of men….God hath ordeyned grace…that thereby wee 
which cannot moove ourselves, may be drawne, but amiablie drawne.275 
Nature and grace share the amiable character of Wisdom. The whole life of grace concurs 
with the ratio of nature and reflects that God ‘ordereth, butt yet with gentleness; mightily, but 
yett in an amiable manner’.276 As with nature, so with redemption since God ‘leadeth still to 
eternall life by an amiable course, framed even according to the verie state wherein wee now 
are’.277 Indeed, in the Lawes the redemptive return to God through Christ turns on eternal 
Wisdom just as creation does: ‘behold how the wisedome of God hath revealed a way 
mysticall and supernaturall….The supernaturall way hath God in himselfe prepared before all 
worldes.’278 In Book Five, Hooker equates the ‘woord’ (λογος) with the ‘Wisdom’ (Sophia) 
of God in the Incarnation. Parsing John 1.14, Hooker writes that ‘wisdom to the ende that she 
might save manie made not this or that man hir habitation but dwelt in us’.279 Hooker rejects 
the Arian idea that there are two ‘wisdoms’ in God, one uncreated, the other (Jesus) 
created.280 Jesus, the eternal λογος, is also eternal Sophia. Since Christ is amiable Wisdom, 
Christ immediately orders creation and redemption, the exit from and return to God. Such 
immediacy does not remove nature but condescends to work through the mediation of 
immanent natural causes, the Incarnation, and sacramental instrumentality. The ‘woord or 
Wisdom of God’ theonomously suspends creation from God as an act of gentle love, working 
for its redemption. Immediacy and mediation meet in Christ as Word and Wisdom. Christ the 
key distinguishes only in order to unite both nature and grace, unlocking their relationship. 
In Book Five of the Lawes, Hooker expands upon the metaphysical role of 
participation for the salvific union between Christ and believers. Hooker’s language elevates 
the weak sense of participation in Christ as Creator into the strong sense of reunion with God 
and deification. For Hooker, the Incarnation entails that by ‘personal union’, Christ’s ‘deitie’ 
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is ‘inseparablie joined’ to the body and soul of his humanity.281 Thus, Hooker generates the 
double sense in which Christ is the foundation of all participation in God: as the eternal Word 
or Wisdom of God creating and directing the cosmos, and also as the wise Word who perfects 
those who believe in His Incarnation, death, and Resurrection. Thus, all things participate in 
God because ‘his influence [is] in the verie essence of all thinges’.282 This general 
participation is also Trinitarian, being in the Father as ‘goodness’, in the Son as ‘wisdom’ 
ordering all things, and in the power of the Spirit as an ‘power’.283 Yet, in addition to this 
general participation is a unique filiation by the saving grace of Christ so that believers are 
‘given the gratious and amiable name of sonnes [1 John 3.1]’.284 Such gratuitous filiation 
ultimately works towards participation in glory since we ‘are therefore in God through Christ 
eternallie’ and are ‘adopted sonnes of God to eternall life by participation of the only 
begotten Sonne of God.’285 Since ‘God hath deified our nature’ in Christ’s Incarnation, 
adoption analogously deifies believers. The ‘woord or Wisdom’ of God draws believers into 
the life of God, and ultimately into the eternal union of the natural with the divine. The 
‘woord or Wisdom of God’ immediately works eternal salvation, then, but also doubly 
condescends into the patterns of natural causality, first in the Incarnation and then in the 
sacraments in order to unfold transcendence within concrete historical communities.  
The sacraments indeed establish the transcendental participation in Christ as an 
immanent pattern of causality whereby ‘Christ is in us’ just as believers dwell in him. The 
eucharist in particular conforms the recipient unto Christ as Wisdom. In his account of 
eucharistic reception in Book Five of the Lawes, Hooker emphasises taste. The eucharistic 
mysteries ‘doe as nailes fasten us to his verie crosse’ and ‘in the woundes of our redeemer 
wee there dip our tongues’ such that ‘our hunger is satisfied….our thirst for ever 
quenched’.286 The logic of desire which ultimately aims at participation in the divine nature is 
here pictured as hunger and thirst. Such desire finds non-discursive satiation in Christ, 
imaged as gustatory delight. The Latin root of taste (sapere) figuratively relates to wisdom 
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(sapientia), identified by Hooker as Christ’s creative and saving influence, and now united 
with the eucharistic consumer. Mediation yields to immediate union, the gratuitous reversion 
of created forms to the Wisdom of God from whom they originally came as a gratuitous gift, 
a prolepsis of heavenly deification. 
C.S. Lewis accordingly points out that Hooker’s universe is ‘drenched with Deity’.287 
As this chapter has shown, Hooker’s metaphysical architecture of participation in the Lawes 
forms the dynamic which saturates creation with divinity in two ways.  
On the one hand, the legal ontology of Book One casts participation in terms of God’s 
extensive influence and causality throughout all of creation. Here, participation in eternal law 
hierarchically suspends created forms from God, the perfect analogate who freely and 
gratuitously donates being. God’s utter transcendence immediately generates such Dionysian 
hierarchy, which itself tends back towards transcendent immediacy. Legally instantiated 
desires within natural hierarchies drive created forms to return in their own manner to their 
unitive origin of being, namely God. Sin corrupts and frustrates natural mediation, however, 
and God gratuitously offers the remedial gift of divine law, God’s immediate self-disclosure 
fulfilled in Christ.  
On the other hand, Hooker’s account of the sacraments in Book Five casts 
participation in terms of God’s intensive influence and causality through Christ within 
believers. Participation suspends believers from Christ, the perfect Saviour who freely and 
gratuitously recreates human nature, donating the light of salvation when the darkness of sin 
corrupts, obscures, and frustrates it. Christ’s hypostatic union again sees God’s utter 
transcendence immediately condescend anew into the mediation of intrinsic patterns of 
causality: believers share in the gratuity of Christ’s elevated humanity through the Church 
and the sacraments. Such patterns drive the return of the believer ’Godward’ until they 
receive immediate union with God as deified analogues of Christ.  
In both extensive and intensive modes of participation, Hooker sees Christ as the key 
who unlocks the tension between Dionysian hierarchy and Augustinian immediacy or nature 
and grace. As Word and Wisdom, Christ forms the sapiential principle of creation as well as 
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the loving gratuity of salvation. Christ alone is the exit from and return to God, whether 
natural or supernatural. As a result, extensive and intensive forms of participation (and the 
corollaries of hierarchy and grace) always imply one another, either disjunctively (in light of 
sin) or conjunctively (as analogous intensities of divine gift). The metaphysical tension 
between immediacy and mediation meets in Christ and disappears when seen as aspects of a 
single divine knowing, loving, and making. 
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3. ‘A drop of that unemptiable fountain of wisdom’: cognitive participation in God 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter unveils how Hooker’s architecture of participation establishes a certain 
homology between his ontology and epistemology. The previous chapter argued that 
Hooker’s architecture of participation unites both extensive and intensive forms of 
metaphysical participation. Accordingly, it describes three aspects, namely the existential, 
formal, and henological relationship between creation and God. In that architecture, Christ as 
‘woord or Wisdom’ forms the key who unlocks the distinct but related textures of nature and 
grace. In Book One, Christ acts as the rational, divine pattern (παράδειγμα) who freely, 
wisely, and lovingly makes creatures as extensive, diminished, hierarchical, and formal 
analogues of divine being. In Book Five, Christ’s incarnation immediately forms the wise 
ratio which restores the integrity of nature and through which believers enjoy an intensive 
(re)union with God, imaged as an analogous form of deification. In Books Two through Five, 
Hooker upholds this richly textured architecture of participation against his puritan opponents 
who ‘hold that only one law, the Scripture must be the rule to direct, in all things’, including 
in church polity and what constitutes the proper liturgical means for edification.1 As Hooker 
responds, reason and desire emerge from the architecture of participation to become the 
constellating categories for a mixed cognitive ecology that circumscribes both extensive 
(natural) and intensive (supernatural) forms of cognitive participation in God, moments 
which Christ as ‘woord or Wisdom’ again unites. First, in Books One through Three, Hooker 
explores how God extensively authors the light and word of reason as well as that of 
Scripture. Divine influence renders reason and Scripture as complementary participants in the 
ratio of God’s ‘unemptiable fountaine of wisdom’, necessary epistemic elements which 
manuduct (literally, ‘guide by the hand’) humanity to the intensive ‘participation of God 
himselfe’. Here, ‘as her waies are of sundry kinds,’ divine wisdom ‘inspireth,’ ‘leadeth and 
trayneth’ human understanding in natural as well as supernatural cognitive participation in 
God.2 Second, in Books Four and Five, Hooker addresses how the ‘elements, parts or 
principles’ of instruction and prayer in worship reform and edify created physical, emotional, 
and intellectual desires such that they become ‘holie’. Such ‘holie desires’ also serve ‘as a 
                                                          
1 Hooker, Lawes, 1:145.12-13; II.1.2. 
2 Hooker, Lawes, 1:147.23-148.6; II.1.4. 
124 
 
hand to lead, and a way to direct’ believers towards an intensive cognitive participation in 
God, issuing in love.3 Together, reason and desire thereby reveal a fourth and final 
participatory turn: as god-like images, human beings are essentially both created and creative 
sharers in the sapiential unfolding of divine influence within human communities. 
Yet, the architectural role of participation in Hooker’s epistemology has gone largely 
unnoticed despite Hooker’s intention to relate ‘general’ principles to ‘particular’ points of 
controversy. As a result, modern scholars typically miss the homology between Hooker’s 
ontology and epistemology, creating an exegetical Scylla and Charybdis. A.S. McGrade 
therefore wryly observes that Hooker ‘has the unusual distinction of being severely criticised 
for both hypo- and hyper-rationalism’, meaning that Hooker allegedly either undermines the 
integrity of human reason with the gratuity of grace, or extols the autonomy of reason at the 
expense of revelation.4 In both cases, the emotions are disparaged as inherently irrational and 
corrupt. As a heuristic device to explain the difficulties that a participatory reading of 
Hooker’s epistemology faces, it remains useful to develop briefly the exegetical Scylla and 
Charybdis. 
Hypo-rationalist readings typically argue that Hooker subsumes reason under the 
contrastive, heteronomous, and irrational activity of grace.5 As such, Hooker’s early 
emphasis in Books One through Four on a modern hermeneutic of public reason, historical 
pragmatism, and linguistic change both has internal problems of coherency and also gives 
way to an affective inwardness of faith and liturgical mysticism in Book Five, involving the 
                                                          
3 Hooker, Lawes 1:275.21-24; IV.1.3. 
4 McGrade, ‘The Coherence of Hooker's Polity’, p. 166 (my italics). 
5 A number of studies together make up the above heuristic model of hypo-rationalist 
readings of Hooker, although only some draw critical conclusions. See the following 
examples: Robert V. Kavanagh, Reason and Nature in Hooker’s Polity; Gunnar Hillerdal, 
Reason and Revelation in Richard Hooker; Egil Grislis, ‘Richard Hooker’s Image of Man’, 
Renaissance Papers 1963 (The Southeastern Renaissance Conference, 1964), pp. 73-84; 
Robert Faulkner, ‘Reason and Revelation in Hooker’s Ethics’, The American Political 
Science Review, 59 (1965), 680-90; Debora Shuger, Habits of Thought in the English 
Renaissance (University of Toronto Press, 1997); and Corneliu Simut, The Doctrine of 
Salvation in the Sermons of Richard Hooker (Berlin, 2005). 
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same irrational appeal to the emotions that Hooker has denounced in his puritan opponents in 
the Preface. First, Hooker emphasises the capacity of human reason in the early books of the 
Lawes as a polemical strategy against the radical puritans in order to undermine what he 
alleges is an emotional delusion behind their claims to interior divine inspiration. Hooker 
thereby disallows ‘an experiential participation of the Spirit by interposing the interpretive act 
[of reason] between object [i.e. God, revelation, Scripture] and subjectivity’.6 Yet, grace 
accordingly becomes problematic and the Spirit’s activity irrational. Hooker cannot explain 
how non-Christians have knowledge of God without grace, and ‘vagueness stamps the whole 
argument’ when he writes of a specifically Christian kind of ratiocination since he cannot 
account for how sanctification transforms mental faculties.7 At the same time, Hooker lets 
slip back in an alternative and discontinuous participatory epistemology in Book Five. 
Whereas the intellect remains concerned with rational evidence, religious faith revolves 
around the certainty of adherence based on illogical desire. Hooker’s emotional encomium of 
eucharistic participation as a mystical, deifying activity represents an incoherent departure 
from a polemical concern with reasonableness, ‘an astonishing turn to a kind of irrationalism’ 
which implies ‘that the Christian can move to a point over and above logical discourse and 
that all questions then will be answered by the grace of God’.8 
In contrast, hyper-rationalist readings of Hooker argue that he grants to dispassionate 
human reason an unabashed, self-sufficient autonomy in Books One through Three, even in 
relation to revelation.9 Of course, the earliest critics who cast Hooker as a hyper-rationalist 
                                                          
6 Shuger, Habits of Thought, p. 37. 
7 Hillerdal, Reason and Revelation, pp. 135-37. 
8 Hillerdal, Reason and Revelation, pp. 126, 135. 
9 A number of studies make up the above heuristic model of hyper-rationalist readings 
of Hooker, although only some draw critical conclusions. See the following examples: L.S. 
Thornton, Richard Hooker: A Study of his Theology (London: SPCK, 1924); Peter Munz, The 
Place of Hooker in the History of Thought; Dewey Wallace, Puritans and Predestination: 
Grace in English Protestant Theology, 1552-1695 (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1982); Brian Vickers, ‘Public and Private Rhetoric in Hooker’s Lawes’, pp. 
95-145; Joan Lockwood O’ Donovan, Theology of Law and Authority in the English 
Reformation (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 2000); & Esther Reed, ‘Richard Hooker, Eternal 
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are the anonymous authors of A Christian Letter from 1599. Those conforming puritan 
authors accuse him of extolling natural law, reason, and pagan thought over the perfect 
sufficiency of Scripture: they decry that, in Hooker’s thought, ‘reason is highlie sett up 
against holie Scripture.’10 The authors accordingly demand that Hooker ‘shew us therefore 
howe your positions agree with our church and the scriptures’.11 Later hyper-rationalist 
exegetes similarly argue that, in Books One through Three, Hooker exaggerates the 
superiority of an autonomous rationality upon which the content and authority of Scripture 
has a ‘pervasive dependence’.12 Indeed, Scripture presupposes ‘the powers and autonomous 
action of human reason to decode its message’, meaning that ‘the possession and use of 
reason was a sine qua non for conversion’.13 More extremely, Hooker thereby ‘evolved in the 
end a conception of a truly omnipotent reason’ and ‘established the complete autonomy of 
human reason over the whole of life’.14 Hooker’s work constitutes ‘before all else a great 
appeal to reason in matters of religion’, itself a rhetorical move of ‘calm and reasoned 
discussion’ against the ‘uninformed enthusiasm’ of his puritan critics.15 The emotions are 
therefore banished to the private realm. Only reason has a public place since it alone produces 
a ‘coherent structure of argument’. In contrast, the emotions have a limited, private aim in the 
eucharistic encomium of Book Five, namely ‘the singling out of the precious elements of 
Christian belief [which] invites the reader to share in the writer’s celebration’.16 The 
autonomy of human reason ultimately entails, then, a specious naturalism that denudes public 
                                                          
Law, and the Human Exercise of Authority’, Journal of Anglican Studies, 4.2 (2006), 219-
238. 
10 A Christian Letter, 20, in FLE, 4:67.1. See H.C. Porter, ‘Hooker, the Tudor 
Constitution, and the Via Media’, in Studies in Richard Hooker, ed. W. Speed Hill 
(Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1972), pp. 77-116, esp. p. 103, 
who agrees that Hooker’s critics were right: ‘the whole of Hooker’s work…was a celebration 
of “our natural faculty of reason”.’ 
11 A Christian Letter, 3, 5, & 20, in FLE, 4:11.10-24; 19.1-2; 65.16-68.19. 
12 O’Donovan, Theology of Law and Authority, pp. 137, 142, 145. 
13 Lake, Anglicans &Puritans?, p. 152. 
14 Munz, The Place of Hooker, pp. 61-62. 
15 Thornton, Richard Hooker, p. 24. 
16 Vickers, ‘Public and Private Rhetoric in Hooker’s Lawes’, p. 145. 
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life of the supposedly sub-rational emotions, evacuates creation of God’s immanent causality, 
and so separates ethics and politics from metaphysics. 
This chapter considers in turn the constellating categories of Hooker’s cognitive 
ecology, namely reason and desire, and shows how the architecture of participation cuts 
through the Gordian knot of hypo- and hyper-rationalism, rescuing the emotions as 
constitutive of human flourishing coram Deo. First, this chapter considers Hooker’s account 
of reason, a power which enjoys natural (3.2) and supernatural (3.3) forms of cognitive 
participation in God. As Egil Grislis points out, Hooker often equivocates in whether he takes 
the ‘light of reason’ to refer to natural reason unaided by special grace, a capacity blighted by 
sin, or a power redeemed by (sanctifying) grace.17 Untangling this equivocation will illumine 
how Hooker’s account navigates between hypo- and hyper-rationalism: divine influence 
works within and through intrinsic, natural capacities, underwriting and restoring their 
integrity. Next, this chapter then turns to the liturgical recreation of divinely instantiated 
desire (3.4). Here, far from being inherently irrational, for Hooker emotions exhibit a logical, 
intentional structure and even a kind of perceptive cognition which drive human beings not 
only to know but also to enjoy loving union with God. Finally, this chapter will return to 
Christ as the key who unlocks the tensions between nature and grace in human cognition 
(3.5). Here, it will be shown how, for Hooker, Christ acts as the principium of reason, 
Scripture, and desire, circumscribing the extensive and intensive ways in which human 
beings cognitively participate in God through their creation and redemption. 
3.2 ‘The light of reason’: natural cognitive participation in God 
 In the legal ontology of Book One, Hooker discusses natural intellectual faculties at 
some length and sets reason as the first constellating category of a cognitive ecology which 
leads human beings to the ‘participation of God himselfe’. Nigel Voak adroitly claims that 
‘Hooker’s philosophy of mind was thoroughly scholastic in its orientation’.18 In order to 
extrapolate Hooker’s ‘philosophy of mind’, Voak traces the similarity between Hooker’s 
account of reason, appetite, and imagination with that of Aquinas, as well as the supposed 
                                                          
17 Egil Grislis, ‘Scriptural Hermeneutics’, in A Companion to Richard Hooker, ed. 
W.J.T. Kirby (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 297-301.See also Robert Hoopes, Right Reason in the 
English Renaissance (Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 123-124. 
18 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, p. 25. 
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consonance between Hooker’s account of the will and that of Duns Scotus.19 Broadly 
speaking, within this scholastic, faculty-based anthropology, ‘the object of wil is that good 
which reason doth leade us to seek’.20 Here, reason (or the ‘shew of reason’) ‘prescribeth the 
thing desired [i.e. the good]’ to the will which, as an intellectual desire, chooses it and moves 
to act. In turn, the ‘inferiour naturall desire’ called ‘appetite’ has as its object ‘whatever 
sensible good may be wished for’ and accordingly solicits the will. Reason mediates such 
solicitation, however, as it presents to the will the intelligibility of the appetite’s desires: ‘now 
pursuit and refusal in the will do follow, the one the affirmation, the other negation of 
goodnes, which the understanding apprehendeth, grounding it selfe upon sense.’21 In Pride, 
Hooker succinctly paraphrases what the ‘orderly disposition of the mind of man should be’ in 
such a faculty-based anthropology, namely that ‘perturbations and sensuall appetites [are] all 
kept in aw by a moderate and sober will; will in all things framed by reason; reason directed 
by the law of god and nature’.22 
Yet, Voak crucially omits the central importance of participation for Hooker and 
Aquinas, who both refuse to see human capacities in merely autonomous, secular terms, or 
the work of grace as heteronomous to natural integrity. Instead, they commonly understand 
natural reason as a cognitive participation in the eternal ratio of God. Hooker, following 
Aquinas, gives a theological account of reason as an intrinsic power nevertheless suspended 
from God’s causality as a gift.23 The central chapters (eight through ten) of Book One of the 
Lawes are concerned with ‘the naturall way of finding out laws by reason to guide the will 
unto that which is good,’ ‘the benefit of keeping that law which reason teacheth,’ and ‘how 
                                                          
19 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp. 28-67. 
20 Hooker, Lawes, 1:78.15-26; I.7.3. 
21 Hooker, Lawes, 1:80.6-11; I.7.6. 
22 Hooker, Pride, I, in FLE, 5:314.16-20. 
23 Voak Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, p. 27 demurs on this point and only 
uses Aquinas as a comparison ‘with some reluctance’ as an accessible cipher for the ‘very 
basic common features’ of scholastic theories of the mind. In contrast, Joyce, Richard Hooker 
& Anglican Moral Theology, pp. 69, 86-87 observes that while Hooker nowhere provides a 
methodical theological anthropology such as that found in Aquinas, what Hooker does say 
‘coheres’ with Aquinas and so Hooker owes ‘much to Aristotelian-Thomist tradition in his 
theological anthropology’. 
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reason doth leade men unto the making of humane lawes’. While Hooker considers the 
integrity of natural reason in these texts, the ‘participation of God himselfe’ entirely frames 
the natural epistemic pursuit of ‘that which is good’ such that, for human beings, there is a 
natural cognitive participation in God, a participated theonomy. Generated out of the 
architecture of participation, natural cognitive participation in God thereby involves formal, 
existential, and henological aspects: it describes the intelligibility, facticity, and purpose of 
reason in relation to God as rational source and end. It also involves, however, a creative 
turn: human agency is not simply emptied into the causation of some transcendent source; 
rather, human reason displays a participated creativity in which its own contingent historical 
activities instrumentally mediate the ratio of divine artisanship. This section unpacks how 
Hooker places natural reason as an analogy of divine rationality (3.2.1) and positions divine 
causality within natural reason (3.2.2). It concludes with the manner in which natural 
cognitive participation in God forms an important prelude to supernatural cognitive 
participation (3.2.3). 
3.2.1 ‘After a sort’: analogy and cognitive participation in God 
Hooker’s metaphysical dependence on Aquinas’ account of law, analogy, and 
participation in Book One matches a comparable vestige around the natural cognitive 
participation of the human intellect in God through the law of reason. An analogical account 
of participation remains crucial to understand how Hooker understands the human intellect as 
imaging the divine intellect ‘after a sort’, and accordingly the created ‘light of reason’ as a 
natural cognitive participation in God. Here, cognitive participation undercuts notions of 
autonomy and heteronomy, namely hyper- and hypo-rationalism: the form of reason is 
theonomously suspended from its transcendental origin as a created and creative similitude. 
Here, analogy holds together the four aspects of the architecture of participation. The ideality, 
existence, and unitive purpose of reason derive from its causal relationship with divine 
reason. In turn, since reason helps constitute human nature as being made in the image of 
God, it also sets humanity as a fabricating animal: the creative capacity of human reason to 
make meaning echoes, in a limited fashion, the nature of God as the rational creator. The 
principle of analogy implied in participatory metaphysics therefore holds together the 
integrity of the intellectual form with its causal dependence upon a higher principle. It 
remains helpful, therefore, initially to revisit Aquinas’ account of analogy, and also sketch 
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out his ideas about natural cognitive participation in God, as that which informs Hooker’s 
epistemology.24 
As a reminder, for Aquinas analogy involves three elements: first, a source that 
possesses some perfection in total and unrestricted fashion (the analogate); second, a subject 
that possesses the same perfection, but in a limited and restricted way (the analogue); and, 
third, that the subject depends on the donating source of the perfection to receive that 
perfection, as an effect from a cause (the suspension of the analogue from the analogate). For 
Aquinas, analogy images how the human intellect is causally suspended as an analogue from 
God. As pure act (purus actus), God is understanding essentially (per essentiam), the primary 
analogate of reason.25 Human beings, as they move from potency to act, understand through 
participating God’s act of understanding (per participationem) and represent the analogue of 
reason.26 The participation of the human intellect in the divine intellect accordingly displays a 
double aspect: first, God causes the intellectual power in human beings as well as the 
intelligible forms by which they understand;27 and second, the power of human reason, in its 
own secondary, intrinsic operations, participates as an effect in such divine influence.28 Thus, 
the ‘natural light’ of the human intellect depends upon God’s ‘enlightenment’ in two ways: 
‘inasmuch as it is from Him that it has the form whereby it acts; secondly, inasmuch as it is 
moved by Him to act.’29 Thus, for Aquinas the intrinsic ‘light’ of human reason participates 
in the light of divine reason as an analogous effect from a transcendent cause, but the same 
cause remains as a constituting influence within it.30 
                                                          
24 For Aquinas’ account of natural and supernatural cognitive participation, see Rziha, 
Perfecting Human Actions, pp. 184-256. 
25 Aquinas, ST, I.14.1-2. 
26 Aquinas, ST, I.79.4. 
27 Aquinas, ST, I.105.3.  
28 Aquinas, ST, I.14.8.3; I.84.5. 
29 Aquinas, ST, II.I.109.1. See David L. Whidden III, Christ the Light: The Theology 
of Light and Illumination in Thomas Aquinas (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014), esp. pp. 135-
172. 
30 Aquinas, ST, I.12.11 ad. 3; I.89.1. Indeed, Aquinas, ST, I.12, 2 resp. sees human 
rationality, whether in its natural operations or as enlivened by special grace, as a participatio 
divini luminis. 
131 
 
Hooker, like Aquinas, sets the natural power of reason as an analogous participant in 
the ratio of its uncreated source, namely God. God’s intellectual nature forms the primary 
analogate of rationality for Hooker.31 ‘Law’ expresses the rule (ratio) and measure of action: 
the essence of law is accordingly something rational (aliquid rationis). As pure act, God 
exists simply as law (per essentiam), the perfect, primary analogate of rational order. ‘Law’ 
accordingly images, then, the perfect ratio of the divine nature itself and identifies God as 
pure reason or intellect. Hooker here shares a similarity with patristic writers who, though 
they rarely define mind (mens) or intellect (nous), assume it as a divine characteristic and so 
set the relationship between divine rationality and the human rational capacity as the ground 
for seeing humanity as being made in the imago dei.32 For Hooker, the rational character of 
God remains publically accessible without the need for special revelation. As evidence, 
Hooker references pagan authors who see the first cause of creation as a self-mediating, legal, 
and rational principle. Hooker lists Homer, Mercurius Trismegistus, Anaxagoras, Plato, and 
the Stoics as examples, concluding that ‘they all confesse therfore in the working of that first 
cause, that counsell is used, reason followed, a way observed, that is to say, constant order 
and law is kept, whereof it selfe must needs be author unto itself’.33 In turn, Hooker identifies 
the divine rationality exhibited within eternal law as the scriptural figure of divine Wisdom, 
eternal and beyond human understanding.34 
                                                          
31 The essential rationality of God can be seen elsewhere in Hooker’s writings. For 
example, see Hooker, Predestination, in FLE, 4:84.9-19 where he employs the scholastic 
distinction of scientia simplicis intelligentiae and scientia visionis in order to describe God’s 
knowledge (scientia Dei) as it relates to the divine will. For an extended discussion of the 
categories as used by Hooker, see Nigel Voak, ‘English Molinism in the Late 1590s: Richard 
Hooker on Free Will, Predestination, and Divine Foreknowledge’, Journal of Theological 
Studies, 60.1 (2009), 130-177. See also Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek 
Theological Terms Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 1985), pp. 274-276. 
32 See Anna Williams, The Divine Sense: The Intellect in Patristic Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 5-7. 
33 Hooker, Lawes, 1:59.33-60.14; I.2.3. 
34 Hooker, Lawes, 1:61.23-62.11; I.2.5. 
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Since the law of reason participates in the ratio of eternal law, Hooker sees reason as 
the highest intrinsic power within human nature, ‘that divine power of the soule.’35 As such, 
wise human beings are diminished analogues of divine rationality, ‘though not Gods, yet as 
gods, high, admirable, and divine.’36 Diminishment does not infer a pejorative intellectual 
status. The power of ‘naturall reason’ elevates humankind above other creatures incapable of 
ratiocination and makes human beings ‘capable of a more divine perfection’, namely the 
ability for self-direction, creativity, and ‘reaching higher then unto sensible things’.37 Hooker 
defines the law of reason twice, and each definition emphasises that reason is an intrinsic 
power to discern appropriate courses of action ‘without the helpe of revelation supernaturall 
and divine’.38 First, ‘the lawe of reason or humaine nature is that which men by discourse of 
naturall reason have rightly found out themselves to be all for ever bound unto in their 
actions.’ Second, ‘lawe rationall therefore…comprehendeth all those thinges which men by 
the light of their naturall understanding evidently know…good or evill for them to doe.’39 
Since ‘the laws of well doing are the dictates of right reason’, the law of reason practically 
guides the human agent to right action.40 Right reason (recta ratio) is, of course, a scholastic 
term with Stoic roots where it reflects living in conformity with a rationally-perceived 
universal law. Thus, although the law of reason describes an intrinsic power, Hooker casts it 
as a participated theonomy. Indeed, human nature represents an analogue of the divine 
artisan: ‘Man in perfection of nature being made according to the likenes of his maker [imago 
dei] resembleth him also in the maner of working’; thus, ‘capable we are of God [capaces 
dei] both by understanding and will.’41 In the Dublin Fragments, Hooker re-iterates the 
analogical character of human reason when he describes ‘reasonable creatures’ such as the 
angels and humankind as the ‘liveliest representations of [God’s] owne perfection and 
glorie’.42 In the Lawes, human beings particularly bear a logocentric similarity to divine 
                                                          
35 Hooker, Lawes, 1:77.8; I.7.1. 
36 Hooker, Lawes, 1:74.5-10; I.5.3. 
37 Hooker, Lawes, 1:75.7-20; I.6.2-3. 
38 Hooker, Lawes, 1:90.5-6; I.8.9. 
39 Hooker, Lawes, 1:89.28-3; 1:90.19-22; I.8.8-9. Compare Pride, I, in FLE 5:312.8-9 
where law is ‘an exact rule whereby human actions are measured’. 
40 Hooker, Lawes, 1:79.11-12; I.7.4. 
41 Hooker, Lawes, 1:77.20-21; 1:113.9; I.7.2; I.11.3. 
42 Hooker, Dublin Fragments, 28, in FLE, 4:135.25-27. 
133 
 
rationality as linguistic animals. God’s ‘speech’ [λογος] imparts the ‘law naturall to be 
observed by creatures’, that is to say, the divine ratio of participable order.43 Since human 
nature reflects this divine influence in a special way through its rational capacity, ‘the 
chiefest instrument of humanine communion therefore is speech [λογος], because thereby we 
impart mutuallie one to another the concepties of our reasonable understanding.’44 Indeed, as 
he explores the analogical similarity between human and divine reason, Hooker twice 
translates the Neoplatonist Mercurius Trismegistus to the effect that, through their rational 
capacity, ‘man ascends even to heaven, and measures it’ and accordingly ‘frame themselves 
according to the PATERNE of the father of spirits’.45 
Finally, Hooker suspends the natural ‘light of reason’ from God, ‘the father of lights,’ 
through a pattern of causality: natural reason exists as an intrinsic power nevertheless derived 
from and tending back towards God’s enlightenment as rational source and end. This pattern 
of causality explains the formal, existential, henological, and creative aspects of reason’s 
participatory constitution. Accordingly, like Aquinas again, Hooker imbeds a ‘vertical’ 
causality within ‘horizontal’ causality, suspending creation and created powers from God.46 
Vertically, Hooker sets God as the efficient and formal cause of all created things which 
participate in God: ‘God hath his influence into the very essence of all things.’47 In order to 
explain how participation suspends created forms from their divine source, Hooker 
reformulates the Thomistic principle that the cause remains in the thing caused (causa est in 
causato): ‘every effect doth after a sort conteine, at least wise resemble the cause from which 
it proceedeth.’ 48 As effects from the first cause, all created forms therefore bear a 
participatory similitude to God and (as they move from potency to act) participate in divine 
perfections.49 In other words, the horizontal, secondary, intrinsic acts of creatures remain 
dynamically suspended from their original, vertical, divine cause. For Hooker (as for 
                                                          
43 Hooker, Lawes, 1:64.18-65.7; I.3.2. 
44 Hooker, Lawes, 1:107.6-9; I.10.12. 
45 Hooker, Lawes, 1:74.13-14; 1:74.t; 1:75.v; I.5.3; I.6.3. 
46 On ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ causation, see F.C. Bauerschmidt, Thomas Aquinas: 
Faith, Reason, and Following Christ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 49-50. 
47 Hooker, Lawes, 2:236.7-13; V.56.5. 
48 Hooker, Lawes, 1:73.7-8; I.5.2. See also Pride, III, in FLE, 5:341.3-9. 
49 Hooker, Lawes, 2:234.33-235.3; V.56.1. 
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Aquinas) God therefore illumines the ‘light of reason’ in two ways. First, God vertically 
causes the form of reason: Hooker explains that St Paul intends the phrase in Romans 2.14 
(‘they are a law unto themselves’) to mean ‘the light of reason, wherwith God illuminateth 
every one which commeth into the world’.50 Second, God moves reason to act: reason (like 
any capacity) cannot ‘rightly performe the functions allotted to it, without perpetuall aid and 
concurrence of that supreme cause of all things’.51 In its ordinary, horizontal, intrinsic 
operations, then, human reason reveals vertical divine influence. The ‘light of reason’ already 
possesses God’s enlightenment, at least in this limited sense: gratuitous divine donation and 
activity are required even for natural knowing, and the purposive activity of reason tends 
towards (re)union with God as source and end. 
3.2.2 ‘Principall cause’: natural and divine vertices of cognitive participation 
As Hooker further considers the ordinary, horizontal operations of natural reason, he 
balances its intrinsic integrity with the pivotal role of gratuitous, vertical divine causality. 
Once again, Aquinas’ account of the human intellect forms the background to understand 
these more disparate comments about the process of natural reasoning in Book One of the 
Lawes. Aquinas distinguishes between two aspects of the intellect in his account of the 
intellectual powers, traces of which can be found in Hooker’s own thought: namely, the 
passive (or receptive) intellect and the active (or agent) intellect.52 The former describes the 
natural, horizontal, intrinsic operations of the intellect, while the latter sees what Hooker 
labels as the ‘principall cause’ of the intellect as something vertically beyond itself, that is to 
say, in God as the first cause of natural intellectual illumination. Again, Hooker’s notion of 
participated theonomy deflates any charge of hypo- or hyper-rationalism since it renders 
rational acts as a series of participatory mediations between the intrinsic, rational human form 
and the ratio of the immediately causative ‘father of lights’ which underpins all of creation. 
Here, Hooker holds together human agency and the transcendental perfection co-extensive 
with divine nature: the former is not deferred or emptied into the latter; rather, the latter 
immediately constitutes the integrity of the former and, in doing so, also directs it to stand in 
                                                          
50 Hooker, Lawes, 1:84.7-12; I.8.3. Compare Hooker, Lawes, 1:238.31-239.4; III.9.3. 
See also Pride, I, in FLE, 5:312.12-18. 
51 Hooker, Lawes, 1:92.25-28; I.8.11. 
52 Aquinas, ST, I.79.2-5. 
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its own co-creative relation to the world through moral and political making. A comparison 
between Aquinas and Hooker in relation to the passive and active aspects of the intellect will 
illustrate the balance struck between human and divine agency in natural cognitive 
participation. 
Aquinas argues that the passive aspect of the intellect (the intellectus possibilis) 
receives and retains the intelligible species abstracted from sensory experience.53 The passive 
intellect essentially describes how human beings come to know and understand. Hooker 
never uses the term passive intellect, but there are a number of features in his account of 
reason which clearly places it as the scholastic background to his epistemology, as Nigel 
Voak points out.54 Both Aquinas and Hooker agree that, while God’s intellect is pure act 
(purus actus), the created intellect of the human being has to pass from potency to act.55 
Aquinas and Hooker therefore both stand within an Aristotelian tradition of the tabula rasa: 
the human intellect starts like ‘a clean tablet upon which nothing is written’; all knowledge 
accordingly begins in the senses, and human understanding grows ‘by degrees’.56 For 
Aquinas, the passive aspect of the intellect has two operations, traces of which are evident in 
Hooker.57 First, the passive intellect infallibly apprehends simple ideas as true (intelligentia 
indivisibilium). Such simple ideas are general concepts derived from experience of individual 
things. Second, it also makes more complex but fallible affirmative and negative judgements 
about particular propositions (compositio et divisio). Without this technical language, Hooker 
similarly notes that the marks of the human soul reaching ‘higher then unto sensible things’ 
will be an ability to comprehend ‘differences of time, affirmations, negations, and 
contradictions in speech’.58 
                                                          
53 Aquinas, ST, I.79.2. 
54 See Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp.30-31. 
55 Hooker, Lawes, 1:72.26-30; 1:74.21-23; I.5.1; I.6.1. 
56 Aquinas, ST, I.79.2 resp. quoting Aristotle’s De Anima 3.4. Compare Hooker, 
Lawes, 1:74.20-28; I.6.1: ‘the soule of man being therefore at the first as a booke, wherein 
nothing is, and yet all thinges may be imprinted.’ 
57 Aquinas, ST, I.79.8; I.85.6. 
58 Hooker, Lawes, 1:75.24-28; I.6.3. 
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For Aquinas, the passive intellect also has certain habits (habitus) of thought which 
enable it to reason, namely the non-derivable, general first principles of speculative and 
practical reasoning, simply apprehended as true by the intellect much like simple ideas and 
from which the intellect creatively derives more specific principles for particular 
circumstances. The first principle of speculative reason is non-contradiction, and the first 
principle of practical reason is to pursue the good and avoid evil.59 These speculative and 
practical intellects are not, however, distinct powers since they are both concerned with truth, 
the former for its own sake, the latter for some further end. Indeed, ‘the speculative intellect 
through extension becomes practical’ and thus ratiocination becomes ‘causative’ of particular 
actions.60 As such, natural reason takes on a moral character indexed against participable 
divine perfection: truth remains convertible with goodness, and all rational actions aim at 
(and are measured against the ratio of) the good as a perfective quality found pre-eminently 
in the divine nature. 
In a similar vein, Hooker uses ‘right reason’ to describe the intrinsic character of 
natural reason as a moral instrument: ‘goodnesse is seene with the eye of the understanding. 
And the light of that eye is reason.’61 Accordingly, ‘the lawes of well doing are the dictates of 
right reason.’62 As the intellect moves from potency to act, ‘the right helps of true art and 
learning’ aid it to know truth and so goodness. Indeed, such ‘education and instruction’ 
enable natural reason ‘the sooner able to judge rightly betweene truth and error, good and 
evill’.63 Echoing Aquinas, Hooker identifies two ways in which the intellect discerns 
goodness: knowledge of first ‘causes’ or ‘principles’; or ‘signs and tokens’ such as the 
                                                          
59 Aquinas, ST, I.II.94.2 resp. 
60 Aquinas, ST, I.70.11 sc; I.II.64.3; & II.II.4.2 ad.3. 
61 Hooker, Lawes, 1:78.3-4; I.7.2. 
62 Hooker, Lawes, 1:79.11-12; I.7.4. 
63 Hooker, Lawes, 1:75.28; 1:76.20-23; I.6.3; I.6.5. On the moral quality of reason, 
see Hoopes, Right Reason, pp. 123-31; and Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, 
pp. 31-32. By ‘right helps,’ Hooker identifies himself with an Aristotelian scholasticism 
against the ‘Ramystry’ popular across Europe and especially at Cambridge, the intellectual 
centre of English nonconformity and puritanism. See the textual commentary in FLE, 6:493-
494; and Lee W. Gibbs, ‘Theology, Logic, and Rhetoric in the Temple Controversy between 
Richard Hooker and Walter Travers’, Anglican Theological Review, 55 (1983), 177-188. 
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‘generall and perpetuall voice of men’, evident in good ‘customs’ which take on the character 
of ‘the sentence of God him selfe’.64 While the former has the greatest certainty as 
intrinsically true, the second gains its apparent force either by ‘strong and invincible 
demonstration’ or as the ‘way greatest probability leadeth’.65 The ‘sentence which reason 
giveth concerning the goodnes of those things which they are to do’ derives from self-
evident, universally applicable, and binding ‘maine principles of reason’ immediately 
recognised by the intellect as true.66 
Given that Hooker remains concerned with law, and law aims at right action, it is 
unsurprising that he focuses on practical principles, even if he also notes that human beings 
are inherently speculative.67 Hooker’s main principle resembles closely Aquinas’ first 
principle of practical reason. Hooker re-works Aquinas’ first practical principle as ‘that the 
greater good is to be chosen before the lesse’, a principle which grounds the law of reason 
‘upon an infallible rule of comparison’.68 In addition, there are also ‘axiomes lesse general, 
                                                          
64 Hooker, Lawes, 1:82.27-83.4; 1:83.17-19; I.8.2-3. Compare Aquinas, ST, I.II.93.2. 
As Loyer, L’Anglicanisme, p. 142 notes, for Hooker, customs become filtered over the course 
of time and take on a character close to natural law as it participates in eternal law, an 
example of vox populi, vox dei. On the link between ‘signs’ and common law, see Charles 
Watterson Davies, ‘“For conformities sake”: How Richard Hooker Used Fuzzy Logic and 
Legal Rhetoric against Political Extremes’, in Richard Hooker and the Construction of 
Christian Community, ed. A.S. McGrade (Tempe, AZ: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & 
Studies, 1997), pp. 332-349. Hooker also acknowledges, however, in Lawes, 1:91.25-92.22; 
I.8.11 that customs can contrarily be ‘lewde and wicked’ and so ‘smother the light of naturall 
understanding’. 
65 Hooker, Lawes, 1:179.8-18; II.7.5. 
66 Hooker, Lawes, 1:85.6-7; I.8.5. On the universally applicable and binding nature of 
these main principles, see Lawes, 1:89.25-31; 1:90.26-91.7; 1:91.21-25; 1:130.15; I.8.8; 
I.8.10; I.15.1. 
67 Hooker, Lawes, 1:86.11-21; I.8.5. 
68 Hooker, Lawes, 1:85.10-25; I.8.5. Joyce, Richard Hooker & Anglican Moral 
Theology, pp. 172-174 suggests that Hooker differs from Aquinas in order to gain polemical 
advantage against the puritans who advocate a ‘lesser’ good than the established order. See 
also Linwood Urban, ‘A Revolution in English Moral Theology’, Anglican Theological 
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yet so manifest that they need no further profe’, which are ‘first found out by discourse, and 
drawne from out of the very bowels of heaven and earth’.69 Like Aquinas, Hooker appeals to 
examples from the Mosaic Decalogue to illustrate these lesser axioms.70 Hooker then grounds 
even the ‘great mandates’ of Christ in Matthew 22.38 to love God and to love neighbour as 
consonant with ‘the sentence of reason’ which is ‘the naturall measure wherby to judge our 
doings’.71 Hooker describes how the ‘sentence of reason’ which measures human actions may 
be either mandatory (‘shewing what must be done’), permissive (‘declaring what may bee 
done’), or admonitory (‘opening what is the most convenient for us to doe’).72 In turn, human 
laws are rational, creative, probabilistic, and expedient applications of the general sentence of 
reason or divine law to more particular, contingent affairs.73 Here, Hooker distinguishes 
between the ‘mixedly’ and the ‘meerly’ human laws.74 The former contains laws which ‘plain 
or necessarie reason bindeth men unto’, which is to say they ratify the law of reason in the 
public square, such as in the prohibition of incest or polygamy.75 The latter deal with matters 
in which reason ‘doth but probablie teach to be fit and convenient’, such as inheritance laws, 
which may reasonably take a number of different forms.76 As such, all these complex 
distinctions around the ‘sentence of reason’ entail that, while the main principles of reason 
are self-evident and universally valid, some human laws derived from them are open to 
                                                          
Review, 53 (1971), 5-20; and Rudolph P. Almasy, ‘Language and Exclusion in the First Book 
of Hooker’s Politie’, in Richard Hooker and the English Reformation, ed. W.J.T. Kirby 
(Dordrecht, 2003), pp. 227-242. 
69 Hooker, Lawes, 1:86.10-11; I.8.5. 
70 Hooker, Lawes, 1:86.4-7; I.8.6. Compare Aquinas, ST, I.II.100.1 & 3. 
71 Hooker, Lawes, 1:87.9-89.2; I.8.6-8. W. David Neelands, ‘Hooker on Scripture, 
Reason, and “Tradition”’, in Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community, 
ed. A.S. McGrade (Tempe: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1997), pp. 75-94 (esp. 
pp. 76-77) regards Hooker as particularly ‘daring’ in this regard since it means’ reason has a 
genuine value in the natural discovery of what is also given in revelation’. 
72 Hooker, Lawes, 1:89.2-5; I.8.9. 
73 Hooker, Lawes, 1:63.24-26; 1:95.27-110.20; 1:237.27-29; I.3.1; I.10; III.9.2. 
Compare Aquinas, ST, I.II.91.3; I.II.99.3. 
74 Hooker, Lawes, 1:105.6-14; I.10.10. 
75 Hooker, Lawes, 1:105.14-106.1; I.10.10. 
76 Hooker, Lawes, 1:106.6-20; I.10.10. 
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change according to evolving circumstances, although they must remain consonant with 
reason and Scripture.77 As a participatory analogue, human reason explores and makes 
meaning, acting as a kind of word which creatively shares in and applies the ratio of eternal 
law within historical contingencies. 
While the passive intellect describes how human beings come to know and 
understand, for Aquinas the active intellect (intellectus agens) explains how they can know or 
understand at all. The active intellect vertically suspends the horizontal integrity of the human 
intellect from its illuminating, causative first principle, namely God. For Aquinas, the active 
intellect abstracts the quiddity of an individual object in order to arrive at the intelligible 
species that will be impressed upon and retained in the passive intellect. Aquinas inherits 
from Augustine the tradition of explaining the power of such intellectual understanding in 
terms of divine illumination: ‘the human soul derives its intellectual light’ from God.78 
Indeed, quoting psalm 4, Aquinas notes ‘the light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed 
upon us’. Aquinas here treads a fine line between the integrity of the human intellectual 
power and the gratuity of divine action. The active intellect exists as a power of each 
individual soul and the act of understanding belongs properly to each individual human 
being. Yet, God remains the first mover in the universe and, as such, so can be said to 
illumine each individual as the beginning of a chain of per se causation.79 Thus, the created 
active intellect participates in the uncreated divine light and this participation works through 
each individual soul.80 Participation yields similitude between cause and effect: ‘the 
intellectual light in us is nothing other than a certain participated likeness of the uncreated 
light’ of God’s knowledge.81 
                                                          
77 Hooker, Lawes, 1:237.21-29; III.9.2 which references Aquinas, ST, I.II.95.3. See 
also ST, I.II.95.2. 
78 Aquinas, ST, I.79.5 resp. 
79.Aquinas, ST, I.II.109.1. 
80 Aquinas, ST, I.76.2. 
81 Aquinas, ST, I.84.5. Also, see De Ver, 10.6 ad.6, pars 2 in which Aquinas sees the 
inborn and self-evident first principles available to the human intellect as ‘a kind of reflected 
likeness in us of the uncreated truth’. 
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While Nigel Voak claims that Hooker has ‘no equivalent of Aquinas’ agent intellect’, 
Hooker’s images of illumination and divine causation suggest that he does.82 As already 
discussed, Hooker writes of the ‘light of reason’ within the context of the vast array of 
participatory laws derived from God as the ‘father of lights.’ Hooker sets up a causal 
relationship between the ‘light of reason’ and the ‘father of lights’. Indeed, God individuates 
intellectual light (the power to know) in all human souls such that they can be ‘inabled to 
know truth from falsehood, and good from evil’.83 That the natural light of reason can 
illumine even ‘our dutie towardes God or towardes man’ presupposes ‘that knowne relation 
which God hath unto us as unto children…whereof himselfe is the principall cause’.84 God 
sits at the beginning of a chain of per se causation which vertically illuminates natural reason 
but does not violate the horizontal intrinsic integrity of each reasoning individual. The law of 
reason does not require any additional ‘helpe of revelation supernaturall and divine’ for its 
intrinsic operations.85 Yet, the natural power of thought participates as an effect in the 
uncreated, intelligible, and causative ‘father of lights’. It also naturally tends towards God as 
the final cause of beauty and goodness, the transcendental perfections pre-eminently found in 
God and which express the attractive and plenitudinous character of participated being. As 
Hooker considers ‘the naturall way of finding out laws by reason to guide the will unto that 
which is good’, he cites the Aristotelian idea of the καλοκα´γαφία (kalokagathia), the 
perfectly good and beautiful person who does things well and orderly.86 The rectitude of 
moral goodness thereby allows human beings ‘divinely’ to be called ‘good’ and ‘beautiful’, 
that is to say, to be diminished images of God’s ontological perfection, the ‘goodness of 
beautie in it self’.87 For Hooker, following his Thomist sympathies, natural illumination 
therefore establishes a participatory likeness to God,88 provides the ground for sanctifying 
                                                          
82 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, p. 30 n.16. 
83 Hooker, Lawes, 1:84.9-12; I.8.3. See also Lawes, 1:238.25-239.4; III.9.3. 
84 Hooker, Lawes, 1:87.12-21; I.8.7. 
85 Hooker, Lawes, 1:90.6-7; I.8.9. 
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See Miller, Richard Hooker and the Vision of God, pp. 202-203. 
87 Hooker, Lawes, 1:113.18-20; I.11.2. 
88 Hooker, Lawes, 1:77.20-21; I.7.2. Compare Aquinas, ST, I.12.2 resp. 
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grace to establish the soul’s direct, supernatural communion with God,89 and explains why 
the beatific vision primarily involves an act of intellect as the proper end of human nature, the 
will resting in love following this activity as an affective perfection which depends upon it.90 
Neither hypo- nor hyper-rationalism adequately captures the intricacy of Hooker’s account of 
natural cognitive participation in God. The integrity of rational human agency remains 
undergirded by gratuitous divine causality. In turn, the transcendental perfections do not 
empty human agency, but rather fulfil it as the participant stands coram Deo. 
3.2.3 ‘Meere natural men’: the character of natural cognitive participation in God 
The natural cognitive participation of the ‘light of reason’ in the ‘father of lights’ 
generates three significant structural features of supernatural cognitive participation in Books 
Two and Three of the Lawes. First, Hooker posits divine illumination as even the natural 
means by which human beings come to know the truth. Human rationality (as a created 
analogue of divine reason) represents an extensive gift of cognitive participation in God, the 
presupposed cognitive capacity for an intensive (re)union wrought by grace. As such, Hooker 
places natural cognitive participation in God far beyond anything that could count as hypo- or 
hyper-rationalist. Pace Shuger, natural reason is not simply an empirical faculty ‘bounded by 
sense perception and therefore intrinsically secular’.91 Rather, natural reason reveals divine 
action and presence within and through its own integrity. Accordingly, Hooker recognises the 
capacity of non-Christians to know and understand both natural and certain spiritual truths. 
Indeed, he obviates what John Marenbon has called the ‘problem of paganism’, namely how 
to account for pagan knowledge and virtue. 92 As A.S. McGrade points out, in Hooker’s 
Lawes ‘the most obvious feature of his nomological cosmology is the preponderance of 
classical references’, with sixteen per cent of Hooker’s textual references in total (and 
                                                          
89 Hooker, Lawes, 1:128.30-129.3; I.14.4. 
90 Hooker, Lawes, 1:113.7-29; 1:118.31-119.15; I.11.3; I.11.6. Compare Aquinas, 
ScG, III.c.26. 
91 Shuger, Habits of Thought, p. 43. 
92 John Marenbon, Pagans and Philosophers: The Problem of Paganism from 
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twenty-five per cent in Book One) coming from classical sources.93 As well as using pagan 
authorities such as Hesiod and Sophocles to support the idea that law structures the universe 
and makes it universally intelligible, Hooker also often notes the natural spiritual knowledge 
of pagan authors.94 Even ‘meere naturall men,’ writes Hooker, ‘have attained to knowe, not 
onely that there is a God, but also what power, force, wisedome, and other properties that 
God hath, and how all things depende on him.’95 Conversely, Hooker regularly quotes from 
scriptural texts in order to illustrate his metaphysical arguments, and maintains that Scripture 
‘is fraught even with lawes of nature’.96 Hooker’s positive valuation of the natural light of 
reason explains why, in Book Two, he insists that the law of reason remains ‘an infallible 
knowledge imprinted in the mindes of all the children of men’ in order that they may derive 
particular choices for ‘the daylie affaires of this life’ from ‘generall principles for directing 
humaine actions’, meaning the ‘maine principles of reason’ which Hooker has discussed in 
Book One.97 It also explains why, in Book Three, Hooker casts moral virtues as human rather 
than exclusively Christian.98 Accordingly, Hooker reserves some of his strongest language in 
Book Three to decry how his puritan opponents allegedly ‘thinke they cannot admire as they 
ought the power and authoritie of the word of God, as in things divine they should attribute 
any force to mans reason’.99 For Hooker, that both Christ and the Apostles exhibit the form of 
reason ultimately means that ‘the light therefore, which the starre of natural reason and 
wisdom casteth, is too bright to be obscured by the mist of a word or two uttered to diminish 
that opinion’.100 Against the biblical singularity of his opponents, Hooker’s architecture of 
participation opens up space in Books Two and Three for the multivocal character of 
                                                          
93 A.S. McGrade, ‘Classical, Patristic, and Medieval Sources’, in A Companion to 
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94 For example, see Hooker, Lawes, 1:59.33-60.4; 1:70.16-22; 1:73.32-74.6; 1:86.21-
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97 Hooker, Lawes, 1:190.12-16; II.8.6. 
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manifold laws, including the law of reason, as they participate in, and are suspended from, 
eternal law. 
Second, reason exhibits an instrumental and public character as it cognitively 
participates in God. The intrinsic goodness of natural reason entails that ‘grace hath use of 
nature’ in Books Two and Three, just as Book One insists that ‘righteous life presupposeth 
life’.101 Just as ‘Nature…is nothing else but God’s instrument’, so too is the voice of reason 
‘but his instrument’ and ‘all good lawes are the voyces of right reason, which is the 
instrument wherewith God will have the world guided’.102 In Books Two and Three, Hooker 
continues to give a crucial role to the instrumentality of reason in its relationship to Scripture 
and theological science. That natural reason constitutes a participated theonomy also renders 
it as a power indexed against cosmic order and which therefore especially has a public or 
corporate charisma.103 Indeed, when Hooker considers ‘the benefit of keeping that law which 
reason teacheth’, he images human nature as a ‘very world in himselfe’ in which natural 
operations ‘preserve’ the goodness of the created order, while ‘transgressing’ the law of 
reason draws ‘harme after it’, even ‘ruine’.104 The public character of reason explains why 
Hooker intends to open up the laws of the Church to ‘the general trial and judgement of the 
whole world’ and to ask his opponents to discern if their ‘opinions’ carry the ‘force of 
reason’.105 It also explains why Hooker highly values the voices of the wise and the 
consensus gentium (‘agreement of the people’) which have stood the test of time, coming 
close to being principles of natural law. In turn, the public nature of reason explains why 
Hooker remains suspicious of claims to truth that contradict received wisdom and cause 
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144 
 
public disturbance. Hooker illustrates this danger in Book Two when he considers how the 
‘vulgar sort’, swayed by dubious puritan arguments, ‘blusheth not in any doubt concerning 
matter of scripture to thinke his own bare Yea, as good as the Nay of all the wise, grace, and 
learned judgements that are in the world.’106 Instead, Hooker insists that only wise men have 
the requisite rational capacity to make binding public laws, but that even ‘companies of 
learned men be they never so great and reverend, are to yeeld unto reason’.107 
Third, Hooker retains a sanguine but humble appraisal of the natural ‘light of reason’ 
because he takes the epistemological limits of sin seriously. When Hooker, considers, for 
example, in chapter ten of Book One ‘how reason doth leade men unto the making of humane 
lawes whereby politique societies are governed’, he distinguishes between ‘sincere’ and 
‘depraved’ nature.108 Hooker details three separate categories of law which pertain to the 
topic of the chapter: first, the law that governs ‘men as men’ (by which he means the ‘law of 
reason’); second, the positive laws that govern ‘men linked with others in some forme of 
politique societie’; and third, the ‘law of nations’ which stand between natural and positive 
law.109 In each of these cases, Hooker then distinguishes between ‘primarie’ and ‘secondarie’ 
laws, ‘the one grounded upon sincere, the other built upon depraved nature.’110 Hooker 
provides an example from the law of nations: sincere nature entails primary laws about 
diplomacy, hospitality to foreign visitors, and ‘commodious trafique’.111 Such sincere nature 
reflects an Aristotelian ‘naturall inclination, wherby all men desire sociable life and 
fellowship’.112 In contrast, depraved nature necessitates secondary laws to regulate an 
‘unquiet world’ such as military laws. Such depraved nature reflects an Augustinian 
awareness that ‘the will of man’ remains ‘inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all 
obedience unto the sacred lawes of his nature’, ‘little better then a wild beast.’113 Hooker 
remains clear that, whatever the intrinsic value of reason, human beings often prefer their 
                                                          
106 Hooker, Lawes, 1:183.16-17; II.7.6. 
107 Hooker, Lawes, 1:102.3-8; 1:181.14-16; 2:43.1-30; I.10.7; II.7.6; V.9.2. 
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own good, are capable of self-deception, resist moral rebuke, reject the teachings of the wise, 
and require political regiment in order to restrain their violent tendencies.114 Hooker 
consistently rejects that ‘meere naturall men’ can, through their own power, discern ‘things 
divine above nature’, namely salvific truths required for supernatural cognitive 
participation.115 Hooker’s other extant works go even further and emphasise the cataclysmic 
impact of sin on human capacities: the ‘minds of all men’ are ‘darkned’ with the ‘foggie 
damp of original corruption’ and are unable to gain salvific knowledge unaided; and through 
sin ‘our nature hath taken that disease and weakenes, whereby of itselfe it inclineth only unto 
evill’.116 As Rowan Williams puts it, Hooker calls his readers to recognise that they are 
‘never in a state of pure rationality’ but rather are contingent, historical beings who 
participate in the living wisdom of God as it unfurls in broken communities.117 
Yet, both in the Lawes and in these other texts, Hooker also remains committed to the 
idea that remedial grace works against the ‘imbecillitie’ of sin and activates natural powers 
and faculties such that they can know and assent to the saving knowledge of Scripture.118 In 
the Dublin Fragments, Hooker distinguishes between aptitude and ability in his account of 
the Fall: ‘had aptnes beene alsoe lost [as well as ableness], it is not grace that could worke in 
us more then it doeth in brute creatures.’119 Accordingly, much like Aquinas, Hooker links 
reason, as part of what makes human beings as capable of God (capaces dei), to a passive 
aptitude (aptitudo passiva) which the ‘aid and assistance of God’s most blessed Spirit’ can 
activate and illumine, restoring human nature as the rational image of God (imago dei).120 In 
short, then, Hooker extracts the intrinsic nature of the ‘light of reason’ from the experience of 
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human corruption in order to show the aptness which healing and elevating grace 
presupposes as necessary for supernatural cognitive participation in God. The precise way, 
however, in which grace and nature cohere together within this participatory dynamic forms 
the hub of the epistemological issues of Books Two and Three, to which the next section 
turns. 
3.3 ‘Supernaturall endowmentes’: supernatural cognitive participation in God 
 Nigel Voak correctly describes the human reception of supernatural grace as being at 
the ‘polemical heart of the Lawes’.121 In Books Two and Three, Hooker considers various 
‘proofs’ designed to defend two general assertions advanced by those ‘who urge reformation 
in the Church of England’: ‘That Scripture is the only rule of all things which in this life may 
be done by men’ and also, as a consequence, ‘that in Scripture there must be of necessity 
contained a form of Church-polity the laws whereof may in no wise be altered.’ At ultimate 
stake in these assertions is the integrity of human nature as well as the gratuity of grace: 
Hooker thinks his puritan opponents render the former otiose with the singularity of biblical 
law (‘the name of the light of nature is made hatefull with men’); they accuse him of denying 
the latter (‘you infer that the light of nature teacheth some knowledge naturall whiche is 
necessary to salvation’).122 Against the singularity of biblical law, Hooker continues the 
commitment of Book One that, as they commonly participate in eternal law, the law of reason 
and divine law are analogically ‘in the substance of law all one’.123 The unity of purpose 
between nature and grace – namely, the ‘participation of God himselfe’ – transforms natural 
reason as sanctifying grace aids it supernaturally to participate in God’s saving knowledge. 
While Hooker still often refers in Books Two and Three to the ‘light of nature’ or ‘starre of 
reason’, he continues to equivocate between the natural and supernatural. As Hooker has 
turned from the ‘waie of nature’ to the ‘waie of grace’, he more precisely takes reason to 
mean a natural power sanctified by grace through the infused habit of faith.124 Here, faith is to 
reason as grace is to nature: as grace ‘hath use of nature’, so too does faith use reason. 
Accordingly, supernatural cognitive participation in God anticipates the Chalcedonian logic 
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of Book Five: just as Christ’s hypostatic union perfects but does not abolish his human 
nature, reason retains its integrity even as grace enlivens it through faith. In both existential 
and epistemological terms, then, while ‘supernatural endowmentes are an advancement, they 
are no extinguishment of that nature whereunto they are given’.125  
This section unpacks, therefore, how Hooker establishes Scripture as a principium 
cognoscendi theologiae and reason as a natural and supernatural instrument of understanding 
(3.3.1). Hooker again obviates accusations of hypo-rationalism: sanctifying grace influences 
the power of reason through its own natural integrity. This section then turns to Hooker’s 
account of the role reason plays in the authentication of Scripture as sacred (3.3.2). While 
many modern exegetes argue that Hooker exaggerates the priority of reason over revelation 
in establishing the sacred nature of Scripture, Hooker’s account will be shown to be far more 
subtle: the Holy Spirit demonstrates its influence within and through the integrity of reason as 
a public instrument of persuasion. As such, supernatural cognitive participation in God 
variously establishes and draws out the extensive gift of reason into an intensive via of return 
to God. 
3.3.1 ‘The light of some higher knowledge’: subalternation and theological science 
As the intellect is the principle of natural knowledge for Hooker, so faith is the 
intellectual principle of saving knowledge. Natural cognitive participation revolves around 
the analogical suspension of human reason from its divine source. Similarly, supernatural 
cognitive participation revolves around the gratuitous suspension of rational faith from God’s 
knowledge. Just as the architecture of participation allows Hooker to retain the integrity of 
natural reason alongside the foundational role of divine influence, so too does it allow him to 
account for how sanctifying grace transforms and relates to natural rational capacities. As 
Hooker considers supernatural cognitive participation in God, the scholastic idea of 
subalternation emerges as an almost hidden buttress to structure how grace and nature, or 
faith and reason, relate in human knowing.126 Broadly speaking, in certain streams of 
scholastic thought shaped by Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, a science (scientia, ‘way of 
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321-43 (p. 333). 
148 
 
knowledge’) is subalternate to another when it depends upon (subalternatio, literally ‘hangs 
down from’) another science, such as music to mathematics or optics to geometry. Unlike 
sciences which contain their own self-evident principles (principia per se nota), a subaltern 
science instead depends upon a higher science for its first principles. As such, subalternation 
describes a binary, asymmetrical relationship between a pair of sciences in which one 
superior science suspends the other subordinate science from itself as participated source of 
self-evident principles. Bonaventure seems to be the first person to apply subalternation to 
theology, and Aquinas developed the case.127 In Aquinas’ thought, sacra doctrina (sacred 
doctrine) has the character of a subaltern scientia because it shares in, proceeds from, and has 
a likeness to premises or first principles proven by ‘the light of a higher science’, namely the 
scientia of God shared with the blessed in heaven.128 Aquinas’ account likely forms the 
source which structures Hooker’s thought about supernatural cognitive participation in God. 
As such, it is therefore worthwhile again first to unpack Aquinas’ account as a prolegomenon 
to Hooker. 
Aquinas concatenates subalternation, theology (theologia), sacred doctrine (sacra 
doctrina), sacred scripture (sacra scriptura), faith, and reason when he considers supernatural 
cognitive participaton in God. Although Aquinas accepts Aristotle’s notion of theologia as a 
synonym for first philosophy or metaphysics which proceeds from the power of reason alone, 
the theologia of sacred doctrine rather proceeds from divine revelation.129 Sacred doctrine 
therefore has as its formal object God as first truth, and God and all things as they relate to 
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God as its material object.130 It primarily involves the principal truths necessary for salvation 
contained in sacred scripture but unavailable to unaided natural reason.131 Accordingly, 
sacred doctrine is a subaltern science that takes its first principles from sacra scriptura, 
which has no higher science.132 Sacred doctrine accordingly subordinates the human knower 
to the pedagogic activity of God, which in its wisdom extrinsically orders all knowledge to 
God as the highest cause.133 Aquinas understands scientia, then, in terms of analogy: scientia 
in God is ‘pure substance and act’ while the perfection of scientia imperfectly belongs to 
creatures in diminished form as they participate in the perfect actuality of God.134 
The theologia of sacra doctrina does not render natural reason redundant, but rather 
also involves the notion of scientific reasoning in which the philosophical sciences inculcate 
understanding ‘as handmaidens’.135 For Aquinas, then, while ‘faith rests on infallible truth’, 
grace perfects nature and ‘natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the 
will ministers to charity’.136 Aquinas ultimately takes reason to mean, however, an 
intellectual power enlivened and perfected by the infused theological virtue of faith, ‘a habit 
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of the intellect, by which eternal life is begun in us, which makes the intellect assent to things 
which are unseen.’137 Such faith ‘is said to surpass reason, not because there is no act of 
reason in faith, but because reasoning about faith cannot lead to the sight of those things 
which are matters of faith’.138 Rational assent to the principles of sacra doctrina involves the 
influence of grace upon natural cognitive powers such that they can immediately apprehend 
these principles as divinely revealed and as true. This supernatural cognitive participation in 
divine knowledge assumes some natural capacity and participated likeness, ‘an intelligible 
light…derived from the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of 
some perfection superadded of grace or of glory.’139 Supernatural cognitive participation 
perfects both the speculative and the practical aspects of reason through an intellectual light 
beyond nature.140 Ultimately, this divine illumination yields the glory of beatitude.141 Here, 
the intellect sees the divine essence itself through a participation in divine understanding, 
which ‘establishes in the intellect a kind of deiformity’, making it ‘like to God’.142 In glory, 
the intellect finally knows and follows the eternal law as perfectly as its form permits.143 As 
such, faith enlivens reason, and reason ministers to faith as God teaches and draws humanity 
actively to participate in, contemplate, and enjoy (re)union with the divine nature.144 
Hooker curiously only explicitly mentions the scholastic idea of subalternation in his 
account of marriage in Book Five of the Lawes, but that remains enough to indicate his 
familiarity with the concept.145 Indeed, like Aquinas, Hooker concatenates theology, science, 
faith, and reason through an implicit structure of subalternation. In Book One, along with all 
other forms of law, Hooker analogously suspends the divine law contained in Scripture from 
eternal law. Unlike other laws, however, which are intrinsic principles of action, divine law is 
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God’s extrinsic declaration of supernatural truths which draw back broken humanity to God. 
Hooker thereby acknowledges the pre-modern notion of science as a ‘way of knowledge’ in 
his pedagogical account of Scripture: it exists to draw and enlighten humanity into a saving 
relationship with God as final cause and end. Given the frustration of the natural desire for 
‘union which that it desireth’, namely God as the metaphysically simple and ultimate good 
(ultimum bonum simpliciter), ‘there resteth therefore eyther no way unto salvation, or if any, 
then surely a way which is supernaturall.’146 The ‘mysterie or secret way of salvation’ God 
has ‘in himselfe prepared before all worldes’, incarnated in Christ, and published in 
Scripture.147 Accordingly, Scripture as ‘the rule of divine law…should herein helpe our 
imbecillitie, that we might the more infallible understand what is good and what evill’, both 
in natural and supernatural ends.148 Hooker accepts that Scripture contains principles of 
revealed truth which unaided human reason alone cannot attain, such as in the case of Festus 
in Acts 25.19, ‘a meere naturall man’ who rejected the resurrection as ‘idle superstitious 
fancies not worth the hearing’.149 Scripture forms, then, the principium cognoscendi 
theologiae in matters of faith and doctrine. In Book Five he describes these principles as 
‘infallible axioms and precepts of sacred truth’ which flow from ‘the credit of divine 
testimonie’.150 Scripture takes on the ‘nature of a doctrinall instrument’, the divine means to 
make people ‘wise unto salvation’ through the ‘vertue which it hath to convert, to edifie, 
[and] to save soules’, that is to say to enjoy the intensive participation of (and union with) 
God.151 
Again like Aquinas, Hooker understands Scripture as the pedagogical source of 
theological science with a series of rhetorical questions: ‘The whole drift of the scripture of 
God what is it but only to teach Theologie? Theologie what is it but the science of thinges 
divine?’152 As with all subaltern sciences, theology ‘leadeth men into knowledge’ by 
presupposing first principles derived from another higher science, in this case the scientia of 
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God in which the angels and beatified participate. As for Aquinas, scientia represents an 
analogical term. Indeed, since Hooker casts human beings as creatures who participate in 
God between the ‘footstool’ and the ‘throne of God’, theology takes on a metaxological 
character: unlike the intrinsic certainty of divine scientia, it unfolds scientia within believers 
who move from becoming to being. As creatures, human beings are composites of material 
and intellectual principles, and naturally move from potency to act as they participate in the 
perfect actuality of God. Human knowledge therefore ‘growes by degrees’ from ‘utter 
vacuitie’ until (through faith) they supernaturally share with the angels the intuitive vision of 
God in beatitude, ‘the full and complete knowledge in the highest degree that can be imparted 
unto them.’153 Standing in this Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, Hooker argues that all sciences 
take their first principles as given, ‘either as plaine and manifest in them selves’ or, as in the 
case of theology, ‘as proved and graunted already, some former knowledge having made 
them evident.’154 For theological scientia, ‘Scripture teacheth al supernaturally revealed 
truth.’ God reveals this supernatural truth ‘by immediate divine inspiration’ to the prophets 
and apostles such that we ‘have no word of God but the Scripture’.155 Since God’s knowledge 
remains intrinsically true and certain, Scripture provides infallible first theological principles 
to theological science sufficient for salvation.156 Indeed, Hooker re-iterates in Book Five how 
the first principles of Christian doctrine, like the first principles of any scientific endeavour, 
‘require no proofe in any kind of science, because it sufficeth if either theire certaintie be 
evident in it iselfe, or evident by the light of some higher knowledge, and it selfe such as no 
man knowledge is ever able to overthrow.’157 As such, the way that theologians pursue their 
science differs in no way from how philosophers pursue natural truths from natural first 
principles. 
The scientia of ‘thinges divine’ bears the similarity and dissimilarity of analogy, then, 
from merely human sciences. While natural first principles are self-evident through particular 
natural intellectual habits, the principles of faith are only assented to as true by someone who 
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accepts the revealed knowledge of Scripture through the supernatural intellectual ‘habit of 
faith’.158 Hooker understands the habit of faith in thoroughly Thomistic terms. Faith begins as 
an extrinsic divine gift gratuitously given to the believer and forms the principal duty of 
Christians to believe in Christ. Faith is also an infused ‘intellectual habit of the mind’ with 
her ‘seate in the understandinge’ gifted at baptism and which intrinsically transforms the 
cognitive capacity of believers through sanctifying grace to participate supernaturally in God 
and enjoy salvific (re)union.159 Once Scripture has left an ‘apprehension of thinges divine in 
our understandinge, and in the mind an assent thereunto’, it can furnish infallible and 
intrinsically certain supernatural first principles which, like first principles within natural 
reasoning, work ‘to procure our assent unto such conclusions as the industrie of right 
discourse doth gather from them’.160 Pace Hillerdal, Hooker obviates hypo-rationalism and 
clearly accounts for how sanctifying grace transforms cognitive capacities without recourse 
to an intractable form of irrationalism. 
Hooker, following Aquinas and in tune with his own contemporary Reformed 
scholastics, gives sanctified reason in particular an instrumental role in theological 
discourse.161 Hooker sees reason as an instrumental cause of understanding, a subordinate 
efficient cause enlightened by and dependent upon the efficient causality of God. Hooker 
writes of theology: ‘what science can be attained unto without the help of natural discourse 
and reason?’162 In his Answer to the Supplication, Hooker makes clearer what he means by 
such reason: ‘I alleged therefore that which mighte under no pretence in the worlde be 
dissalowed namely a reson not meaning thereby myne owne reason as now it is reported, but 
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true sounde divine reason…, reson proper to that science whereby the thinges of god are 
knowne, theologicall reason.’163 In Book One of the Lawes, Hooker gives examples where 
theological discourse rationally deduces ‘by collection’ from scriptural propositions 
necessary beliefs ‘no where to be found by expresse literall mention’, such as the Trinity, the 
coeternity of the Son, the double procession of the Holy Spirit, and the duty of infant 
baptism.164 The use of reason does not here constitute a ‘supplement of any maime or defect’ 
in Scripture, which is ‘perfect, exact, and absolute in it selfe’. Rather, reason works as an 
elicitive tool, a ‘necessary instrument, without which we could not reape by the scriptures 
perfection, that fruite and benefite which it yieldeth’.165 
 The instrumentality of reason also allows Hooker to blur, however, the boundary 
between natural and supernatural cognitive participation in God. Against the biblical 
singularity of his opponents, Hooker opens up space for the creative capacity of natural 
reason to make meaning by qualifying what Charles Miller, following Olivier Loyer, calls a 
‘triad of characteristics’, namely the sufficiency, perfection, and clarity of Scripture.166 
On one side, Hooker clearly affirms the sufficiency, perfection and clarity of Scripture 
in recognisably Reformed terms. Hooker links sufficiency and perfection together in terms of 
Scripture as a scientific principium cognoscendi theologiae. ‘The absolute perfection of 
scripture,’ writes Hooker in the final chapter of Book Two, ‘is seene by relation unto that end 
wherto it tendeth,’ namely ‘a full instruction in all things unto salvation necessary’.167 The 
nuance carries polemical weight: it allows Hooker to avoid two dangerous extremities 
‘repugnant unto truth’ about the sufficiency of Scripture, one from the puritans and the other 
from Tridentine Catholicism.168 For Hooker, the puritans enlarge ‘the necessarie use of the 
word of God’, ‘racking and stretching it further than by [God] was ment’, making Scripture 
‘a snare and torment to weake consciences, filling them with infinite perplexities, 
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scrupulosities, doubts insoluble, and extreme despaires’.169 Hooker also rejects the puritan 
assumption that scriptural silence in any issue implies disapproval, a form of negative 
argument which might threaten many established ecclesial and political practices.170 While 
‘in some cases a negative argument taken from scripture is strong’, this principle cannot 
universally hold as true because the context of the negative argument may well limit its 
historical force.171 At the opposite extreme, Hooker argues that Tridentine Roman 
Catholicism teaches the insufficiency of Scripture without additional unwritten traditions, a 
notion which he also firmly rejects.172 In Book Five, Hooker also emphasises the clarity of 
Scripture, casting the saving ‘word of life’ as ‘alwaies a treasure, though precious, yeat easie, 
as well to attaine, as to finde’.173 He argues that the public reading of Scripture can ‘furnish 
the verie simplest and rudest sorte with such infallible axioms and preceptes of sacred truth’ 
that will allow them to judge ecclesial doctrine and instructions.174 Indeed, in Book Three 
Hooker lauds Christ for choosing twelve ‘simple and unlearned men, that the greater their 
lack of naturall wisdom was, the more admirable that might appeare, which God 
supernaturally indued them with from heaven’.175 
Yet, Hooker makes room for natural reason in relation to Scripture as an already 
divinely enlightened instrument of understanding, developing a complex method of scriptural 
interpretation that could hardly be described as open to the ‘verie simplest and rudest 
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sorte’.176 First, the limits of Hooker’s teleological definition of Scripture as perfectly 
sufficient for the end of salvation opens up space for the wisdom of other participatory laws, 
especially the law of reason, in other spheres of life. Scriptural sufficiency does not relate to 
natural or rational laws, which it simply re-publishes to ‘helpe our imbecillitie’. Neither does 
scriptural sufficiency entail that all of Scripture has the direct character of supernatural law. 
Scripture contains other natural sciences and ‘doth take out of all kinds of truth’ as much as 
the particular purpose requires, either for the exigency of the historical occasion or to make it 
‘more playne, apparent, and easye’ to know necessary supernatural truths.177 Grace 
presupposes nature in this regard, which is not a defect in Scripture but a recognition of how 
grace works in nature such that they ‘joyntly and not severallye eyther of them be so 
complete’ that they may not together serve to lead people into the knowledge required for 
‘everlasting felicitie’.178 Furthermore, positive laws found in Scripture may well be mutable 
since they are context-bound and relate to particular historical ends.179 Indeed, the mutability 
of certain kinds of scriptural laws forms the capstone of Hooker’s final two chapters of Book 
Three in which he rejects the thesis that Scripture contains a necessary form of church polity 
commanded by God as the ‘author of laws’. Rather, the ‘carefull discretion of the Church’ 
discerns convenient and fit laws for its government coram Deo, creatively drawing ‘from the 
lawes of nature and God, by discourse of reason, aided with the influence of divine grace’.180 
Hooker also displays markedly elitist exegetical notions of who can interpret 
Scripture properly, all of which privilege the role of natural reason. Indeed, as Hooker points 
out in the Preface, in the ‘more obscure, more intricate and hard [matters] to be judged of’, 
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the majority require the guidance of those few who have dedicated themselves to ‘the studie 
of things divine’.181 These notions are informed by the historical and philological methods of 
humanist scholarship which again open up space for the activity of natural reason, but only 
among those with the right training.182 Hooker’s account of scriptural exegesis recalls the 
idea of reason’s natural but developed capacity to make complex but fallible affirmative and 
negative judgements about particular propositions, namely Aquinas’ compositio et divisio or 
what Hooker calls an ability to comprehend ‘differences of time, affirmations, negations, and 
contradictions in speech’. In Book Five, with an emphatically humanist bias, Hooker holds 
‘for a most infallible rule in expositions of sacred scripture’ that the literal sense of the text 
ought to be preferred.183 The ‘literal sense’ includes the exegete taking into account literary 
type, metaphor, cultural context, and authorial intent of a particular text.184 As such, as Paul 
Forte emphasises, Hooker here largely ‘eschews the excesses of patristic and scholastic 
exegesis, with its theory of multiplex intelligentia, multiple senses’.185 Instead, Hooker 
demands that an exegete have a strong humanistic grasp of linguistic change, as well as what 
William Haugaard calls ‘a gift of the Renaissance: historical contextualization’.186 The 
exegete must attend, then, to ‘the difference of times, places, persons, and other the like 
circumstances’ in order to understand scripture and its laws.187 Alongside historical sense, 
Hooker further expects exegetes to understand something akin to juridical science as it had 
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developed in sixteenth-century English common law.188 Hooker explicates how general 
common laws that ‘continewallie and universallie’ are found should equitably be applied and 
adjusted to particular circumstances ‘accordinge to theire right meaninge’.189 Similarly, in 
Book Three, as he considers the divine law of Scripture, Hooker explains how even scriptural 
laws with permanent ends may require equitable ‘alteration, if there bee anye unfitness in the 
meanes which they prescribe unto that end’.190 There is, of course, a polemical advantage in 
such a hermeneutic. Philological and historical analysis allow Hooker to dismiss, for 
example, what Debora Shuger calls the naïve ‘putative isomorphism of past and present’ 
employed by his puritan opponents, namely their normative use of typological arguments 
about proper church and political order drawn from scriptural texts.191 Instead, Hooker’s 
notions about mutability, historical context, and teleology allow him to see positive laws 
(such as those that order lay ecclesiastical supremacy) as contingently mutable and yet also, 
when rationally ordered, as participations in divine wisdom: ‘which shineth in the bewtifull 
varietie of all thinges, but most in the manifold and yet harmonious dissimilitude of those 
ways, whereby his Church upon earth is guided from age to age.’192  
Hooker erects no strict barrier, therefore, between natural and supernatural cognitive 
participation: the former ‘hath need of’ the latter, but the latter ‘hath use of’ the former. 
Natural cognitive participation sets reason as an extensive gift which dynamically images, 
and draws humanity back towards, the creative divine nature. Supernatural cognitive 
participation unfolds sanctifying grace within the power of reason in order to bring about an 
intensive (re)union with God as rational end. As a ‘supernaturall endowment’, supernatural 
cognitive participation does not obliterate the natural operations of reason, however, but 
perfects and elevates them. In both forms of cognitive participation, Hooker affords priority 
to grace, that is to say, to God’s gratuitous and causative donation. Hooker therefore unites 
both natural and supernatural forms of cognitive participation in what Daniel Hardy 
(appealing to Coleridge) labels as ‘abduction’, the capacity of reason to be drawn by an inner 
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light which belongs to, but does not originate or end within, itself.193 Grace coheres rather 
than conflicts with nature because nature is gratuitous in the first place. Yet, the divine 
abduction of human reason does not empty it of agency: as human knowers participate in 
God’s scientia, it becomes their own and the inner light of reason calls them to stand as co-
creators of meaning. To be a creative participant in God reveals the gift and responsibility of 
reason: ‘That which by right exposition buildeth up Christian faith, being misconstrued 
breedeth error: betweene true and false construction, the difference reason must shew.’194 
3.3.2 ‘The power of the holy goste’: autopistos and reason 
Hyper-rationalist exegetes of Hooker argue, however, that the balanced coherence he 
sets up between natural and supernatural cognitive participation in God breaks down when he 
considers the meta-principle of how human beings come to know that the scriptures are 
sacred. Such critics contend that Hooker rejects the Reformed idea that Scripture self-
authenticates its identity, known technically as Logos autopistos (λογος αὐτόπιστος). Instead, 
Hooker allegedly claims that natural demonstrative reasoning establishes the meta-principle 
of scriptural authenticity, thus stepping outside of what might count as Reformed 
orthodoxy.195 As such, hyper-rationalist exegetes essentially concur with the anonymous 
authors of A Christian Letter who claim that Hooker infers ‘that the light of nature teacheth 
some knowledge naturall which is necessarie to salvation, and that the Scripture is a 
                                                          
193 Daniel W. Hardy, Wording a Radiance: Parting Conversations about God and the 
Church (SCM Press, 2010), pp. 49-50. 
194 Hooker, Lawes, 1:233.18-20; III.8.16. 
195 See, for example, Lake, Anglicans & Puritans?, pp. 153-155; Shuger, Habits of 
Thought, pp. 28, 41-42; Joyce, Richard Hooker & Anglican Moral Theology, pp. 114-118; 
Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp. 253-254; O’Donovan, Theology of Law 
& Authority, pp. 143-145; Mohamed, ‘Renaissance Thought on the Celestial Hierarchy’, pp. 
559-582. The textual commentary in FLE, 6:516 similarly insists that Hooker ‘is challenging 
the Calvinistic principle of the self-authenticating authority of Scripture’. On the contrary, 
Nigel Atkinson, Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, Tradition and Reason 
(Paternoster Press, 1997), pp. 93, 108 argues that Hooker’s account does remain consonant 
with the Reformed idea of Logos autopistos. 
160 
 
supplement and making perfect of that knowledge’.196 This final subsection instead 
demonstrates how Hooker’s account of reason’s role in authenticating the scriptures as sacred 
offers a subtle interpretation of autopistos in which ‘the special grace of the holy ghost’ 
informs the rational ‘inlightning of our minds’ such that we can participate in the intrinsic 
truth of divine scientia. 
As a prolegomenon, it remains useful to understand the claims involved in the idea of 
Logos autopistos. Reformed orthodox theologians commonly state that Scripture exhibits its 
own sure authority (autopistos) and that the Holy Spirit testifies within believers 
(testimonium Spiritus sancti internum) such that they can recognise Scripture as sacred. This 
idea originates as a novel theologoumenon in Reformed orthodoxy directly out of Calvin’s 
works, although Bullinger may well in turn have influenced him.197 Calvin only uses the term 
autopistos eleven times as an adjective for scriptura across his works, and only once in the 
1559 Institutes, but it soon became a key confessional term for Reformed theologians. 
Autopistos seems to have roots in Greek logic and geometry, as well as medieval 
scholasticism.198 In Greek thought, the term is connected with the word ‘axiom ‘(άξίωμα), 
that is to say propositions accepted as true, self-convincing, and trustworthy without the need 
for proof. Various scholastic notions also influence Calvin’s idea of Logos autopistos. The 
medieval idea that Scripture acts as a primary scientific principium of Christian knowledge 
with its own self-evident principles (principia per se nota) presages Calvin’s idea that 
Scripture has ultimate and independent autopistic authority. Aquinas’ distinction between 
things which are evident by themselves (secundum se) and those which are evident for us 
(quoad nos) also stands behind Calvin’s account of the Spirit’s testimony which establishes 
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scriptural authority for us (apud nos).199 That Calvin prefers the Greek adjective autopistos to 
these Latinate medieval philosophical terms does not suggest, then, that he arrives at the 
concept in a vacuum; rather, in using the Greek term, he emphasises the theological elements 
of faith and trust involved in the autopistic character of Scripture. Indeed, in terms of 
etymology, while the prefix auto simply means ‘by itself’, pistos recalls the theological idea 
of faith, itself containing notions of trust and confidence (from the Greek πίστις, pistis; 
translated in Latin as fides, also from the same root as fiducia).200 Rather than simply 
meaning ‘self-evident’ as it might in philosophical terms, the theological meaning of 
autopistos therefore rather indicates ‘self-convincingly leading to faith’, as Henk van den 
Belt translates it.201 
Calvin discusses autopistos in the first book of the 1559 Institutes entitled De 
Cognitione Dei Creatoris (‘The Knowledge of God the Creator’). In context, autopistos 
works as a confessional rather than philosophical statement: it does not refer to self-evident 
axioms as such but instead places the authoritative trustworthiness of Scripture in itself; the 
Spirit sanctions (sancire) and confirms (constare) Scripture rather than the judgement 
(iudicium) of the (Roman) Church.202 At the end of chapter seven, Calvin explicitly uses 
autopistos and links it directly to the dynamic, internal, and non-inferential witness of the 
Spirit: 
Let this point therefore stand: that those whom the Holy Spirit has inwardly taught 
truly rest upon Scripture, and that Scripture indeed is self-authenticated [αὐτόπιστον]; 
hence it is not right to subject it to proof and reasoning. And the certainty it deserves 
with us [apud nos], it attains by the testimony [testimonium] of the Spirit. For even if 
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it wins reverence for itself by its own majesty, it seriously affects us only when it is 
sealed upon our hearts through the Spirit.203 
Here, Calvin adapts the medieval idea that Scripture is a scientific principium of theology: 
Scripture gains reverence for itself by its own majesty and ‘exhibits fully as clear evidence of 
its own truth as white and black things do of their colour, or sweet and bitter things do of 
their taste.’204 The Spirit mediates the trustworthiness of scriptural self-evidence within the 
believer; the principia of Scripture would only be an analogy, then, of the self-evident 
principia of natural sciences. Calvin accordingly baptises the Aristotelian notion of scientia 
in order to emphasise the elements of faith, trust, and pneumatic illumination. Logos 
autopistos does not depend on ‘proof and reasoning’ since the Spirit inspires Scripture and is 
more excellent than any rational proof.205 Yet, it nevertheless cannot be isolated in existential 
terms of assurance from the subjective, internal testimonium of the Spirit which makes it 
certain with us (apud nos) and through which we find rest (acquiescere). The testimony of 
God in Scripture and the testimony of the Spirit within believers are not identical, then, but 
they are inseparable in the existential act of human knowing: ‘The same Spirit…who has 
spoken through the mouths of the prophets must penetrate into our hearts to persuade us that 
they faithfully proclaimed what had been divinely commanded.’206 
In the eighth chapter, however, Calvin immediately introduces a caveat about 
autopistos and the testimonium of the Spirit. He considers how human reason [humana ratio] 
can provide ‘sufficiently firm proofs [probationes]’ to ‘establish the credibility of 
Scripture’.207 While Calvin elsewhere pejoratively contrasts humana ratio to faith, here he 
links it to probationes which are strong enough to confirm the authority of Scripture.208 The 
probationes exist independently of internal pneumatic testimony. As ‘secondary aids’ they 
demonstrate (demonstrare), prove (evincere) or offer proof (demonstratio), and make clear 
the trustworthiness of Scripture, establishing them as indubitable to human reason. While the 
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probationes confirm (stabilire) the trustworthiness of Scripture, they do not share in, 
however, the absolute existential certainty of the Spirit’s testimony. Consequently, reason 
plays a subordinate role in the ratiocinative analysis of the marks of Scripture, namely the 
objective evidence that can confirm and defend beliefs for us (apud nos). The probationes do 
not render the testimonium as superfluous: Calvin distinguishes, for example, between a 
general opinion (opinio) about the plausibility of scriptural majesty for which the probationes 
serve as an apologetic aid, and the full persuasion of ‘firm faith’ through the testimony of the 
Spirit which allows believers to rest (acquiescere) in the intrinsic certainty of scriptural 
without proof.209 Yet, the ratio of the Word examines the private testimony of the Spirit: the 
‘Word and Spirit belong inseparably together’ such that ‘the Holy Spirit is recognised in his 
agreement with Scripture’ and is, in fact, present in Scripture itself.210 Calvin’s account of 
autopistos represents, then, what Richard Muller calls a balancing act between the ‘subjective 
and inward certainty resting on the Spirit and on faith alone’ and ‘an external objective 
certainty resting on evidence’ which allows the subjective aspect ‘to be grounded in reality’ 
and rationality.211 
There are admittedly grounds for the hyper-rationalist exegetical claim that Hooker 
rejects Calvin’s Reformed account of autopistos and the internum testimonium. Hooker 
certainly rejects that scriptural marks can indefeasibly assure people that the scriptures are 
sacred, as will be developed. He also certainly uses the Anabaptists in the Preface to the 
Lawes as an example of the dangers of special claims to pneumatic illumination: ‘when they 
and their Bibles were alone together, what strange phantasticall opinion soever at any time 
entred into their heads, their use was to thinke the Spirit taught it them.’212 Hooker implicitly 
places his puritan opponents in the troubling shadows of the Anabaptists. He thinks that the 
‘common’ people are not convinced of the puritan case from first principles but are rather 
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‘credulous’ and induced that ‘it is the speciall illumination of the holy Ghost, whereby they 
discerne those things in the word, which others reading yet discerne them not’.213 Hooker 
opposes non-demonstrable claims to internal pneumatic certainty because they seem to imply 
that reason remains of little to no value in faith. In Book Three, Hooker summarises this 
incredulous position: ‘If I believe the Gospell, there needeth no reasoning about it to 
perswade me: If I doe not believe, it must be the spirit of God and not the reason of man that 
shall convert my hart unto him.’214 Instead, Hooker allegedly exaggerates the priority of 
reason and subalternates the authenticity of scripture to it, especially as he writes that we 
know ‘by reason that the scripture is the word of God’.215  
Yet, a close reading, provided in the following paragraphs, of the three texts in which 
Hooker considers the meta-principle of scriptural authenticity obviates accusations of hyper-
rationalism by revealing a parallel between his account of supernatural cognitive participation 
and the relationship between the Spirit and the form of reason in scriptural authentication.216  
Just as God’s scientia suspends theological science and divine influence abducts the light of 
reason, the ‘power of the holy goste’ sits at the beginning of a chain of per se causation in the 
authentication process through which the believer receives assurance of, and reason 
apprehends and assents to, the autopistic quality of Scripture.217 In turn, the participatory 
mediation of reason publically unveils the presence of the Spirit. 
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The problem of why anyone should accept the authenticity of Scripture first briefly 
rears its head in the fourteenth chapter of Book One on the ‘sufficiency of scripture unto the 
end for which it was instituted’.218 Hooker acknowledges that Duns Scotus has ‘affirmatively 
concluded’ in his commentary on the Sentences that only Scripture contains the necessary 
knowledge for its appointed end of salvation. Yet Scripture (like any ‘Arte or Science’) has 
‘certaine boundes and limits’ and presupposes ‘many necessarye things learned in other 
sciences and knowne beforehand’. Hooker acknowledges, then, that the necessary saving 
knowledge of Scripture presupposes ‘knowledge concerning certaine principles whereof it 
receaveth us already persuaded’. One of these principles is the sacred authority of Scripture 
which Hooker does not take as self-evident to us, even if scriptural science contains 
necessary salvific knowledge. The meta-principle of which books are holy is ‘confest 
impossible for the scripture it selfe to teach’, although Hooker does not develop here why that 
might be the case. Hooker argues that scriptural authenticity presupposes ‘being therefore 
persuaded by other meanes that these scriptures are the oracles of God’. Only then can 
Scripture ‘teach us the rest, and laye before us all the duties which God requireth at our hands 
as necessary unto salvation’. 
In the second and third texts, Hooker gives a stronger account of in what sense the 
scriptures cannot self-authenticate and the consequential role of reason. In the fourth chapter 
of Book Two Hooker repeats a classic Roman Catholic argument against the principle of sola 
scriptura that criticises what it sees as an indissoluble problem of infinite regress: 
Finally we all beleeve that the Scriptures of God are sacred, and that they have 
proceeded from God; our selves we assure that wee doe right well in believing. We 
have for this point a demonstration sound and infallible. But it is not the worde of 
God which doth or possiblie can assure us, that wee doe well to thinke it his worde. 
For if any one booke of Scripture did give testimonie to all; yet still that Scripture 
which giveth credite to the rest, would require another Scripture to give credite unto 
it: neither could we ever come unto any pause whereon to rest our assurance this way, 
so that unlesse besides scripture there were some thing which might assure us that we 
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do well, we could not thinke we do well, no not in being assured that scripture is a 
sacred and holie rule of well doing.219 
In the eighth chapter of Book Three, Hooker repeats the same argument.220 Hooker develops 
how the meta-principle of scriptural authenticity is not self-evident in the way that the 
proposition ‘every whole is more then any parte of that whole’ is a per se nota principle. 
Instead, ‘there must be therefore some former knowledge presupposed which doth herein 
assure the hartes of all believers. Scripture…presumeth us taught otherwise that it selfe is 
divine and sacred.’ Scriptural authenticity remains in this regard comparable to all scientific 
knowledge: ‘no science doth make knowne the first principles whereon it buildeth, but they 
are alwaies either taken as plaine and manifest in them selves, or as proved and graunted 
already, some former knowledge having made them evident.’ In this third passage, Hooker 
explicitly mentions the vital role of reason in theological scientia: ‘Scripture indeed teacheth 
things above nature, things which our reason by it selfe could not reach unto. Yet those things 
also we believe, knowing by reason that the scripture is the word of God.’ 
 Nigel Voak offers the most extensive, naturalistic interpretation of these three texts as 
examples of Hooker’s hyper-rationalism. For Voak, in the first passage, ‘Hooker is taking the 
immensely significant step of rejecting the view that Scripture is self-authenticating’ in 
relation to its sacred status, which implies that ‘knowledge of this principle must come from a 
higher science’. 221 As such, Voak implicitly suggests that, in relation to the meta-principle of 
scriptural authenticity, Scripture becomes a subaltern scientia in relation to reason.222 Voak 
then argues in relation to the first two passages that the ‘other meanes’ and ‘demonstration 
sound and infallible’ that Scripture presupposes are ‘basic truths of natural law and natural 
theology’. That is to say, natural reason shows the authenticity of Scripture through infallible 
demonstrative rational arguments which involve ‘natural principles such as the existence and 
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qualities of God, taught by human reason’ and available to all.223 Accordingly, in the final 
passage from Book Three, Hooker makes natural reason the inferential arbiter for knowing 
that Scripture is divine. Thus, Hooker rejects ‘the Reformed view that Scripture can be 
infallibly authenticated non-inferentially on the basis of the internal witness of the Holy 
Spirit’.224 He furthermore ‘implicitly makes demonstrative reasoning a second principium 
cognoscendi theologiae in matters of Christian doctrine,’ the sine qua non for conversion, as 
Lake has it.225 For Voak, the exaggerated advantage of reason over Scripture places Hooker 
‘decisively outside the Reformed tradition over the issue of religious authority’. As 
O’Donovan argues, in Hooker’s thought: 
[T]he authority of Scriptural revelation is everywhere bounded by reason’s own 
assured authority; reason disposes of divinely revealed truth according to its 
invariable principles and operations, without itself apparently being at the disposal of 
faith’s immediate and certain knowledge, without itself being demonstrably directed 
and empowered in its work by the Holy Spirit.226 
Indeed, for Voak, Hooker thereby opposes ‘characteristically Reformed doctrine under the 
cover of an attack on puritanism and presbyterianism’.227 
There are, however, two significant problems with such naturalistic readings of these 
three texts. First, Hooker never directly uses or abuses the term autopistos, and he never 
rejects the Spirit’s testimony. He rather casts Scripture in the scholastic terms of scientia, per 
se nota, and subalternatio, terms which are not simply equivalent to autopistos. As such, the 
question Hooker poses does not revolve around the intrinsic, autopistic nature of Scripture as 
objectively self-convincing per se, but rather turns on the existential question of assurance, 
namely how human beings subjectively come to know and accept the sacred identity of 
Scripture. The emphasis on existential assurance in all three texts, rather than the intrinsic 
identity of Scripture, makes Hooker’s claims less controversial: since theology represents a 
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subalternate science, the first principles are of course only self-evident (per se nota) within 
the higher scientia dei; it is the supernaturally infused habit of faith that allows the human 
intellect to apprehend and assent to these first principles as self-evident to us. Aquinas’ 
scholastic distinction between principles evident by themselves (secundum se) and to us 
(quoad nos) therefore forms the correct interpretive paradigm for the passages from the 
Lawes about scriptural authenticity. Indeed, Hooker’s example in the third passage of a self-
evident proposition (‘every whole is more then any parte of that whole’) is also found in 
Aquinas’ thought as he explores whether God’s existence is self-evident.228 There, the 
proposition about ‘whole and part’ is self-evident (per se nota) in itself (secundum se) and to 
us (quoad nos) as we understand the terms of the predicate and subject. In contrast, God’s 
existence is self-evident ‘for the predicate is the same as the subject’, but not self-evident to 
us ‘because we do not know the essence of God’. In the texts at hand, Hooker’s similar 
concern is to distinguish between the intrinsic credibility of Scripture as the Word of God and 
its subjective credibility for us. ‘Things are made credible,’ Hooker writes, ‘eyther by the 
knowne condition and qualitie of the utterer, or by the manifest likelihood of the truth which 
they have in themselves.’229 For Hooker and Calvin, Scripture remains more intrinsically 
credible than rational demonstration or even sense data because it reveals what God himself 
sees. Thus, Scripture contains ‘the strongest proofe of all, and the most necessaryly assented 
unto by us’.230 Yet, such credibility floats above the existential question of why or how we 
should ‘thus receive the scripture’. Hooker considers that, while ‘reason’ and ‘sense’ (much 
like Calvin’s probationes) can demonstrate ‘a certaine beliefe evidentially grounded upon 
other assurance then Scripture’, some kind of existential motor is required to mediate the 
intrinsic credibility of Scripture as a subjective reality.231 Just as Calvin places the 
testimonium internum as this existential motor, Hooker suggestively lists the ‘secret 
inspiration of the holy Ghost’ along with ‘revelation from heaven’ and ‘instruction upon 
earth’ as the ‘means’ by which rational believers can know, for example, theological 
principles such as that God exists and rewards the faithful.232 
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Second, Hooker does not develop what might constitute ‘other meanes’ or a 
‘demonstration sound and infallible’ in the way that Voak envisages. That scriptural 
authenticity presupposes ‘other meanes’ neither necessarily subalternates Scripture to reason 
nor denies a role for the Holy Spirit. Indeed, Hooker’s example in Book One of the ‘other 
meanes’ which one science presupposes does not involve an act of subordination. Hooker 
argues that the art of oratory presupposes the precepts of grammar; and yet in the pre-modern 
period both rhetoric and grammar were both commonly seen as subalternate to logic, just as 
both the law of reason and divine law are suspended from eternal law.233 Similarly, Aquinas 
gives a clear sense in which utility can suggest a particular kind of dependence without 
involving subalternation.234 Aquinas writes that sacra doctrina ‘can in a sense depend upon 
the philosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but only in order to make 
its teaching clearer’. As such, sacred doctrine ‘does not depend upon other sciences as upon 
the higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as handmaidens’. Hooker most 
probably has a comparable, non-subaltern notion of ‘other meanes’, especially reason, in 
relation to the authenticity of Scripture. Furthermore, Hooker never offers an example of a 
‘demonstration sound and infallible’ for scriptural authenticity, and he does not link such 
demonstrations to the full existential assurance of firm faith. Voak’s argument that Hooker 
refers to natural demonstrative reasoning in these passages ignores Hooker’s qualification 
that while ‘the force of naturall reason is great….the force whereof unto those effects is 
nothing without grace’.235 While demonstrations can certainly take a logical or deductive 
form as Voak argues, they can also take the form of signs or manifestations that exhibit that 
something is true. Indeed, Hooker makes clear in Book One that the demonstration of 
goodness (and so truth) comes either from direct knowledge of some infallible first principle, 
or from ‘signs and tokens’ which, as they mount up in human experience, also take on the 
infallible character of ‘the sentence of God him selfe’.236 Neither of these kind of 
demonstrations as of yet precludes the causal activity of the Holy Spirit in some regard, 
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especially given the causative role given to divine influence in the architecture of 
participation. 
 In order to understand properly the ancillary role that Hooker affords to reason in 
relation to the meta-principle of scriptural authenticity, it is necessary to consider in more 
detail the third of these passages. In the eighth chapter of Book Three, Hooker examines by 
‘what meanes we are taught’ that the Scriptures are sacred.237 First, ‘the first outward motive 
leading men so to esteeme of the scripture is the authority of Gods Church.’ Here, Hooker 
accepts (as did Calvin) the Augustinian dictum ‘I should not believe the gospel except as 
moved by the Catholic church’. Hooker’s interpretation of the dictum seems to differ, 
however, from that of Calvin.238 The latter reformer interprets Augustine’s dictum as 
referring to unbelievers, making the consensus of the Church important since (as Calvin puts 
it) ‘those who have not yet been illumined by the Spirit of God are rendered teachable by 
reverence for the church’ and so ‘prepared for faith in the gospel’.239 Hooker instead more 
traditionally interprets the dictum as referring to believers ‘bredde and brought up in the 
Church’. It is clear, then, that such believers already have some kind of faith, but that the first 
move towards evidential certainty begins with an appeal to ecclesial authority which cannot 
be questioned ‘without cause’ and which itself is persuasive, although not indefeasibly. As 
such, Hooker recognises human authority as ‘the key which openeth the dore of entrance into 
the knowledge of the scripture’ because such authority ‘may enforce assent’.240 Second, after 
having accepted the testimony of the Church, the individual discovers that the ratiocinative 
analysis of the marks of Scripture ‘doth answer our received opinion concerning it’, resulting 
in a firmer sense of evidential certainty. The ratio of the scriptures as ‘we bestow our labor in 
reading or hearing the misteries thereof’ corresponds, then, with the witness of the Church. 
Such ratiocinative analysis recalls, of course, Calvin’s probationes that confirm the identity 
of Scripture to human reason. Indeed, like Calvin’s probationes, such ‘infallible’ rational 
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‘arguments’ and ‘proofes’ have an apologetic use against ‘Infidels or Atheists’ who question 
the church’s testimony or personal persuasion about the authenticity of the scriptures. Since 
they conform to human reason (Calvin’s humana ratio), they are open to all and cannot be 
denied without ‘denying some apparent principle such as al men acknowledge to be true’. 
Like Calvin’s probationes, for Hooker the rational analysis of the marks of scripture also 
‘confirmeth … beleefe the more’ in the believer and, as they show how the witness of the 
Church corresponds to the ratio of Scripture, may ‘somwhat help’ to convert and persuade 
unbelievers. 
Immediately following this passage, however, Hooker makes it clear that, while the 
witness of the Church and ratiocinative analysis of scriptural texts provide objective 
evidence, they cannot work subjective assurance or faith in the principle that the Scriptures 
are sacred. Like Calvin, Hooker places pneumatic illumination as the posterior and interior 
source of faith and existential assurance about this meta-principle: 
Neither can I thinke that when grave and learned men do sometime hold, that of this 
principle there is no proofe but by the testimony of the spirit, which assureth our harts 
therin, it is their meaning to exclude utterly all force which any kind of reason may 
have in that behalfe; but I rather incline to interpret such their speeches, as if they had 
more expresly set downe, that other motives and inducements, be they never so strong 
and consonant unto reason, are notwithstanding uneffectual of them selves to worke 
faith concerning this principle, if the special grace of the holy ghost concur not to the 
inlightning of our minds.241 
Voak alleges that if Hooker takes ‘grave and learned men’ to refer to Calvin and other major 
Reformed theologians, ‘then his interpretation is very free, if not disingenuous.’242 Yet, 
Hooker’s interpretation, as has been shown, shares a great deal of similarity with Calvin. For 
the latter, the witness of the Holy Spirit confirms the intrinsic autopistos of Scripture within 
the believer, giving a full assurance and firm faith not possible through the witness of the 
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Church or the probationes alone. Similarly, for Hooker, ‘if the special grace of the holy ghost 
concur not to the inlightning of our minds’, then all other ‘motives and inducements’ remain 
ineffectual to work faith. 
 Behind these passages, Hooker offers a quiet and subtle account of the Holy Spirit 
that he nevertheless believes remains consonant with Reformed orthodoxy. Polemics rather 
than heterodox theological commitments drive his subtlety: as Hill argues, Hooker reduces 
his appeals to grace and the Spirit in order to shift his puritan adversaries away from 
indemonstrable appeals to interior illumination and towards public rational argument.243 
Hooker’s architecture of participation goes deeper than this, however, and he interprets 
pneumatic illumination as what David Neelands calls ‘the engracing of human reason itself, 
not an interruption of it’.244 As such, the causal activity of the Holy Spirit displays continuity 
with reason and the voice of the Church. Hooker emphasises that the Holy Spirit 
demonstrates its influence within and through reason as a public instrument of persuasion. 
Thus, ‘the spirit leadeth men into all truth’ either through an extraordinary ‘speciall divine 
excellency’ (such as in the direct ‘Revelation’ given to biblical prophets) or through the 
manuduction of ‘Reason….the hande which the Spirit hath led’.245 That puritan ‘men, women 
and children’ would cast themselves as isomorphic ‘Prophets’ constitutes an absurdly egoistic 
proposition for Hooker, who therefore observes: ‘It is not therefore the fervent earnestness of 
their perswaion, but the soundes of those reasons whereupon the same is built, which must 
declare their opinions in these things to have been wrought by the holie Ghost, and not by the 
fraud of that evill Spirit which is even in his illusions strong.’246 Claims to inner illumination, 
though not to be rejected, nevertheless require public scrutiny to avoid demonic delusion. 
Hooker commends public reason as an arbiter for the discernment of true pneumatic 
illumination: 
[E]ven to our own it needeth caution and explication how the testimony of the spirit 
may be discerned, by what means it may be knowen, lest men thinke that the spirit of 
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god doth testifie those things which the spirit of error suggesteth. The operations of 
the spirit, especially these ordinary which be common unto all true Christian men, 
are as we know, things secret and undiscernible even to the very soule where they 
are, because their nature is of another and an higher kind then they can be perceived 
in this life. Wherefore albeit the spirit lead us into all truth and direct us in all 
goodnes, yet bicause these workings of the spirit in us are so privy and secret, we 
therfore stand on a plainer ground, when we gather from the qualitie of things 
beleeved or done, that the spirit of God hath directed us in both; then if we settle our 
selves to beleeve or to do any certaine particular thing, as being moved thereto by the 
spirit.247 
Within this public scrutiny, reason and the Spirit conform to one another, just as the Word 
and Spirit conform for Calvin: the light of reason works as the ordinary ‘effectuall 
instrument’ of the Spirit which illumines it, and as the legal ‘instrument wherewith God will 
have the world guided’.248 In turn, the true presence of the Spirit remains discernible when 
there is ‘soundnes’ of reason displayed in public discourse.249 Indeed, in Book Five Hooker 
further writes against the ‘rule of mens private spirits’ which wreaks ‘utter confusion…under 
pretense of beinge taught, led, and guided by [the Holy] spirit’, while the insufficiency of 
their arguments makes ‘against them a stronge presumption, that God hath not moved theire 
hartes to thinke such thinges, as he hath not inabled them to prove’.250 The instrumentality of 
reason does not preclude, therefore, the illuminatory role of the Holy Spirit; it rather 
safeguards a proper means of public discernment through which the Spirit unveils itself.  
 Hooker’s notion of reason as an ‘effectual instrument’ of the Spirit can broadly be 
seen as congruent with Reformed orthodoxy. As both this chapter and the one before it have 
argued (2.2.3 and 3.3.1), Reformed scholastics within Reformed orthodoxy regularly use the 
causal theory of Aristotle as mediated through medieval scholasticism, just as Hooker does. 
Reformed theologians often speak of the instrumental cause (causa instrumentalis) as a 
subordinate efficient cause (causa efficiens). Here, while God is the primary efficient cause 
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of all that exists and takes place in reality, God also involves humanity as an instrumental 
cause. Rather than being merely passive recipients of God’s efficient activity, the human 
form (and all of its actions) reciprocally participates in God as a subordinate efficient (or 
instrumental) cause. The integrity of creation and the gratuity of grace are therefore 
commonly held in productive tension within Reformed thought. As such, Hooker’s account 
of reason as an ‘instrument which God doth use’ stands within such a Reformed scholastic 
context.251 God or the Holy Spirit sit at the beginning of a chain of per se causation. As such, 
God remains the primary efficient cause of knowledge; this grounds the integrity of reason as 
a subordinate efficient cause, and also casts that integrity as a form of revelation in itself. 
While Hooker creatively interprets Calvin’s account of the internal witness of the Holy Spirit 
in order to emphasise the instrumentality of reason, this does not put him outside of 
Reformed orthodoxy as such. 
Indeed, Hooker’s account of how faith and human reason relate prefigures, for 
example, the later Reformed orthodox thought of Gisbertus Voetius in the seventeenth 
century.252 In Voetius’ first disputation of the Disputationes theologicae selectae (1648-
1669), he argues that while human reason is the receiving subject of faith (subjectum fidei 
recipiens), it is also the instrumental or elicitive principle (principium elicitivum) of faith 
because it draws out rational conclusions from the inner illumination of faith.253 Like Hooker, 
then, Voetius argues that Scripture acts as the source of faith, the Spirit’s illumination 
efficiently causes faith, and reason is the ordinary receptive psychological faculty in which 
faith finds its proper place. For both Hooker and Voetius, the light of reason enjoys a vital but 
ancillary and instrumental status as a secondary principium of faith, but Scripture alone is the 
primary principium.254 As Voetius puts it, reason is an elicitive principium quod of faith, a 
scholastic term meaning a passive principle that is acted upon, rather than the principium quo 
which is the basis for an event or effect. The priority Hooker gives to divine action in both 
natural and supernatural cognitive participation suggests that he similarly sees reason as an 
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instrumental (and therefore subordinate efficient) cause of faith, but not as its ground, a 
preserve kept for the illumination of God or the Holy Spirit. Indeed, in Book Five Hooker 
gives a hierarchical list of religious authorities in which reason remains secondary to Holy 
Scripture: ‘what scripture doth plainelie deliver, to that the first place both of credit and 
obedience is due; the next whereunto is whatsoever anie man can necessarily conclude by 
force of reason; after these the voice of the Church succeedeth.’255 Having a broader sense of 
what constitutes ‘Reformed orthodoxy’ means that Hooker does not need to be cast 
irrevocably outside of the Reformed pale as Voak and others insist. Rather, he can be seen as 
one part of its rich, varied, and complex historical and theological tapestry. 
Within his cognitive ecology, Hooker’s architecture of participation therefore 
navigates between hypo- and hyper-rationalism, intimately connecting divine influence with 
the form of reason. Just as natural cognitive participation involves a similitude to God as first 
mover, so too does supernatural cognitive participation involve the action of the Holy Spirit 
within and through the integral operation of reason. Indeed, Hooker describes Scripture’s role 
as a doctrinal instrument in terms of the believer’s participation or reciprocal indwelling of 
Christ, with the Holy Spirit sitting at the beginning of a chain of per se causation in rational 
cognition: 
The cawse of life spirituall in us is christ, not carnally nor corporally inhabitinge but 
dwelling in the soule of man as a thinge, which when the minde apprehendeth it is 
said to inhabitt and posses the mynde. The mind conceyveth Christe by hering the 
doctryne of christianitye…[O]ur life is Christe by the hearing of the gospell 
apprehended as a saviour and assented unto through the power of the holy goste.256 
Christ is the formal cause of spiritual life, and the Spirit acts as the primary efficient cause of 
doctrinal knowledge within the ordinary rational process of apprehension and assent. Pace 
Shuger and Voak, who variously argue that Hooker sets up reason as ‘an interpretive act’,257 
or ‘a kind of barrier, or filter, between the Spirit and the believer’,258 the form of reason, 
whether natural or supernatural, presupposes divine activity, rendering reason as a divine 
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instrument even within its own integrity. Hooker therefore ends the eighth chapter of Book 
Three by making the necessity of the Spirit’s activity within cognition abundantly clear: ‘the 
force and use of mans reason in thinges divine’ ultimately depends upon the ‘aide and 
assistance of Gods most blessed spirite’; and human laws, even as they draw from the laws of 
nature and God through rational discourse, are ‘aided with the influence of divine grace’ and 
the ‘instinct of the holy Ghost’.259 
3.4 ‘Union with that it desireth’: desire and cognitive participation in God 
 Although scholars most commonly depict that Hooker composes his epistemology in 
a rationalist key, desire forms the second constellating category of his cognitive ecology and 
sets the emotions as constitutive of human happiness coram Deo.260 If reason directs people 
to know God’s truth, then desire moves them to love God’s goodness. As such, W.J. 
Bouwsma perceptively notes two anthropological models in Hooker’s thought: the scholastic 
structure of discrete faculties all subject to the rational rule of the mind; and the biblical and 
humanist image of the heart where the passions are a source for good.261 If the former model 
dominates Hooker’s account of cognitive participation in God in Books Two and Three of the 
Lawes, then the latter model re-emerges in Books Four and Five as the cognitive motor of 
such participation. In the latter two books, Hooker tackles the claims of his puritan opponents 
that ‘our forme of Church-politie is corrupted with popish orders rites and ceremonies’ and 
that ‘there is amongst us much superstition’ retained in the Book of Common Prayer. At 
heart, the debate revolves around what constitutes the proper means of liturgical edification. 
Just as divine influence manuducts reason to participate cognitively in God, Hooker argues 
that the established liturgy affords ‘mutuall conference and as it were commerce to be had 
betwene God and us’, creatively crafting appropriate ‘holie desires’ which lead believers both 
to know and also to love God in sacramental union with Christ..262 For Hooker, worship 
therefore creates ‘emotional communities’ (that is, social groups whose members express and 
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evaluate emotions together) through an ‘emotional regime’ (meaning a shared affective set of 
cultural, embodied, creative, and symbolic practices).263 Like reason, desire stands within the 
rational architecture of participation and exhibits both an extensive as well as an intensive 
aspect and logic. Just as the divinely suspended ‘light of reason’ enlightens truth for the 
human participant, desires are created existential motors which drive the ecstatic, formal 
move from becoming to being through the pursuit of perfective ends parsed as ‘good’. 
Ultimately, since ‘no good is infinite but only God’, human beings naturally desire an 
intensive ‘union with that it desireth’, namely (re)union with God as their first and final 
cause, resting in the affective perfection of joyful love.264 This section accordingly explores 
Hooker’s essential logic of extensive desire in Book One (3.4.1), and then considers the 
cognitive role of desire in faith (3.4.2). Finally, this chapter shows how the established liturgy 
for Hooker displays the fourth, creative aspect of participation: the work of worship unites 
heaven and earth, recreating desire as the existential motor driving an intensive return to God 
(3.4.3). 
3.4.1 ‘To covet more or lesse the participation of God himselfe’: the logic of desire 
 As Charles Miller puts it, desire, goodness, and perfection run ‘through the whole of 
Book I and beyond like a silver thread’.265 As noted in the previous chapter (2.2.3), ‘desire’ 
broadly describes for Hooker what Sarah Coakley defines as ‘the physical, emotional, or 
intellectual longing that is directed towards something or someone wanted’.266 As created 
desires move an actor to pursue cognized goodness as a perfective quality, they also drive the 
actor ‘to covet more or lesse the participation of God himselfe’ as the source and end of all 
participable perfection. Yet, modern exegetes often claim that the silver thread of desire 
represents an illogical interruption of an otherwise strongly rationalist epistemology. For 
example, A.J. Joyce claims that Hooker, unlike Aquinas, ‘is in general inclined to 
be…disparaging of the role played by emotion,…[implying] a fundamental conflict between 
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emotion and reason.’267 Like Bouwsma, Debora Shuger notes ‘two epistemologies or 
discourses’ in Hooker’s thought, but sets them in conflict: a ‘rational consciousness’ and a 
‘participatory consciousness’ form contrary ‘habits of thought, that is, the culturally based 
ways the mind categorizes and structures the world’.268 The ‘rational consciousness’ empties 
‘cosmos, state, and history of…numinosity’ since it involves an objective and secular 
‘hermeneutic based on reason and historical evidence’. In turn, the ‘participatory 
consciousness…assumes the primacy of desire in the act of knowing’ and subjectively 
enchants material things such that they ‘reflect the supernatural order and symbolize 
transcendence’. As such, Hooker’s rational emphasis in the early books of the Lawes gives 
way to ‘a traditional mystic epistemology’ by Book Five and ‘Hooker’s spiritual psychology 
consistently makes desire rather than reason the epistemic ground’. Yet, the desire which 
characterises religious belief remains ‘illogical’ because it exceeds and even contradicts 
rational evidence. The architecture of participation debunks, however, Shuger’s claim that 
reason is intrinsically secular for Hooker, as the previous sections of this chapter have shown. 
The architecture of participation similarly challenges the idea that desire and the emotions 
tout court are inherently irrational. Hooker distinguishes in the Lawes between a corrupted 
experience of desire and its essentially logical structure. Like reason, the essential logic of 
desire remains bound up with a Neoplatonic participatory metaphysic of exit and return: as 
created desires perceptively move towards the ratio of goodness, they ultimately drive human 
beings to love God’s nature, co-extensive with transcendental goodness, and so enjoy an 
intensive cognitive (re)union with their transcendent origin. 
Hooker’s logic of desire in Book One of the Lawes represents the confluence of 
medieval theories of the emotions. ‘Emotion’ remains, of course, an anachronistic term for 
Hooker’s Elizabethan period since it only came into regular use from the mid-seventeenth 
century and in subsequent centuries became a flattened, secular denuding of theological 
notions of the passions and affections.269 Instead, pre-modern categories used by Hooker 
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(such as passions, affections, habits, virtues, and vices) exhibit significant overlap with the 
modern category of emotion. While so single theory of the emotions dominated the medieval 
period, Augustine and Aquinas proved the most influential thinkers, with the latter building 
upon the former in light of the ‘Aristotelian revolution’ of the thirteenth-century.270 
Augustine principally addresses the emotions in De civitate Dei in Book 9.4-5 and Book 14, 
while Aquinas particularly considers them at length in his ‘treatise on the passions’ in the 
Summa Theologiae I.II.22-48.271 In both cases, Augustine and Aquinas develop a syncretistic 
account of the emotions, adopting and transforming elements from Stoic, Platonic, and 
Aristotelian thought into a Christian vision where created desires relate emotions (as 
perceptive forms of cognition which move an agent) to love sourced in God. Neither 
Augustine nor Aquinas cast the emotions, then, in merely secular terms but variously index 
them against divinity. As the background to Hooker’s thought, then, it remains useful first to 
draw out the relevant aspects of Augustine’s and Aquinas’ thought on the emotions and 
desire. 
Augustine and Aquinas distinguish between two kinds of emotional phenomena, 
namely the passions (passiones) and the affections (affectiones). The passions are involuntary 
movements of the lower appetitive or sensitive soul towards sensible goods; they affect both 
the body as well as the rational soul, and (for Aquinas) are somatic. The affections are 
voluntary movements of the higher appetitive soul (the intellective self) towards intelligible 
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goods; Thomas Dixon accordingly calls the affections ‘the emotions of the rational mind’.272 
Augustine adopts the Stoic fourfold classification of the ‘emotions’ paired into binaries 
according to the type and presence or absence of good and evil objects: delight (laetitia) and 
desire (libido/cupiditas/appetitus) for present and future goods; or distress (aegritudo/dolor) 
and fear (metus) for present and future evils.273 Aquinas gives a more complex taxonomy but 
similarly argues that all emotions are objectual in that they offer an intentional form of 
perception coloured by cognitive evaluation of perfective goods.274 Like Augustine, Aquinas’ 
taxonomy puts desire for the good as the central principle of motion. Concupiscible passions 
include the first-order desires (concupiscentia) and aversions/repulsions (fuga/abominatio) 
for absent sensible goods or evils, as well as the pleasures (delectatio) and sorrows/pains 
(tristitia/dolor) of present sensible goods or evils. The irascible passions (hope, spes; despair, 
desperatio; daring, audacia; fear, timor; and anger, ira) are second-order emotional 
phenomena which presuppose and defend the concupiscible passions, ‘rising against 
whatever gets in the way of what is agreeable, which is whatever the concupiscible power 
desires.’275 The intellectual affections reside in and move the intellectual appetite rather than 
the sensitive, but follow the structure of the concupiscible passions while aiming at 
intelligible goods. 
While Augustine and Aquinas offer different emotional taxonomies, they give logical 
priority to love in the intentional cognition of the good. All emotions are united in the 
principle of love and relate in some way, then, to created desires which orient and propel an 
actor towards a desirable object through attraction to the cognized good. Here, desire takes on 
a central perceptive and motivational role in cognition: it engages the world directly and 
exhibits a certain kind of logic which moves the basic inclination to love towards final rest in, 
and joyful union with, the beloved. For Augustine, as love tends toward its end, it signifies 
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desire for the good; and as love reaches its end, it rests in the delight of union.276 All love 
involves attraction, then, meaning it orders (according to the ratio of the good) the desire of 
the lover to enjoy union with the beloved. Similarly, for Aquinas, love is the first of the 
passions and affections since they both ‘presuppose love of some kind’.277 Love is the first 
inclination towards the possession of a sensible good, and desire moves the lover towards 
possession of, and union with, that cognized sensible good.278 Love also forms the ‘first 
movement of the will’ and so orients the affections to seek union with the intellectual 
good.279 The intellectual affection of desire (desiderium) springs as a principle of motion 
from the intellectual appetite towards the cognized good when it is absent, and joy (gaudium) 
occurs as a species of pleasure (delectatio) when the loved intellectual good becomes 
present.280 
Augustine and Aquinas offer an ambivalent but ultimately holistic view of emotional 
phenomena, relating them to cognitive participation in God as source and end of love. As 
such, both abstract an essential logic of desire from an inherently corrupted experience. Like 
the Stoics, Augustine at times pejoratively labels emotional phenomena as ‘disturbances’ or 
‘upheavals’ (perturbationes), and both Augustine and Aquinas argue that the passions need to 
be subject to reason or they can lead to irrational sins of passion.281 At other times, however, 
Augustine refers to passions in a morally neutral sense, and consistently praises the 
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affections, linking them to the ‘rule of reason’ and virtue.282 In a stronger vein, for Aquinas 
while the passions ‘sometimes oppose reason,’ it remains ‘natural’ for the passions to ‘obey 
reason’ and human passions are accordingly ‘rational by participation’ when they enjoy the 
political rule of reason.283 Virtuous habits produce ordinate passions which, as they are 
consonant with ‘reason’s command’, produce an affective knowledge of the good, rendering 
the passions as essential for human flourishing.284 Like Augustine, for Aquinas the inferior 
passions do not exhaust the affective capacity of the soul since godly affections produce 
imperturbable love which binds humankind with the desire of the angels and the love of 
God.285 For both Augustine and Aquinas, then, while created desires are existential motors 
intrinsic to human beings, right desires also reveal a transcendental charisma, namely the 
drive towards an intensive return to, or reunion with, God. For Augustine, proper love is 
caritas, ‘that affection of the mind which aims at the enjoyment of God for His own sake, and 
the enjoyment of one's self and of one's neighbour in subordination to God.’286 Such human 
caritas only becomes possible through participation in the divine nature which is coextensive 
with goodness and love; human caritas refers love for the world to the ultimate love of 
God.287 Right desire orders an actor to pursue union with God as the cognized source of love 
and goodness, the ground of beatific happiness, and the eternal beloved.288 Hence, Augustine 
prays about desire at the beginning of the Confessiones, using the ‘heart’ to signify both 
rational and affective forms of cognition: ‘man…desires to praise Thee….for Thou hast 
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formed us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee.’289 Similarly, for 
Aquinas the will’s basic inclination is towards the unrestricted goodness only found in God’s 
nature, knowledge of which elicits a natural desire (desiderium naturale) to ‘see’ God.290 The 
theological virtue of charity presupposes rational cognition of Godand orients the will 
towards God as supreme good through an affective habitual disposition of benevolence.291 
Aquinas therefore defines ‘charity’ as ‘friendship’ (amictia) with God, a reciprocal 
relationship of love which tends towards ‘a union of affection’.292 Accordingly, Aquinas links 
the intellectual appetite and affection of desire to the final happiness of beatitude where, as 
they cognitively participate in God, believers experience loving union with the divine 
beloved, the joy of rest following as an affective consequence.293 
Hooker’s scattered account of the emotions in the Lawes shows three crucial points of 
contact with Augustine and Aquinas. First, like the two medieval theologians, Hooker links 
the sensitive appetite to the ‘inferiour naturall desire’ for sensible goods and describes the 
will as an intellectual appetite or desire which takes as its object ‘that good which reason doth 
leade us to seeke’.294 Accordingly, he also broadly speaks of ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ as 
phenomena which move appetitive inclinations from potency to act, relating them to the 
emotional life of human beings and Christ,295 as well as to affective states in the immaterial 
angels296 and God, whose perfectly loving ‘harte’ abducts creation through ‘that naturall 
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desire which his goodness hath to shew and impart himself’297 and whose loving ‘desire is to 
have all men saved’.298 Hooker regularly recognizes, then, the central epistemic and 
motivational role of emotional phenomena such as delight, desire, distress, fear, joy, love, 
pleasure, hope, despair, grief, and anger, even if he does not arrange them into an 
Augustinian or Thomistic taxonomy. Second, like Augustine and Aquinas, Hooker remains 
ambivalent about such emotional phenomena and at times certainly suggests a conflict 
between them and reason. In the Preface to the Lawes, for example, Hooker remains scathing 
of those whose ‘affections doe frame their opinions’.299 He opposes the ‘mist of passionate 
affection’ and ‘vehemencie of affection’ found in his puritan opponents with ‘the light of 
sound and sincere judgement’ and the ‘force of reason’.300 Hooker later suggests that, since 
emotions spring out of appetitive powers, ‘it is not altogether in our [rational] power, whether 
we will be stirred with affections or no.’301 Alongside the puritans, Hooker regularly points to 
heretics from the patristic era as another class of people in whom inordinate ‘corrupted 
affections’ led to malign or irrational behaviour,302 as well as the fallen angels,303 
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Anabaptists,304 atheists,305 and even Calvin and his followers.306 More broadly, Hooker 
argues in his Sermon on Pride that a sinful person suffers from ‘immoderate swelling’, an 
Augustinian perturbation in which the will tyrannises ‘over reason, and brutish sensuality 
over will’.307 Yet, at the same time Hooker criticises any appearance of ‘couldnes in 
affection’ in the unyielding legalism of his opponents, and, as will be shown, puts desire as 
the second constellating category of his cognitive ecology.308 Third, then, despite such 
ambivalence over the moral value of emotional phenomena, Hooker (following Augustine 
and Aquinas) unifies them under the priority of love and the concomitant emotions of desire 
and pleasure, all of which are finally indexed to participation in God as site of transcendental 
goodness and beatitude. Far from opposing reason and emotion, Hooker sees desire as a kind 
of cognitive state or intelligent appraisal of the world which remains vital for the participation 
of God. Like Augustine and Aquinas, then, the pressing epistemological question for Hooker 
does not turn around how to extract a dispassionate secular rationality from irrational desire, 
but rather around how to extract desire’s essential transcendental logic from an inherently 
corrupt experience. Accordingly, Hooker’s two accounts of desire in Book One of the Lawes 
respectively draw upon Aquinas and Augustine in order to pull the ‘silver thread’ that 
logically suspends desire, goodness, and perfection from the architecture of participation of 
God, placing the emotions as essential for human intellectual growth. 
Hooker first considers created human desires in the fifth chapter of Book One entitled 
‘the law wherby man is in his actions directed to the imitation of God’. Hooker immediately 
appeals to three Aristotelian-Thomistic principles to explore how desire moves and informs 
extensive and intensive forms of participation in God, rooting the law of reason within 
notions of movement, appetite, and goodness. First, God is purus actus and in contrast all 
created forms are ‘somewhat in possibilitie’, that is capable of being moved from potency to 
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act.309 Second, there is therefore ‘in all things an appetite or desire, whereby they [i.e. 
creatures] incline to something which they may be’. Aquinas similarly understands appetites 
to be passive inclinations towards what is perfective or completing, and natural inclinations in 
fact constitute natural law.310 Third, as creatures move from potency to act through desire, 
Hooker thereby writes that ‘they shall be perfecter then nowe they are’, with perfections 
‘conteyned under the generall name of Goodnesse’, ultimately identified with God. For 
Hooker, as for Aquinas, creation here displays a dynamic quality: created imperfect, desire 
affectively drives a creature towards ‘the participation of God himselfe’ as ‘supreme cause’ 
and exemplary pure act. Appetites direct human beings towards partial happiness in this life 
and beatific union with God in the next.311 In the fifth and sixth chapters of Book One, then, 
Hooker essentially rehearses an Aristotelian-Thomistic anthropology in order to describe the 
perfective goods desired by human beings as they imitate God’s perfection.312 Hooker 
arranges humankind’s natural appetites into an ascending hierarchy, gearing their desires 
towards proportionately perfective terminal goods: vegetative (with a desire for nutrition, 
growth, and reproduction); sensitive (with a desire to experience the world); and rational 
(with a desire for theoretical and practical speculation). As people grow in knowledge and 
virtue, they participate in God’s actuality conditioned to their rational form; the logic of 
desire drives this appetitive movement towards the ratio of perfection and so sets the 
emotions as a source for good. 
Hooker gives a second account of desire in the eleventh chapter of Book One that 
combines elements from Aquinas and Augustine, linking appetitive desire to love and 
participation in God. For Hooker, the rational appetite in human beings moves cognitive 
participation in God through its orientation towards the ‘soveraign good or blessedness’.313 
Desire springs from this rational appetite, moving the capacity to know and love the world 
                                                          
309 Compare Aquinas, ST, I.3.1 resp. On Aquinas’ appropriation of Aristotle’s 
distinction between ἐν δυνάμει (potentiality) and ἐν ἐνέργεια (actuality), see James, Passion 
and Action, pp. 48-64. 
310 Aquinas, ST, I.II.8.1; II.II.133.1. 
311 Compare Aquinas, ST, I.II.1-5. 
312 Hooker, Lawes, 1:73.10-23; 1:75.7-27; I.5.2; I.6.2-3. Compare Aquinas, ScG, 
III.26.8 
313 Hooker, Lawes, 1:111.2; I.11.1. Compare Aquinas, ST, I.59.1; I.93.3, 6, & 7. 
187 
 
and ultimately God as ‘that wherin the highest degree of al our perfection consisteth’.314 
Hooker here navigates an Augustinian course between worldly and divine love. Augustine 
distinguishes between love as use (uti) and love as enjoyment (frui).315 ‘Use’ is the correct 
love for creation as a means through which human beings can come into fellowship with 
God. ‘Enjoyment’ is the right love for God as ‘an end in Himself’ and site of terminal 
happiness. Hooker implicitly employs this Augustinian distinction when he describes the 
triple perfection sought by human beings, arranged into an ascending Aristotelian hierarchy 
of desire: the ‘sensuall’, the ‘intellectual’ (meaning the ‘law of morall and civil perfection), 
and the ‘spirituall and divine’.316 The former two properly involve desires ‘linked and as it 
were chained one to another’ as people pursue ‘convenient’ sensible and intellectual goods 
‘with reference to a further end’, namely ‘some thing…desired for it selfe simplie and for no 
other’.317 While use of worldly goods remains proper, for Hooker such love is penultimate 
and must be referred to some transcendental origin and end. The ‘spiritual and divine’ 
perfection orients an actor, therefore, to desire the infinite good of God such that, ‘by force of 
participation and conjunction with him,’ he or she enjoys intellectual union with the beloved 
divine ‘soveraigne truth’ and ‘sea of goodness’.318 Although the intellectual appetite of the 
will ‘doth now worke upon that object by desir, which is as it were a motion towards the end 
as yet unobtained’, in beatitude desire yields to love and rests in ‘the sweete affection’ of 
‘those supernaturall passions of joye peace and delight’.319 Desire produces a double dilation, 
then, allowing human beings to engage with the horizontal goodness of creation but 
ultimately referring humanity vertically to the love of God, who ought to be desired and 
loved for Himself. 
The essential logic of desire, abstracted from an inherently corrupt experience, 
therefore remains vital for human flourishing and constitutes the essential motive force in 
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both natural and supernatural cognitive participation in God. Rather than constituting an 
obstacle to the telos of humanity, the emotions are indispensable to its attainment. The logic 
of desire allows Hooker to remain critical of his puritan adversaries because their egoism has 
distorted the emotions and deluded the ‘common multitude’. Pace Shuger and Joyce, then, 
Hooker does not see the emotions per se as fundamentally irrational; they are rational by 
participation insofar as they order human beings both to know and also to love the 
transcendental ratio of the true and the good. Indeed, as the second constellating category of 
Hooker’s cognitive ecology, desire extensively moves human beings to participate in, and 
enjoy intensive union with, God as the eminently desirable Good. As such, the re-emergence 
of desire in Books Four and Five does not interrupt Hooker’s rationalist epistemology. 
Instead, the logic of desire plays a key epistemic role in faith, creating an emotional regime 
geared towards adhering to God through shared liturgical practices that are affective as well 
as intellectual. Before turning to the liturgical recreation of desire, the next section considers 
how the logic of desire relates to faith. 
3.4.2 ‘It is good for me to cleave to God’: desire and faith 
Debora Shuger diagnoses that desire, as the second constellating category of Hooker’s 
cognitive ecology, interrupts his ‘incipient rationalism and historicism’.320 Shuger 
perceptively notes that, while Hooker affirms in the Lawes that ‘we have necessary reason’ 
for holding that the scriptures are sacred, he never says what that necessity might be; indeed, 
Shuger suggests that Augustine and Aquinas claim that only probable reasons can ever be 
evidenced. Accordingly, Shuger writes that ‘if, therefore, assent should be proportioned to 
evidence, Christianity dwindles to a hypothesis’.321 Shuger looks to Hooker’s first extant 
sermon, Of the Certaintie and Perpetuity of Faith in the Elect, in order to explore how 
Hooker might address this dilemma, turning to the role of desire in his account of faith. In 
that sermon, it is desire (rather than reason) that orients and directs the believer to ‘cleave to 
God’ since ‘faith grasps its object by love, not evidence’.322 Yet, for Shuger such ‘self-
warranting desire’ remains ‘illogical’ because the faith it produces believes ‘against all 
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reason’ and ‘one can feel very strongly and still be very wrong’.323 A closer analysis of 
Certaintie suggests, however, an alternative to Shuger’s reading: the logic of desire promises, 
as it orients the whole person to the ratio of divine goodness, to overcome the limits of 
human reason in order to fulfil the capacity of believers to enjoy supernatural cognitive 
participation in God. Desire here constitutes the key emotional phenomena which can allay 
existential doubt and inculcate intellectual assurance in which the knower conforms to the 
intrinsic ratio of God’s nature and love. 
In Certaintie, Hooker uses Habbukuk 1.4 to address the problem of doubt and anxiety 
even within the elect assured of salvation, a common pastoral issue within Reformed 
orthodoxy. As Shuger points out, Hooker unusually reframes the pastoral problem within the 
Aristotelian dilemma of knowability: for Aristotle, there are two kinds of knowability, either 
the experience of particulars or the inherent truth of universals; yet, the latter remains harder 
to know, even if it is more excellent.324 In short, there is an inverse relationship between the 
excellence of an object and its knowability, what Wesley Trimpi calls the ‘ancient dilemma 
of knowledge and representation’ common to all pre-modern epistemologies.325 So it is that 
God, as most excellent and true, is also most unknowable to the human intellect. As Shuger 
phrases it, ‘the ancient dilemma entails…that the subjective certainty of faith always exceeds 
the objective evidence.’326 The gap between subjective certainty and objective evidence 
produces anxiety in believers. Yet, in Certaintie, Hooker argues that believers can deflate 
doubt and enjoy the assurance of faith if they cultivate desire for God which leads to an 
affective experience and knowledge of divine love. 
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Using a scholastic distinction derived from Aquinas, Hooker therefore develops two 
kinds of certainty, that of evidence and that of adherence, in order to explain doubt but also 
offer its remedy.327 Hooker begins with the certainty of evidence: 
Certainty of evidence wee call that, when the mind doth assent unto this or that; not 
because it is true in it selfe, but because the truth therof is cleere, because it is 
manifest unto us. Of thinges in them selves most certain, except they be also most 
evident, our persuasion is not so assured as it is of thinges more evident although they 
in themselves be lesse certain.328 
Nigel Voak argues that Hooker describes three descending ‘subtypes’ of evidential certainty 
in the Lawes: ‘plaine aspect and intuitive beholding’ (that is to say, empirical experience or 
speculative first principles); ‘strong and invincible demonstration’ (meaning demonstrative 
reasoning); and ‘greatest possibility’.329 Hooker also mentions the intrinsic certainty of things 
in themselves. While Voak places intrinsic certainty alongside evidential certainty, Hooker 
rather takes it to hover above the actual experience of an object. In the Lawes, for example, 
while Scripture reveals what God sees, having an intrinsic and ‘infallible certaintie’ as ‘the 
strongest proofe of all’, that does not explain how people actually experience that the 
scriptures are sacred.330 As Hooker considers in Certaintie how faith relates to evidential 
certainty, then, he preaches that faith often seems weak apart from in the angels, who 
immediately see God ‘by the light of glorie’.331 While God remains the most certain object in 
intrinsic terms, the divine nature nonetheless remains unavailable to the senses and beyond 
propositional demonstration for human beings. Faced with uncertain objective evidence, the 
faith of believers experiences a subjective motion of doubt. Pace Voak, this does not mean 
that faith remains doomed to assent always ‘in an imperfect, and at times a weak and faltering 
manner’, with only rational reflection able to bring believers to know ‘with demonstrative 
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certainty’.332 Rather, Hooker simply recognizes the pastoral consequence of the Aristotelian 
dilemma of representation, namely the unavoidable gap between intrinsic certainty and the 
type of subjective assurance which objective evidence can render in relation to matters of 
faith. 
Hooker then turns to the certainty of adherence which, in contrast to evidential 
certainty, represents goodness apprehended and desired, offering an affective logic in which 
faith subjectively assures the believer. In the second kind of certainty, faith trumps any other 
science because it directs both the intellect to truth and the will to goodness, both of which 
are co-identical with the intrinsic certainty of God: 
The other which wee call the certaintie of adherence is when the hart doth cleave and 
stick unto that which it doth beleeve. This certaintie is greater in us then the other. 
The reason is this: the fayth of a Christian man doth apprehend the wordes of the law, 
the promises of god, not only as true but also as good, and therefore even then when 
the evidence which he hath of the trueth is so small that it greaveth him to feele his 
weaknes in assenting thereunto, yeat there is in him such a sure adherence unto that 
which he doth but faintly and fearfully beleeve that his spirit having once truly tasted 
the heavenly sweetnes thereof all the worlde is not able quite and cleane to remove 
him from it but he striveth with him selfe to hope even against hope to beleeve even 
against all reason of believing, being settled with Job upon this unmoveable 
resolution, thought god shall kill me I will not geve over trusting in him. For why? this 
lesson remayneth for ever imprinted in his hart, it is good for me to cleave unto 
God.333 
Faith fixes the believer upon God by reason of desire’s draw to cognized goodness under the 
habit of love even where the certitude of material evidence seems slim. For Hooker the 
visceral, loving experience of God’s ‘heavenly sweetnes’ induces belief, then, rather than 
rational calculation. While Voak changes ‘heart’ to ‘will’ and ‘apprehend’ to ‘assent’ in order 
to recast this passage simply as a confused and inchoate scholastic treatment of a rational 
phenomena,334 Shuger more appropriately insists that, unlike Aquinas in this regard, Hooker 
                                                          
332 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp. 245, 265. 
333 Hooker, Certaintie, in FLE, 5:70.31-71.15. 
334 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp. 70, 197-9, 244. 
192 
 
lends an emotional and sensuous dimension to adherence beyond merely rational 
movement.335 Indeed, for Hooker ‘desire’ writes in what Eric Jager calls the medieval 
tradition of the ‘book of the heart.’336 Here, the ‘heart’ connotes the ‘supreme symbol of the 
self’ rooted in scriptural images where the heart (Hebrew: lev, levav; Greek: kardia) refers 
moral beings to God as law and Christ as love, signifying the interior centre of a person as 
rational, emotional, volitional, and embodied. In short, for Hooker the heart means the whole 
person. Pace Shuger, however, the desires of the heart are not illogical. The logic of desire, 
as it aims at goodness, allows believers to cleave to God not simply against reason per se but 
against particular reasons which threaten belief, such as the pastorally vexing experiences of 
Habbukuk, Job, and (it can be assumed) the hearers of the sermon. Desire, springing from 
love received from God and returned, offers a visceral perception of (and motivation towards) 
God’s experienced goodness and grace, even amidst the sense of desolation or evidential 
doubt, and perhaps as a consequence of it. As such, the emotions offer a form of knowledge 
and understanding not simply available as a rational exercise. The affective certainty of 
adherence ought to be cultivated, then, in order to secure and build up the faith which 
promises union with God. 
 The central role Hooker affords to desire in faith finds its corollary in the Lawes as he 
considers the theological habits which shape Christian life under love. Hooker’s account of 
faith, hope, and love recalls that of Aquinas. For Aquinas, the initial moment of justification 
sees all three theological virtues infused as habits such that they sanctify the intellectual 
faculties to be able to enjoy supernatural cognitive participation in God.337 Whereas faith is 
primarily a habit of the intellect that illuminates the principles of theology, love and hope are 
habits of the will: the former causes the will also to seek friendship with God and desire the 
divine good; the latter causes the will to see participation in God as attainable. Like 
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Aquinas,338 then, Hooker unites the theological virtues of faith and love in order also to speak 
of ‘thaffection of faith’, noting ‘hir love to Godward [is] above the comprehension which she 
hath of God’.339 Faith here takes on the affective logic of desire alongside its intellectual habit 
of illumination. Again like Aquinas, Hooker argues that ‘the whole traine of vertues, which 
are implied in the name of Grace, [are] infused att one instant’, namely in the initial moment 
of justification leading to sanctification, logically beginning with faith.340 As with Aquinas, 
for Hooker the theological virtues (like all virtues) are habits that incline human beings 
towards perfection, in this case the supernatural cognitive ‘participation of God himselfe’.341 
For Hooker, just as faith moves the intellect to assent to the ‘promises of god’ as true, the 
theological virtue of love forms faith to direct human desire ‘Godward’ as it moves the will to 
the perfect good through intellectual apprehension of that good.342 This represents Hooker’s 
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formulation of the Thomistic idea of faith formed by love (fides formata caitate). Indeed, the 
end of love is ‘endlesse union with God’, which is to say that believers are made partakers of 
God, a perfection which Hooker (like Aquinas) primarily casts in intellectual terms as the 
endless vision of God, with love following this activity as an affective perfection which 
depends upon it.343 Far from opposing reason and desire, Hooker sees the two constellating 
categories of his cognitive ecology as commonly directing human beings to an intensive and 
supernatural cognitive participation in God, the first to the ratio of the true and the latter to 
the ratio of the good, both convertible with the divine nature. Desire is rational by 
participation in divine love, just as ‘the light of reason’ is rational insofar as the light of 
eternal law illumines it. 
 Hooker’s Lawes contains, of course, a pastoral parallel with Certaintie, namely the 
problem of doubt. The importance of cultivating desire for God re-emerges in Books Four 
and Five of the Lawes because Hooker seeks to redress how the puritans’ insistence on the 
singularity and omnicompetency of biblical law fills weak consciences ‘with infinite 
perplexities, scrupulosities, doubts insoluble, and extreme despaires’.344 In Books Four and 
Five, the way the puritans assert that the established forms of worship do not constitute a 
properly Reformed means of liturgical edification gives an example of how tender souls may 
be left vexed within the Elizabethan Religious Settlement. Hooker returns to desire in order 
to craft the sense in which the liturgical practices of the Elizabethan Book of Common Prayer 
are indeed fit and convenient to edify and produce holiness. Just as a vast array of 
participatory laws shape life together under eternal law, the established form of worship for 
Hooker creatively unites the earthly with the heavenly as an emotional community in order to 
manuduct ‘holie desires’ towards God through a regime of shared material, affective, and 
intellectual practices shaped by participation in God’s love. The following section expands 
how, then, how Hooker envisages the liturgical recreation of the essential logic of desire, 
reclaiming the emotions as central to Christian life and participation in God. 
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3.4.3 ‘His heavenly inspirations and our holie desires’: the theurgic manuduction of desire 
 Hooker responds in the Lawes to the critics of established worship by offering a 
robust apology for ‘the publique duties of Christian religion’.345 In Book Four, Hooker 
refuses to capitulate to the puritans’ demand that ceremonies which display Catholic liturgical 
sensibilities simply be abandoned wholesale: what edifies should remain in use. He then turns 
in Book Five to the varied practices of the Book of Common Prayer in order to show their 
edifying potential. The central concern therefore of Books Four and Five, easily concealed by 
the vast panoply of liturgical issues surveyed, turns on what constitutes the proper means of 
liturgical edification.346 Hooker aims to counter the biblical singularity and perfectionism of 
his puritan opponents who insist that the Word alone edifies the inner self and that all forms 
of outer worship ought to be directly sanctioned by Scripture. As an alternative vision, he 
turns to how a participatory tapestry of natural, social, rational, and emotional threads 
rehabilitates the logic of desire in worship, linking our physical, emotional, intellectual, 
social, and spiritual practices and selves with the knowledge and love of God. If Book One 
extracts an essential logic of desire extensively suspended from divine goodness, then Books 
Four and Five unpack how the ‘elements, parts or principles’ of worship manuduct or lead 
‘holie desires’ by the hand in response to God’s ‘heavenly inspiration’, creating an intensive 
and affective journey of return towards participatory (re)union with the Creator. As with his 
ontology, Hooker here holds together two Christian Platonisms, namely Augustinian 
immediacy and Dionysian mediation. Along with Reformed traditions, Hooker holds that the 
incarnate Christ immediately establishes the union between the soul and God by grace alone 
in forensic justification. As such, descending ‘heavenly inspirations’ emphasise the 
pedagogical character of God who immediately reforms the inner cognitive life and desires of 
the believer through the doctrinal gift of divine, saving knowledge, cleaved to as true and 
good within the believer through faith. Yet, sanctification unfurls by steps and degrees as an 
intrinsic reality in the life of the believer through a series of participatory mediations which 
yield ascending ‘holie desires,’ the ‘habituall and reall infusion’ of grace.347 As a psychic 
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motor for natural and supernatural cognitive participation in God, intrinsic desires are drawn 
out and reformed through communal, liturgical, and sacramental activities, binding the 
hierarchies of angelic and ecclesiastical orders to the divine ratio convertible with the true, 
the good, and the beautiful, the final of which transcendental qualities expresses the attraction 
of love towards God’s perfect and perfecting being.348 Hooker’s account of edification holds 
together these Augustinian and Dionysian moments in a Chalcedonian paradigm: the inner 
life of the heart and the outer form of worship are united through a ‘communication of 
attributes’ but never simply conflated.349 
 At the beginning of Book Four, Hooker gives an account of edification which shapes 
all of his subsequent claims. There, he argues that the purpose of religious ceremonies is to 
edify the Church through inculcating appropriate intellectual and affective forms of 
cognition: 
Now men are edified, when either their understanding is taught somewhat whereof in 
such actions it behoveth all men to consider, or when their harts are moved with 
suitable affection therunto, when their minds are in any sorte stirred up unto that 
reverence, devotion, attention and due regard, which in those cases semeth requisite. 
Because therfore unto this purpose not only speech but sundry sensible meanes besids 
have alwaies bene thought necessary, and especially those meanes which being object 
to the eye, the liveliest and the most apprehensive sense of all other, have in respect 
seemed the fittest to make a deepe and strong impression.350 
For Hooker, outward religious acts can stir the inner intellectual and emotional life of the 
mind and heart through a series of ritualised correspondences which inculcate sanctifying 
habits. Hooker casts this capacity in thoroughly Dionysian terms whereby symbol and ritual 
bring the believer towards deified union with God. For Pseudo-Dionysius ‘in the realm of 
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intellect…it is love of God which first moves us towards the divine’ and ‘divinization’.351 
Hooker therefore recapitulates a Dionysian theology of sign and edification in Book Five: the 
‘sensible excellence’ of ceremonies creates ‘celestial impressions in the mindes of men’ and 
conforms ‘our wills and desires’to God’s excellence through shared practices which build up 
faith and love.352 ‘That which inwardlie each man should be,’ Hooker writes, ‘the Church 
outwardlie ought to testify.’ Similarly, in the passage at hand from Book Four, ceremonies 
respond to the Aristotelian dilemma of representation addressed in Certaintie: ‘sensible 
meanes’ in worship vividly represent the otherwise ineffable greatest object in order to move 
the affections to a form of knowing and loving that same object, namely God. Hooker 
therefore quotes Pseudo-Dionysius in order to explain how the material practices of worship 
mediate the supernatural cognitive participation of God: ‘the sensible things which Religion 
hath hallowed, are resemblances framed according to things spiritually understood, 
whereunto they serve as a hand to lead and a way to direct.’353 As Shuger points out, Hooker 
here also stands in the Renaissance grand style where the imagination arouses the emotions in 
order to allow the self to respond to God’s love, in this case through worship.354 Peter Lake 
puts Hooker’s account in stronger terms: ‘this was little short of the reclamation of the whole 
realm of symbolic action and ritual practice from the status of popish superstition to that of a 
necessary, indeed essential, means of communication and edification.’355 In worship, then, 
reason and emotions alike are reformed and moved such that the believer may share in the 
‘eternall affection of love’ found in the Trinity.356 As such, Hooker sees both as essential for 
human cognitive flourishing coram Deo. Indeed, as worship rehabilitates the logic of desire 
through an emotional regime of shared intellectual and affective practices, it forms a remedial 
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gift which, like grace, helps our ‘imbecillitie and weakness’ by referring the ‘affection of 
harte’ to God.357 
 As the site of Dionysian mediation, the Church becomes a creative repository of 
spiritual illumination and a training school for the virtuous habits of ‘holie desires’ recreated 
by divine influence. Hooker casts the Church as a both a ‘visible mysticall bodie’ and as a 
‘societie supernaturall’.358 Shuger labels the latter as an ‘imagined community’359 populated 
by ‘God, Angels, and holie men’,360 suspending the horizontal, visible Church from a 
vertical, heavenly communion. Outward worship binds natural and supernatural communities 
together and refers them to God through what Anna Wierzbicka calls an ‘emotional script’, 
meaning the verbal and non-verbal expressions that shape how and what to feel as well as 
know about the self, others, and (in Hooker’s case) God.361 In earlier parts of the Lawes, 
Hooker proleptically notes a Dionysian resemblance between celestial orders, angelic desires, 
and the heavenly vision of God with the solemn outward worship of the Church. As the 
previous chapter showed (2.2.3), in Book One the angelic vision of God has a markedly 
affective character which sets the tone of earthly worship and renders participation in God as 
a supernaturally social phenomenon. Through imitation of God’s goodness, the angels form a 
generous ‘societie or fellowship with men’, acting as a ‘paterne and a spurre’ to human 
desires bonded with theirs as a community of cognitive participants in God.362 In Book Five, 
public liturgy therefore extends angelic ministration and reflects heavenly devotion 
characterised by the common desire to share in God’s truth and goodness. Accordingly, 
Hooker images doctrine and prayer as an exchange between humanity and God mediated, at 
least in similitude, by angels: 
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Betwene the throne of God in heaven  and his Church upon earth here militant if it be 
so that Angels have theire continuall intercourse, where should we finde the same 
more verified then in these two ghostlie exercises, the one ‘Doctrine,’ and other 
‘Prayer’? For what is thassemblie of the Church to learne, but the receiving of Angels 
descended from above? What to pray, but the sendinge of Angels upward? His 
heavenly inspirations and our holie desires are as so many Angels of entercorse and 
comerce betwene God and us. As teaching bringeth us to know that God is our 
supreme truth; so prayer testifieth that we acknowledge him our soveraigne good.363 
The double angelic motion of doctrine and prayer orients the believer to God as the 
transcendental source of ‘supreme truth’ and ‘soveraigne good’, and so abducts the believer 
to God as the transcendent end of both rational intellect and affective desire. Reason and 
emotion accordingly form part of the same script which orders all understanding to cognitive 
participation in God. 
 Hooker turns to the seductive quality of beauty in order to link the true with the good 
in the theurgic recreation of the logic of desire, reclaiming the emotions as central to knowing 
and loving God. Here, the inventive capacity of the liturgy as a form of work uniting heaven 
and earth places the Church as an emotional community which co-creatively shapes desire 
alongside God. The public duties of religion are best ordered when ‘the militant Church doth 
resemble by sensible meanes…that hidden dignitie and glorie wherewith the church 
triumphant in heaven is bewtified’.364 Churches should visibly evoke a sense of God’s 
attractive beauty, a ‘sensible help to stirre up devotion’, and reflect ‘cherefull affection’ for 
God.365 They form a space which allows for ‘mutuall conference and as it were commerce to 
be had betwene God and us’.366 Worship becomes a sensorium in which the human body and 
mind becomes oriented to God through the double angelic motion of doctrine and prayer. 
Sermons become ‘keyes to the kingdom of heaven, as winges to the soule, as spurres to the 
good affections of man, unto the sound and healthie as food, as phisicke unto diseased 
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minds’.367 In turn, prayers represent ‘most gracious and sweet odors; those rich presentes and 
guiftes which being carryed up into heaven doe best testifie our dutifull affection’.368 Prayer 
for earthly things engages with ‘hartie affection and zeale’ the natural love for immediately 
desirable objects, an affective motion ‘more easily raysed higher’ to supernatural love for 
God as most desirable.369 In public prayer, ‘the alacrity and fervour of others’ serves as a spur 
to zeal in everyone else.370 Likewise, the fervour of the minister remains vital to inspire the 
faithful or how otherwise could they experience anything but ‘frosen couldnes, when his 
affections seeme benummed from whom theires should take fire?’371 Visible signs deliver a 
‘strong impression’ of eternal truths, while music expresses ‘the turns and varieties of all 
passions’ and can move and moderate the affections and delight the mind. 372 Mimetic manual 
acts such as making the sign of the cross or kneeling shape appropriate physical passions and 
engender, as silent teachers, right affections.373  Festivals produce a joyful concurrence of 
earthly cycles with celestial motions, inspiring hearty praise, charitable bounty, and physical 
rest in light of God’s goodness.374 Although worship is not meritorious in a salvific sense, 
outwards acts of public rituals have a real relationship with the inward sanctification of the 
heart and so are of significant benefit to believers. Sensible ceremonies ‘testify’ to the truth, 
‘signify’ spiritual realities, ‘betoken’ the exemplary goodness of God, ‘set forward 
godliness,’ and abduct the believer ‘Godward’. In all of these cases, the emotions further 
rather than hinder the edification of the believer: an imaginative correspondence between the 
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outer habits of worship and the inner habit of faith binds together higher and lower faculties 
in worship as they are seduced by the ‘bewtie of holines’.375 
The relation that inheres between desire and beauty in the attraction of love also 
places Hooker’s thought, then, within Renaissance philosophical retrievals of Platonic 
theories where love as a desire for the beautiful moves the mind to a state of self-
transcendence in which the knower also becomes the lover of wisdom and love leads to a 
union of the mind with the beloved object.376 For Hooker, being a lover entails a form of 
cognitive participation in God which means an erotic union with Christ as beloved source and 
end through the motion of desire under the attraction of beauty. The double motion of 
doctrine and prayer forms ‘the act correlative to God’s disclosure of the truth’ in Christ’s 
incarnation.377 As such, the Dionysian mediation of desire through sensible means both 
prepares for and also assumes the Augustinian immediacy of Christ received in the 
sacraments. The logic of desire, rehabilitated through the ‘elements partes or principles’ of 
outward worship, prepares the believer to experience as well as know ‘the union of the soul 
with God’ directly through Christ. As the previous chapter showed (2.3.2), participation in 
Christ is erotic and reciprocal, a ‘mysticall copulation’ between the believer and Christ. 
Eucharistic reception sees sensible means dissolve into the immediacy of erotic union as 
desire yields to joy in a consummated motion of love or charity: through the eucharistic 
species, believers imaginatively share in the physical passion of Christ through touch, taste, 
and sight, affectively resting not in pain but in the enflamed joy of union, cleaving to ‘that 
incomprehensible bewtie which shineth in the countenance of Christ’.378 Yet, the logic of 
desire depends upon Christ not only to elicit the movement towards loving union with the 
‘bewtie of holiness’ but also to undergird its own integrity: public worship ‘deals with the 
whole of that humanity assumed by Christ’, as Rowan Williams phrases it, which naturally 
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includes the passions, affections, will, imagination, and reason.379 Public worship recreates 
the logic of desire, then, because it takes it (alongside reason) already to be a divine gift, part 
and parcel of that which Christ and grace assumes in order to transform human nature and 
erotically unite it with God as beloved. 
As the two constellating categories in Hooker’s cognitive ecology, then, reason and 
desire cut through both hypo- and hyper-rationalist readings as well as the supposed 
dichotomy between rationality and the emotions. Hooker’s account of natural and 
supernatural cognitive participation in God challenges what Charles Taylor calls ‘two 
connected illusions’ in the modern ‘myth’ of ‘disengaged’ scientific reason.380 First, for 
Hooker there is no created reserve of autonomy, even in the operations of reason, for all of 
creation remains suspended from the eternal law in which it theonomously participates. Even 
in its own integrity, reason exists as a kind of divine revelation which God’s remedial 
revelation in the Word does not disturb but rather restores and elevates. Second, for Hooker 
reason cannot be disengaged from culturally embedded practices and affective forms of 
making meaning, but rather has rational continuity with them in the pursuit of truth, 
goodness, and beauty, found in exemplary fashion in God. In both constellating categories, 
cognitive participation in God does not evacuate the natural actions of reason and desire of 
any substance; it is not simply heteronomous. Rather, it abducts human nature to become co-
creative analogues of God’s own creativity, makers of meaning in rational discourse and 
theurgy. The final section considers how, once again, Christ forms the key who unlocks this 
participatory relationship between nature and grace (or mediation and immediacy) in 
cognition. 
3.5 ‘That unemptiable fountaine of wisdom’: Christ as the key to participated wisdom 
The previous chapter (2.4.2) showed how Christ as ‘woord or Wisdom’ unlocks the 
textures of nature and grace in Hooker’s ontology. The idea of participation in Christ as 
‘woord or Wisdom’ continues in Books Two through Five of the Lawes as the ‘general’ 
architectural principle which informs the shape of Hooker’s polemical response over more 
‘particular’ epistemological points of controversy. Christ immediately unites and unlocks 
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reason and desire as participatory mediations of cognitive participation in God. As he begins 
his polemical defence in Book Two of the Lawes, Hooker crucially returns to the scriptural 
figure of divine Wisdom in order to address the origin and manner of human knowing. 
Hooker uses Thomas Cartwright’s ‘pretended proofe’ from Proverbs 2.9 for biblical 
omnicompetency to show, on the contrary, the ‘sundry’ divine influences on human 
understanding: 
To teach men therfore wisedome professeth, and to teach them every good way: but 
not every good way by one way of teaching. Whatsoever either men on earth, or the 
Angels of heaven do know, it is as a drop of that unemptiable fountaine of wisdom, 
which wisdom hath diversly imparted her treasures unto the world. As her waies are 
of sundry kinds, so her maner of teaching is not meerely one and the same. Some 
things she openeth by the sacred books of Scripture; some things by the glorious 
works of nature: with some things she inspireth them from above by spirituall 
influence, is some thinges she leadeth and trayneth them onely by worldly experience 
and practise. We may not so in any one special kind admire her that we disgrace her 
in any other, but let all her ways be according unto their place and degree adored.381 
As with Hooker’s ontology, the transformative patterns of divine influence set both natural 
capacities (the ‘glorious works of nature’) and revealed theology (‘the sacred books of 
Scripture’) as discrete but consonant epistemic participations commonly united in the ratio of 
eternal Wisdom. Indeed, alongside ‘the sacred books of Scripture’, human nature inherently 
discloses the ‘sundry’ causal influences of divine Wisdom, and together they lead human 
beings to the extensive and intensive ‘participation of God himselfe’. For Hooker, then, 
Christ (as ‘woord or Wisdom’) acts as the principium who informs reason, Scripture, and 
desire alike as first and final cause. 
 Hooker tantalisingly identifies Christ with the form and end of reason. In Book Three, 
Hooker returns to the Neoplatonic and biblical image of the ‘fountain’ in order to cast the 
manifold variety of human wisdom evident in Moses, Daniel, Solomon, and Paul as 
participatory mediations of God’s ‘principall truth’ or Logos, who ‘being that light which 
none can approach unto, hath sent out these lights whereof we are are capable, even as so 
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many sparkls resembling the bright fountain from which they rise’.382 Since the law of reason 
and divine law are suspended from eternal law, God extensively authors both the light and 
word of scripture and also that of reason, rendering both as complementary participants in the 
eternal light of Christ, namely the Word from John’s Prologue: ‘He is the author of all that 
we thinke or doe by vertue of that light, which him selfe hath given.’383 In supernatural 
cognitive participation, faith as an intellectual habit has as its final object the ‘eternal veritie 
which hath discovered the treasures of hidden wisedome in Christ’.384 As such, Christ as 
Word ‘inspireth’ the form of reason, and reason finds its beatitude in the return to Christ as 
Wisdom. Mediation begins in and yields to the immediacy of Christ. 
 As Egil Grislis points out, Hooker also gives a Christocentric shape to Scripture and 
scriptural exegesis.385 While the Old and New Testaments both make believers ‘wise unto 
salvation’, they do so in a different regard: ‘the difference betwene them consisting in this, 
that the old did make wise by teaching salvation through Christ that should come, the newe 
by teaching that Christ our Saviour is come.’386 Hooker can therefore distinguish between 
central and peripheral ideas in Scripture, rather than give all texts an equal weighting, but still 
see them as united in their relation to Christ as the saving ‘woord or Wisdom’. He can also 
give an instrumental role to natural and supernaturally endowed reason in reading the 
scriptures since, as already shown, Christ exists as a constituting influence within the form of 
reason itself. The word of reason and the word of Scripture examine and conform to one 
another through the eternal Word who yokes them together as mirrors of divine love. Indeed, 
Scripture abducts all kinds of wisdom into its Christocentric message: ‘everie booke of holie 
scripture doth take out of all kinds of truth, naturall, historicall, forreine, supernaturall, so 
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much as the matter handled requireth.’387 For Hooker, therefore, the puritans ‘restraine the 
manifold ways which wisdom hath to teach men by, unto one only way of teaching, which is 
by scripture’.388 Hooker has an alternative, generous vision: ‘the boundes of wisedome are 
large’ and the ‘school of nature’ mediates divine wisdom within created forms just as 
Scripture publishes the way of salvation; but both are immediately united in Christ as the font 
of wisdom. 
 Finally, Christ exemplifies human affectivity in relation to divine love, as well as 
being the transcendental draw for reason and desire to participate cognitively in God. In Book 
Five, Hooker considers Christ’s prayer in the garden of Gethsamene before his passion and 
distinguishes between two voluntary desires, ‘the one avoyding, and the other accepting 
death’.389 The former desire was a natural (and so not sinful) ‘effect’ of the wish to avoid 
death, even when God has ordained it: ‘the presence of dolorous and dreadfull objects even in 
mindes most perfect, may as cloudes overcast all sensible joy’. The latter desire was an 
‘affection’ drawn to God’s will: ‘mercie worketh in Christ all willingness of minde’ to share 
in and act upon God’s goodness in order ‘to procure the salvation of the world’. As Barry 
Rasmussen insightfully writes, as Hooker considers human prayer and desire in relation to 
Christ’s prayer and suffering, ‘the determining factor is not a simple alignment of the human 
will with the divine but is an examination of the context of human desire and will set by the 
gracious action of God in Christ.’390 As such, Christ models the reformed logic of desire: 
God’s love gives birth to an affection that orients human identity to cleave to God’s 
goodness, even amidst ‘present conflicts’. More broadly, then, while the theurgic 
manuduction of desire in worship takes the form of mediatory sensible acts, Christ 
immediately sits behind such mediation in order to transform believers, leading and training 
                                                          
387 Hooker, Lawes, 1:127.24-27; I.14.3. 
388 Hooker, Lawes, 1:147.3-11; II.1.4. 
389 Hooker, Lawes, 2:197.9-199.23; V.48.10-11. Compare Aquinas, ST, III.18.2-5 who 
distinguishes three types of willing in Christ: the will of sensuality, the will-as-nature, and the 
will-as-reason. For Aquinas, in Gethsamene Christ’s will of sensuality ‘naturally shrinks 
from sensible pains’ and the will-as-nature ‘turns from what is against nature’ such as death. 
The will-as-reason, however, ‘may choose to will these things’ for particular ends, in this 
case for what God has willed. 
390 Rasmussen, ‘The Priority of God’s Gracious Action’, p. 9. 
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them as the ‘woord or Wisdom of God’ through intermediate ‘worldly experience and 
practise’. Indeed, the logic of desire shaped within worship draws liturgical communities to 
the participation of Christ in the sacraments, inviting them to share in the life of the Trinity. 
Indeed, ‘the bewtie of holines’ seduces desire so that believers may share in the Father as 
‘goodness’, in the Son as ‘wisdom’ ordering all things, and in the power of the Spirit as an 
end.391 
In conclusion, Hooker’s participatory metaphysics and epistemology display a certain 
systematic homology in which Christ unites and unlocks the relationship between natural 
capacities and divine influence. The systematic quality of Hooker’s epistemology stems from 
the assumption, equally present in patristic and medieval thought, that all that exists only 
exists insofar as it participates in divine wisdom (and so in God).392 While in modern thought 
the ideal subject is an isolated unit who interacts with the world through an autonomous and 
dispassionate rationality, Hooker’s pre-modern subject is ecstatic, that is to say is someone 
whom divine love forms from the outside and draws back to itself through Christ, whether in 
the enlightening of reason or in the abduction of desire.393 Unlike the later Enlightenment, 
Hooker’s sanguine appraisal of reason and the emotions celebrates not human autonomy but 
rather the beauty of divine wisdom ordering creation as a diminished image of God. Indeed, 
the end of both reason and desire is (re)union with beloved wisdom, namely God. Here, the 
architecture of participation undercuts notions of autonomy and heteronomy, both of which 
assume radical contrast between God and creation. Instead, creation is theonomously and 
non-contrastively suspended from God. Accordingly, ‘reason’ has a multivalent texture: it is 
an intellectual power natural to the human form, but also comes as a divine gift that 
participates in God’s rational nature as a diminished similitude. Sin corrupts the ability, but 
not the aptness, of this intellectual gift. Grace supplies the want and need of natural reason as 
a further, remedial, complementary gift. Similarly, the ‘emotions’ (or rather Hooker’s pre-
modern analogues of passions and affections) are also multivalent: they are part of the formal 
giftedness of human nature and are essential for human flourishing; but, the disorder wrought 
by sin requires remedial grace, which (through the habitual, embodied practices of worship) 
                                                          
391 Hooker, Lawes, 2:237.10-13; V.56.5. 
392 See Williams, The Divine Sense, pp. 3-4. 
393 See Julia Kristerva, Tales of Love (New York: Colombia University Press, 1987), 
pp. 137-188. 
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reorders and trains the emotions towards participation of God’s nature. The logic of desire 
circumscribes both the intellect and the emotions, placing them together on a rational 
continuum of holy desires oriented to participation in, and union with, God. Hooker holds 
reason and the emotions together within what Béata Tóth calls a ‘traditional logic of Christian 
affectivity’ where ‘affectivity and reason, love and logos coincide and, without losing their 
distinctive identities, interact in multiple mediations’.394 Divine rationality drenches, then, 
both the material and immaterial aspects and powers of created forms such that desire 
variously draws them in non-cognitive and cognitive ways alike towards goodness. Far from 
the model of an incorporeal autonomy or evacuated heteronomy, cognitive participation 
becomes theonomous, suspended from God, warm, hearty, affective, and embodied within 
the legal, participatory order of desire. 
                                                          
394 Béata Tóth, The Heart Has Its Reasons: Towards a Theological Anthropology of 
the Heart (Cascade, 2016), p. xi. 
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4. ‘Politique societie’: the politics of participation 
4.1 Introduction 
In the last three so-called ‘books of power’ in the Lawes, Hooker finally defends 
episcopal orders and lay ecclesiastical supremacy against their detractors, a closing 
movement from the ‘general meditations’ of earlier books to the disputed ‘particular 
decisions’ of the Tudor polity. Here, Hooker generates a celestial fusion of politics with 
metaphysics and epistemology: just as the ‘statelinesse of houses’ and the ‘goodliness of 
trees’ depend upon a hidden ‘foundation’ or ‘root,’ his defence of the established church and 
commonwealth springs from the architecture of participation.1 Indeed, the architecture of 
participation developed in his metaphysics and epistemology yields the substructure upon 
which Hooker constructs his political ecclesiology. While W.J.T. Kirby and Charles Miller 
designate Hooker’s tendency to ground authority in theological foundations as a form of 
‘political theology’,2 the proper label might rather be ‘politicised metaphysics’ since the 
architecture of participation centrally engenders, limits, and exceeds political discourse, 
making it provisional in relation to the divine source of power.3 Four features from the 
architecture of participation generate a kind of ‘grammar of participation’ that proves 
crucially important in this endeavour, uniting Aristotelian-Thomistic ideas with tenets of 
Reformed orthodoxy that distinguished between the invisible and visible regiments, or the 
inner and external fora.4 First, as Kirby argues, out of his legal ontology, Hooker uses the 
twin Platonisms of Augustinian immediacy and Dionysian mediation to distinguish between 
(but also causally connect) divine and secular authority: ultimate power remains the 
immediate hypostatic preserve of invisible divinity, but the twin hierarchs of bishops (as 
‘angels among men’ and ‘Image of God’) and the monarch (as ‘God’s lievtenant’ and 
‘highest uncommanded Commander’) dispositively mediate power as diminished, public, 
                                                          
1 Hooker, Lawes, 1:57.6-16; I.1.2. 
2 Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy, pp. 1-4. See also Miller, 
Richard Hooker and the Vision of God, pp. 251-253. 
3 Compare Stephen Collins, From Divine Cosmos to Sovereign State: An Intellectual 
History of Consciousness and the Idea of Order in Renaissance England (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), p. 103. 
4 I take the phrase ‘grammar of participation’ from Candler, Theology, Rhetoric, 
Manuduction, pp. 21-51. 
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participatory analogues of God’s ratio.5 Second, as Kirby elsewhere notes, Hooker uses the 
Chalcedonian logic of Christ’s hypostatic union in order to distinguish between but also 
connect the unseen ‘mystical’ and ‘visible Church’, as well as the Church and 
Commonwealth as a ‘politique societie’, just as Christ’s two natures are distinct but also 
inseparably united.6 Third, adding to Kirby’s insights, the architecture of participation also 
contains a scholastic account of causality typical of reformed orthodoxy in which every 
separation nevertheless remains a link: secondary causes (whether human acts in general, the 
‘light of reason’, or political acts) receive divine approval insofar as they are undergirded by 
God as First Cause. Fourth, from Hooker’s logic of desire, the twin hierarchs of bishop and 
monarch guide right political desires since ‘true religion is the roote of all true virtues and the 
stay of all well ordered common-wealthes’.7 This chapter accordingly explores how these 
four grammatical aspects of Hooker’s architecture of participation structure and govern what 
he has to say about ecclesial and political order. 
Yet, as the first chapter of this work showed (1.3.2), Hooker’s ‘books of power’ face 
numerous challenges over their coherency. Some scholars accuse Hooker of abandoning an 
earlier rational outlook in favour of an irrational voluntarism in the later ‘books of power’ 
where lay ecclesiastical supremacy receives authority de jure divino. Indeed, writers such as 
Peter Munz and H.F. Kearney see Hooker as incoherently abandoning his earlier Thomistic, 
rational conception of law in favour of a Marsilian, voluntaristic, and positivistic justification 
of the civil magistrate’s authority.8 The argument takes the following heuristic shape. First, 
Hooker erects a Thomistic edifice in Book One whereby all laws dispositively participate in 
eternal law. Laws inherently govern creation and share in the providential ratio of God’s own 
                                                          
5 Kirby, ‘“Law Makes the King”: Richard Hooker on Law and Princely Rule’, pp. 
274-88. See also W.J.T. Kirby, ‘From “General Mediations” to “Particular Decisions”: The 
Augustinian Coherence of Richard Hooker’s Political Theology’, in Sovereignty and Law in 
the Middle Ages and Renaissance, ed. R. Sturges (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2011), pp. 
41-63. 
6 Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy, pp. 51-52, 74-79. See 
also Kirby, Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist, pp. 79-96. 
7 Hooker, Lawes, 2:16.1-2; V.1.1. 
8 See Munz, The Place of Hooker in the History of Thought, esp. pp. 49-57; and 
Kearney, ‘Richard Hooker: A Reconstruction’, pp. 300-11. 
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self-diffusive being. Participation in eternal law includes the positive human laws which 
establish the Tudor lay ecclesiastical supremacy through Parliament and Convocation. The 
Dionysian lex divinitatis remains a corollary of these Thomistic first principles, however, and 
this law of divine power typically subordinates temporal powers to the spiritual, much as 
grace supervenes over nature. Therefore, when Hooker explicitly turns in the final books 
towards an apologia for the Erastian Tudor constitution, his Thomistic foundations crumble 
and a ramshackle Marsilian edifice emerges from the rubble. Indeed, for Munz, Hooker has 
to buttress the historical contingencies of the Tudor Reformation that his speculative Thomist 
foundations cannot bear with ‘diametrically opposed’ ideas from Marsilius of Padua.9 In the 
‘books of power’, the will of the crown becomes law and the monarch properly controls the 
governance of the national church by ‘divine right’ in lay ecclesiastical supremacy. Thomistic 
rationalism gives way to what Munz labels ‘Tudor Averroism’, a political modality in which 
politics functions as an autonomous secular realm.10 
Other scholars such as Rory Fox argue that ‘Hooker’s ecclesiastical polity is muddled, 
incomplete, and quite simply incoherent’. 11 This claim of incoherency in relation to 
episcopacy takes the following heuristic shape. In Book Three, Hooker argues against any 
                                                          
9 Munz, The Place of Hooker in the History of Thought, p. 101. 
10 Compare W.D.J. Cargill Thompson, ‘“The Philosopher of the “Politic Society”,’ 
pp. 139-140 who argues that, while Hooker at ‘no point comes close to suggesting that the 
State is a purely secular institution’, he cannot ‘be acquitted of the charge of subordinating 
his political ideas to the immediate needs of the controversy’. Also compare Robert 
Eccleshall, ‘Richard Hooker and the Peculiarities of the English’, History of Political 
Thought, 2 (1981), 63-117 who says that Hooker only provides ‘window dressing for the 
command structure of Elizabethan society’. 
11 Fox, ‘Richard Hooker and the Incoherence of the Ecclesiastical Polity’, p. 57. 
There has been exegetical disagreement over the authenticity of the ‘books of power’ given 
their sometimes incomplete state, posthumous publication, and later aspersions over the 
corruption of Hooker’s manuscripts. This work concurs with the judgement of A.S. McGrade 
and P.G. Stanwood that textual reasons for the authenticity of the ‘books of power’ remain 
compelling. See McGrade, ‘The Coherence of Hooker’s Polity’, pp. 164-165; and P.G. 
Stanwood, ‘Works and Editions I’, in A Companion to Richard Hooker, ed. W.J.T. Kirby 
(Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 27-39. 
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prescriptive and unalterable order of church governance derivable from Scripture and 
therefore possessing divine warrant. Thus, while ‘the necessitie of politie and regiment in all 
Churches may be helde…sundrie [forms] may equally be consonant unto the general axioms 
of the Scripture’.12 In Book Seven, however, he claims that bishops are apostolic and thus 
divinely ordained, a strong (if not irreconcilable) contrast with the earlier position.13 Indeed, 
the office of bishops is ‘truely derived from God, and approved of him’, and the bishop, like 
the king, acts as a hierarchic analogue, ‘the Image of God and of Christ.’14 Even a sanguine 
defender of Hooker like W. Speed Hill admits that, faced with the historical emergence of 
jure divino accounts of the episcopacy with Bancroft, Bilson, and Saravia, Hooker simply 
gives ground and struggles to make it cohere with his earlier moderate position.15 
Furthermore, Hooker’s allegedly jure divino defence of episcopacy poses an insurmountable 
and unacceptable constraint upon the authority of the civil magistrate in the Tudor Royal 
Supremacy: if episcopal orders are indeed permanently binding and divine, the monarch 
would not have untrammelled powers over church governance after all. Similarly, if Hooker 
calls upon puritan dissenters to obey the superior authority of the English bishops as those 
who protect peace and unity, then so too (logically) should the English Church assent to the 
universal authority of the Catholic Church and the Pope as they sit in Council, again 
undercutting the claims for lay ecclesiastical supremacy. 
Both sets of accusations betray, however, the marked tendency from the twentieth 
century onwards to read Hooker’s political vision without due attention to the systematic role 
of the architecture of participation and in isolation from much else other than the Preface, 
Book One, and small sections of Book Three.16 Indeed, as A.S. McGrade points out, scholars 
                                                          
12 Hooker, Lawes, 1:207.8-10; 1:208.7-8; III.2.1. 
13 For example, see F.J. Shirley, Richard Hooker and Contemporary Political Ideas 
(London: SPCK, 1949), p. 109. 
14 Hooker, Lawes, 3:210.4-211.16; 3:4.25-5.7; VII.11.9-10; VI.2.2. 
15 W. Speed Hill, ‘Hooker’s Polity. The problem of the “last three books”’, 
Huntingdon Library Quarterly, 24 (1971), 317-36. Compare M.R. Sommerville, ‘Richard 
Hooker and His Contemporaries on Episcopacy. An Elizabethan Consensus’, Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History, 35.2 (1984), 177-187 who argues against the exegetical ‘orthodoxy’ 
that Hooker’s claims about episcopacy are incoherent. 
16 See Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy, pp. 11-15. 
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should rather attempt to see each part of the Lawes as ‘presenting different parts of a total 
position, not as re-iterating (or failing to re-iterate) a position presented in its full essentials 
elsewhere in the work’. 17 Accordingly, Kirby notes that, excluding his own work, ‘no 
thorough, critical study of [the] theological dimension of the Royal Supremacy has been 
undertaken by a modern scholar.’18 The majority of modern studies of Hooker’s political 
thought instead eschew the theological framework which surrounds the royal supremacy and 
so elide or misread the systematic role of participation. 
This chapter therefore builds upon Kirby’s seminal work in showing how the 
architecture of participation informs the terms and limits of episcopacy and lay ecclesiastical 
supremacy. The fourfold ‘grammar of participation’ gestures towards coherency and system 
across the Lawes. Hooker’s coherency derives from his systematic application of the 
grammar of participation to specific ecclesiological and political ends. First, then, this chapter 
details how the grammar of Hooker’s architecture of participation allow him to parse the 
episcopal character of the Church as contingent and yet binding, undercutting the puritans’ 
insistence on the omnicompetency of Scripture as well as their denuding of the created 
participatory order (4.2). Second, this chapter then similarly explicates how the grammar of 
participation shapes Hooker’s account of lay ecclesiastical supremacy in the same ambivalent 
terms (4.3). Finally, this chapter concludes how Hooker’s participatory account of the 
ecclesiastical polity ultimately sees him return to the twin Platonisms seen in Book One, 
namely Augustinian immediacy and Dionysian mediation (4.4). Here, Hooker unites the 
sacred and the secular not in the Pope or the Church as a self-subsisting authority, but rather 
in the monarch. For Hooker, it is the monarch who visibly mediates the immediate dominion 
of Christ over Church and Commonwealth in a diminished, derivative, and subordinate 
manner. Throughout this chapter, the architecture of participation shows how, as well as 
being made in the imago dei, the human political agent is a homo faber, a fabricating animal 
whose public laws and figures are ‘instruments to work by’ and which are caught up in the 
providential work of God but also dependent upon it as their ultimate cause and fulfilment.19 
                                                          
17 McGrade, ‘The Coherence of Hooker’s Polity’, p. 164. 
18 Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy, p. 9. 
19 See A. Paddison & N. Messer (eds.), The Bible. Culture, Community, Society 
(London: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2013), pp. 219-222. 
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4.2 ‘A societie and a societie supernaturall’: the participatory grammar of the Church 
In Books Three and Seven Hooker defends the ecclesiology of the established Church 
of England, as well as the office of bishops within its life. In Book Three, Hooker addresses 
the radical puritans’ assertion that Scripture determines a normative and unalterable form of 
presbyterian polity. For Hooker, the claim of scriptural omnicompetency also contains a 
latent political threat: if only the Bible mandates the proper ecclesiastical polity, then the 
legal basis of the English Reformation, enacted through Parliament and Convocation, 
becomes heterodox. Indeed, the ‘implications of their logic would lead to the overthrow of 
the English legal and political system, in favour of a form of government and law based 
directly on the Bible’.20 In response, for Hooker the claim that the scriptures are 
omnicompetent disturbs a peaceable kingdom. Such biblicism deflates the whole 
participatory order in which rational human communities are free to determine their ecclesial 
polity within the bounds of the legal orders that participate in eternal law. Hooker’s 
ecclesiology therefore gestures back to the epistemology of Book Two, which in turn 
develops the metaphysical architecture of participation established in Book One. Indeed, his 
ecclesiology is the practical outworking of the theological commitment that the manifold 
legal, rational, and political acts of human communities, as they participate in eternal law, 
read divine wisdom into the world alongside divine law. The following sections unpack how 
the architecture of participation shapes Hooker’s ecclesiology (4.2.1) and account of 
episcopacy (4.2.2), as well as how its grammar deflates the accusations of incoherency. 
4.2.1 ‘Visible’ and ‘mysticall’: the dual aspect of the Church 
Participation serves a practical and polemical purpose in Hooker’s ecclesiology: it 
shapes the complex nature and telos of the Church, as well as its liturgical practices, in such a 
way as to mitigate against the radical puritan critique of the Elizabethan Settlement.21 For 
Hooker, the end of the Church is participation in and union with Christ as its constitutive 
Head. The Pauline image Hooker unsurprisingly adopts to describe the Church is the ‘Body 
of Christ’, and he parses that body in the dual terms of ‘visible’ and ‘mysticall’. While many 
                                                          
20 See Alexander S. Rosenthal, Crown under Law: Richard Hooker, John Locke, and 
the Ascent of Modern Constitutionalism (Lexington Books, 2008), pp.15-16. 
21 See William H. Harrison, ‘The Church’, in A Companion to Richard Hooker, ed. 
W.J.T. Kirby (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 305-336 (pp. 305-306). 
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scholars argue that Hooker intends to ‘conflate’ these two aspects so that ‘the invisible 
mystical church essentially becomes one with the visible’, the contrary reading remains more 
accurate.22 In his ecclesiology, Hooker upholds Calvin’s twofold distinction23 between the 
forum conscientiae (the inner forum of conscience) and the forum externum (the external 
forum of politics), as well as Luther’s idea of two regiments24 (the geistliches and weltliches 
Reich, or the spiritual and the temporal). Hooker parses the dual aspect of the Church through 
the grammar of the architecture of participation in order to maintain a separation but also a 
real relation between the visible and the mystical, the outer and the inner fora. As such, he 
takes his place among Protestant or Reformed scholastics of the period who carefully 
distinguished between inner and outer fora as well as emphasizing their final unity in the life 
of the faithful.25 He also undercuts the call of his puritan opponents for ‘further reformation’ 
along disciplinarian lines: for Hooker, ‘conformity was completely in tune with the substance 
of reformed doctrine.’26 
                                                          
22 See Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, p. 180. See also Harrison, ‘The Church’, pp. 
306-312; and W. David Neelands, ‘Richard Hooker on the Identity of the Visible and 
Invisible Church’ in Richard Hooker and the English Reformation, ed. W.J.T. Kirby 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), pp. 99-110 (p. 109). For an excellent 
rebuttal, see W. Bradford Littlejohn, Richard Hooker: A Companion to His Life and Work 
(Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2015), pp. 147-162. 
23 Calvin, Institutes, III.19.15; 1.847-849. See Bernard Bourdin, The Theological-
Political Origins of the Modern State (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2011), pp. 30-34. 
24 Martin Luther, Temporal Authority: to what extent it should be obeyed, in Selected 
Writings of Martin Luther, ed. G. Tappert, trans. J.J. Schindel, 4 vols. (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
2007), 2.281. For the consonance between Calvin and Luther, see Kirby, Richard Hooker's 
Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy, pp. 30-58. See also W. Bradford Littlejohn, ‘The 
Edification of the Church: Richard Hooker’s Theology of Worship and the Protestant 
Inward/Outward Disjunction’, Perichoresis, 12.1 (2014), 3-18. 
25 See W. Bradford Littlejohn, The Freedom of a Christian Nation (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2017), pp. 182-225. 
26 Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy, p. 67. 
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Hooker parses the dual nature of the Church through the first grammatical feature of 
the architecture of participation. At its core, for Hooker the dual aspect of the Church 
expresses the twin Platonisms (Dionysian mediation and Augustinian immediacy) originally 
found in the legal distinction between the first and second eternal law in particular. On the 
one hand, the Church mediates participation in Christ through the contingent, dispositive 
practices of the ‘visible’ political body of the institutional Church as it administers the 
dominical sacraments, reveals Christ’s saving work, and habituates sanctification. The 
contingent external practices and constitution of the Church, as they participate in God, 
unfurl the second eternal law into the world. On the other hand, the Church also represents 
the invisible ‘mysticall’ body ‘removed altogether from sense’ and known only to God, being 
immediately constituted by Christ’s salvific action and the saving grace he imputes to the 
inner soul of the believer.27 The first eternal law hypostatically contains this ‘mysticall’ body, 
hidden and unknowable. Hooker relates the ‘visible’ and ‘mysticall’ bodies through another 
grammatical aspect of the architecture of participatory: namely, the logic of Chalcedonian 
Christology, through which Hooker analogously describes how the two natures of the Church 
are not to be conflated or confused, but nevertheless are related in that the visible shares in, 
and ultimately enjoys union with, the mystical. As such, Hooker nestles ecclesiology within 
his soteriology, where imputed justification unites with imparted sanctification in final glory. 
Within such soteriological confines, the visible Church exists as an intermingled body of 
saints and sinners, or wheat and tares, until ‘the final consummation of the world’.28 Hooker 
therefore sacralises the temporality of the visible Church through its liturgical participation in 
Christ, but desacralizes it as penultimate to and dependent upon the mystical church. Through 
the grammar of participation, Hooker here undercuts his puritan opponents who, he thinks, 
confuse and conflate the visible and mystical aspects of the Church when they insist that 
Scripture determines a normative visible form of ecclesiastical polity, thereby sinking the 
invisible (inner, spiritual) into the visible (outer, temporal) sphere. Instead, Hooker refuses to 
transplant the perfection of the mystical Church onto the visible, but still retains a sense that 
the visible performance and polity of the established church remains suspended as a 
participatory body from God’s gracious influence, striving towards mystical fulfilment. The 
                                                          
27 Hooker, Lawes, 1:195.3; III.1.2. 
28 Hooker, Lawes, 1:199.4; III.1.8. 
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remainder of this section will flesh out these two grammatical aspects of Hooker’s 
ecclesiology. 
Hooker first turns to the nature of the Church in Book One and notes its dual aspect as 
both a visible political society and also an invisible supernatural society uniting heaven and 
earth, or what Deborah Shuger calls an ‘imagined community’.29 Using Aristotle’s doctrine, 
mediated through Aquinas, that human beings are political creatures by nature, Hooker 
writes: 
The Church being a supernaturall societie, doth differ from naturall societies in this, 
that the persons unto whom we associate our selves, in the one are men simplye 
considered as men, but they to whome wee be joyned in the other, are God, Angels, 
and holie men.  Againe the Church being both a societie and a societie supernaturall, 
although as it is a societie it have the selfe same original grounds from which other 
politique societies have, namely, the naturall inclination which all men have unto 
sociable life, and consent to some certaine bond of association, which bond is the 
lawe that appointeth what kinde of order they shall be associated in: yet unto the 
Church as it is a societie supernaturall this is peculiar, that part of the bond of their 
association which belong unto the Church of God, must be a lawe supernaturall, 
which God himself hath revealed concerning that kind of worship which his people 
shall do unto him.30 
The Church retains both a natural and a supernatural aspect nevertheless united in eternal 
law. The Church as a visible, natural society exists as a political body in time and history 
through the human positive laws it promulgates. Yet, the Church as a supernatural society 
suspends believers from a participatory communion with God, angels, and saints through 
supernatural law. The Church dynamically exists, then, under both earthly and heavenly 
aspects, between the footstool and throne of God, as an ecstatic participatory movement from 
becoming to being, from visible polity to invisible communion and union with God. As Kirby 
points out, at heart Hooker’s ecclesiology recapitulates Luther’s soteriological dictum that 
believers are simul justus et peccator, that is to say, they exist simultaneously in the imperfect 
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116-141. 
30 Hooker, Lawes, 1:131.6-20; I.15.2. Compare Aquinas, ST, I.96.4. 
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visible Church as well as in the perfect invisible Church.31 Hooker distinguishes the inner and 
outer fora, the supernatural and the political, but also unites them as they commonly 
participate God through Christ who is the source and end of law. As such, Bourdin adroitly 
notes that this passage ‘demonstrates that Hooker used his borrowings from Aristotelo-
Thomist philosophy to serve a reformed ecclesiology first and foremost’.32 
In Book Three, Hooker develops the dual aspect of the Church and, along reformed 
lines, carefully distinguishes between ‘that Church of Christ which we properly term his body 
mysticall’ and the ‘visible Church’.33 In order to trace out how the visible and mystical 
aspects of the Church relate to one another, Hooker implicitly turns in Book Three to the first 
and second features of the grammar of participation. On one hand, Hooker separates the 
visible from the mystical along lines that recall the twin Platonisms of Dionysian mediation 
and Augustinian immediacy found in the legal ontology of Book One. On the other hand, he 
also appeals to the Chalcedonian orthodoxy of Book Five in which the human and divine 
natures of Christ are distinct but also indivisibly co-inhere in his person.34 Hooker steers the 
way the mystical and visible aspects of the Church relate, moving ‘away from the prevalent 
fixation on predestination and the elect, and turns towards a Christological vision of the 
Church as a participatory body within which we can hope for the gradual sanctification of 
all’, as Christopher Insole puts it.35 Hooker notes that his puritan opponents seem to conflate 
                                                          
31 Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy, pp. 62, 66-74. 
32 Bourdin, The Theological-Political Origins of the Modern State, p. 32. 
33 Hooker, Lawes, 1:194.27-28; III.1.2. David Neelands, ‘Richard Hooker on the 
Identity of the Visible Church’, pp. 99-110 traces the distinction through Augustine as it 
gains prominence among Reformers and conciliarists. Although Hooker prefers ‘mystical’ to 
‘invisible’ he seems to treat them as synonyms, such as in Lawes, 2:339.3-6; V.67.11 when 
he writes of the sacraments that they ‘mysticallie yeat trulie, invisiblie yeat reallie worke our 
communion or fellowship with the person of Jesus Christ’.  
34 See Hooker, Lawes, 2:227.6; V.54.10, where he describes orthodox Christology as 
teaching that the hypostatic union can be condensed into four words: ‘truly, perfectly, 
indivisibly, distinctly.’ 
35 Christopher J. Insole, The Politics of Human Frailty. A Theological Defence of 
Political Liberalism (London: SCM, 2004), pp. 55-56. Indeed, Hooker does not seem to 
define the mystical Church in terms of predestination or the elect, terms which are more 
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the visible and mystical aspects of the Church, much like how heretics confused the human 
and divine natures of Christ. Speaking of how the puritans collapse matters of visible church 
order into internal matters of salvation, Hooker echoes Chalcedonian language when he 
writes how ‘the mixture of those thinges by speech which by nature are divided, is the mother 
of all error’, and then commends that ‘to take away therefore that error which confusion 
breedeth, distinction is requisite’.36 In Chalcedonian fashion, he first distinguishes between 
mystical and visible aspects, before turning to how they are united in certain regards. 
Throughout, Hooker takes pains to ensure his reformed orthodoxy, implying that the radical 
puritans are they who have abandoned the sound magisterial reformed distinction between 
Calvin’s two fora as well as between Luther’s two regiments.37 
For Hooker, the mystical Church refers to all whom God saves through the alien, 
external, and imputed righteousness of Christ and so contains God’s saving activity within 
the visible Church.38 This singular, mystical body expresses the divine aspect of the Church 
as the society of those who are saved across time, immediately through Christ as the esse of 
the invisible Church. It is hypostatically unknowable, having an invisible unifying principle 
much like the first eternal law, but ‘such a real body there is’.39 This definition fastidiously 
corresponds with Luther’s spiritual regiment and Calvin’s inner forum.40  
                                                          
readily referred to as the ‘invisible Church’ by Augustine, Aquinas, and the Magisterial 
Reformers. See William P. Haugaard, ‘Books II, III & IV’, in FLE, 6.1:172-173. 
36 Hooker, Lawes, 1:209.24-26; III.3.1. 
37 See Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy, pp. 79-91. See also 
W.J.T. Kirby, ‘The Paradigm of Chalcedonian Christology in Richard Hooker’s Discourse on 
Grace and the Church’, Churchman, 114.1 (2000), 22-39. 
38 See W. David Neelands, ‘Richard Hooker and the Debates about Predestination, 
1580-1600’, in Richard Hooker and the English Reformation, ed. W.J.T. Kirby (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), pp. 43-61; and Daniel Eppley, ‘Richard Hooker and the 
Un-conditionality of Predestination’, in Richard Hooker and the English Reformation, ed. 
W.J.T. Kirby (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), pp. 63-77. 
39 Hooker, Lawes, 1:194.33-195.1; III.1.2. 
40 Compare Calvin, Institutes, IV.1.7; 2.1021-1022; and Luther, Against the Roman 
Papacy, an Institution of the Devil, ed. J. Pelikan and H. Lehmann, trans. Eric Gritsch, in 
Works, vol. 41 (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), pp. 259-376. 
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The mystical Church cannot simply be identified, however, with the visible Church 
because the sole and immediate political principle of the mystical Church is Christ, rather 
than a mediatory and contingent temporal polity such as in the visible Church: 
So fare foorth as the Church is the mysticall body of Christ and his invisible spouse, it 
needeth no externall politie. That very part of the law divine which teacheth faith and 
workes of righteousness is itself alone sufficient for the Church of God in that 
respect.41  
Just as Christ immediately forms the polity of the mystical Church, the only regulative law of 
that mystical Church is justification by faith; again, here Hooker remains committed to a key 
reformed theological tenet. Hooker appeals to the language of participation to describe the 
relationship of the mystical Church and Christ: there is an asymmetrical ‘inherent copulation’ 
and ‘mystical conjunction’ between the two such that the saved are raised into the glory of 
the exalted Christ as far as their human nature permits.42 The sexualised metaphors – the 
Church as spouse, copulation, and conjunction – portrays the generative renewal of human 
nature through immediate union with Christ, but the adjective ‘mysticall’ asymmetrically 
protects the divine nature from change. The saved therefore recapitulate and receive the 
analogous benefits of Christ’s hypostatic union: ‘newness of life’ in the renewed relationship 
with God (both in time and in the eschaton) and ‘the future restauration of our bodies’ in the 
resurrection.43 Accordingly, the mystical Church flows out of immediate union with Christ 
and reveals a divine, atemporal aspect and perspective. David Neelands argues, then, that 
through this divine aspect Hooker deflates the puritan insistence, proof-texted in Book Three, 
that Scripture contains a necessary polity for the visible Church, ‘for they have transposed the 
divine polity of the church qua mystical to the church qua political.’44 As such, for Hooker 
the radical puritans have also betrayed christological orthodoxy in which the human and 
divine natures must be distinguished, as well as sound reformed doctrine that clearly 
distinguishes between inner and outer fora or spiritual and temporal regiments. 
                                                          
41 Hooker, Lawes, 1:261.25-27; III.11.14. 
42 Hooker, Lawes, 2:234.31; 2:239.3; V.56.1; V.56.7. 
43 Hooker, Lawes, 2:242.1-2; V.56.10. 
44 Neelands, ‘Richard Hooker on the Identity of the Visible Church’, p. 108. See also 
Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, p. 31. 
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In contrast, according to Hooker the visible body of the Church remains marked as a 
mediatory and contingent ‘publique Christian societie’ analogous to any political gathering. 
Hooker’s idea of a ‘sensible knowne compagnie’ corresponds with Luther’s temporal 
regiment and Calvin’s external forum. Entry into the visible Church is through the Pauline 
public profession of one faith, one Lord, one baptism; it contains a broad swathe of people, 
even those in grievous sin.45 The visible Church reveals a temporal and earthly aspect which 
requires mediating structures: ‘as the Church is a visible societie and body politique, laws of 
polities it cannot want.’46 While Christ remains its spiritual Head, the visible Church 
constitutes a mediatory body, historically-rooted and contingent, disposed towards the end of 
sacramental union with Christ through sanctification. The variety of historical circumstances 
facing the visible ecclesia corresponds with the possibility that there is more than one valid 
ecclesial polity.47 Hooker therefore distinguishes between matters necessary to salvation and 
the adiaphora of discipline and government: some things are ‘meerely of faith’ and must be 
believed, while other things are ‘accesorie and appendent onely’.48 Just as multiple valid 
secondary moral principles can be derived from primary moral axioms, the same is true for 
church government. Hooker’s puritan opponents, he alleges, confuse necessity and variety 
and ‘misdistinguish’ between matters of discipline and matters of faith or salvation, 
stretching Scripture beyond its appointed end of salvation in supposing it must contain 
binding directions over indifferent matters. Thus, ‘the scripture of God leaveth unto the 
Churches discretion in some thinges, including the form of church government, decided 
through the wit of man,’ meaning through right reason (a power conditioned by cognitive 
                                                          
45 Hooker, Lawes, 1:196.5-7; 1:198.7-33; III.1.3; III.1.7-8. 
46 Hooker, Lawes, 1:261.28-30.III.11.4. 
47 See Hooker, Lawes, 1:3-12; Pref.2.1-10 which considers the origins of Calvin’s 
‘new discipline’ in Geneva. Despite some caustic remarks about those who follow (or wish to 
emulate) Calvin, Hooker sees Calvin’s reforms of the Church in Geneva as historically 
conditioned and as a contingently appropriate course of action: ‘I see not how the wisest at 
that time lyving could have bettered, if we duely consider what the present estate of Geneva 
di then require.’ Hooker takes great care not to ‘de-church’ the Protestant churches even 
where he also wishes to defend episcopacy as a fitting polity for the English Church. 
48 Hooker, Lawes, 1:210.3; 1:211.4-25. III.3.2-3. See Bernard J. Verkamp, The 
Indifferent Mean: Adiaphorism in the English Reformation to 1554 (Ohio University Press 
and Wayne State University Press, 1977). 
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participation in God), taking into account the broad axioms of Scripture.49 Indeed, while God 
had established one form of religious government in the Old Testament, in the New the 
contrary holds true: ‘Christ did not mean to set down particular positive laws for all things in 
such sort as Moses did.’50 For Hooker, the puritans’ claim of biblical omnicompetency 
flattens creation: it denudes and denies the rich cognitive ecology of the architecture of 
participation in which human beings are creative sharers in law-making through the 
participation of God. As such, the puritans disturb the sound legal basis in the English 
Reformation for the ‘yoke of human power’ to subject the visible Church as a human 
‘politique society’.51 Furthermore, unlike Hooker, the puritans also stand outside of 
magisterial reformed orthodoxy: Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, and the Zurich divines largely 
held that the marks of a true visible Church (the notae ecclesiae) included the preaching of 
the Word and administration of the sacraments, but not any particular form of church 
government.52 
After distinguishing the mystical and visible aspects of the Church through the twin 
Platonisms of Augustinian immediacy and Dionysian mediation, Hooker then explores their 
unity through the logic of Chalcedonian christology. The authority of the positive laws made 
by the visible church stems from a communicatio idiomatum with the mystical Church, 
echoing Chalcedonian orthodoxy in which divine attributes can loosely be said to also belong 
to Christ’s human nature. The visible church receives authority when it displays continuity 
with the divine law of the mystical Church: 
                                                          
49 Hooker, Lawes, 1:207.19-21; 1:210.22-26; 1:212.26-213.7; III.2.1; III.3.3; III.4.1. 
50 Hooker, Lawes, 1:249.9-12; III.11.5. 
51 Hooker, Lawes, 3:395.28-396.6; VIII.6.9. Hooker here refers to the Anabaptists, but 
the polemical implication remains clear: the puritans are guilty by theological association 
with the opinion that Church and Commonwealth exclude one another, thereby threatening 
the theological ground for lay ecclesiastical supremacy. 
52 Hooker, Lawes, 1:208.12-209.20; III.2.2. Cartwright certainly stands within the 
reformed tradition of Bucer and Beza who held that a scriptural form of church government 
was a mark of the true Church. Yet, Hooker offers a conservative defence of broader 
magisterial reformed thought. See Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal 
Supremacy, p. 86. 
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So that lawes humane must be made according to the generall lawes of nature, and 
without contradiction unto any positive law in scripture. Otherwise they are ill made. 
Unto lawes thus made and received by a whole Church, they which live within the 
bosome of that Church, must not thinke it a matter indifferent either to yeeld or not to 
yeeld obedience….It doth not stand with the duty which we owe to our heavenly 
father, that to ordinances of our mother the Church we should shew ourselves 
disobedient.  Let us not say we keepe the commandments of the one, when we break 
the law of the other: For unlesse we observe both, we obey neither.53 
While the visible and mystical remain distinct, they are united under the second eternal law as 
it unfolds divine wisdom in history, the ratio and telos of which is participation in Christ. The 
ecclesial aspects of visible and mystical are not confused or mixed, but they have a real 
relationship and the latter mediates authority to the former. When Hooker objects, then, in 
Book Three to Cartwright’s critique of the visible Church established under law in England, 
he does so because it ‘misdistinguishes’ the aspect of the mystical with that of the visible. For 
Cartwright and the radical puritans, ecclesiastical polity should be drawn from a divinely 
appointed, scriptural form where Christ’s authority is immediately present. In addition to 
Word and Sacrament, Cartwright argues that a scriptural form of church government was 
another mark of the Church (notae ecclesiae).54 Indeed, Cartwright expects a golden age of 
reformed purity when ‘our Saviour Christ sitteth wholly and fully not only in his chair to 
teach  but also in his throne to rule, not alone in the hearts of everyone by the spirit, but also 
generally and in the visible government of the church, by those laws of discipline he hath 
prescribed’.55 For Hooker, this is to sink the mystical Church into the visible, at great peril to 
the penultimate status of the visible Church, confusing the inner and outer fora, the spiritual 
and the temporal regiments.56 Thus, the puritans miss the mark and should yet subject 
themselves to the established church as that which remains consonant with magisterial 
reformed ecclesiology, upholding a firm distinction between the inner and outer, the visible 
                                                          
53 Hooker, Lawes, 1:237.28-238.7; III.9.3. 
54 On the notae ecclesiae, Hooker quotes Cartwright in a lengthy footnote in Lawes, 
1:208.s; III.2.2. 
55 John Whitgift, The Works of John Whitgift, ed. J. Ayre (Cambridge: Parker Society, 
1851-3), 3.315. Hooker parodies this disciplinarian position in Lawes, 1:265.8-16; III.11.17. 
56 Hooker, Lawes, 3:376.13-22; VIII.4.9. 
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and invisible. Indeed, for Hooker, the established visible church gains contingent, mediate, 
and historical authority from a yet greater mystical body participating immediately in Christ, 
rather than from the confusion of the two fora or regiments.  
Yet, whatever its contingency, the visible Church remains, however, a necessary 
‘instrument’ for the participation of divine nature. Pace Shuger, Hooker does not merely 
think of the visible Church ‘as a judicial body necessary for dealing with heretics and 
schismatics’, as a ‘coercive institution’, or as an institution that ‘performed a functional and 
administrative role’.57 Rather, for Hooker sanctification unfurls through time and materiality: 
Christ transforms the recipient of grace ‘by steppes and degrees’ from sinfulness towards 
eschatological glory through the practices of the visible Church.58 Accordingly, sacramental 
participation forms the heart of the visible Church’s activity. Baptism acts as the means 
through which the believer ‘is incorporated into Christ’ and outwardly receives both imputed 
righteousness (the alien, external justification wrought by Christ) as well as the beginning of 
imparted righteousness (sanctification).59 The visible Church becomes a mediated-
immediacy: baptism ‘is admission into the visible church’, but this also, through a 
communication of idioms, brings the visible Church very close to the mystical as it reveals in 
time the atemporal imputation of righteousness by Christ.60 Baptism unveils how the visible 
Church and baptisand participate in God’s saving action.61 Sanctification occurs (although is 
not guaranteed) through eucharistic participation: the liturgical reception of Christ’s body and 
blood is necessary but not sufficient for salvation.62 At these moments, however, the mediate 
visible Church once again bears a close resemblance to the mystical Church as it immediately 
joins with Christ in the visceral ‘participation of the bodie and blood of Christ’. As it relates 
to a supernatural society, the visible Church theurgically tends towards communion with 
‘God, Angels, and holie men’ through the sacraments. 
                                                          
57 Shuger, Habits of Thought, pp. 133-135. 
58 See Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, p. 196. 
59 Hooker, Lawes, 2:254.23-255.13; V.60.2. 
60 Hooker, Lawes, 1:196.7; III.1.4. 
61 Hooker, Lawes, 2:280.22-281.3; V.62.15. 
62 Hooker, Lawes, 2:230.19-29; V.55.6. 
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As the previous chapter showed (3.4.3), Hooker defends the established public liturgy 
because it lifts up, shapes, and manuducts human desires into a likeness of the angelic law, 
satiated with divine love. The visible Church dynamically participates in God’s saving action, 
an eschatological viator awaiting the fulfilment of desire in the final union with Christ. While 
the radical puritans attempt to extract the ‘godly elect’ from the ‘ungodly’ on this temporal 
side of the eschatological kingdom, Hooker refuses any slippage between the visible and 
mystical. As he writes in his First Sermon Upon Part of S. Jude, ‘we cannot examine the 
hearts of other men, [but] we may our own’ and so we ‘must leave the secret judgment of 
every servant to his own Lord’.63 Hooker therefore portrays a visible church that includes 
everyone and through which, over the recalcitrant but certain passing of time, grows towards 
the mystical body as sacramental grace ameliorates those whom it touches. Perhaps this 
explains why Hooker conflates in Book Five the dual aspect of the Church: in the public 
prayer that we share across time and space with those people and angels whom God alone 
calls, ‘we are joined as parts to that visible mystical body which is his Church.’64 As Insole 
remarks, Hooker’s ecclesiology seems to ‘harbour the suggestion…that the entire historical 
visible Church may actually be smaller than the invisible; or at least, that in its glory and 
consummation in Christ, the invisible Church may be more universal and inclusive than we 
dare to hope’.65 For Hooker, God’s grace raises up the broad visible church into the mystical, 
rather than descending the mystical into the visible in order to limit it, as the puritans 
contend. 
The grammar of the architecture of participation therefore helps Hooker chart the 
difference but also the union between the visible and the invisible or mystical. Despite the 
perspectival distinction between the mystical and visible Church, a real relationship and 
union obtains between the two ecclesial aspects: in Chalcedonian fashion, and in accordance 
with the system of laws, they co-inhere through their telos (union with Christ), profession 
(one Lord, one faith, one baptism), and causal relation to Christ as spiritual Head.66 Thus, 
Hooker states ‘our being in Christ by eternall foreknowledge saveth us not without our actuall 
                                                          
63 Hooker, Jude, First Sermon 11-13, in FLE, 5:26.3-4; 5:28.10-11. 
64 Hooker, Lawes, 2:111.26-27; V.24.1.  
65 Insole, The Politics of Human Frailty, p. 56. 
66 See Bourdin, The Theological-Political Origins of the Modern State, p. 34. 
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and reall adoption into the fellowship of his sainctes in this present world’.67 As William 
Covell put it in 1603, Hooker insists that ‘visible and invisible maketh not two churches; but 
the diverse State and condition of the same church’.68 The mystical Church remains clouded 
in apophatic mystery: Hooker writes that ‘onely our mindes by intellectual concepit are able 
to apprehend’ the membership which only God knows. Rather than election or predestination, 
then, Hooker’s real concern in the Lawes remains sanctification, the spiritual regeneration 
and growth of believers through the Holy Spirit in the visible Church. The goal of 
sanctification is participation in Christ. Participation begins in the passive, immediate, 
external, alien, and atemporal imputation of Christ’s merits; participation also temporally and 
mediately unfolds through baptism and through the life of the visible Church: 
From hence it is that they which belonge to the mysticall bodie of our Savior Christ 
and be in number as the starres of heaven, devided successivelie by reason of their 
mortall condition unto manie generations, are notwithstandinge coupled everie one to 
Christ theire head and all unto everie particular person amongst them selves, in as 
much as the same Spirit, which anointed the blessed soule of our Savior Christ, doth 
so formalize unite and actuate his whole race, as if both he and they were so many 
limmes compacted unto one bodie, by being quickned all with one and the same 
soule.69 
The apophatic limits of human knowledge mean that, beyond knowing the reality of a 
divinely ordered ecclesia atemporally and immediately united with Christ, all that can truly 
                                                          
67 Hooker, Lawes, 2:238.27-29; V.56.7. This seems to be Hooker’s version of the 
principle ‘extra ecclesiam nulla salus’ [‘no salvation outside of the Church’]. The same 
principle was also accepted by Luther and Calvin, as well as by Roman Catholic apologists. 
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Theological Terms, p. 112. 
68 William Covell, A Just and Temperate Defence (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 
1998), p. 66. 
69 Hooker, Lawes, 2:243.14-23; V.56.11. 
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be spoken of remains the visible Church because the saved are known only to God.70 In fact, 
since the visible Church overlaps the invisible Church, there can be no perceptible difference 
until the eschaton. As such, the visible Church truly proffers grace and becomes sacralised, 
but remains penultimate to the revelatory reality of the mystical Church. Kirby rightly points 
out, then, the ‘close interlocking of soteriology and ecclesiology’ in the Lawes.71 The grace of 
justification calls the mystical Church to be immediately ‘in Christ’, while the grace of 
sanctification unfolds through the mediation of the visible Church whereby Christ is ‘in us’.72 
The double aspect of the Church remains united through participation in Christ, ‘that mutuall 
inward hold which wee have of him and he of us.’ Grace remains one in its unitive source, 
but reflects the multiplicity of a participatory order. The union and distinction of the visible 
and mystical Church relates to the two modes of participation in Christ, namely imputed and 
infused righteousness: participation involves atemporal immediacy and also temporal 
mediation in the one Church, the participated Body of Christ. Christ therefore wields 
authority over the mystical and political bodies at the same time, giving the Church as his 
Body the character of unity in duality.73 
4.2.2 ‘Of all good things’: the bishop as godly hierarch 
If the grammar of Hooker’s architecture of participation helps him to articulate a 
coherent ecclesiology in Books One and Three, then it also aids him in Book Seven to make 
what A.S. McGrade calls ‘a clear, strong case for episcopacy as divinely instituted or 
approved, historically well tested, yet not immutably fixed as the only possible legitimate 
form of church government’.74 McGrade here encapsulates the problem over Hooker’s logical 
cohesiveness for other scholars such as Rory Fox and W. Speed Hill: a divinely instituted 
form of church government seems to contradict Hooker’s emphasis in Book Three on the 
indifference of ecclesial polity. As already noted, McGrade also offers, however, a solution: 
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71 Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy, p. 73. 
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74 A.S. McGrade, ‘Episcopacy’, in A Companion to Richard Hooker, ed. W.J.T. Kirby 
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each part of the Lawes presents different aspects of the whole argument, reflecting the 
various practical and polemical pressures on Hooker’s apologia. In Book Three, Hooker 
responds to the radical puritans’ claim that Scripture mandates an unalterable form of church 
government and remains competent in all matters. For Hooker, his opponents hereby 
evacuate creation of divine influence, flatten out the manifold systems of laws that share in 
eternal law, and so cut the participatory cord that suspends everything (including the English 
Reformation) from God. Hooker therefore stresses mutability, contingency, and the 
multiplicity of divine influence within the participatory order, maintaining room for human 
law-making such as that which instituted the English Reformation. In contrast, when Hooker 
later defends episcopacy as constituting the bene esse of the ecclesia in Book Seven, he 
responds to disciplinarian calls for ‘further reformation’ along Genevan lines. Yet, his 
defence still depends upon the participatory contours of earlier books. Two aspects of the 
grammar of participation play a key role in this endeavour. First, Hooker employs scholastic 
notions of causality, typically found in post-Reformation orthodox thinkers, where secondary, 
temporal, contingent, instrumental causes participate in divine perfections and receive divine 
approval. In short, history takes on a providential character, just as it has in his ontology and 
epistemology. Hooker defends episcopal orders, then, as the contingent and historic 
development of church polity that also receives divine approbation (if not actually divine 
appointment) since God is the author of ‘all good things’.75 Second, Hooker’s logic of desire 
also casts the bishop as a hierarch who mediates divine goodness in some diminished form in 
the life of the visible Church. Here, Hooker maintains that God remains the immediate source 
of power and authority, but mediates them through episcopal orders as a fitting or convenient 
polity for the outward political regiment of the Church in a well-ordered Commonwealth as it 
pursues holiness. 
The first of these grammatical aspects of the architecture of participation, namely 
scholastic notions of causality, allows Hooker to balance in Book Seven the contingency of 
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episcopal orders with their binding divine approval.76 Hooker begins by contesting the 
puritans’ claim that contemporary bishops depart from what was originally meant by ‘bishop’ 
in the early Church, namely ‘presbyters’ simply in charge of a local congregation. The fifth 
chapter of Book Seven acts as an historical enquiry into the ‘time and cause of instituting 
every where Bishops with restraint’, by which he means within the geographical limits of 
dioceses. Hooker defines a bishop as follows: 
A Minister of God, unto whom with permanent continuance, there is given not onely 
power of administring the Word and Sacraments, which power other Presbyters have; 
but also a further power to ordain Ecclesiastical persons, and a power of Chiefty in 
Government over Presbyters as well as Lay men, a power to be by way of jurisdiction 
a Pastor even to Pastors themselves.77 
This definition allows Hooker to portray the apostles as bishops: the distinctive essence of a 
bishop is the power to ordain; the historic wealth and territorial extent of historic bishops are 
accidental and develop as such over time.78 Thus, the apostles were bishops ‘at large’ 
whereas later bishops have a limited geographical compass in the diocese and so minister 
‘with restraint’; but they are all bishops in the essential sense. Indeed, quoting Cyprian, 
Hooker recalls how ‘it was the general received perswasion of the ancient Christian world, 
that Ecclesia est in Episcopo, the outward being of a Church consisteth in the having of a 
Bishop’.79 
In relation to episcopal orders, Hooker displays a sense of historical pragmatism but 
also gives history a providential texture as it creatively participates in and unfolds eternal law 
like an effect from a first cause mediated through temporal human acts. In the fifth chapter of 
Book Seven, he accepts that the primitive church was governed in a presbyteral model of 
local congregations, but argues that an Ignatian monarchical episcopacy took precedence in 
order to protect doctrinal unity by the end of the apostolic age. Hooker also accepts that the 
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visible Church exists as a corporation, a political body in which certain kinds of laws, 
including those of order, can be mutable or changeable ‘as need may require’.80 All forms of 
government, even those of the visible Church, are matters of positive law and remain subject 
to change when their original basis has become eroded and there is no divine commandment 
to the contrary. Thus: 
…the whole body of the Church, hath power to alter with general consent and upon 
necessary occasions, even the positive laws of the Apostles, if there be no 
commandment to the contrary, and it manifestly appears to her, that change of times 
have clearly taken away the very reason of Gods first institution…81 
Yet, Hooker suspends such contingency from divine providence: God sits behind history as 
the primary cause and author of all perfective secondary acts. Indeed, ‘of all good things God 
himself is Author and consequently an approver of them.’ The fittingness of monarchical 
episcopacy was, therefore, divine in origin insofar as it protected the peace and order of the 
Church: ‘if any thing in the Churches Government, surely the first institution of Bishops was 
from Heaven, was even of God, the Holy Ghost was the Author of it.’82 Indeed, ‘the Apostles 
who began this order of Regiment by Bishops, did it not but by divine instinct.’83 Within this 
divine authorship, since the fittingness of the office persists, any bishop is ‘lawful, divine and 
holy’, that is formed according to divine reason, imitative of God, and set apart for special 
service to the Church.84 
Accordingly, the grammar of participatory causality allows Hooker to delineate how 
God authors the law of nature, the law of scripture, and the law of reasonable activity such 
that the contingent development of the office of bishops remains ‘truely derived from God, 
and approved of him’.85 Yet, Hooker, perhaps more than his English contemporaries, blends 
Aristotelian notions of causality with Reformed commitments, as was typical of theologians 
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within Reformed orthodoxy, perhaps with Peter Martry Vermigli being the most obvious 
influence, as W. Bradford Littlejohn argues.86 For Hooker, as with the medieval scholastics 
and theologians inside Reformed orthodoxy, all secondary causes are suspended from God as 
First Cause, saturating history and human actions with divine influence. Far from 
contradiciting Book Three, then, Hooker’s affirmation of episcopal orders as divinely 
mandated does not entail its immutability or necessity. Episcopal orders form part of a 
contingent order hypostatically distinct from the immutability of God and founded on custom 
and consent rather than explicit divine command. In Book Seven, Hooker quotes Jerome that 
bishops ought to know that ‘custom, rather then the truth of any Ordinance of the Lords 
maketh them greater than the rest’, and so ‘they must acknowledge that the Church hath 
power by universal consent upon urgent cause to take it away, if thereunto she constrained 
through the proud, tyrannical, and unreformable bishops’.87 As it establishes a custom such as 
an ecclesiastical polity, human reason (inspired by the Holy Spirit) leads the visible Church; 
as in earlier books of the Lawes, the utility, benefit, and popularity of a custom testifies to its 
provisional truth and, through a communication of idioms, lends to it divine authority as the 
mediation through which eternal law reads itself into the world. The laws of the Church are 
then said to be authored by God where the life of the Church demonstrably conforms to the 
activity of the Holy Spirit: the authority of the bishops springs from the fact that the Church 
‘hath found it good and requisite to be so governed’ for the purpose of peace and unity.88 As 
a fitting institution, the development of monarchical episcopacy, while historically 
contingent, thereby also reveals for Hooker ‘Divine appointment beforehand’ or at the very 
least ‘Divine approbation afterwards’.89 Seen from the unitive perspective of eternal law, 
episcopacy is fitting for peace and unity within the visible Church, making it into a 
providential office. For Hooker, the ‘pretended Reformers’ in the puritan camp lack urgent 
                                                          
86 W. Bradford Littlejohn, ‘“More than a swinehered”: Hooker, Vermigli, and an 
Aristoelian defence of the royal supremacy’, Reformation & Renaissance Review, 15.1 
(2013), 68-83. 
87 Hooker, Lawes, 3:166.16-168.35; VII.5.8. 
88 Compare Hooker, Lawes, 1:328.18-20; 1:31.32-33; IV.13.2; Pref.6.3. 
89 Hooker, Lawes, 3:161.5-18; VII.5.2. 
231 
 
cause, universal consent, and reason to remove the office of bishops, producing only seditious 
disquiet with the ‘fruitless jars and janglings’ of their ‘contentious Disputes’.90 
The episcopal polity of the visible Church derives, then, from human positive law, a 
reflective process of rational discernment within contingent and mutable circumstances. 
Nevertheless, the scholastic notion that secondary perfective acts are contained within God’s 
causality means that episcopal orders participate in eternal law. Returning to the legal 
ontology of Book One, Hooker puts up a high bar for the radical puritans when he claims 
only general consent and extreme duress can allow episcopal orders to be replaced in favour 
of presbyterianism. What Hooker means by general consent evokes his earlier discussion in 
Book One of the ius gentium as a particular kind of participation in eternal law. The 
particular fittingness of episcopal orders becomes clearer when held up against Hooker subtle 
discussion of ius gentium as a form of human positive law dealing with community, the 
natural inclination ‘to have a kind of society or fellowship even with all mankind’.91 Turning, 
then, to the relations between visible ecclesial bodies, Hooker produces a conciliarist call for 
the renewal of General Councils: 
The urgent necessity of mutual communion for preservation of our unity in these 
things [i.e. doctrinal unity], as also for order in some things convenient to be every 
where uniformly kept, maketh it requisite that the church of God here on earth have 
her laws of mutual commerce between Christian nations, laws by virtue whereof all 
Churches may enjoy freelie the use of those reverend religious and sacred 
consultations which are termed councels generall.92 
The implication for his opponents remains clear: since in Book Seven Hooker states that 
‘Councils do all presuppose bishops’, episcopal orders thereby become a normative 
requirement of the ius gentium as it relates to the Church, notwithstanding issues of egregious 
abuse in which episcopal orders have therefore been rescinded, such as in Geneva.93 
Accordingly, it can never ordinarily be proper to replace episcopal orders as they are a 
necessary part of the participatory legal structures that providentially govern God’s creation. 
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As Alan Cromartie argues, Hooker’s use of the ius gentium means ‘it could never be 
legitimate willfully to replace the existing order’ without common consent under extreme 
provocation.94 
Hooker’s conciliarism and appeal to the ius gentium as it relates the Church of 
England to the Roman Catholic Church and to the Council of Trent does not, however, 
produce the kind of ecclesiastical incoherency in the Lawes that Rory Fox alleges.95 Fox 
writes that if Hooker’s ‘use of authority against the puritans really has any merit at all then it 
is very difficult to see how he can escape having to accept the validity of the same Roman 
Catholic appeal to authority against Anglicanism’.96 Yet, far from suggesting that the Church 
of England must (by the logic of an argument from authority presented to the puritans) 
submit to the higher, universal authority of Rome, Hooker’s argument remains far more 
nuanced than Fox allows. For Hooker, the Church of England need not yield to the episcopal 
command of the papacy because only Parliament and Convocation represent the reasoned 
consensus of the Christian community within the geographical limits of the 
Commonwealth.97 As such, neither the puritans nor the papacy have any claim to supervene 
over the positive ecclesial laws that the crown in Parliament and Convocation have 
promulgated. Similarly, the Church of England should not conform to the decrees of the 
Council of Trent because it was not truly a general council. For Hooker, the Council of Trent 
cannot represent the reasoned consensus of the universal Church: as a clerical gathering, it 
lacked both authority and representatives from the lay faithful and from reformed English 
Christians; as such, it cannot bind the Christian conscience.98 The same reservation does not 
hold true for the crown in Parliament and Convocation, which can accordingly bind the 
conscience and practice of the English Christian through its legislation; to ‘despise them is to 
despise in them’ also the God who remotely authors such human laws through their 
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participation in eternal law.99 Here, it is the architecture of participation and its grammar that 
allows Hooker to develop a politicised metaphysics. This development yields a strong and 
coherent account of the role of law, reason, consent, and the episcopacy as he understands it 
against his puritan adversaries. In this politicised metaphysics, Hooker suspends the Church 
of England from the ratio of eternal law mediated through history, casting the radical puritans 
as both unreasonable and as potentially treasonous to the lawful and holy English Church. 
Despite Hooker’s apparently radical authoritarianism in these texts, he does not quite 
claim, as some scholars suggest, any unmitigated or unreflective authority for Parliament as 
the voice of Christian rationality over all aspects of Christian life. For example, Timothy 
Rosendale argues that Hooker’s ‘ideology of order demands the uniform and universal 
submission of all private concerns to the public order’.100 Ethan Shagan similarly writes of 
‘Hooker’s strangely authoritarian constitutionalism, his gift of public consent to all members 
of the body politic so that their capacity for private conscience could be taken away’.101 Yet, 
Hooker’s participatory epistemology has already located rationality fully in the individual 
participating in divine reason; the public scrutiny of church authorities simply is there to 
determine whether particular claims to special spiritual illumination truly demonstrate a 
consonance between Word and Spirit.102 Hooker qualifies the authority of the Church since 
‘what scripture doth plainlie deliver, to that first place both of credit and obedience is due; the 
next whereunto is whatsoever anie man can necessarelie conclude by force of reason; after 
these the voice of the Church succeedeth’.103 As Eppley points out, in the same passage, 
while this hierarchy seems perfectly straightforward, Hooker also establishes the church 
authorities as the arbiter of what counts as demonstrative reasoning, subverting the apparent 
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hierarchy between reason and the Church about where obedience is due.104 If Hooker errs, 
however, it is not perhaps in paving the way thereby for radical authoritarianism, but in 
assigning too sanguine an appraisal that public scrutiny would yield to or recognize rational 
persuasion, namely that the church authorities would indeed uphold the standard of applying 
and assenting to demonstrative reasoning. Such a sanguine appraisal permits, however, a 
creative fiction for Hooker, namely what Daniel Eppley labels as the possibility for ‘dissent 
without disloyalty’ or ‘critically thinking loyalty’ that, rather than silencing his puritan 
opponents, challenges them both to ‘recognize the essential validity of the established 
church’ and also ‘to continue actively seeking to understand God’s will for the church more 
fully and when appropriate to work for reform within the structures of the church’.105 The 
appropriate way remains, of course, to show through rational argument the case for reform, 
the very call Hooker gives in the Preface to the Lawes to ‘resolve the conscience’ when he 
asks to examine whether his opponents can show ‘reasonable cause’ or the ‘force of reason’. 
If that reasoned case could be given, then Hooker seems to believe sincerely that he and the 
whole Church of England would ‘embrace together with you the selfe same truth’. 
Having justified the institution of bishops, Hooker turns in the rest of Book Seven to 
another aspect of the grammar of the architecture of participation, namely the logic of desire, 
in order to cast the figure of the bishop as a divine hierarch who dispositively mediates 
participation in God’s goodness. As such, the episcopal office should be esteemed. Hooker 
yokes the benefits of episcopacy to its capacity to yield two levels of participation. For 
Hooker, the episcopacy yields horizontal participation across the Church and Commonwealth 
in terms of social and political participation, with demonstrable and pragmatic benefits. It 
also yields vertical participation by imitating divine authority and leading the spiritual desire 
to share in God’s nature towards holiness. The bishop simultaneously represents, then, a 
social functionary but also a divinely-appointed hierarch directing the logic of desire towards 
penultimate political goods as well as towards its final end of loving union with God.   
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On the one hand, then, when Hooker considers in chapter eighteen of Book Seven 
‘what good doth publiquely grow from the Prelacy’, he surveys six particular instances of 
benefit for the horizontal, political well-being of English society. A.S. McGrade writes that, 
taken together, these benefits ‘present episcopacy as an important tempering and harmonising 
institution’.106 The benefits revolve around the fittingness of episcopal orders in fairly 
quotidian matters: the country’s reputation abroad benefits from the ‘higher place and calling’ 
of episcopal ministers; the ‘successions, doings, sufferings, and affairs of Prelates’ provide 
salutary historical guidance to society; clergy require a greater authority to settle disputes 
with congregations and give them support; when ‘twined together’, prelacy and nobility 
balance society with wisdom and valour respectively; and rulers need the moral guidance of 
clergy ‘whose greater and higher callings do somewhat more proportion them unto that ample 
conceit and spirit, wherewith the minde of so powerful persons are possessed’. Yet, for all 
that such benefits are seemingly pragmatic and quotidian, through them the prelacy becomes 
‘the temperature of excesses in all estates, the glew and soder of the Publique weal, the 
ligament which tieth and connecteth the limbs of the Body politique each to the other’.107 The 
social function of bishops remains vital: in Book Eight, Hooker avers that ‘in all 
commonwealths things spirituall ought above temporall to be provided for’ and the ‘of things 
spirituall the chiefest is Religion’.108 At best, then, episcopacy acts as a pragmatic social glue 
guaranteeing and mediating public order for the common good, as well as equipping public 
society to be properly oriented to its ultimate spiritual end. 
On the other hand, the bishop (like all persons and things employed in religious 
matters) becomes ‘by an excellencie termed Spirituall’. He reflects not merely pragmatism 
but emerges as a particular kind of participation in the providential ordering of creation. 
Christ gives spiritual authority to bishops; their spiritual jurisdiction has to do with the 
Church as a supernatural community governed by divine law and as a political society under 
positive law, both types of participation in God.109 The bishop leads the visible society of the 
Church to its desirous end: that which is ‘most desirable’, Hooker argues in Book One, is that 
‘wherin ther is infinitie of goodness’, and since ‘no good is infinite but only God’, our 
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greatest desire is to be ‘unto God united’.110 Accordingly, then, the bishop becomes a 
mediatory analogue of the angels as they are desirously oriented to God and co-operate with 
humankind to bring creation to salvation. Hooker links esteem for a bishop with virtue, and 
understands virtue in desirous terms echoing the angelic law of Book One: a ‘Bishops 
estimation doth grow from the excellency of vertues suitable unto his place’. The chief 
episcopal virtues are ‘devotion and the feeling sence of Religion’. These virtues humble the 
powerful and ‘frameth their hearts to a stooping kind of disposition’, allowing bishops to 
‘shine…as Angels of God in the midst of perverse men’.111 Hooker uses the parallel image of 
bishops as ‘angels among men’ three times in Book Seven.112 Hooker does not spell out what 
he means by ‘devotion and the feeling sence of Religion’, but it remains allusive to the logic 
of desire in angelic law and the participation in Christ through prayer and the sacraments 
found in Book One and Book Five respectively. Where bishops exist, people can see how:  
[In] The powers and faculties of whose souls God hath possest, those very actions the 
kind whereof is common unto them with other men, have notwithstanding in them a 
more high and heavenly form, which draweth correspondent estimation unto it, by 
vertue of that celestial impression, which deep meditation of holy things, and as it 
were conversation with God doth leave in their mindes.113 
Just an the angels act as intermediaries and helpers for humanity, desirous that all of creation 
shares in God’s self-diffusive plenitude, so too do bishops show a ‘fatherly affection toward 
the flock of Christ’, thereby shining as ‘Angels of God’.114 
Hooker also at times turns the bishop into an analogue of God. In Book Six, Hooker 
explains the purpose of a church is to lead souls to felicity and to restrain the impious.  
Within this purpose, the Bishop ‘doth beare the Image of God and of Christ’ because he rules 
and administers holy things respectively.115 Hooker here cites Ignatius of Antioch, the 
theological progenitor of monarchical episcopacy, and he repeatedly does so in what follows, 
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invoking the sense that the esse of a bishop is the participatory image of the Trinity. Together 
with the more commonly used analogy between bishops and angels, Hooker thereby extends 
(as a communicatio idiomatum) divine illumination from the eschatological realm into the 
polity of the visible Church, thereby sacralising it and its bishops while maintaining their 
contingency. Feisal Mohamed rightly locates this element of Hooker’s thought in the 
Neoplatonism of Pseudo-Dionysius and brings to the fore two pertinent examples.116 First, 
when Hooker defends the English Church from the accusation that it is ‘corrupted with 
Popish orders’, he does so with an explicit quotation from Pseudo-Dionysius that extends 
illumination from the celestial order into the material world of the visible Church: ‘The 
sensible things which religion hath hallowed, are resemblances framed according to things 
spiritually understood, whereunto they serve as a hand to lead and a way to direct.’117 The 
long usage of things by the Church becomes imbued with divine power that leads by the hand 
(manuductio) and directs material creatures back to their Creator. Much like in Pseudo-
Dionysius’ thought, for Hooker the clergy possess a special kind of illumination, both by 
virtue of their office and through their theurgia, the holy works that Pseudo-Dionysius claims 
allow divinity to pass down through the mediation of the celestial and ecclesiastical 
hierarchies. Second, Mohamed traces how Hooker accordingly sacralises ordination and the 
episcopacy in a Dionysian fashion. In ordination, clergy receive power from Christ and 
become direct agents of the Holy Spirit, thereby possessing a special, unique illumination:  
To whome Christ hath imparted power both over that mysticall bodie which is the 
societie of soules, and over that naturall which is him selfe for the knitting of both in 
one (a worke which antiquitie doth call the making of Christes bodie) the same power 
is in such not amisse both termed a kind of marke or character and acknowledged to 
be indeleble.  Minsiteriall power is a mark of separation, because it severeth them that 
have it from other men and maketh them a special order consecrated unto the service 
of the most high in thinges wherewith others may not meddle….[W]hen wee take 
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ordination wee also receive the presence of the holy Ghost partlie to guide direct and 
strengthen us in all our waies, and partlie to assume unto itself for the more authoritie 
those actions that apperteine to our place and calling….Whether wee preach, pray, 
baptise, communicate, condemne, give absolution, or whatsoever, as disposers of 
Gods misteries, our wordes, judgmentes, actes, and deedes, are not ours but the holie 
Ghostes.118 
It is within this Dionysian context that a presbyter is ‘he unto whome our Savior Christ hath 
communicated the power of spirituall procreation’ and that a bishop is ‘the Image of God and 
of Christ’ as well as ‘like unto an angel’.119 Dionysian hierarchy elevates the bishop into a 
particularly important mediatory role: ‘the apostles peculiar charge was to publish the gospel 
of Christ unto all nations, and to deliver them his ordinances received by immediate 
revelation from himself’, a role filled ‘afterwardes in stead of Apostles [by] Bishops’.120  
Accordingly, the architecture of participation and its grammar coherently and 
systemtically informs and structures Hooker’s ecclesiology throughout the Lawes. The idea 
of the visible Church as a political body bound by positive as well as divine law does not 
evacuate it of divine agency, reducing it or its bishops merely into being a locus of repressive 
temporal authority. Rather, the political character of the visible Church ennobles it and its 
orders as a creative co-participant in the unfolding of the eternal law in the world and the 
contiguous desire to participate in God. As such, the visible intersects with the mystical and, 
just as ‘grace hath use of nature’ and ‘nature hath need of grace’, so too does the natural 
Church prove of use to, as well as having need of,  the supernatural Church. Charles Miller 
rightly notes, therefore, that Hooker’s use of the ‘visible’ and ‘mystical’ couplet attempts to 
‘recapture the dynamism found in, say, Augustine and Aquinas, for whom the church, while a 
concrete reality in time and space, is chiefly defined in – for a lack of better words – invisible 
terms’.121 Yet, pace Miller and Lake, such an ecclesiology represents neither a departure from 
continental Reformed orthodoxy nor an attempt to locate the Church of England as some kind 
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of via media between Geneva and Rome.122 The grammar of participation allows Hooker to 
weave a tapestry of claims that distinguish clearly between the natural and supernatural, the 
visible and the mystical or invisible, in accordance with magisterial reformed assumptions 
about the Church, as well as scholastic concepts about causality that suspend creation from 
divine influence. Such participatory grammar simultaneously humanises the reformed Church 
of England as a mediatory, penultimate, and historically contingent institution open to 
creative variety and change, and also elevates it as a participant in the providential and 
ultimate ratio of God, the end of which is heavenly union and the present of which is 
temporal authority. 
4.3 ‘Lovingly dwell together in one subject’: royal supremacy and the grammar of 
participation 
As with Hooker’s ecclesiology, the grammar of participation informs and structures 
how Hooker defends the ‘dominion’ of lay ecclesiastical supremacy in Book Eight of the 
Lawes against attacks from Roman Catholics and radical puritans. Although they represented 
strange bedfellows, both of these groups argued that lay ecclesiastical supremacy deviated 
from religious orthodoxy by stripping the Church of its autonomy and by setting up the 
monarch in place of Christ as the Head of the Church.123 Hooker summarises the objections 
of his opponents as follows: ‘unto no Civill Prince or Governour there may be given such 
power of Ecclesiastical Dominion as by the Lawes of this Land belongeth unto the Supreme 
Regent thereof.’124 Through the grammar of participation, Hooker unfolds both the distinction 
and union of the spiritual and the temporal regiments in the concrete human person, and 
particularly in the person of the monarch as hierarch.125 First, as Torrance Kirby has shown, 
Hooker uses the Chalcedonian logic of Christ’s hypostatic union in order to distinguish 
between but also connect the Church and Commonwealth as aspects of a ‘politique societie’ 
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in which both can ‘lovingly dwell together in one subject’, just as Christ’s two distinct 
natures co-inhere in his person.126 Such language allows Hooker to undercut the unequivocal 
perpetual separation between Church and Commonwealth insisted on by his opponents, as 
well as their refusal of the title ‘head’ to anyone except Christ. For Hooker, ‘headship’ 
belongs to the monarch insofar as he or she analogically participates in Christ, to whom the 
title of ‘head’ properly belongs in an unrestricted sense as the primary, participated analogate. 
Second, as Kirby has again demonstrated, Hooker uses the twin Platonisms of Augustinian 
immediacy and Dionysian mediation found in his system of laws in order to distinguish 
between Christ’s authority and the monarch’s power, but also to connect them since the 
monarch is ‘God’s lievtenant’ and ‘highest uncommanded Commander’.127 Here, Hooker 
suggests every separation forms a link: as in his account of episcopal orders, Hooker employs 
scholastic notions of God’s prime causality, as well as the logic of desire, in order to portray 
the monarch as a mediatory divine hierarch who manuducts (‘leads by the hand’) society 
towards the common good and so to the participation of God. 
This section considers these two features in turn: the opening half unpacks Hooker’s 
use of Chalcedonian christology in relation to lay ecclesiastical supremacy (4.3.1); the second 
half unpacks how Hooker portrays the monarch as a diminished, public, participatory 
analogue of God’s ratio found perfectly in Christ as Head of the Church (4.3.2). Through the 
grammar of participation, Hooker accordingly both deflates and elevates the terms of lay 
ecclesiastical supremacy, placing Christ as the key to unlock the relationship between visible 
and invisible political orders. On one side, the power of the monarch shares in divine power 
in a subordinate sense, and as such should remain limited by law like all other creatures. On 
the other hand, however, the monarch is a divine hierarch or ‘instrument’ and ‘subjection is 
due unto all such powers in as much as they are of God’s owne institution even when they are 
of mans creation’.128 On both sides, using ‘grammatical’ aspects of the architecture of 
participation developed in his metaphysics and epistemology, Hooker challenges the 
                                                          
126 Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy, pp. 51-52; 74-79. See 
also Kirby, Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist, pp. 79-96. 
127 See Kirby, ‘“Law Makes the King”: Richard Hooker on Law and Princely Rule’, 
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128 Hooker, Lawes, 3:398.25-28; VIII.6.9. Hooker here interprets Romans 13.1. 
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doctrinal orthodoxy, reformed credentials, and biblicism of his radical puritan opponents. The 
parameters of lay ecclesiastical supremacy follows an orthodox Chalcedonian Christology, 
immaculately respects reformed commitments to Luther’s two regiments or Calvin’s two 
fora, and derives its authority or cura religionis (‘oversight of religion’) from natural and 
human law, rather than simply from divine law, as they share in eternal law.  
4.3.1 ‘Personallie one societie’: the Chalcedonian logic of Church and Commonwealth 
As both Kirby and Bourdin comment, Hooker employs one particular feature of his 
grammar of participation in order to argue for a personal unity of Church and 
Commonwealth: namely, the logic of Chalcedonian christology developed in Book Five that 
both distinguishes between Christ’s human and divine natures, but also unites them as they 
co-inhere in Christ’s person.129 The analogous unity between the visible Church and 
Commonwealth as ‘personallie one socieitie’ in turn justifies that there is only one visible 
head over both, namely the monarch who wields lay ecclesiastical supremacy. As such, 
Hooker puts allegiance to the royal supremacy as a test of doctrinal orthodoxy consistent with 
the reformed ecclesiology he has already defended in earlier books of the Lawes. The 
personhood of Christ forms the key by which Hooker unlocks the distinction but also the 
unity of invisible spiritual and visible secular power. 
Hooker’s political use of the Chalcedonian logic of distinction and union has, of 
course, a specific polemical purpose and context, responding directly to the earlier 
Elizabethan debates over the royal supremacy between Thomas Cartwright and Bishop John 
Whitgift in the Admonition Controversy of the 1570s.130 The latter defended the title of 
‘head’ as applied to the monarch governing the visible Church by appealing to the 
commonplace motif of reformed ecclesiology, namely the distinction between ‘spiritual 
regiment’ (exclusively the invisible power of Christ ‘reigning in the consciences of the 
                                                          
129 Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy, pp. 51-2; 74-9; 
Bourdin, The Theological-Political Origins of the Modern State, pp. 30-44. See also Eppley, 
‘Royal Supremacy’, pp. 516-517.  
130 Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy, pp. 54-58; 98-105. 
Kirby convincingly argues that Hooker depends upon and takes up unresolved issues from 
the Admonition Controversy. See also W.J.T. Kirby, ‘Supremum Caput: Richard Hooker’s 
Theory of Ecclesiastical Dominion’, Dionysisus, 12 (1988), 69-110. 
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faithful’) and ‘external regiment’ (mediated by Christ’s visible representatives).131 The 
former figure, however, followed Calvin’s criticism of the royal supremacy: Cartwright 
argued that civil and ecclesiastical spheres ought to remain separate, grounding his argument 
in the Chalcedonian distinction between Christ’s two natures.132 Cartwright employed this 
Chalcedonian distinction in order to distinguish perpetually between Church and 
Commonwealth, offering a doctrinal rationale for opposing lay ecclesiastical supremacy since 
the ‘spirituall regiment’ of Christ is identical with the so-called Disciplina, the outward form 
of the Church that can suffer no other head than Christ.133 Writing against Whitgift’s ‘absurde 
distinction’ between inner and outer fora that seemed to ‘overthrowe this doctrine that Christe 
alone is Head of his Church’ by allowing the monarch to have authority over the external 
regiment of the Church, Cartwright penned: 
The other faulte of this distinction is / that yt confoundeth and shuffleth together the 
authoritie of our Saviour Christ / as he is the sonne off God onely before all worldes / 
coequall with his father: with that which he hath gyven off his father and which he 
exerciseth in respecte he is mediator betwene God and us. For in the governement off 
the church / and superiorytie over the officers off it / our Saviour Christ himselfe hath 
a superior / which is his father: but in the governement off kingdoms / and other 
commonwealths / and in the superiority which he hath over kings / and judges / he 
hath no superior / but immediate authoritie with his father. Therfore the mouldinge 
upp off the two estates / and governementes together / is to lay the foundations of 
many errors.134 
                                                          
131 Whitgift, Works, 2:83-84. 
132 Hooker references Calvin’s complaint, seeing it as misinformed, in Lawes, 
3:380.23-381.4; VIII.4.12, also cited by Thomas Cartwright, The Second Replie of Thomas 
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Hooker, Lawes, 3:357.10-28; VIII.4.2. 
134 Cartwright, The Second Replie, 2:411-414. 
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For Cartwright, just as Christ’s sovereignty is distinguished in a twofold manner (qua his 
humanity and qua his divinity), so too must the Church and Commonwealth be separated. 
Cartwright roots the perpetual separation in the double function of Christ. On one hand, 
Christ rules the Church as Son of Man and Redeemer, meaning through his humanity 
‘subordinate to the Father’. On the other hand, the Commonwealth receives its rule from 
Christ as the Son of God, consubstantial and ‘coequall with his Father and the Holy Spirit’. 
Cartwright held that the ‘externall governement off Christ in his church is spirituall’, fusing 
the outward polity of the Church with Christ’s direct authority as Redeemer, precluding lay 
ecclesiastical supremacy since that would seem to abrogate Christ’s spiritual regiment.135 
Cartwright simultaneously reifies the two regiments in such a way that the visible church 
becomes a sacralised political institution alongside or in place of natural political 
communities, but also that natural political communities such as the Commonwealth become 
‘de-Christianised’, as Kirby puts it.136 Cartwright and his puritan allies strangely advocate 
then, in the pithy words of Bradford Littlejohn, both an ‘overreaching biblicism and [an] 
incipient secularism’.137 
Hooker’s response to Cartwright expands that of Whitgift’s in the Admonition 
Controversy, but seizes on the participatory grammar of Chalcedonian christology developed 
in Book Five of the Lawes as the singular key to unlock the right, reformed relationship 
between the spiritual and the external regiments or inner and outer fora in the political and 
ecclesial realms. For Hooker, Cartwright’s political christology brings his opponents close to 
a form of political and ecclesiological Nestorianism, the heretical division of Christ into two 
persons, one human and another the divine Logos. It also violates the reformed distinctions 
between inner and outer fora, spiritual and temporal regiments, which nevertheless enjoy a 
real participatory relationship. The participatory textures of visible and invisible, spiritual and 
temporal, so key to Hooker’s reformed ecclesiology, re-emerge in his account of the royal 
supremacy over the visible Church. The participatory grammar of distinction and union 
allows him both to defend and also to define lay ecclesiastical supremacy as contingent and 
penultimate, but also as the providential mediation of, and participation in, the invisible 
authority of Christ. In this regard, Hooker’s political vision clearly exhibits a systematic 
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homology with his architecture of participation and its grammar established in earlier books 
of the Lawes. 
Hooker responds to Cartwright in Book Eight of the Lawes by turning the doctrinal 
tables on him and, by extension, the radical puritans en masse. As Hooker puts it, the puritans 
object that, by exercising supremacy over the visible Church, ‘kings, being meer lay 
persons…exceed the lawfull boundes of their calling,’ therefore arguing for a ‘necessarie 
separation perpetuall and personal between the Church and Commonwealth’.138 Yet, for 
Hooker, those who oppose lay ecclesiastical supremacy, supposing it entails no limits on 
royal dominion or subjection to God, are ‘brainsick’. Hooker therefore pragmatically defines 
what ‘Church’ and ‘Commonwealth’ mean in the case of a Christian nation. Hooker’s 
account recalls the Chalcedonian logic of separation and union recounted in Book Five, as 
well as the ecclesiology of Book Seven and its distinctions between visible and invisible, 
inner and outer, spiritual and temporal. While he grants that Church and Commonwealth are 
‘thinges in nature the one distinguished from the other’, he goes on to describe their personal 
unity in the English context: 
[T]he name of a Church importeth only a Societie of men first united into some 
publique forme of regiment and secondly distinguished from other Societies, by the 
vertue of Christian religion…[S]eeing there is not any man of the Church of England, 
but the same man is also a member of the Commonwealth, nor any man a member of 
the Commonwealth which is not also of the Church of England, therefore as in a 
figure triangular the base doth differ from the sides thereof, and yet one and the self 
same line, is both a base and also a side; a side simplie, a base if it chance to be the 
bottome and underlie the rest: So albeit properties and actions of one kinde doe cause 
the name of a Commonwealth, qualities and functions of an other sort the name of a 
Church to be given unto a multitude, yet one and the self same multitude may in such 
sort be both and is so with us, that no person appertaining to the one can be denied to 
be also of the other.139 
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Hooker distinguishes between Church and Commonwealth, but denies that they need to be 
(or in fact are) essentially and perpetually separated.140 The difference between the two (one 
defined by true religion, the other by a certain political arrangement) remains accidental, ‘and 
such accidentes as may and should alwayes lovingly dwell together in one subject.’141 Indeed, 
the Church and Commonwealth co-inhere in every English subject.142 Both Church and 
Commonwealth therefore share the Aristotelian telos of rightly ordering community towards 
the common good. To a far greater degree than Aristotle, however, Hooker makes religion 
the primary duty of politics since the aim of any society:  
…is not simplie to live, nor the duetie so much as to provide for life as for meanes of 
living well, and that even as the soule is the worthier part of man, so humane societies 
are much more to care for that which tendeth properly unto the soules estate then for 
such temporall thinges as this life doth stand in need of.143 
Church and Commonwealth are ‘in this case personallie one societie’ living under various 
laws and with a complex web of dependency and interaction.144 As such, Hooker employs 
one grammatical feature of his architecture of participation (the logic of Chalcedonian 
christology) in order to lay the basis for the royal supremacy and its authority in the external, 
temporal regiment of the Church. To oppose the order of such supremacy is, for Hooker, 
tantamount to sedition since ‘out of such division [follows] inevitable destruction’.145 
Hooker responds, after this prolegomena, to the particular theological objections 
against the ‘title of Headship which we give to the kings of England in relation unto the 
church’.146 For Cartwright, the title could only belong to Christ through his priestly, 
                                                          
140 Hooker follows Stephen Gardiner’s De Vera Obedientia (1535) in casting Church 
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mediatorial function as Son of Man. In response, however, Hooker employs the participatory 
grammar of Chalcedonian christology in order to defuse Cartwright’s doctrinal objections, 
offering a nuanced, coherent, and orthodox account of royal ecclesiastical dominion. 
Following Whitgift, Hooker distinguishes between ‘two kindes of power’, namely the 
‘external regiment’ of the visible Church and the ‘secret inward influence of grace’, hereby 
maintaining the reformed distinction between the visible and invisible kingdoms.147 Yet, 
within his architecture of participation, every separation remains a link. Hooker qualifies the 
title of headship by reminding his readers that while it only belongs by nature to Christ as 
Head of the Church, 148 the monarch can participate in that headship as a diminished 
similitude who differs in order, measure, and kind from Christ, just as Christ’s human nature 
enjoys union with the divine nature while remaining distinctly human.149 Here, Hooker 
(building on Whitgift’s account in the Admonition Controversy) immaculately maintains the 
sense of Luther’s two regiments or Calvin’s two fora. More broadly, the relationship of the 
civil magistrate to the source of divine authority also recalls, of course, the basic relationship 
which obtains between a participant and that which it participates in: an effect participates in 
its cause and exhibits a diminished and dependent similitude to that cause. Hooker 
distinguishes headship in terms of order, measure, and kind, but sees the civil magistrate as a 
participant in Christ’s headship. In terms of order Christ suffers no subordination, ‘whereas 
the power which others have is subordinated unto his.’ In terms of measure, there is not ‘any 
kinde of lawe which tyeth him [i.e. Christ] but his own proper will and wisedome; his power 
is absolute’, whereas monarchs are restrained by external laws and geographical limits in 
ecclesiastical headship, even though ‘the largnes of power wherin neither man nor Angell can 
be matched or compared with him’.150 Finally, in terms of kind, Christ exercises the 
immediate, internal, and spiritual headship over the Church (visible and mystical) whereas 
the monarch forms the mediate, visible, and external power to order the visible Church. 
Using a Platonic image, Christ remains the unitive ‘fountaine of sense, of motion, the throne 
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where the guide of the soule doth raign, the court from whence direction of all thinges 
humane proceedeth’.151 
In measure, order, and kind, therefore, royal headship participates in and mediates 
Christ’s headship like an effect from its cause, but remains fundamentally distinct, just as 
created laws share in the eternal law, or just as Christ’s human nature is united to but distinct 
from his divine nature. Christ is the participatory origin and animator of human life; the king, 
whatever his temporal headship, remains penultimate to the unfolding and eternal rule of 
Christ, as does the visible Church.152 Thus, there are two kinds of dominion: that of Christ as 
the primary analogate or the ‘fountaine of life’ and ‘welspringe of spiritual blessings’; and 
that of monarchs who, as analogues of Christ, are ‘his principall instrumentes for the 
Churches outward government’.153 In what Kirby labels as an ‘irenical gesture’, Hooker 
distinguishes between two modes of ‘spirituall regiment’: the inward, invisible, and direct 
authority of Christ ‘in his own person’; and the outward, visible, and mediated power of those 
given charge of the temporal Church through Christ’s ‘influence’.154 The first distinction 
appeals to the puritan notion of Christ’s singular authority, while the latter sees the outer 
forum or regiment as distinct from, but contained within and permitted by, the spiritual 
regiment of Christ.  
Hooker’s grammar of participation, especially the Chalcedonian logic of Christ’s two 
natures, allows him to rebut and rebound puritan attacks on the royal supremacy, casting their 
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argument as a heterodox development that divides Christ’s sovereignty. Hooker describes the 
doctrinal assumptions underneath Cartwright’s attacks as follows: 
Of the Church he [i.e. Christ] is Head and governour only as the sonne of man, Head 
and governour over Kingdomes only as the sonne of God.  In the Church as man he 
hath officers under him, which Officers are Ecclesiastical persons. As for the Civill 
Magistrate his office belongeth unto Kingdomes and Commonwealthes, neither is he 
therein an under or subordinate Head of Christ considering that his authoritie 
commeth from God simplie and immediately even as our Saviour Christs doth.155 
For Hooker, Cartwright and the puritans mistakenly separate out the ecclesial and political 
spheres, the former receiving authority from Christ as human, and the latter immediately 
from the divine nature. Since this is the doctrinal basis for the argument against lay 
ecclesiastical supremacy, Hooker immediately attacks these divisions. He argues that 
Cartwright here introduces a form of subordinationism into the Trinity and a form of 
Nestorianism into his Christology, producing an unwarranted division of divine activity and 
of Christ’s two natures: 
In what Evangelist, Apostle, or Prophett is it found, that Christ Supreme Governour of 
the Church should be so unequall to himself as he is supreme Governour of 
Kingdomes?....Surely if Christ as God and man have ordayned certaine meanes for 
the gathering and keeping of his Church….it must in reason follow I think that as God 
and man he worketh in Church regiment….[T]here is no remedie but to acknowledg it 
a manifest errour that Christ in the government of the world is equall unto the Father 
but not in the government of the Church.156 
According to Hooker, Cartwright distorts Trinitarian dogma by making Christ subordinate to 
the Father in relation to the Church, and he also rigidly separates Christ’s two natures. 
Upholding Calvin’s distinctions between the kingly, priestly, and prophetic roles on Christ, 
Hooker locates Cartwright’s principal error as a confusion of the first two of these offices.157 
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As such, ‘dominion’ of any kind belongs to Christ’s kingly office, and Christ exercises 
dominion in the unity of his person rather than simply through one or the other of his natures. 
For Hooker, in both the visible Church and the Commonwealth, authority is ‘from God’ but 
‘mediately through Christ’ and with ‘subordination to Christ’ such that ‘Christ hath supreme 
dominion over the whole universal world’. Christ’s universal headship indissolubly 
encompasses both his divine and human natures. The differences in order, measure, and kind 
between the monarch’s and Christ’s headship do not lessen the real relationship between 
visible secular power and its invisible divine approbation. In fact, the unity of Christ’s natures 
logically implies the universality of his power; as that invisible power is visibly mediated, the 
nature of ecclesiastical dominion (and who wields it) becomes the next issue for Hooker to 
explore.  
Indeed, maintaining Luther’s distinction between spiritual and temporal regiments, as 
well as Calvin’s separation between inner and outer fora, Hooker explores how Christ’s 
government remains invisible and so requires external, mediatory government because his 
human nature is not ubiquitous. Recalling the rejection of Lutheran accounts about the 
ubiquity of Christ’s physical presence in Book Five, Hooker reminds his readers that 
although Christ is ‘spiritually alwayes united unto every part of his body which is the 
Church’, his ‘corporall presence is removed as farr as heaven from earth is distant’.158 In 
Book Five, however, Hooker also argues that, even though it is not ubiquitous, since Christ’s 
body ‘is presently joyned unto deitie’ it also has ‘presence of force and efficacie throughout 
all generations of men’ and is ‘infinite in possibilitie of application’.159 The sacraments 
therefore form a mediated-immediacy, a mediatory but necessary and external co-operation 
with divine grace. Similarly, in Book Eight the structures and forms of political life, though 
contingent, participate in a nuanced manner in Christ. Hooker here appeals to something like 
the so-called extra calvinisticum, the distinction between the Word incarnate and the eternal 
Word. Just as ‘Christ touching visible and corporall presence is removed as far as heaven 
from earth is distant’, such distance requires a ‘visible and corporall’ subordinate who 
mediates in some diminished form Christ’s spiritual authority.160 So, ‘visible goverment is a 
thing necessarie for the Church’ and ‘Heads indued with supreme power unto a certain 
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compasse are for the exercise of visible regiment not unncessarie’.161 Yet, since such power is 
external, it is also limited, provisional, dependent on, and distinct from Christ’s immediate, 
internal rule: ‘We doe not therefore vainly imagine but truly and rightly discerne a power 
externall and visible in the Church exercised by men and severed in nature from that 
spirituall power of Christes own regiment.’162 The monarch as visible spiritual head becomes 
Christ’s ‘principal instrument’, participating like any secondary cause or instrument in divine 
providence. Crucially, unlike the radical puritans, Hooker includes the administration of ‘the 
word, sacraments, and discipline’ as constituents of the external polity of the Church, giving 
the monarch responsibility for such matters under human law, such as was established in the 
Henrician and Elizabethan Acts of Supremacy. The magistrate’s cura religionis derives from 
and shares in Christ’s spiritual regiment without being identical to it or requiring explicit 
scriptural mandate. As such, the ecclesiastical dominion of the monarch is one thread in a 
vast participatory tapestry that reveals the manifold ways creation shares in God. As Kirby 
puts it, ‘the two regiments are invisibly unified in Christ, their source; they are visibly unified 
through the royal supremacy’.163 
Hooker’s doctrinal defence of lay ecclesiastical supremacy shows, then, two crucial 
features. First, his political vision displays a close logical connection between the 
metaphysical ‘mini-treatise’ of Book Five and the political concerns of Book Eight, 
suggesting the systematic role of gesture and order across the Lawes. Second, the role of 
participation in particular remains central in establishing such homology: the participatory 
grammar of Chalcedonian christology gives Hooker clear doctrinal grounds to justify lay 
ecclesiastical supremacy and chart out what he sees as the proper reformed orthodox 
relationship between the two reigns of Luther’s thought or two fora of Calvin’s theology. The 
unity of Christ’s person under the formula of Chalcedon allows Hooker to distinguish in 
order to unite. The universal dominion exercised by the unity of Christ’s distinct natures 
analogously suspends the monarch’s dominion over the visible Church from its transcendent 
origin. The monarch subordinately and provisionally mediates the immediate spiritual 
dominion of Christ. Although Hooker sets out to undermine Cartwright’s theological 
credibility as a reformed thinker, he also offers a sound doctrinal basis for, as well as an 
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irenic call to support, lay ecclesiastical supremacy through the established commitments of 
patristic, conciliar, and reformed orthodoxy acknowledged by all Elizabethan reformed 
groups. Once again, Christ is the key to Hooker’s thought in this regard. 
4.3.2 ‘Godes Livetenantes’ and ’Principall instrumentes’: the monarch as godly hierarch 
Hooker goes even further in Book Eight of the Lawes and argues that lay 
ecclesiastical supremacy is not merely doctrinally sound but also exhibits a providential 
fittingness to which obedience is due for the common good. Indeed, monarchs under law 
work as godly hierarchs, acting as ‘Godes Livetenantes’ and God’s ‘principall instrumentes’ 
in the visible political realm. This high evaluation in Book Eight of the monarch’s dominion 
and status occasions, however, the modern critical allegations of inconsistency and 
incoherency in Hooker’s thought outlined in the introduction to this chapter. In Book Eight of 
the Lawes, the argument goes, Hooker strains to square the historical political contingencies 
of the Tudor world with his legal ontology. In this line of criticism, a kind of ‘Tudor 
Averroism’ in Book Eight replaces Hooker’s earlier Thomistic commitment to the rule of law 
with a kind of Marsilian political voluntarism where the will of the crown becomes law and 
the monarch properly controls the governance of the national church by ‘divine right’ in lay 
ecclesiastical supremacy. Yet, this section will show how the presence of two grammatical 
aspects of the architecture of participation in Book Eight deflates such accusations, revealing 
a kind of homology between Hooker’s political vision and the epistemological and 
ecclesiological commitments of Books Three and Seven in particular. As such, the Lawes 
remains a coherent whole. Just as he appeals to the grammar of participation in order to 
undercut the radical puritans’ doctrinal opposition to the royal supremacy, Hooker also 
rejects their biblicism through reformed scholastic notions of causality and the logic of desire 
drawn from the same grammar. He casts lay ecclesiastical supremacy not as an unchangeable 
prescript of divine law, but rather as the result of natural law mediated through the 
changeable contingencies of human law and history. Hooker employs reformed scholastic 
notions of causality in order to describe how visible human political agents can be said to be 
creative participants in the invisible power of God: the human political agent is a homo faber, 
a fabricating animal whose public laws and figures are ‘instruments to work by’, caught up in 
the work of God but also dependent upon it as their ultimate cause and fulfilment. The 
Neoplatonic return to God (reditus) is no mere passive act. Far from emptying agency from 
the created ‘middle’ between creative exit and redemptive reversion, Hooker implicitly 
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follows the Proclean Neoplatonic structure of monē-prodoos-epistrophē that honours the 
suspended middle between exit and return (see 1.2.2). If monē and monos describes the 
unitary source of emanation, and epistrophē describes the reversion of the many to the One, 
then the proodos identifies the rise of every being into its own determinate being. As such, 
the proodos describes the dynamic sharing of the many in the productive capacity of the 
monos. Just as was the case with Hooker’s defence of episcopal orders, lay ecclesiastical 
supremacy can be seen to be contingent and yet also caught up in the providential texture of 
history, lending a sense of fittingness but not necessity. Indeed, the logic of desire in the 
architecture of participation sets the monarch as a divine agent or hierarch guiding, alongside 
bishops, the political fulfilment of temporal and spiritual goods in the Commonwealth. This 
section will develop how Hooker deploys these two grammatical aspects of the architecture 
of participation, deflating the biblicism of his opponents and avoiding modern charges of 
incoherency. 
As André Gazal persuasively argues, before the legal ontology of Hooker’s Lawes cut 
through the stranglehold of biblicism, both conformist apologists and radical puritans were 
typically committed to the priority of Scripture in political discourse, emphasising the 
warrant of scriptural arguments either for or against lay ecclesiastical supremacy.164 Hooker’s 
architecture of participation, and his participatory epistemology in particular, generates a 
profound shift in Book Eight of the Lawes away from this common Elizabethan emphasis on 
biblical authority. The kind of philological and historical analysis developed in his 
participatory epistemology allows Hooker to dismiss any putative isomorphism of past and 
present employed by his puritan opponents, namely their normative use of typological 
arguments about proper church and political order drawn from scriptural texts. Hooker 
certainly begins Book Eight with appeals to scriptural narrative, but in Thomistic fashion 
argues from the convenience or fittingness (ex convenientia) of lay ecclesiastical supremacy 
shown therein rather than from any binding quality of divine law. Accordingly, Hooker lists 
Simon, David, Jehosaphat, Hezekiah, and Josiah as ‘the patterne of which example the like 
power in causes Ecclesiastical is by the Laws of this Realme annexed unto the Crowne’.165 
The sole dominion of kings exhibited a public ‘conveniencie’ for the common good since ‘the 
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multitude of supreme commanders is troublesome’ and ‘No man (sayth our Saviour) can 
serve two masters’.166 The joining of civic and ecclesiastical powers in the royal supremacy 
followed the ‘example or patterne’ of Moses who ‘deriving so great a part of his burden in 
government unto others did notwithstanding retained to himself universall supremacie’.167 
These scriptural examples or patterns have no regulative force in themselves, however, but 
simply lend weight to the legality of the English Reformation. 
Having relegated the biblicism of his radical puritan opponents in political discourse, 
Hooker’s architecture of participation allows him to cast the positive human laws that 
established the royal supremacy both as contingently mutable and yet also as sharing in 
divine wisdom, ‘which shineth in the bewtifull varietie of all thinges, but most in the 
manifold and yet harmonious dissimilitude of those ways, whereby his Church upon earth is 
guided from age to age.’168 Hooker again puts to play scholastic notions whereby secondary 
acts depend upon the primary causality of God insofar as they participate in God. Just as with 
his defence of episcopal orders, Hooker therefore has an exalted but historically grounded 
conception of monarchy. Hooker argues that neither monarchy nor lay ecclesiastical 
supremacy are necessary or commanded by Scripture, but are rather historically 
contingent.169 Monarchy and the royal supremacy emerge out of particular human 
arrangements, and human positive law remains competent to make a political order suitable 
for its variable contexts, a position entirely compatible with his account of human freedom to 
make laws of polity in Books One and Three.170 As with episcopal orders, however, God 
ratifies the fitting benefits of monarchy and so, through a providential communicatio 
idiomatum, can be loosely said to author it: 
That the Christian world should be ordered by kingly regiment, the law of God doth 
not any where command; and yet the law of God doth give them right, which once are 
exalted to that estate, to exact at the hands of their subjects general obedience in 
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whatsoever affairs their power may serve to command. So God doth ratify the works 
of that sovereign authority which kings have received by men.171 
All authority comes from God (directly or otherwise) and so civic magistrates share in God’s 
power and authority.172 Thus, English Christians have historically ‘condescended unto 
[monarchy] for their own most behoof and securitie’, but God ratifies that consent as 
providential. The same dynamic holds true for lay ecclesiastical supremacy: Scripture does 
not dictate that all monarchs should or should not have it, but when monarchs are lawfully 
granted such dominion, ‘we by the law of God stand bound meekly to acknowledg them for 
Godes Livetnenates.’ For Hooker, even if (following Aristotle) human beings are naturally 
social, government is nevertheless a product of artifice, a matter of human positive law 
which, as it variably shares in eternal law, also can be said to participate in God despite its 
contingency. Hooker hereby sacralises the practical law-making capacity of human societies. 
Human beings make positive human laws through using their rational faculties which 
participate in God, rendering them as not only made in the imago dei but as homo faber, co-
creative participants in God’s Wisdom, the divine Logos who is ‘that law which hath been the 
pattern to make, and is the card to guide the world by’. As such, the royal supremacy, as it 
exhibits the scholastic notion of fittingness or ‘conveniency’, also displays the Thomistic 
aesthetic notion of how contingency relates to transcendence, or of how history unveils 
providence. The legal character of the royal supremacy demonstrates an aesthetic fittingness 
in accordance with the rational character of eternal law. Accordingly, it shares in the binding 
character of divine wisdom, refusing the Catholic and Puritan objections to its legitimacy. 
By suspending the royal supremacy from God’s influence with such participatory 
cords, Hooker develops a nascent constitutionalism, meaning that Book Eight acts as ‘a 
crucial bridge between medieval and modern political theory’, as Alexander Rosenthal 
suggests.173 Pace Munz and Kearney, Hooker’s participatory account of law, consent, and the 
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compact of sovereignty put him in marked contrast to contemporary proponents of royal 
absolutism like Hadrian Saravia or Jean Bodin. Instead, Hooker here stands in continuity with 
the medieval and reformed English tradition of legal constitutionalism, including figures such 
as Henry Bracton, Sir John Fortescue, Christopher St Germain, and Sir Thomas Smith. More 
surprisingly, he also finds sympathetic allies in the early modern Spanish scholastic school of 
Salamanca (including Francisco Suàrez, Luis de Molina, Thomas de Vitoria, and Domingo de 
Soto) that advanced constitutional Thomistic models of government against the emergent 
absolutists.174 For Hooker, the rule of the monarch derives its legitimacy from historic 
consent, depends upon a social compact with the entire body politic, and is limited by the 
species of laws that participate in eternal law, as developed in Book One.175 As such, the 
monarch is limited from above by God and eternal law, as well as from below by the body 
politic since sovereignty belongs to the community as a whole. Such dependency both 
subordinates and subjects the monarch to God (through eternal law) and the visible body 
politic (through the species of laws participating in eternal law).176 After celebrating in 
chapter six of Book Eight the legislative competence of parliament and convocation which 
historically and personally represent the entire body politic, Hooker writes in chapter eight in 
relation to the crown’s dominion that: 
What power the King hath he hath it by law, the boundes and limites of it are knowne. 
The entire communitie giveth generall order by law how all thinges publiquely are to 
be done and the King as head thereof the highest in authoritie over all causeth 
according to the same lawe every particuler to be framed and ordered thereby. The 
whole body politique maketh laws which laws give power unto the King and the King 
having bound himself to use according unto lawe that power, it so falleth out that the 
execution of the one is accomplished by the other in most religious and peaceable 
sort.177 
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Hooker therefore defends a legally-grounded and legally-limited Royal Supremacy, as A.S. 
McGrade notes.178 The monarch as hierarch is subsumed by the hierarchical superiority of the 
whole body politic and its variegated species of laws suspended from God through 
participation in eternal law. Hooker strings together a series of allusive statements drawn (or 
re-written) from classical, patristic, and medieval sources to support this legal vision: from 
the Hellenistic Stobæus, ‘Happier that people, whose lawe is their King in the greatest thinges 
then that whose King is himself their law’;179 from St. Ambrose, ‘Kings have dominion to 
exercise in Ecclesiastical causes but according to the lawes of the Church’;180 and from the 
medieval jurist Henry Bracton, ‘The King is major singulis universis minor,’ ‘attribuat Rex 
Legi quod Lex attribuit ei potestam et Dominum,’ ‘Rex no debet esse sub homine, sed sub 
Deo et Lege,’ and ‘Lex facit Regem’.181 The power of the king is best limited such that the 
law guides and restrains the king (lex facit regem), rather than the king being the law.  
Echoing the notion from Book One that law is a rule (regula) and measure (measura) for 
right action, so is the ‘power of the King over all and in all limited that unto all his 
proceedings the lawe itself is a rule’. 182 Therefore, ‘limited power is best…[as] tyed unto the 
soundest and perfectest and most indifferent rule; which rule is the law.’183 Since law has its 
metaphysical roots in the divine nature, Hooker remains clear that the visible political realm 
remains subject to God’s dominion and order. 
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Hooker’s architecture of participation entails, therefore, a constitutionally limited 
form of monarchy in which the monarch ought to serve the common good (‘commonweal’) 
as a godly hierarch under the system of laws that share in and are bounded by eternal law. 
Accordingly, the royal supremacy, whatever its providential contours, remains mediated 
through Parliament and Convocation – ‘the very essence of all government within this 
kingdome’ – and no ecclesiastical law can be made ‘without consent of the highest power and 
under the guidance of Scripture and the General Councils’.184 The spiritual dominion of the 
monarch is ‘universall dominion, but with dependence upon that whole entier body over the 
severall partes whereof he hath dominion’.185 Indeed, the co-inherence of Commonwealth 
and Church in the personal dominion of the monarch itself becomes parsed through the type 
of harmony envisaged by the legal metaphysics of participation of Book One: 
Where the King doth guide the state, and the lawe the King, that commonwealth is 
like an harpe or melodious instrument, the stringes whereof are tuned and handled all 
by one, following as lawes the rules and canons of Musicall science.186 
In short, the monarch, though visible head of the Commonwealth and Church, remains (or 
should remain) at the service of the whole community for its common good. Indeed, in 
Aristotelian fashion, ‘the end whereunto all government was instituted was bonum publicum, 
the universal or common good’ and ‘the good which is proper unto each man belongeth to the 
common good of all as a part of the wholes perfection’.187 The ‘competent authoritie’ of 
Parliament grounds the royal supremacy in legal consent, lending it the legitimacy but also 
the limits of a political form participating in eternal law. While lay ecclesiastical supremacy 
appeared within the contingencies of history, the implication remained clear: God loosely 
could be said to author and ratify it, just as much as episcopacy and monarchy, because it 
providentially shared in the ratio of eternal law.  
Finally, in the remaining fifth through ninth chapters of Book Eight, Hooker explores 
the powers and prerogatives of the royal ecclesiastical supremacy within such nascent 
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constitutionalism. The logic of desire found in the architecture of participation provides the 
grammar through which he parses such powers and prerogatives. Debora Shuger goes too far, 
therefore, when she insists that ‘Hooker virtually never thinks of royal power as participation 
in the divine but as an authority able to constrain people to perform their duties’.188 The 
opposite is true. Pace Shuger, Hooker does not separate out the mystical, inward, invisible, 
participatory, and private life of faith from the ‘visible arenas of history and institutions’ 
which are ‘analyzed in terms of coercion, politics, contingency, and secondary causality’ and 
‘no longer serve as carriers of ultimate value or signification’. Rather, the visible political 
regiment remains freighted with, and suspended from, divinity; that is to say, Hooker 
intimately nestles lay ecclesiastical supremacy within the architecture of participation. 
Whatever the limits ideally placed by law upon the monarch-in-parliament as the practical 
authority in the Church, Hooker emphasizes that the monarch nevertheless acts as 
participatory hierarch who, along with bishops, shapes and guides or manuducts social 
desires towards divine ends. As such, the monarch combines hierarchical and representative 
aspects. 
On one hand, while Hooker rejects the notion that the monarch can ‘participate that 
sanctified power which God hath endued his clergy with’, he merely maintains the distinction 
drawn by John Jewel, his former patron and conformist hero. Jewel remained clear that the 
monarch did not have the power of orders (potestas ordinis), only the power of authority 
(potestas jurisdictionis) to see that religious duties ‘be done, and orderly and truly done, by 
the bishops’.189 Hooker concurs. Monarchs delegate civil coercive powers to bishops, but 
bishops remain jurisdictionally subordinate to monarchs. The proper relationship between 
sacerdotal and temporal power, then, is that monarchs should take counsel from clergy, 
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especially on matters of piety and religion, and use their coercive power accordingly.190 Yet, 
the monarch, rather than the clergy, has supreme visible dominion over how the Church 
exercises ‘the word, sacraments, and discipline’. As such, Hooker’s polity is not crudely 
Erastian: royal dominion derives from the historic body politic below but also from God 
above; it includes and visibly represents voices from the Convocation of clergy as well as 
from divine law. 
On the other hand, the provision of godly religion exists as the most important 
spiritual and political responsibility of the monarch for the common good since ‘godliness’ 
represents the ‘welspring of all true virtues’. Hooker may refuse to the monarch any 
sacerdotal characteristics, but he certainly therefore sacralises the monarch as a mediatory, 
visible analogue of God’s invisible dominion in Christ. Hooker calls the monarch an 
‘uncommanded Commander’ and ‘general mover’ in the body politic, evoking the 
Aristotelian and scholastic idea of God as First Mover. In a footnote appended to his 
discussion of monarchs as ‘Godes Livetenantes’ in the context of an exegesis of Romans 13, 
Hooker quotes from Hellenistic passages where kingship is likened to divine kingship, as 
well as Henry Bracton’s notion that the crown is a power delegated by God.191 Later in Book 
Eight, Hooker goes even further and sets the monarch above visible and invisible natural 
orders: within the geopgraphical and legal limits of dominion, the sovereign enjoys ‘the 
largnes of power wherin neither man nor Angell can be matched or compared with him’.192 
While Hooker certainly transmits a form of constitutionalism from the medieval to the 
modern period, he also appropriates within this commitment aspects of Hellenistic (especially 
Pythagorean) and Dionysian thought that stress a hierarchy of mediated power as well as the 
mystical likeness of human to divine kingship. Pace Frederick Beiser and Frank Furedi, then, 
who respectively charge that Hooker ‘lapses into the kind of authoritarianism that he hoped to 
avoid’ and cultivates the ‘secularisation and politicisation of power’ in the Elizabethan 
period, for Hooker the desirable natural public goods retain a transcendent orientation.193 As 
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such, the monarch does not merely concern him or herself with the temporal and material 
wellbeing of his or her subjects. Just as human nature has a hierarchy of natural, material, and 
moral goods, all of which remain subordinate to the final spiritual participation of God, so too 
are the temporal perfections of the body politic penultimate and subordinate to the highest 
goods of religion. The monarch, as visible head of the body politic and guide of its political 
desires, therefore fosters two levels of participation. On a horizontal plane, the monarch as a 
mediatory hierarch nurtures a social ethos of mutuality and interdependency, otherwise 
known as the common good, through exercising dominion in the ecclesiastical polity. On a 
vertical plane, the monarch also has a duty to draw out and craft the inward cosmic draw to 
spiritual union with God through Christ in the visible cura religionis. These two aspects of 
Hooker’s thought suggest, of course, that God ultimately suspends the horizontal political 
participation of the body politic and its pursuit of the common good from the vertical and 
final participation of the divine nature, rendering any notion of an autonomous secular 
politics impossible.  
4.4 ‘Under God and under the law’: the twin Platonisms of the ecclesiastical polity 
This chapter has explored how, above all else, the controversies in the Elizabethan 
polity implied the relation between God and the world, addressing what transcendent source 
constituted the power of social institutions. As Debora Shuger sagely notes, ‘such 
controversies inevitably centered on the question of participation – the mystical relation 
between the apparently separate.’194 Far from desacralizing, however, episcopal orders and 
lay ecclesiastical supremacy, as Shuger suggests, Hooker freights them both with divinity, 
albeit by carefully limiting them as diminished and dependent analogues ‘under God and 
under the law’. Indeed, the architecture of participation theonomously suspends creation from 
God as source and goal, including the visible political structures of the royal supremacy. As 
Kirby concludes, here ‘Hooker anchors his elaborate exposition and defense…in a 
metaphysical theory of law which itself assumes a Neoplatonic ontology of “participation” in 
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the Proclean tradition’.195 In the Proclean tradition of participation, the highest cause remains 
the fundamental but non-competitive cause at work in every other secondary cause. Hooker 
regularly talks of ‘God’s influence’, recalling the Neoplatonic notion of influentia, as that 
which underwrites and suspends all of creation. For Hooker, the unity of natures in Christ’s 
divine personhood means that he personally influences everything, moving all of creation 
from within. Across the Lawes, Christ forms the key who unlocks the distinct but related 
textures of nature and grace. As this chapter has shown, such divine influence undergirds 
episcopal orders and lay ecclesiastical supremacy, giving a christological character to both as 
godly hierarchs, but also maintaining their visible authority as provisional and subordinate to 
Christ’s absolute dominion. Through the grammar of the architecture of participation 
developed in earlier books of the Lawes, Hooker remains able in the ‘books of power’ to 
meticulously observe the Protestant-Reformed distinction between the two regiments or fora, 
grounding their distinction and unity in the unitary person and work of Christ. 
As he distinguishes and relates lay and clerical power, Hooker turns full circle in the 
‘books of power’ to the first grammatical aspect of his architecture of participation developed 
in Books One and Five, namely the two Platonisms of Augustinian immediacy and Dionysian 
mediation. Hooker accordingly sets out, then, a deeply hierarchical view of political society, 
but one which participates in the immediacy of the eternal ratio by steps and degrees. He 
roots visible political order and the need for conformity in the Dionysian lex divinitatis [law 
of divinity]: 
Without order there is no living in publique societie, because the want thereof is the 
mother of confusion, whereupon division of necessitie followeth, and out of division 
inevitable destruction…For order is a graduall disposition. The whole world 
consisting of so partes so manie so different is by this one thing upheld, he which 
framed them hath sett them in order. Yea the very deitie it self both keepeth and 
requireth for ever this to be kept as a law, that wheresoever there is a coagmentation 
of many, the lowest be knit to the highest by that which being interjacent may cause 
each to cleave unto other and so all continue one.196 
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Whereas in the traditional Dionysian lex divinitatis, temporal power ought to yield to the 
spiritual authority of the Church, Hooker radically inverts the relationship, refusing to sink 
the invisible forum of divine power into the visible regiment of spiritual association as he 
thinks his radical puritan and Catholic opponents do in their respective ecclesiologies.197 As 
such, Hooker gives one example of the Renaissance reaction against the Pope’s claim to the 
plenitudo potestatis [plenitude of power] through the lex divinitatis, as well as the conformist 
critique of the radical puritans.198 The result inverts the Catholic claim, investing the monarch 
with supreme dominion within the geographical boundaries of the Commonwealth. It also 
divests final authority from the visible Church, contra the radical puritans, framing the visible 
Church as subject to the external political order which is itself subordinate to, and dependent 
upon, God’s ultimate power. 
Yet, herein lies the root of the problem for interpreters of Hooker such as Peter Munz. 
The Thomistic dispositive understanding of the lex divinitatis secures the priority of the 
Church over civil power, just as nature remains subordinate to grace. For Munz, Hooker’s 
inversion of the lex divinitatis in Book Eight therefore contradicts the Thomistic legal 
ontology of Book One. In its place, Munz argues, Hooker embraces the thought of Marsilius 
of Padua in the Defensor Pacis, subordinating the Church to the secular powers in both 
religious and civic matters. Munz incorrectly assumes, however, that Hooker only reproduces 
a Thomistic dispositive account of law in Book One. Kirby conversely argues that Book 
Eight actually ‘is nothing less than the practical completion of [Hooker’s] argument, the 
necessary fulfilment of his nomos-theology’ found at the beginning of the Lawes.199 As Kirby 
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illustrates, while all laws detailed in Book One dispositively participate in the second eternal 
law, they nevertheless remain hypostatically distinct from the first eternal law. While 
participation in the second eternal law is hierarchical and dispositive insofar as creatures 
share in God as diminished analogues, the first eternal law describes eternal law from God’s 
perspective, securing the radical otherness of God. Hooker’s twin Platonisms hereby both 
distinguish but also relate the spiritual and temporal realms, just as they secure the distinction 
and relationship between grace and nature. Thus, in the ‘books of power’ Christ rules 
immediately in the invisible mystical sphere, but mediates his authority through penultimate 
visible hierarchies. Even though Christ is the unitive source of both spheres, being ‘severed in 
nature’ these two kinds of power are incommensurable and not dispositive, just as the second 
eternal law is hypostatically distinct from the first. In a similar fashion, as we have seen, 
unlike both Roman Catholics and radical puritans, Hooker distinguishes the visible Church 
from the mystical, rendering the former as part of the ‘politic society’, itself hypostatically 
distinct from (if still subordinate to) Christ’s immediate authority. As such, the temporal 
power subordinates the visible Church within the hierarchical dispositio. The visible Church 
remains under the monarch’s cura religionis when and where the identity of the visible 
Church and Commonwealth coincide. While English bishops have, therefore, certain spiritual 
powers (such as ordination) which do not belong to the monarch, only the latter properly has 
‘authoritie and power to command even in matters of Christian Religion’ in the temporal, 
visible, external sphere. In the mystical, invisible, and inward sphere, however, Christ’s 
immediate, universal, and final authority suffers no possible abrogation. 
While Kirby and Charles Miller claim, like Munz, that Hooker’s argument from these 
twin Platonisms closely resembles the political theology of Marsilius of Padua, this seems 
unlikely, both on textual and theological lines.200 Textually, Hooker’s sole reference to 
Marsilius’ Defensor Pacis is in Book Eight, where Hooker strenuously opposes his attack on 
the authority of bishops. Cargill Thompson casts doubt on the provenance even of that sole 
quotation.201 Even though both Marsilius and Hooker attack papal jurisdiction, subordinate 
the visible Church to secular authority, and discuss consent, the singular lack of other 
references to Marsilius in the Lawes make him, at best, a highly speculative influence. 
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Instead, the architecture of participation, as well as its grammar, seems a more parsimonoius 
theological and philosophical frame of reference.202 Indeed, participation lies behind every 
major claim Hooker makes in relation to metaphysics, epistemology, and politics, drenching 
human activity with deity and refusing any ‘de-Christianization’ of the secular political order. 
As this chapter has shown, therefore, the architecture of participation structures 
Hooker’s commitments to patristic and Reformed doctrinal orthodoxy as he defends 
episcopal orders and lay ecclesiastical supremacy. It singularly explains the gestures made 
back and forth across the Lawes, suggesting the systematicity, coherency, and success of 
Hooker’s desire to move from ‘general meditations’ in Book One to the disputed ‘particulars’ 
of the Tudor ecclesiastical polity in the ‘books of power’. Just as for Hooker Christ is the key 
who unlocks the participatory relation between nature and grace, the architecture of 
participation forms the key which unlocks the integrity of Hooker’s thought. 
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5. ‘My whole endevor is to resolve the conscience’: revisiting the architecture of 
participation 
 Having now demonstrated the homology that Hooker’s architecture of participation 
generates across metaphysics, epistemology, and politics, this final chapter returns to the 
provocations mooted in the opening chapter, giving some concluding thoughts. Just as in the 
Lawes Hooker’s ‘whole endevor is to resolve the conscience’ of his opponents, this work has 
addressed those modern scholarly voices who either fail to see the systematic aspect of 
Hooker’s architecture of participation in the Lawes, or argue that Hooker’s thought falls into 
one form of incoherency or another.1 This final chapter accordingly determines in what sense 
Hooker can be said to be systematic and coherent in the Lawes, allaying accusations to the 
contrary. 
 The opening chapter (1.3.2) discussed just how contested Hooker’s place as a 
coherent and systematic thinker remains in modern scholarly circles. It suggested two basic 
hermeneutical principles to adjudicate between seemingly intractable appraisals of Hooker’s 
thought (1.3.3). First, Hooker’s thought would be coherent to the degree that the 
metaphysical, epistemological, and political claims of the Lawes avoid blatant contradiction 
but not necessarily tension, while also implying each other. Second, Hooker’s thought would 
be systematic if it unveiled in each of its parts a series of gestures back and forth which 
measured, shaped, or informed other moments. 
 This work has explored how, as Hooker moves in the Lawes from ‘general 
meditations’ to the ‘particular decisions’ that govern the Elizabethan Religious Settlement, 
the architecture of participation indeed structures, informs, and unites his varied arguments 
into a coherent and systematic vision. Demonstrably, the architecture of participation yields a 
strong homology between his metaphysics, epistemology, and politics. Each chapter in this 
work has laid out the following gestures around the idea of participation across Hooker’s 
Lawes. 
The second chapter demonstrated how two mini-treatises in Books One and Five of 
the Lawes describe extensive and intensive modes of participation, with Christ the ‘woord or 
Wisdom’ of God relating and unlocking natural and supernatural orders. The extensive mode 
of participation found in Book One describes how manifold species of laws participate in 
                                                          
1 Hooker, Lawes, 1:34.20; Pref.7.1. 
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eternal law. In this extensive mode, Christ acts as the rational, divine pattern who freely, 
wisely, and lovingly makes creatures as extensive, diminished, hierarchical, and formal 
analogues of divine being. The intensive mode found especially in Book Five describes the 
saving return of human beings to God through participation in Christ. Christ’s incarnation 
restores the integrity of nature, allowing through grace believers ultimately to enjoy an 
intensive (re)union with God. Across both modes, Hooker balances the integrity of nature and 
the gratuity of grace. The former is rendered possible by theonomous participation in eternal 
law, refusing to evacuate creation of its own agency in unfolding the eternal law into the 
world. Instead, human beings are fellow-workers with God; human intellective capacities 
reflect a diminished but real image of God’s perfection and Christ as eternal creative Logos. 
Here, the human capacity for creativity flows from and reflects the divine act of creation. The 
latter is doubly secured by seeing creation and salvation as God’s free and gratuitous act 
through Christ, refusing any created space to be evacuated of divine influence. In this way, 
Hooker understands creation under the system of laws that participates in eternal law as 
logical, dynamic, and open to self-transcendence. In short, creation is suspended from God 
and imbued with God’s influence. 
The third chapter then showed how, in Hooker’s epistemology, reason and desire 
emerge from Hooker’s participatory metaphysics to become the constellating categories for a 
mixed cognitive ecology in Books Two through Five. This ecology circumscribes both 
natural and supernatural forms of cognitive participation in God, moments which Christ as 
‘woord or Wisdom’ again unites and unlocks. Divine influence undergirds and illumines the 
integrity of created intellective capacities, leading them to natural fulfilment and ultimately 
lifting them into supernatural beatitude through participation in Christ. Alongside Scripture, 
human nature inherently discloses the ‘sundry’ causal influences of divine Wisdom, and (as it 
is attuned to the world around it) leads human beings under the influence of grace to the 
extensive and intensive ‘participation of God himselfe.’ As such, reason and Scripture are 
correlative acts of divine disclosure. Human creativity in law-making and in cultural artifice 
flow out of the created status of human beings as made in the imago dei. Since Hooker sees 
human beings as homo faber, human creativity reflects the rational participation in God’s 
own creativity. For Hooker, Christ (as ‘woord or Wisdom’) acts as the sapiential, personal 
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principium who informs reason, Scripture, and desire alike as first and final cause.2 Worship 
(especially sacramental participation) acts as a training school that mediates supernatural 
illumination and re-forms both right reason and right desire as a participation in God as 
source and goal through sacramentally sharing in Christ. The established forms of worship 
acts as a repository of spiritual formation preparing the habits of the body and mind to be fit 
for heaven as their final beatitude. 
Next, the fourth chapter showed how these prior arguments generate a grammar of 
participation that structures how Hooker defends episcopal orders and lay ecclesiastical 
supremacy. The grammar of the architecture of participation allows Hooker to parse both the 
ecclesiastical polity and lay supremacy of the Church of England as contingent products of 
human history and yet also as binding participations in the divine ‘woord or Wisdom’ of God. 
The natural integrity of human societies to order themselves stems from the intellectual status 
of humankind as not only being made in the imago dei but also as being co-creative 
participants in God’s providential ordering of creation. Far from being passive recipients 
evacuated of political agency, simply caught between the creative exit from and salvific 
return to God, human beings are co-creative participants in God, cultivating the metaphysical 
becoming of the world as it is drawn towards union with God. As they use their rational 
capacities to create laws, human beings are homo faber, makers who read divine wisdom into 
the world through the ‘divine power of the soule’. As co-workers with God, human political 
agents participate in the ongoing, dynamic, ecstatic process of creation and redemption. Yet, 
such natural integrity is undergirded by divine influence, which is to say human politics 
remain suspended from, contingent upon, and penultimate to God’s sapiential ordering of 
history for the common good. Hooker here refuses simply to sink the invisible into the visible 
                                                          
2 See R.A. Muller, After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological 
Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 97-98, which distinguishes between 
the ‘soteriological christocentrism’ of Calvin that places Christ as the sole mediator of 
redemption, and the ‘principial christocentrism’ of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
which has a more synergistic account. Hooker’s sapiential, personal christocentrism suspends 
creation and believers from the personhood of Christ, the former as eternal Logos and the 
latter as the personal union of the divine nature with a specific human nature. As such, 
Hooker holds together the possibilities of both of Muller’s models, protecting the priority of 
Christ but also maintaining the agency of creation as it participates in its highest cause. 
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order as he thinks his opponents do, but also charts out their relationship as the former 
constitutes the authority of the latter. Once again, Christ forms the key to unlock the 
relationship between the visible political order of the Church and Commonwealth and the 
transcendent, invisible source of power. All powers, visible and invisible, are distinguished 
only in order to be united through Christ’s universal dominion, just as his two natures remain 
distinct but co-inhere in his person. 
Each of these chapters present a strong case for seeing Hooker as both coherent and 
systematic in the senses already suggested. Hooker’s metaphysical, epistemological, and 
political claims across the Lawes consistently appeal to elements drawn from the heuristic 
architecture of participation and its grammar. The various parts of Hooker’s argument in the 
Lawes show remarkable consistency and logical arrangement, drawing connections across 
disparate arguments, even as they explore the tensions between nature and grace, or the 
visible and the invisible. As such, they may fairly be said to exhibit a rich form of coherency. 
Hooker remains remarkably aware, of course, that his legal arguments in the Lawes are not 
indubitable but are rather provisional and open to change with the vagaries of history. The 
royal supremacy has its legal basis in human law, a particular positive application of the 
natural law of reason that can find examples and motives in divine law to support it. All such 
laws are suspended, however, from eternal law through the legal metaphysics of 
participation. The royal supremacy is thus binding within the contingencies of history: it is 
not unconditionally necessary, but it is conditionally compulsive for it shows the aesthetic 
convenience of the magisterial duty to order religion as the wellspring of public virtue, 
drawing the Commonwealth towards God. Hooker’s arguments across the Lawes, framed by 
an architecture of participation, accordingly seek to imitate the divine self-disclosure and 
draw people into divine participation, making him confident that his contemporaries ought to 
be ‘led by great reason’ to support the ecclesiastical laws of the Elizabethan Church, for they 
are fit to lead the people to godliness. 
Similarly, Hooker intends the argument of the Lawes to be systematic, endeavouring 
that ‘that every former part might give strength unto all that followe, and every later bring 
some light unto all before.’ Such an account is systematic insofar as each move acts like a 
jigsaw piece: though a complete picture of Christian doctrine may be absent, each individual 
piece gestures towards linkage and a unifying picture. Participation illumines the entirety of 
the Lawes: it is the principle behind and implied in every argument; all of Hooker’s claims 
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must be read in light of his commitment to participation. The architecture of participation 
forms a picture of associated ideas that, at various points, individually emerge to structure 
and justify both Hooker’s particular claims as well as his overall argument. No one piece 
fully explains or contains the entirety of this Christian vision, but each witnesses and 
contributes to the presence and force of it. Across the Lawes, the architecture of participation 
stands behind and informs every major claim, generating relations between ideas that 
mutually gesture back and forth towards each other. The architecture of participation both 
structures his particular arguments, but also describes the rhetorical tone and purpose of the 
Lawes. Just as divine influence manuducts creation towards its beatitude through natural and 
supernatural means, Hooker’s Lawes attempts to induce his opponents to not only obey the 
ecclesiastical polity of the Church of England, but also to freely embrace it as the mediating 
aspect of God’s call to heal and restore creation in Christ. As such, the Lawes certainly both 
contains and displays a system (the architecture of participation) and Hooker may be 
classified as a systematic theologian. In Hooker’s systematics, of course, the person of Jesus 
Christ represents the key who unlocks the separation but also the link between nature and 
grace in the architecture of participation. Across the Lawes, Hooker develops a Christ-
centered theological vision that he uses to explore the matters at hand in an integrated way, 
sufficiently confident about what it illumines (namely the architecture of participation) that 
he employs and advocates it. Indeed, Hooker’s very method in the Lawes is, as Andrea 
Russell puts it, ‘intensely participative’ since it imitates (as a text seeking to ‘resolve the 
conscience’) the manuduction by God of a broken world such that it enjoys the peace and 
order that is the ‘participation of God himselfe’.3 
This work hopefully opens up two future avenues for an ecumenical and political 
ressourcement of participation using Hooker’s thought.  
On the one hand, Hooker’s architecture of participation yields two ecumenical 
possibilities. First, Hooker’s Lawes provides one significant western trace of what Paul 
Collins calls the ‘metaphor of deification’.4 The strong, intensive return to God within the 
architecture of participation, imaged as union with God, leads Hooker unabashedly to use the 
language of deification. In the Lawes, he gives an analogical but also realistic account of 
                                                          
3 Russell, Richard Hooker, Beyond Certainty, pp. 101-102. 
4 Collins, Partaking in Divine Nature, pp. 111-12. 
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deification as a kind of christifcation, imaging the ontological and ethical transformation of 
the believer sharing in Christ. The words of Catherine Mowry LaCugna might very well 
summarise Hooker’s intensive mode of participation: 
Since theōsis means the true union of human and divine, the model for which is Jesus 
Christ, in a theanthroponomous ethic persons are defined neither autonomously nor 
heteronomously but with reference to the conincidence of divine and human, Jesus 
Christ. The ultimate good of human beings is to achieve theōsis, to realise the fullness 
of our humanity in union with the Trinity.5 
While Hooker’s account of theōsis is thematic rather than doctrinal, meaning that it would be 
a stretch to describe Anglicanism as it developed as a ‘western Orthodoxy’, Anglican-
Orthodox dialogue can and should nevertheless comfortably move to a rich and productive 
level of common agreement about deification as a shared theological emphasis for the 
Christian life. Second, in a different direction, while scholarship has until the seminal work of 
Torrance Kirby contested within what theological taxonomy to place Hooker, the emerging 
consensus that now identifies Hooker as a Reformed orthodox and scholastic thinker also 
opens up a range of possibilities for dialogue between the Anglican and Reformed churches.6 
Indeed, new studies are emerging on the relationship between Hooker and Reformed 
orthodoxy.7 Further critical scholarly and ecumenical engagement, especially in relation to 
the role of participation, should prove productive, both in seeing Reformed orthodoxy as a 
fertile and protean sensibility within which Hooker operates, and in breaking down an overly 
simplistic sense of dualism between ‘Reformed’ and ‘medieval’ or ‘Catholic’ thought. 
 On the other hand, further study of Hooker’s architecture of participation could 
critically feed into the broader ressourcement of participatory metaphysics in relation to 
political theology. Hooker represents a Janus-like figure who connects both medieval and 
modern political visions. As this thesis has shown, Hooker’s nuanced account of nature and 
grace within an architecture of participation underpins his entire political theology, or (as 
                                                          
5 Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1991), p. 284. 
6 See Littlejohn, ‘The Search for a Reformed Hooker’, pp. 62-82.  
7 See Scott Kindred-Barnes & W. Bradford Littlejohn, eds., Richard Hooker and 
Reformed Orthodoxy (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, forthcoming). 
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might be better said), his politicised metaphysics. Hooker remains sanguine about the 
incipient rational capacity and broken nature of humankind from within which grace works. 
As such, Hooker’s architecture of participation unfurls the central role for a political culture 
of persuasion, rather than one of dogmatic absolutes.8 The former culture is marked by a 
character of humility recognising the ‘root of human frailty and corruption’ in political 
society. Again, Christ is the key for Hooker. In Christ, the union of his divine nature with his 
human nature becomes a source of participable perfection to recreate human nature as we 
embody it, as individuals and as communities. Churches and nations are immediately under 
the kingship of Christ. Yet, they also share in the unfolding of the perfection to which we are 
drawn by nature – namely, in Hooker’s context, to a commonwealth secured by a public 
religion. Such political mediation remains, however, contingent upon, and secondary to, the 
immediacy of Christ’s rule as it is completed in the beatific vision, not in the here and now. 
That immediacy ought never to be sunk into the visible regiment, which is itself always 
marked in time by frailty, fallenness, and complexity. As Hooker thinks the radical puritans 
fail to recognise, there ‘not only are, but have been always more or less, yea and (for any 
thing we know to the contrary) will be till the world’s end complained of, what form of 
government soever take place’.9 
Hooker’s politicised metaphysics can neither simply be transplanted into a fully 
modern context, nor can he be seen as a political liberal in any direct sense. Yet, his 
architecture of participation certainly stands within the genealogy of modern 
constitutionalism, as Alexander Rosenthal argues, and, as John Rawls points out, ‘the 
historical origin of political liberalism’ begins with ‘the Reformation and its aftermath, with 
the long controversies over religious toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’.10 
Accordingly, any modern retrieval of participation will do well to pay careful attention to 
Hooker. In contrast to the sometimes agonistic dualism of the loose sensibility known as 
‘Radical Orthodoxy’, seeing (as it does) a dangerous and debilitating ‘unhooking’ of the 
world from God in the modern period, Hooker (as unlikely a candidate as he might seem) 
offers resources for modern thinkers in what Christopher Insole calls a ‘theological defence 
                                                          
8 See Littlejohn, The Freedom of a Christian Nation, pp. 224-225. 
9 Hooker, Lawes, 1:30-16.1; Pref.3.7-8. 
10 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 
xxvi. See Rosenthal, Crown under Law, pp. 245-266. 
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of liberalism’. As a representative of Radical Orthodoxy, John Milbank offers an alternative 
to political liberalism that might rightly alarm a reader sensitive to Hooker’s architecture of 
participation. ‘True society,’ Milbank writes, ‘implies absolute consensus, agreement in 
desire, and entire harmony amongst its members, and this is exactly (as Augustine reiterates 
again and again) what the Church provides, and that in which salvation, the restoration of 
being, consists.’11 Hooker would agree with this sentiment, as well as the centrality afforded 
to participation in its vision, but not with the sinking of the invisible into the visible, the 
conflation of the eternal gratuitous donation of the beatific vision with the temporal (and 
temporary) mediations of the world. Despite his own apparent authoritarianism, Hooker 
offers a perspicacious embodiment of trying to manduct (‘lead by the hand’) competing 
visions of the good towards a sense of peace and harmony that contains and even welcomes 
dissent as part of public enquiry. As Insole puts it, Hooker sees the ‘danger and hubris’ of 
conflating the invisible and visible Church, a sight which is at ‘the heart of the theological 
defence of political liberalism’.12 Therefore, as Insole points out, ‘Hooker’s call to self-
examination, moderation and charity provides a theological reason for the sort of self-
restraint and consideration to others’ central to certain traditions within political liberalism. It 
may well be that political liberalism, far from being simply individualist, relativist, and 
hubristic, has the theological resources within itself for a renaissance rather than needing a 
revolution. Hooker’s architecture of participation offers one such resource, and it ought to be 
explored so that, as he writes at the beginning of the Lawes, ‘posteritie may know we have 
not loosely through silence permitted things to passe away as in a dreame.’13  
 
                                                          
11 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 402. 
12 Insole, The Politics of Human Frailty, p. 59. 
13 Hooker, Lawes, 1:1.9-10; Pref.1.1. 
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